The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan
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THE END OF RYOZOJI TAKANOBU 345
adversary, the Shimazu family, became the masters of western Kyushu
as a result of Takanobu's demise and the subsequent collapse of the
Ryuzoji realm. To be sure, the resounding victory of the Shimazu at
Okidanawate did not immediately elevate them to unquestioned su-
premacy over that part of the island. They still had rivals in Kyushu.
To start with, there were the Otomo, who either failed to recognize or
sought to mask the weakness that had overcome them since the black
day of Mimikawa in 1578; in any event, they thought they had the
reputation of
a
major power to uphold. Naturally, they welcomed the
chance to pick up the pieces left behind by the fall of one implacable
enemy, Ryuzoji Takanobu, and at the same time to counteract, if not
forestall, the rise of another, the Shimazu.
In the fall of 1584, Otomo Yoshimune accordingly sent troops into
Chikugo. His intention was to intimidate and bring to heel Takanobu's
son and successor, Ryuzoji Masaie (1556-1607), while at the same
time checkmating Akizuki Tanezane, that old enemy of the Otomo.
Yoshimune's envoys even proposed that the Shimazu join him in an
offensive alliance directed against those two.
54
But their forcible-
feeble policy availed the Otomo nothing. Their Chikugo army first
encamped at Bandoji (now part of the city of Chikugo, Fukuoka Pre-
fecture), then moved camp to Korasan (now Kurume), and after that
hardly stirred from its lines. Its few offensive operations ended in
failure, and in November 1585, even before the Shimazu could inter-
vene in force against the Otomo, the Chikugo army finally withdrew
from the field. One of its two generals, the famous Otomo loyalist
Tachibana Dosetsu, was dead. The other, Takahashi Joun (1550-86),
returned to his fortress at Iwaya in Chikuzen (now part of Dazaifu-
machi, Fukuoka Prefecture) and braced himself
to
meet the onslaught
that was sure to come. For it must be admitted that the futile maneu-
vers of this forlorn army, along with some feeble gestures made by
Yoshimune toward the recovery of
Higo,
did have one concrete result.
They provided the Shimazu with a casus belli against the Otomo.
At this juncture - in the late autumn and early winter of 1585 - it
became vitally important for the Shimazu to consolidate their position
in Kyushu and, if possible, to seize control of the entire island before an
external force could intrude there to cross their plans and block their
54 According to what Ryuzoji's ambassadors reported to the Shimazu, the Otomo were at the
same time proposing an anti-Shimazu alliance to Masaie. See Tokyo daigaku shiryo hensanjo,
ed.,
Umai Kakuken nikki, vol. 2, Dai Nihon
kokiroku,
no. 5 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1954),
pp.
125-6, entry for Tensho 12.10.15 (November 17, 1584). Also see the entries for 9.21 and
9.25 of the same year, ibid., p. 113 and pp. 114-15, respectively.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
346 CHRISTIANITY AND THE DAIMYO
triumphal progress. That such an intervention from the outside was
more than likely became apparent to them with the arrival of an imperi-
ous message, dated the second day of the tenth month (November 23,
1585),
from Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Speaking for the sovereign in the
capacity of his imperial regent
(kampaku)
- a lofty appointment he had
obtained through intimidation three and a half months previously
55
-
Hideyoshi grandiloquently told Shimazu Yoshihisa that the whole
realm, "as far as the outer limits of Oshu," had now submitted to the
imperial will and was at peace. This was balderdash, but it contained
a
serious threat. Kyushu alone, Hideyoshi asserted, was still plagued by
war; this was a reprehensible state of affairs, and Yoshihisa must put a
stop to it or suffer punishment.
The Shimazu, conscious of their status as a "house of unblemished
lineage since the days of Yoritomo," were outraged at the bluster of
this "parvenu"
(yurai
nakijin). Considering Hideyoshi obviously unfit
for his new office and unworthy to be addressed with the deference
ordinarily due a kampaku, they refused to dignify his ultimatum with
the courtesy of a direct
reply.
Instead, Yoshihisa chose the expedient of
writing back to an intermediary, the "literary daimyo" Hosokawa
Fujitaka (1534-1610). Protesting the Shimazu party's solemn commit-
ment and scrupulous adherence to the armistice agreement arranged
by Oda Nobunaga and Konoe Sakihisa in 1580, and putting the blame
on the Otomo for violating the peace of Kyushu with their recent
incursions into Hyuga and Higo, Yoshihisa insisted that any counter-
measures by the Shimazu were steps taken in justifiable self-defense.
In other words, the Shimazu would not abandon their aggressive de-
signs in order to placate Hideyoshi. Instead, they planned an intensifi-
cation of the conflict in Kyushu.
The contents of this fateful correspondence were revealed to the
principal captains of the Shimazu at
a
council of war held in Kagoshima
in February and March 1586. The diary of Uwai Kakuken (or Uwai
Satokane; 1545-89), the castellan of Miyazaki in Hyuga who
was
one
of
Yoshihisa's senior councilors, affords us an interesting glimpse into the
proceedings.
56
The die
was
cast, or rather the lots
(mikuji)
were drawn,
55 See my "Hideyoshi, the Bountiful Minister," in Elison and Smith, eds.,
Warlords,
Artists, &
Commoners, pp. 229-32.
56 The text of Hideyoshi's message to Shimazu Yoshihisa may be found in Uwai Kakuken nikki,
vol. 3 (1957), p. 89, entry for Tensho 14.1.23 (March 13, 1586). Kakuken notes that
Hosokawa Fujitaka and Hideyoshi's confidant, the interior decorator Sen no Rikyu (1522-
91),
had sent adjunct letters (soejo) supplementing that message. Yoshihisa addressed his
reply to Hosokawa; the text, dated [Tensho
14].
1.11, is found ibid., pp. 89-90. The lots
regarding the invasion of Bungo were drawn on 1.22; ibid., p. 88.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS OF COELHO 347
at
this
council.
Their
oracle
made it evident that the
gods
wanted Bungo
to
be
invaded from two directions. Shimazu Yoshihiro was
to
lead
a
force that would strike through
Higo.
Commanding another army in an
advance through Hyuga would be the daimyo Yoshihisa
in
person.
THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS
OF
VICE-PROVINCIAL
COELHO
Their opponents did not stand idly by
as
the Shimazu prepared for war.
In May 1586, Otomo Sorin himself traveled
to
Osaka
to
seek Hideyo-
shi's pledge
of
military support. Although
he got no
such assurance
directly from Hideyoshi,
who was
at
his
most garrulous
as he
conducted
his awestricken guest on
a
tour through the sumptuous bedchambers,
tearooms, and treasure houses of
his
nonesuch
of
the moment, Osaka
Castle, Otomo could nevertheless go home with his fears assuaged,
as
the
kampaku's
half-brother and right hand, Hashiba Hidenaga (1541?-
91),
promised
to
take care
of
everything
to
Sorin's complete satisfac-
tion.
57
Among
the
others who were engaged
in
lobbying activities
in
Osaka that spring was the vice-provincial
of
the Jesuits, Padre Gaspar
Coelho. His mission, too, was adverse to the interests of
the
Shimazu,
whose oppressive dominance over
the
Christian areas
of
Kyushu
he
sought
to
resist at
all
costs.
Indeed, he had undertaken the journey from
Nagasaki
to
the Kansai
in
defiance
of
their express prohibition.
His trip was absolutely necessary, Coelho tried
to
tell
the
Shimazu,
because
he had an
obligation
to
express
his
thanks
to
Hideyoshi
for
permitting
the
Jesuits
to
maintain
an
establishment
in
Osaka. Even
while granting
the
mission superior
of
Japan
the
necessity
of
making
such
a
courtesy visit,
one
wonders about
its
timing.
The
Jesuits
had
been enjoying
the
hegemon's protection
in
his great new castle town
since 1583. What, then, was Coelho's hurry?
No
fools,
the
Shimazu
suspected that the vice-provincial "went to Miaco for no other purpose
than
to
arrange with Quambacu
[the
kampaku Hideyoshi] that
he
should favor Bungo
and
assist
it
against Saccuma, which
is the
king-
dom
of
the most inveterate
and
hard-bitten enemies that
the
Law
of
God has
in
Japan."
58
57 Sorin reported
on his
visit
to
Osaka
in
detail
in a
letter addressed
to
three
of the
elders
of
Bungo realm, Furuso Tango Nyudo (Ikkan), Kasai Suo Nyudo Sosen, and Saito
Kii
Nyudo
Doreki,
and
dated Tensho 14.4.6 (May
24, 1586, the day
after
the
audience);
a
convenient
synopsis may
be
found
in
Toyama, Otomo Sorin, pp. 265-9.
58 Frois, Hiswria,
pt. 2
[B], chap.
29,
Wield,
vol. 4, p. 216;
Matsuda
and
Kawasaki, trans.,
Furoisu
Nihonshi,
vol. 9, pp. 25-6.
Also
see
Uwai Kakuken nikki,
vol. 3, p. 47,
entry
for
Tensho 13.10.10 (December
1,
1585).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
348 CHRISTIANITY AND THE DAIMYO
To be sure, it is clear that questions of even wider scope and greater
import than the affairs of Kyushu occupied the visionary mind of the
vice-provincial; his flights of fancy took him to the most rarefied
regions of higher politics. Recall from Chapter 6 that Hideyoshi had at
least since 1585 planned an invasion of Korea and China.
In the course of the audience that the kampaku granted him at
Osaka Castle on May 4,1586, Coelho proved only too eager to discuss
that plan. Indeed, if we are to believe Organtino Gnecchi-Soldo, a
fellow Jesuit who was present at this baneful interview, Coelho even
volunteered to use his influence in getting two Portuguese Great Ships
put at Hideyoshi's disposal when the time came for the assault on the
Asian mainland. But an invasion of the continent could obviously not
be mounted unless a base were secured for it in Kyushu, and
Hideyoshi would first have to conquer the island for that reason if for
no other. Coelho saw himself playing a not-insignificant part in this
grand design.
How justified the Shimazu were in suspecting him of hostile inten-
tions is apparent from the testimony of Padre Organtino, who affirms
that Frois, addressing Hideyoshi as the interpreter on Coelho's
behalf,
began his speech by requesting the
kampaku's
military intervention in
Kyushu and promising in turn the vice-provincial's aid in putting all
of that island's Christian lords on Hideyoshi's side. In actuality,
Coelho lacked the power
to
deliver on such a promise: Try as he might
to create a bloc of Christian daimyo, he never succeeded. That, how-
ever, is not really the point at issue. The paramount factor in the
subsequent turn of
events,
one perceived clearly by Organtino, if only
in retrospect, was that Hideyoshi had nothing but the greatest disdain
for priests who meddled in military matters.
59
Hence Coelho's ambi-
tious performance in Osaka, rash at best, was at worst - and proved to
be in fact - suicidal.
For the time being, however, Hideyoshi hid his contempt. Appar-
ently he found the prospect of cooperation outlined by Coelho attrac-
tive and useful. Assuming momentarily the mantle of
a
patron of the
Christian mission, the kampaku made sure that the vice-provincial
would be sent on his way in a contented state, by issuing him a charter
that guaranteed the padres the right to reside and to preach their
59 A more detailed discussion of this audience can be found in my Deus
Destroyed,
pp. 112-14.
Note that Frois and Organtino wrote conflicting versions of what was said in the course of the
interview. Frois's report, which is dated October 4, 1586, was designed for publication
throughout Europe. Organtino's confidential letter to the general of the Society of Jesus,
written on October 10, 1589, is accordingly the more trustworthy even if less immediate
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS OF COELHO 349
gospel unimpeded "in all the lands of Japan," freed them from the
duty of quartering soldiers, and granted them exemption from other
imposts.
60
The kampaku's decree, which is dated Tensho 14.5.4 (June
20,
1586), gave Coelho an entree even with those daimyo who had
previously shown no disposition to favor Christianity or its apostles.
Armed with this document, Coelho left Sakai on July 23 and pro-
ceeded westward by measured stages through the Inland Sea.
First Coelho crossed over to the island of Shikoku to call on
Kobayakawa Takakage (1533-97), the lord of Iyo Province (now
Ehime Prefecture), and was received by him with extreme courtesy.
This may seem surprising, because Takakage was one of the main
pillars of the great house of Mori, a family with a history of hostility to
the Christian religion. But the vast power complex of the Mori, which
covered the six westernmost provinces of Honshu as well as Iyo on
Shikoku, had by 1586 been fully subordinated to Hideyoshi's national
regime. It is evident that in welcoming the vice-provincial as lavishly
as he did, Takakage was in fact deferring to the promulgator of the
kampaku's pro-Christian decree rather than to its bearer and benefi-
ciary. (The end result of that decree, so far as the Mori were con-
cerned, was the temporary reestablishment of the Jesuit residence in
Yamaguchi after three decades of closure. It was promptly closed again
when Hideyoshi turned anti-Christian in July 1587.) Along with his
nephew Mori Terumoto and his brother Kikkawa Motoharu (1530-
86),
Takakage was destined to play a key role in the vanguard of the
invasion of Kyushu that Hideyoshi would shortly set in motion. Know-
ing Coelho's record, it is difficult to imagine him managing to stay
away from that topic in his conversations with Takakage.
In early August, the vice-provincial proceeded from Iyo to Bungo,
but he found little encouragement to tarry there. Gloom impended
over the Otomo realm as the threat that had so long been in the offing
grew ever more palpable: Having rejected yet another plan for the
partition of Kyushu, the Shimazu on August 15 took the offensive.
61
After a month of early successes, their advance bogged down. But the
60 The charter's Portuguese translation, in which the standard chancery form of the exemption
or "off-limits" decree (kinzei) is easily recognizable, can be found in Frois, Historia, pt. 2 [B],
chap.
32, Wicki, vol. 4, p. 238. The original Japanese text does not survive.
61 The partition plan floated by Hideyoshi would have given Chikuzen to Hideyoshi himself,
turned over Hizen to Mori Terumoto, and assigned Chikugo, half of Higo, and half of Buzen
to the Otomo, whereas the rest of Kyushu was to go to the Shimazu; see Uwai Kakuken mkki,
vol. 3, p. 127, entry for Tensho 14.5.22 (June 9,1586). The Shimazu, required by Hideyoshi
to reply to this plan by the seventh month or face his military intervention, decided at a
council of war held on Tensho 14.6.7 to spurn the proposal and two days later ordered a
mobilization; ibid., pp. 133-4.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
350 CHRISTIANITY AND THE DAIMYO
very awareness that Satsuma was on the march kept the Jesuit sympa-
thizers of the Otomo in an undiminished state of anxiety.
This awareness evoked so vivid a specter of ruin before the eyes of
Coelho's companion Frois that he thought he saw the enemy's grasp
already extending over eight of the nine provinces of Kyushu - only
"the wretched kingdom of Bungo" was left to stand by
itself,
and it
was so denuded of resources and stripped of protection that "one
could not help feeling sorry for its destitution." The causes of Bungo's
derelict condition were obvious to this observer: The realm "lacked a
head that would govern it, and its lords each went his own way with-
out there being any sense of union among them." It was bad enough
that Otomo Yoshimune "made light of the advice given him by his
father, el-rey Francisco." Even worse, he shut his ears to Coelho's
expostulations. The daimyo of Bungo refused to have Hideyoshi's
decree regarding the free spread of Christianity officially proclaimed
and enforced in his domains - not that the Society of Jesus "had any
intention of forcing anyone," Frois reassures us. "Like another Pha-
raoh," Yoshimune failed to heed all admonitions and instead "repudi-
ated the light," becoming ever more "obstinate and clouded with
darkness in his heart." Cleaving to his dissolute ways, he "gave free
rein to his appetites."
62
The missionary's harsh words notwithstanding, Yoshimune's lack of
enthusiasm for the Jesuits was not necessarily an instance of perver-
sity. The daimyo of Bungo may simply have been afraid that any
further encouragement of the Christian religion would exacerbate the
deep cleavages that divided his realm and imperiled his rulership. If
so,
then there was reason in his recalcitrance.
Conversions to Christianity had increased dramatically in Bungo,
even as the storm gathered over the domain of the Otomo: There were
2,000 adult baptisms in 1584, no fewer than 12,000 in 1585 (almost
half that number in Funai and its vicinity alone), and 6,150 in the first
nine months of 1586.
63
To note that is by no means to suggest that
these Christians posed a threat to the Otomo because they were some-
how disloyal or even seditious. But because many important vassals of
the Otomo continued to cherish traditional religion, it is plain that the
issue of the toleration - let alone the advancement - of the Christian
62 Frois, Hisioria, pt. 2 [B], chaps. 34 and 36, Wicki, vol. 4, pp. 254,
270-1;
Matsuda and
Kawasaki, trans., Furoisu Nihonshi, vol. 11 (1979), p. 40, and vol. 8 (1978), pp. 159-61.
63 See Schutte, Iniroduclio ad
historiam
Societatis Jesu injaponia, pp. 411-12; and Frois, Histo-
ria, pt. 2 [B], chaps. 27 and 28, Wicki, vol. 4, pp. 202-4,
2I
5> Matsuda and Kawasaki,
trans.,
Furoisu
Nihonshi, vol. 8, pp. 136-8, 156.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS OF COELHO 351
cause by the daimyo family was highly divisive at the best of times and
downright explosive during a time of
crisis.
In any event, Yoshimune
resisted the Jesuits' entreaties, and Vice-Provincial Coelho departed
for Shimonoseki on September 16, 1586, with his mission to Bungo an
apparent failure.
Or is it possible that Coelho was undertaking these travels from
Kyushu to Honshu and Shikoku and back on something other than a
purely religious mission? If part of his task, self-appointed or not, was
the coordination of military plans - decidedly not out of character for
this adventurist - then he may even have left Bungo with a sense not
of frustration but of expectation. When he landed in Shimonoseki
some five days later, he found himself in the middle of a military
camp,
the staging area of an army drawn from the extensive domains
of the Mori and forming an advance echelon of the invasion of Kyushu
ordered by Hideyoshi.
Early in October, Coelho went on to Yamaguchi to meet Dom
Simeao Kuroda (Yoshitaka, also known as Kodera Kambyoe, 1546-
1604),
the inspector general charged by Hideyoshi with overseeing the
operations of the Mori forces. The two traveled back together to Shi-
monoseki, where they were shortly joined by another chief member of
Hideyoshi's field staff who was a fervent Christian, Dom Agostinho
Konishi (Yukinaga, 15 56?-1600). Here the vice-provincial had the
opportunity not only to consult again with Kobayakawa Takakage but
also to make the acquaintance of Mori Terumoto when that powerful
daimyo arrived to take personal charge of his troops as they prepared
to launch their assault across the Strait of Shimonoseki. By the middle
of November, the Mori army had occupied a strong beachhead in
Kyushu, capturing the Shimazu side's fort at Kokura. For his part,
Coelho left for Kyushu in the middle of December. In an odd throw-
back to the association between
wako
and missionaries that dated back
to Xavier's day, the vice-provincial was convoyed to Nagasaki by an
escort of seven armed vessels from the fleet of Kurushima Michifusa
(1561-97), the "supreme captain of all the pirates of
the
sea," who had
been baptized in Shimonoseki a few days previously.
64
64 Frois, Historia, pt. 2 [B], chap. 38, Wicki, vol. 4, pp. 282-3; Matsuda and Kawasaki, trans.,
Furoisu
Nihonshi, vol. 9, pp. 56-8. As noted by Frois, "Cuniximadono" or Kurushima (more
properly, Murakami) Michifusa ranked alongside Murakami Takeyoshi, the head of the
Noshima branch of the Murakami family, at the top of the pirate hierarchy of the Inland Sea.
Michifusa, whose fort dominated the narrows at Kurushima (now part of the city of Imabari,
Ehime Prefecture), due to its swift tidal currents one of the most difficult passages in that sea,
was one of the maritime barons whose fleets, mobilized in the service of Hideyoshi, played an
indispensable part in the invasion of Korea. He died at the battle of Mydngnyang, one of the
key naval engagements of the second Korean campaign.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
352 CHRISTIANITY AND THE DAIMYO
From Nagasaki, his own domain, Coelho went on to Arima, where
he did his best to persuade the daimyo Arima Harunobu to abandon
his temporal loyalties and join his fellow Christians, Konishi and
Kuroda, in the war against the Shimazu. Dom Protasio, however,
refused to turn his back on his erstwhile saviors, the lords of Satsuma,
in order to take up the cause of the Jesuits. The vice-provincial there-
upon ordered not only all missionaries but even the pupils of the
seminario
to leave Arima.
65
One would attribute this extraordinary action to a random fit of
temper, were there no similar examples of how Coelho conducted
policy. In the early 1580s, for instance, at a time when Arima was
being brutalized by Ryuzoji Takanobu, Coelho sought to inspire Dom
Bartolomeu Omura - a sworn vassal of Takanobu - to rise against his
lord, enter into a compact with Dom Protasio "so that Christianity
would flourish," and "make war as best he could" against Ryuzoji.
Omura raised scruples about this proposal. Among the concerns he
mentioned was the safety of his son Sancho, a hostage under Taka-
nobu's control, but to Coelho this was a small matter, one to be dis-
missed out of hand in view of any Christian's higher duty to his
church. Hence Dom Bartolomeu's demur and the halfheartedness of
his subsequent show of compliance with Coelho's fanciful anti-Ryuzoji
scheme earned him the permanent ill will of the vice-provincial.
The ambitious Coelho failed to recognize that the lords he sought to
influence had concrete interests other than Christianity and that his
project for a Christian axis in Hizen, not to speak of his even more
ambitious plan for a Catholic league in Japan, was therefore un-
grounded in reality. What a chimera this particular vision of a holy
alliance was may be judged from the fact that Dom Protasio Arima and
Dom Bartolomeu Omura in 1586 actually fought
a
war with each other
over a parcel of territory in the western Sonogi peninsula. This was a
small war, but it was bloody nonetheless. Unfortunately, it is not the
sole example of a military conflict in which Christians shed Christian
blood in Japan.
In the event, Coelho applied to Omura Sumitada the very same
sanctions that he had used against Arima Harunobu. According to the
veteran Jesuit missionary Afonso de Lucena's reminiscences, "Our
Japan Superior, for certain reasons and considerations that appeared to
him to be just, ordered and required that all the Padres who were in
65 Padre Joao de Crasto SJ to Padre Alexandra Valignano SJ, dated Hirado, March 19, 1587,
cited in Schutte,
Introductio
ad
historian
Societatis Jesu injaponia, pp. 698-9, n. 54.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
COLLAPSE OF THE OTOMO REALM 353
Omura should remove ad
tetnpus
to Nagasaki, and [he did] this as a
punishment he meted out to the Tono [Bartolomeu] for not doing
certain things that [Bartolomeu] believed he could not do with respect
to his honor and his temporal interests." Nor did Coelho's hostility to
Sumitada end with this measure of coercion. When Dom Bartolomeu
lay on his deathbed in the spring of 1587, Coelho twice refused urgent
requests that he come to visit, to console, and to be reconciled with his
prominent spiritual charge, the first of the "Christian daimyo."
66
What sort of ecclesiastical politics was this? The distinguished Jesuit
historian Josef Franz Schiitte calls it "political willfulness" on the part
of the Japan Superior.
67
Coelho's arrogance, however, was about to
meet its match, and the vice-province he headed would presently
suffer the grave consequences of his imprudent actions.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTOMO REALM
As if to mock the orderly processes of causation, the downfall of
Coelho's and his fellow Jesuits' enterprise was compassed not by
Satsuma, the enemy they feared, loathed, and tried to damage, but
rather by the kampaku Hideyoshi, the self-decreed friend whose pro-
tection they cherished, whose interests they sought to further, and
whose sweeping plans for conquest the vice-provincial had enthusiasti-
cally embraced. First, however, Hideyoshi brought about the humilia-
tion of the Shimazu, by no means an easy endeavor. The campaign to
break the power of the Shimazu, establish Hideyoshi's dominance
over Kyushu, and (perhaps most important of
all)
show the mastery of
the national hegemon over the daimyo of central and western Japan
was a military operation of a scale and complexity unprecedented in
Japanese history.
The kampaku is said to have ordered the mobilization of 200,000
men, drawn from no fewer than thirty-seven provinces, for his inva-
sion of Kyushu.
68
At least half that total was to be assembled in the
66 See Lucena,
Erinnerungen,
pp. 108-15 on Coelho's anti-Ryuzoji scheme; pp. 114-25 on the
war between Omura and Arima; pp. 134-9 on Dom Bartolomeu's final illness (he died on
May 25, 1587); and pp. 138-41 on the withdrawal of missionaries from Omura.
67 See Schiitte, "Einleitung" to Lucena,
Erinnerungen,
p. 29, and n. 54 to pt. 2 of Lucena's text,
pp.
134-5.
68 Oze Hoan, Taikoki, ed. Kuwata Tadachika (Tokyo: Shin jimbutsu oraisha, 1971), p. 230.
Hoan's chronicle, which has a preface dated Kan'ei 2 (1625), is an anecdotal work not
characterized by an attachment to accuracy. His statement regarding the mobilization of
Hideyoshi's Kyushu army is apt to be an exaggeration. Historians, however, have by and
large followed Hoan. The normally careful Fujiki Hisashi, for instance, even raises Hoan's
number of troops to "more than 250,000" drawn from "nearly forty provinces"; see Fujiki
Hisashi, Oda-Toyolomi
seiken,
vol. 15 of Nihon no
rekishi
(Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1975), p. 202.
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354 CHRISTIANITY AND THE DAIMYO
Kansai area as Hideyoshi's main striking force. This large army would
then have to be provisioned, marched in echelons for some five hun-
dred kilometers (310 miles) to the western extremity of Honshu, fer-
ried across the Strait of Shimonoseki, and finally deployed to fight in a
vast territory over which a resourceful enemy held preponderant con-
trol. The kampaku knew that he had to allow plenty of
time
for prepa-
ration; hence, setting the departure date of the several elements of his
main force well ahead into the spring, he determined that he would
lead his personal guard from Osaka on Tensho 15.3.1 (April 8, 1587).
He hoped that the Shimazu could be held in check until then by the
Otomo and the advance contingents, made up of levies of his subject
daimyo, that he had sent to their assistance.
In the meantime the Shimazu laid their own plans to conquer Bungo
and entrench themselves in control of Kyushu. Shimazu Yoshihiro was
to advance through Higo while his brother Iehisa struck at Bungo
from Hyuga; their offensive was scheduled to begin on Tensho
14.10.21 (December 1, 1586). Long before that date - in fact, at least
since the autumn of the previous year - vassals and even members of
the house of Otomo were covertly taking up contacts with the
Shimazu, as though vying with one another to clamber aboard the
juggernaut they saw rumbling their way.
When the Shimazu struck, Bungo's entire southern front caved in,
as a rolling wave of defections from the vassal band of the Otomo
smoothed the way onward for the invaders. As advised by his spies
and collaborators, Shimazu Iehisa advanced with only a small force of
his own, no more than three thousand men from Hyuga and five
hundred from Satsuma. His ranks, however, were swelled by the
troops of his fifth column in Bungo. This collapse of the vassalage
structure of the Otomo in the face of an enemy attack showed once
again how far behind the times their domain actually
was.
The Otomo
had failed utterly to establish the direct control over their liegemen
that was one of the identifying characteristics of the new breed of early
modern daimyo. Theirs was still essentially a medieval realm built on
the principle of coalition - a foundation, as it proved, of sand. The
Shimazu knocked down their ramshackle dominion without much
difficulty; then Hideyoshi restored it for a brief half-dozen years; but
it would not survive the stewardship of Otomo Yoshimune.
Bungo did not fall without a fight. Saiki Koresada, the keeper of
Togamure-jo (located on the boundary of what now are the city of
Saiki and the township of Yayoi, Oita Prefecture), sallied from his
castle and mauled a force sent by Shimazu Iehisa to conquer eastern
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