The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan
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COMMERCE AND EARLY MODERN CITIES 115
to Ise, whereas other, ordinary merchants had to pay tolls collected
along the way, a clear restraint on the free conduct of trade. Clearly,
though Nobunaga adopted new commercial and urban policies that
reflected the desires of the warrior class, he did not aim to promote
conditions of general free trade throughout all of Japan.
Oda Nobunaga also had a mixed record in dealing with the indepen-
dence of temple towns. Immediately after his arrival in Kyoto, he
began to challenge militarily the towns of Sakai and Hiranogo. In
time,
these communities submitted to him and lost their rights to
autonomous self-governance. Yet Nobunaga was never able to impose
his will completely over Kyoto and most of the temple towns in the
capital region. In Kyoto, for instance, Nobunaga achieved some ad-
ministrative powers by asserting the right to appoint representatives
(shoshidai),
but at the same time, he still had to acknowledge the
landownership rights of the vested order and their partial powers to
investigate and prosecute
criminals.
Beyond
this,
Nobunaga
also
recon-
firmed the vested interests of the proprietary classes in those temple
towns that were not antagonistic toward him, as in the examples of
Tondabayashi and Tonda."
Toyotomi Hideyoshi continued these policies concerning guilds for
one or two years. In the ninth month of 1585, for example, Hashiba
Hidekatsu (1568-85), who was holding down the Settsu region on be-
half of Hideyoshi, issued the following seven-article agreement that re-
confirmed the existing special rights of the area's self-governing towns:
1.
No guilds and no corv6e levies.
2.
No forcible property seizure or attachment for debt restitution.
3.
Administration by city elders.
4.
Exemption from military service levies.
5.
Cessation of unreasonable demands.
6. Exemption from debt moratorium decrees.
7.
No samurai residences in the city.
23
However, from the mid-15 80s Hideyoshi began to enforce ordi-
nances against guilds and self-governing urban communities, and he
also initiated his nationwide cadastral survey. Ultimately these mea-
sures would bring Japan's cities more fully under the influence of the
military lords and also would promote the formation of new types of
22 "Shimizu-ke monjo," in Takatsuki shishi hensan iinkai, ed., Takaisuki shiski (Takatsuki:
Takatsuki-shi, 1973), vol. 4, pp. 548, 584.
23 "Shimizu-ke monjo." Hashiba (Toyotomi) Hidekatsu was the fourth son of Nobunaga and
the adopted son of Hideyoshi.
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Il6 CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
economic and protective organizations among merchants and artisans.
Clearly, Hideyoshi was more successful than Nobunaga
had
been
in
asserting
his
authority over urban areas. One reason
for
this success
was that Hideyoshi articulated his urban policy with other policy initia-
tives.
Important
in
this context was his cadastral survey, which had an
adverse impact
on
self-governing towns,
as the
survey recognized
all
land
as
coming under
the
administrative authority
of the
national
overlord. Land survey documents remain
for
the area incorporated as
the modern-day Osaka metropolitan prefecture, except for the old city
areas
of
Osaka and Sakai. These records reveal that temple towns like
Tondabayashi
and
Tonda were legally redefined
as
villages, which
meant that they lost their old special urban privileges. Consequently,
all governing rights, including
the
power
to
apprehend
and
punish
criminals, were assigned to the military lords who received these areas
as parts
of
their fiefs.
Hideyoshi had a particularly difficult time coping with Kyoto, where
the authority
of
court nobles and religious institutions was
so
firmly
rooted in history. Hideyoshi carried out
a
cadastral survey in Kyoto but
confronted serious political problems when he tried to curtail the rights
and interests of these noble and religious proprietors. Finally, following
a land survey
in
1591, Hideyoshi
was
able
to
persuade some noble
families
and
religious institutions
in
central Kyoto
to
give
up
their
holdings and accept substitute land
in
villages surrounding the city of
Kyoto.
24
Hideyoshi then went
on to
rearrange the layout
of
the city's
residential wards, construct
an
earthen wall around the city, create
a
special ward for temples, and grant exemptions from corvee and prop-
erty taxes
-
all measures of his newly acquired powers.
Hideyoshi also imposed
his
control over commercial institutions
and marketing structures.
One
major policy initiative came
in the
ninth month
of
1585, when Hideyoshi issued
his
famous injunction
that "the various fees levied by noble families, warriors, and common
merchants are to cease, and guilds are to be abolished," a measure that
effectively erased from existence
the
business taxes, tolls,
and
other
miscellaneous imposts that the Kyoto nobility, warriors, and powerful
merchants
had
traditionally collected from merchants and artisans.
25
Hideyoshi also
put his
seal
on a
letter severely criticizing the Suzuki
family,
a
member
of the
court nobility,
for
levying imposts
on the
24 Ono Kdji, "Kyoto
no
kinsei toshika," Shakai keizai
shigaku
10 (October 1940):
1-32.
25 The quotation
is
from the "Hideyoshi jiki." Additional details can
be
found
in
the "Kanemi
kyoki"
and
"Kobayakawa-ke monjo"
in
Shiryo hensanjo,
ed., Dai
Nihon komojo urwake
(Tokyo: Tokyo teikoku daigaku, 1929), vol. 11,
p. 2
and pp. 401-3.
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COMMERCE AND EARLY MODERN CITIES 117
trading of cattle, and his agent Asano Nagayoshi reprimanded mer-
chant leaders in the town of Imazu in Omi for collecting a fee for each
traveler and piece of baggage that passed through that post town.
26
The decree to abolish guilds, however, did not bring in its wake
complete freedom of commerce. Hideyoshi's intentions were much
more complex, for tied into his promotion of commerce was the desire
to terminate the domination of trade by court nobles and religious
institutions and to assert his own direct lines of authority over mer-
chants. Thus Hideyoshi could tolerate, and even encourage, certain
closed business associations if this were in his own immediate interest.
Hideyoshi also permitted a few merchants to dominate the rice market
in Kyoto. Warehousing documents of
the
Toyotomi family dated 1598,
for example, record that imposts were still being levied against guilds
in Sakai, an indication that the Toyotomi regime allowed some guilds
to continue to exist so as to tap them for business taxes.
27
Then, from
1594,
Hideyoshi had his nephew and adopted son Hidetsugu (1568-
95),
who had succeeded him as regent
(Jkampaku),
require these men
to submit monthly reports concerning the prices and the marketing of
rice.
28
Particularly revealing was Hideyoshi's policy toward certain trans-
portation guilds. He abolished the rights of the merchant association
that controlled shipping on Lake Biwa, only to turn around and autho-
rize the establishment of the "One Hundred Ship Association" at
Otsu, as well as another shipping association on the Yodo River.
Hideyoshi guaranteed exclusive monopolies to these groups, but in
exchange, he issued codes of operating procedures, dictated official
prices, levied business fees, and reserved the right to commandeer the
ships for official business. Allied daimyo engaged in the same expedi-
ences.
For example, Hashiba Hidenaga (1541-91), Hideyoshi's step-
brother, abolished all guilds and corvee levies in the towns of Nara and
Koriyama in his home domain of
Yamato.
But just three months later,
he exempted the iron, fish, and salt guilds from that order.
29
The historical significance of the 1585 decree abolishing guilds had
many ramifications. First, it deprived the Kyoto-based court families
26 For the Suzuki case, see doc. 463 in "Kobayakawa-ke raonjo," in Dai Nihon
komonjo
iewake,
vol. 11, p. 2, pp. 401-3. The Asano document is contained in "Kawarabayashi monjo" in
Shiga-ken, ed., Shiga
kenshi
(Tokyo: Sanshusha, 1928), vol. 5, p. 376.
27 "Keicho sannen Toyotomi-ke zono mokuroku," in Dai Nihon sozeishi, vol. 2 (Tokyo:
Choyokai, 1927), pp. 585-91.
28 See the entry for Bunroku 3/3/21 in the "Komai nikki," in Kaitei shiseki
shuran,
vol. 25
(Tokyo: Kondo shuppanbu, 1902), pp. 549-50.
29 See the entry for Tensho 15/1/16 in the "Taken'in nikki," in
Taken'in
nikki, vol. 4 (Tokyo:
Kadokawa shoten, 1967), p. 61.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Il8 CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
and central religious institutions
of
their supervisory powers over
the
activities
of
merchant
and
artisans, and
it
transferred that control
to
the hands of the warrior
class.
Merchants and artisans thus were freed
from
the
domination
of
medieval guild organizations,
but
they were
made more subject to the emerging forms of daimyo authority. Conse-
quently, the decree
did
not literally free trade and commerce from all
restrictions. Although Hideyoshi eliminated many of the monopolistic
privileges
of the
medieval guild associations,
the
artisans
and mer-
chants themselves came under
new
restraints devised
by the
rising
military aristocracy, who ultimately proved hostile to the development
of the independent, self-governing aspects
of
cities
and of
merchant
and artisan activities.
The coalescence
of
political control over cities
and
commerce was
clearly revealed
in
the castle towns that appeared during the late six-
teenth
and
early seventeenth centuries. Above all, these castle towns
became residential centers
for the
military class
of
proprietors,
the
daimyo and their retainers, and the merchant and artisan classes that
supported economic development. Because the castle towns served
as
domain military headquarters, the daimyo lords were concerned about
their ability
to
regulate affairs
in
these urban centers. One measure of
this
is
the care that daimyo took to plan the layout of these new cities.
The central focus
for
most castle towns was
a
keep that itself was
encircled with moats and canals that protected the daimyo,
his
chief
administrative officers,
and the
residences
of his top
military
and
administrative personnel. Next came
a
belt
of
merchant residences,
and finally temples
and the
residences
of
low-ranking warriors were
situated on the outskirts of the cities near natural barriers like rivers or
foothills, forming outer defense perimeters.
This type
of
urban plan showed
a
sensitivity
to
the dictates
of
the
emerging status system. The daimyo lived
at
the center of
his
domain
world,
as
befitted
his
status. Living within
the
safety
of the
moats
were his chief lieutenants, protected by his lordship both symbolically
and physically. The merchants resided in undefended parts of
the
city,
and
the
outcast
(semmiri)
subcommunities were located
on the
outer
fringes of the cities, typically near rivers that often flooded. Merchants
and artisans did not "own" the land in the modern, legal sense
of
that
term
but,
rather, merely
had the
right
of
usufruct over their plots.
Clearly this type
of
urban layout reflected
the
needs
of
Japan's new
rulers.
When compared with
the
earlier temple towns,
it
shows how
daimyo had strengthened their claims to political control over the land
and the activities of the merchants and artisans.
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COMMERCE AND EARLY MODERN CITIES 119
It is also useful to observe how urban administrative structures were
changed to accommodate the ascension of daimyo power. The corpo-
rate organizations
(kyddotai)
of the old temple towns, which had been
formed by merchants to protect their own interests, were now placed
at the very bottom of the administrative structure. Daimyo assumed
legislative, judicial, and military prerogatives, and the merchant resi-
dents who had previously served as community leaders were converted
into functionaries in the daimyo's administration, executing decisions
made by the daimyo and inner samurai elite. The most important
merchant offices were now those of the city elders and ward representa-
tives,
who carried out such administrative duties as conducting census
reports, investigating crimes, collecting taxes, and transmitting the
lord's laws to the urban residents.
30
The daimyo also entrusted to the merchants and artisans responsibil-
ity for constructing and maintaining streets, bridges, and sewage ca-
nals in their sections of the city. For instance, of the more than one
hundred bridges in Osaka that were called "public bridges," the sho-
gunate actually built and maintained only twelve. In addition, as a
general principle, merchants and artisans had to resolve commercial
and debt disputes among themselves, with the city elders and ward
representatives attempting to negotiate settlements based on tech-
niques of reconciliation.
The early modern marketing structure took shape around this kind
of urban nucleus. There was both a central marketing structure and a
set of domain markets. Within each domain market, the daimyo ma-
nipulated the tax system in order to lay claim to rice and other local
products. He then sold these to merchants in the domain, particularly
in the castle town, and used the proceeds to buy military equipment
and everyday necessities. Moreover, peasants also purchased in the
local urban centers items that they could not produce themselves, such
as salt and certain farm implements. Consequently the castle town
became home to a variety of merchants and artisans who had previ-
ously resided in villages and country towns: swordsmiths, armorers,
carpenters, plasterers, dyers, weavers, transportation agents, and mer-
chants who dealt in perishables and textiles. This indicated a growing
functional separation of village and city, and despite the continuing
trade between the two in those goods that were part of the lord's tax
system, there were strong restraints on the peasants' participation in
the commercial economy.
30 Wakita Osamu, "Kinsei toshi no kensetsu to gosho," in Nihon rekishi, vol. 9 (1975).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
120 CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
The internal economies of most domains were not self-sufficient.
Moreover, not all rice and specialty products were consumed within
the domain, thus leaving a surplus that could be shipped to markets
outside the domain. The apex of the central marketing area included
the cities of Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, and Nara in the Kinai region. In
1634,
Kyoto probably still had a population of more than 410,000, and
Osaka was home to perhaps nearly the same number of
people.
31
Edo
quickly became a major consumption center as well, and it too eventu-
ally became an integral part of the central marketing area.
This national marketing structure was supported by the growth of
local, domain economies, and these in turn could not have come into
existence without the adoption of the kokudaka system and the prac-
tice of collecting local specialty products. For fiscal reasons, the
daimyo had to develop the capability to market certain goods in the
central markets, while at the same time maintaining control over their
own domain marketing structures. Thus, they kept themselves in-
formed about rice prices in the central markets and then maintained
rice prices within their domains at a higher level. They also created
their own independent currency systems, as well as uniform standards
of weights and measures.
This domestic marketing system underwent important modifica-
tions during the latter half of the seventeenth century. Much of this
was a consequence of shogunal policy initiatives, particularly the im-
plementation of measures that led to an extraordinary degree of na-
tional seclusion
(sakoku).
During the 1640s the Edo shogunate issued a
series of ordinances that prohibited the possession of oceangoing
ships,
thus throwing the country into relative trade isolation. Indeed,
scholars are still troubled by the question of how a policy of national
closure could be adopted without disastrous results to the national
economy. But the measures did not lead to a complete cessation of
trade
itself,
nor were they so intended. The ongoing growth of domain
market economies certainly stimulated commercial expansion, and the
lower demand for imports of critical military supplies such as lead and
leather brought on by the onset of the "Great Tokugawa Peace" meant,
in any case, that Japan was becoming less dependent on foreign trade.
Japan also gained increasing self-sufficiency in the production of raw
silk thread, which for many years had been the main import item from
China. Finally, there was a decline in the output of gold, silver, and
copper, Japan's chief items of export. Viewed from the standpoint of
31 Wakita Osamu, "Kinsei shoki no toshi keizai," Nihonshi kenkyu 200 (April 11, 1979): 52-75.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE EARLY MODERN SOCIAL SYSTEM 121
market relations, Japan had never been deeply involved in foreign
trade, and the closure policy was adopted largely for political reasons,
chiefly as an anti-Christian measure.
32
THE EARLY MODERN SOCIAL SYSTEM
All of the issues we have discussed - the Taiko cadastral survey, the
decision to encourage migration to the castle towns, and the separation
of warrior and peasant - combined to produce a new social order at
the beginning of the early modern period. At the apex of this new
structure was the bushi class, secure in its position of military and
political dominance and concentrated in the castle towns. The reloca-
tion of the bushi from the countryside into urban centers took many
decades to complete. In the medieval period, the warriors possessed
personal fiefs
(honryo),
and they tended to stay in these home areas,
where they put down strong roots, living with their families and their
own bands of retainers. As part of his effort to consolidate military
control over the country, Toyotomi Hideyoshi adopted policies that
severed, or at least weakened, this bond between the warrior and his
fief.
The key move here was Hideyoshi's efforts to compel increasing
numbers of warriors to take up residence in the newly emerging castle
towns. He also used rather frequently the practice of transferring
daimyo from one domain to another, and this required the daimyo and
the entire vassal band of fief holders to relocate.
Such pressures to break the personal tie to specific holdings were
applied at different levels, even into the early decades of the Edo
period. The Shimazu family of Satsuma, for instance, had been histori-
cally prominent from the Kamakura period and was never transferred
to a new domain, even by the Tokugawa shoguns. Consequently, the
so-called rural samurai, or
goshi,
system, remained intact in that area
of southern Japan. Yet, even though these local samurai continued to
hold fiefs after the Taiko cadastral survey, they were instructed to
"order [their] affairs and be prepared to transfer to new fiefs."
33
The
Tokugawa shogunate continued the policy of transferring daimyo, so
much so that the philosopher Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728) compared the
life of the samurai with that of
travelers,
"always living in inns."
34
The policy of separating the warriors from the peasantry also had a
32 Wakita, "Kinsei toshi no kensetsu to gosho."
33 "Haseba-ke monjo" in Miyagawa, Taiko
kenchi
ran,
vol. 3, p. 326.
34 See Ogyu Sorai's "Seidan," in Yoshikawa Kojiro and Maruyama Masao, eds., Ogyu Sorai,
vol. 36 of Nihon
shiso
taikei (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1973), p. 295.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
122 CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
significant impact
on the
shape
of
early modern society. Although
many bushi continued
to be
granted
a
fief
of
record even after
an
extensive round
of
cadastral surveys
in
the early seventeenth century,
they now
had no
permanent home village,
no
ancestral base
to
which
they could return
if
they became "masterless samurai"
(roniri).
More-
over,
the
samurai now
had no
claims
to
landed property,
a
condition
that transformed
the
lord-retainer relationship.
In the
medieval
pe-
riod,
the
bushi lived
in the
villages
as
proprietors,
and the
warriors
and peasants lived together communally, cooperating in the cultivation
of fields, the construction of irrigation facilities, and the celebration of
festivals.
Of
course, status differences intruded between
the
peasants
and warriors,
but
these had been overshadowed by the deep, personal
relationships that bound them together. However,
in
the early modern
period, only the peasants lived
in
the villages. The village had become
the peasant's possession,
and
proprietary landholding was
no
longer
vested
in
individual samurai.
The policy
of
separating warriors
and
peasants
was
designed
to
ensure better control over
the
bushi while still providing
a
means
of
governing
the
peasantry. When
the
daimyo's vassal retainers lived
in
villages
as
minor proprietors, they were self-reliant
and
often disre-
garded
the
higher authority
of
their daimyo masters, who feared acts
of betrayal
and
perfidy. These rural bushi were also sensitive
to the
pressures from
the
peasantry,
and,
although most bushi
had
relatives
and tenants
in the
villages, they were clearly
in the
rural minority.
Consequently,
in
kuni ikki and Ikko ikki, village-based retainers
fre-
quently allied with the peasants. The Honganji sect often served as the
nucleus
for
this kind
of
confederation.
To
cite
a
concrete example,
when
a
large-scale
tsuchi
ikki occurred
in
1465, the shogunate, fearing
that
its
own direct retainers might
go
over
to the
side
of
the farmers,
compelled
the
protesters
to
assemble
in the
capital.
35
By
doing this,
the shogunate strengthened
its own
position
and
prevented
the
rural
federation
of
its rivals. Confronted with these circumstances, the pol-
icy
of
separating peasant from warrior took
on a
special meaning and
can be seen
as
one step toward severing the connection between bushi
and peasant power.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his successors also implemented measures
to entice merchants and artisans to live in their
cities.
Especially impor-
tant was
the
granting
of
tax exemptions
to
those who moved into
the
35
See
"Toji monjo,"
in Dai
Nihon
komonjo,
Toji
monjo,
vol. 6
(Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku
shuppankai, 1959), pp.
363-71.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE EARLY MODERN SOCIAL SYSTEM 123
castle towns. One goal of the daimyo was to build up their own eco-
nomic base, but they also used this policy as a political tool for main-
taining the economic distinctions between city and peasant village.
The early modern daimyo continued to place heavy tax obligations on
the peasantry, while granting special privileges to the cities. This prac-
tice apparently did induce large numbers to migrate to the cities.
36
Another special characteristic of the early modern social order was
the forced imposition of the status system
(mibun-sei)
on the popula-
tion. Of
course,
status distinctions had existed in the medieval period,
but during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the shogun
and daimyo sought new ways to bring about a more complete separa-
tion of peasant from warrior and peasant from merchant. Usually the
early modern status system is seen as being fourfold, consisting of
warrior, peasant, merchant, and artisan statuses. Conceptually, how-
ever, divisions can also be drawn between warrior-proprietor, peasant,
and townsperson, with various outcast categories such as
eta
and
hinin
existing outside the specified status groups.
The daimyo enforced these distinctions in several ways. For exam-
ple,
the legal system was based on status considerations, and separate
legal codes were issued for each status group. Bushi carried two
swords and used surnames, but peasants, townspeople, and outcasts
had neither. Marriage between members of different status groups,
particularly between warriors and the ruled status groups, or with
outcasts, was strictly prohibited.
37
Status groups were also separated spatially according to occupation:
The bushi, merchants, and artisans lived in cities, and the peasants
lived in villages. Some outcast subcommunities were also located in
peasant villages, but administratively they were treated as separate,
detached "branch villages" and could not participate in the selection of
village officials such as the headmen or elders. Within most castle
towns, separately defined areas were created for warriors, townspeo-
ple,
temples, and outcasts, as well as for "pleasure quarters" of
theaters and houses of prostitution
(yukaku).
Urban outcast communi-
ties were subordinate to urban administrative associations, but they
were typically located on the outskirts of
the
city, on land of very poor
quality.
38
Furthermore, pleasure quarters, such as the Yoshiwara in
36 See Wakita, Kinsei hokensei
seiritsu
shiron, chap. 3.
37 There were ways of bypassing this, such as Che so-called practice of adopting daughters. But
if the woman was of eta status, and this was later discovered, she would be divorced and
punished.
38 For more details of outcast subcommunities, see Buraku mondai kenkyujo, ed.,Burakushi no
kenkyu: zenkindai-hen (Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyujo shuppanbu, 1978).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
124 CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
Edo,
Shimabara in Kyoto, and Shinmachi in Osaka, were confined to
certain geographically defined areas. Status distinctions tended to be-
come blurred in these areas - customers were not usually queried at
the entry gates - and if there were rights or disputes, the government
did not usually intervene but, rather, let the people settle the issues
themselves.
The social distinctions and class separation also became the basis for
determining the distribution and use of residential land. The bushi,
peasants, and townspeople each had different claims to land. The
enfeoffed members of the bushi class held plots of land bestowed by
the overlord, and consequently, they could not sell or otherwise con-
vey their holdings. Of course, the majority of the bushi received sti-
pends and hence had no claims to the land at all. In contrast with this,
peasants in the early modern period were given certain rights to the
use of land. In a technical sense, these might be called "tillage rights"
or "user rights," although in actual practice they amounted to a close
equivalent to what we would style ownership rights. As we noted,
townspeople could own houses and use land.
Fiscal obligations also varied according to status. Peasants were
assessed the
nengu,
the annual land tax, as well as corvee. Most daimyo
extracted various services from merchants and
artisans.
Chartered mer-
chants and artisans usually had to pay a service tax in goods of their
own specialty, and ordinary townspeople were assessed a tax in cash to
pay for the construction and maintenace of the castle. Outcasts, on the
other hand, were charged with such duties as keeping up the castle
grounds, tanning hides, cleaning prisons, and carrying out the punish-
ment of criminals.
The changing social conditions also had an impact on the lord-
retainer relationship. Within the bushi class as a whole, the delegation
of powers of governance from the shogun to the various daimyo then
down through the lower elements of the bushi class was based on
feudalistic practices. The basic principles of this relationship between
lord and vassal - ideals of
loyalty,
service, and obligation - had pene-
trated the consciousness of the bushi during the medieval period. In
the early modern period, these older practices became intertwined
with more abstract notions of centralized state authority, as expressed
in concepts such as kogi, or a public authority, a term that daimyo
began to use from the late sixteenth century. The shift toward the
more abstract conceptualization of power tended to put more authority
into the hands of the daimyo. This contrasted with relationships be-
tween lord and master that had existed during Nobunaga's regime,
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