Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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degree to which the face and eyes are tucked

under the frontal bone (Balter, 2002). Reducing the

number of measurements would, in Lieberman’s

view, reduce the complexity involving theories re-

garding the evolutionary appearance of Homo

sapiens. Typically, however, measurements of

human skulls (i.e., human craniometry) in pale-

oanthropology and archaeology involve over sixty

different measures (Howells, 1989; White, 2000).

Beauty and the body

Bodily symmetry is generally the most consistent

factor to correlate with assessments of physical

beauty (Geary, 1998). Women prefer men with

high bodily symmetry, a strong chin and cheek-

bones, and an emotionally expressive mouth.

These preferences may have adaptive value in that

illnesses during puberty are known to reduce the

secretion of male hormones (i.e., androgens)

which in turn decreases bone size and density

(Thornhill and Gangstad, 1993). Additionally,

lower facial symmetry in men correlates with

higher baseline metabolism (Manning, Kouk-

ourakis, and Brodie, 1997) and higher incidents

of depression, anxiety, and minor illnesses

(Schakelford and Larsen, 1997). Note, however,

that this correlation does not hold for individuals

who are assessed as either very attractive or as un-

attractive (Kalick et al, 1998). Men’s assessments of

physical beauty in women also correlate with bod-

ily symmetry but rely more on facial features show-

ing youthfulness relative to a man’s own age (Ken-

rick and Keefe, 1992), except during male

adolescence (Kenrick et al, 1996). Finally, men

think women with a waist-to-hip ratio of around

0.7 are more attractive than women with other ra-

tios, and men find women of average weight with

this ratio to be more attractive than heavier or thin-

ner women who have this ratio (Geary, 1998).

There is evidence suggesting that women with ra-

tios larger than 0.85 become more ill and have a

harder time conceiving children than women with

ratios around 0.7 (Singh, 1995).

Smell also plays a role in assessing physical

beauty. Evidence associates women’s ratings of the

bodily fragrances of men with differences between

their major histocompatibility complex (MHC). Men

who differ more in MHC from women raters are

assessed as having more pleasant fragrances than

men more similar to the women’s MHC (Apanius et

al, 1997). Having a more variable MHC is associ-

ated with greater flexibility in one’s immune re-

sponse, and thus this fragrance preference could

reflect the effects of natural selection.

Self determination according to the immune

system

The immune system provides for both innate im-

munity and adaptive immunity. Innate immunity

applies to parts of the immune system that do not

adapt within an individual organism to a particular

immune challenge. Adaptive immunity includes

those systems that adapt within an organism to re-

spond in ways specific to each challenge event.

Innate immunity as an organismal function is

evolutionarily old since its components are found

in both plants and animals. Even single-celled or-

ganisms have the capacity to recognize “microbial

nonself” (Medzhitov and Janeway, 2002). Genetic

changes in the molecular structure of components

of innate immunity (i.e., pattern recognition recep-

tors, or PRRs) happen slowly via evolution

( Janeway and Medzhitov, 2002). This in turn forces

innate immunity to act only against those molecu-

lar patterns on nonself bodies (i.e., pathogen-asso-

ciated molecular patterns, or PAMPs) that do not

change rapidly across generations (i.e., antigens

that are evolutionarily conserved). PRRs available

in the blood or tissue fluid bind to PAMPs, provid-

ing a signal for pathogen destruction by cells such

as macrophages or neutrophils or by complement.

Complement is a group of proteins in blood

plasma that undergo transition from inactive to ac-

tive forms via action by PRRs and participate in the

destruction of pathogens, largely by making a hole

in the pathogenic cell (i.e., cell lysis). PRRs that are

bound to cells are called Toll-like receptors (TLRs,

because of similarities to immune-related proteins

of the Drosophila Toll family). PRRs cannot differ-

entiate between microorganisms that are patho-

genic to the body and microorganisms that are

beneficial to the body (e.g., those in the gustatory

system) but are prevented from acting on benefi-

cial microorganisms by physical barriers prevent-

ing their access.

Innate immunity also is responsible for what is

called the recognition of missing self (Medzhitov

and Janeway, 2002). The term missing self (instead

of nonself) was chosen to highlight the observation

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that some components of innate immunity, instead

of responding to molecular patterns of pathogens,

respond to lower levels of molecular patterns

specifically expressed by a body’s own cells. This

concept was introduced to account for observa-

tions that natural killer (NK) cells mainly kill tumor

cells that lack MHC class I proteins. MHC class I

proteins are adaptive immunity structures that can

combine with parts of the body’s own cells and are

displayed on the surface of those cells to indicate

the presence of a self cell. When cells in the body

become cancerous, they display fewer or no MHC

class I proteins bound with their own fragments.

NK cells have proteins on their surfaces, called re-

ceptors, that recognize MHC class I proteins bound

to self fragments and stop NK cells from killing

(Medzhitov and Janeway, 2002). Other examples

of innate immunity acting by recognizing a missing

self include the activation mechanism of C3, a

complement protein; the inhibition of macro-

phages and neutrophils through receptors on those

cells that recognize sialic acid, which is expressed

on vertebrate cells but generally not on microor-

ganisms; and the inhibition of macrophages by the

protein CD47, largely responsible for distinguish-

ing between functioning and nonfunctioning ery-

throcytes. Note that these missing self strategies

can be fooled if pathogens acquire the DNA that

makes the self-specific molecules directly from the

body’s cells. Then they start looking like self ac-

cording to the innate immune system. This is

known to happen and is called horizontal gene

transfer.

Adaptive immunity relies strongly on signals

from the innate immune system. It is only present

in jawed vertebrates, and its molecular compo-

nents change in a challenge-specific manner. All

jawed fish exhibit adaptive immunity, which is

lacking in vertebrates without jaws, such as lam-

preys. Charles A. Janeway names this sudden ap-

pearance in the evolutionary record the “immuno-

logical ‘Big Bang’” ( Janeway et al, 2001, p. 602). In

a series of experiments culminating in 1998, it was

discovered that the genes mediating the genetic re-

combination underlying adaptive immunity could

also mediate the insertion of one DNA fragment

into others, a process known as transposition

(Hiom, Melek, and Gellert, 1998; Agrawal, East-

man, and Schatz, 1998). Scientists infer from this

result that adaptive immunity was acquired from a

transposable element that inserted itself into the

DNA of an ancestor of jawed vertebrates. Signifi-

cantly, adaptive immunity, unlike innate immunity,

is not hereditary. Genetic modifications that occur

in adaptive immunity occur in somatic cells, not in

the germline cells (sperm or eggs). This leads im-

munologists to say that the “memory” of adaptive

immunity is limited to the lifespan of the individ-

ual, and immunizations must be repeated for each

generation. Adaptive immunity is thought to con-

tribute to greater lifespan, though it is the cause of

rejection in organ transplantation.

Antibodies, or B-cell receptors, are a key com-

ponent of molecular pattern recognition in the

adaptive immune system. There are on the order

of one hundred billion different antibody specifici-

ties in the human body ( Janeway et al, 2001). The

structure of an antibody molecule is modeled as a

Y-shape. The stem of the Y is called the constant

region, and the arms of the Y are called variable

regions. There are five different classes of anti-

body: IgA, IgD, IgE, IgG, and IgM. IgG is the most

abundant antibody class in humans. Each arm of

an antibody’s Y structure is composed of a heavy

(H) chain and a light (L) chain. Moreover, each H

and L chain in each arm of the Y is composed of a

constant (C) and a variable (V) region, connected

by a hinge.

Antibody diversity is produced in four major

ways. The first two are controlled genetic recom-

bination of gene segments forming the gene for

the V-regions. Light chain V-region genes include

the V gene segment (because it codes for most of

the final V protein, 95 to 101 amino acids long)

and the J gene segment (because it joins the V-re-

gion to the C-region, coding for up to thirteen

amino acids). Heavy chain V-region genes include

the V, J, and D (or diversity) gene segments. In ad-

dition to genetic recombination, diversity arises in

different combinations of V and H chains at the

protein level through different combinations of

protein subunits. Finally, specialized mutations

within B cells, occurring only at rearranged V-re-

gion DNA, add to the diverse antibody repertoire.

T-cell receptors are diversified much in the

same way as B-cell receptors and are structurally

similar to antibodies. T cells work in conjunction

with the MHC, a gene complex whose proteins

combine with small protein fragments inside a cell

and take these fragments to the cell surface where

they can be accessed by T cells. There are two dif-

ferent classes of MHC: I and II. T cells with CD8

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proteins on their surface bind to MHC class I mol-

ecules, and those with CD4 proteins bind to MHC

class II molecules. Both MHC class I and II mole-

cules bind to protein fragments of the body’s own

cells if those cells are uninfected or otherwise

harmed, though class II MHC molecules are largely

responsible for binding to protein fragments from

pathogenic microorganisms. CD4 T cells then rec-

ognize infection and activate other cells in the im-

mune response. Human immunodeficiency virus

(HIV) is particularly toxic to CD4 T cells, resulting

in a lower level of these cells, which leads to ac-

quired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).

Emotions and bodies

Emotions are patterns of bodily activity that are

often thought to have evolved because they allow

an organism to respond to its environment in ways

that enable survival and successful reproduction

(Rosenberg and Ekman, 1997). In The Emotional

Brain (1996) Joseph LeDoux says that “Emotions

evolved not as conscious feelings, linguistically dif-

ferentiated or otherwise, but as brain states and

bodily responses. The brain states and bodily re-

sponses are the fundamental facts of an emotion,

and the conscious feelings are the frills that have

added icing to the emotional cake” (p. 302). The

bodily responses LeDoux refers to include changes

in position, posture and movement, facial expres-

sion, vocal expression, skin tone, heart rate, blood

pressure, breathing rate, and hormone production.

Social affiliation and aversion are correlated

with the amount of distance between two bodies,

the orientation of one body to another, how much

one body leans forward toward another, and the

degree of welcome contact between two bodies

(Collier, 1985). Two people who disagree but who

like each other can show welcome physical con-

tact during arguments (Scheflen and Scheflen,

1972; Collier, 1985). Bodily movement also indi-

cates when someone is startled or suddenly afraid.

In these cases, the eye blinks and the bodily move-

ment freezes for a time (e.g., “My spine was frozen

in fear.”). Observers can infer happiness, sadness,

anger, and occasionally pride simply from watch-

ing people move (Planalp, 1999).

Perhaps the main route of emotional commu-

nication in everyday human interaction is the face.

Facial expression includes both the arrangement of

the facial anatomy and the direction of eye gaze.

There are sixteen muscles used to control facial

expression, excluding those involving gaze direc-

tion. Surprise is expressed via the occipitofrontalis

on the forehead; frowning is accomplished by the

corrugator supercilii and the procerus, both of

which work on the eyebrows, and by the depres-

sor anguli oris, the depressor labii inferioris, the

risorius, and the mentalis; and smiling (or sneer-

ing) is mediated by the levator labii superioris

alaeque nasi, the levator labii superioris, the zygo-

maticus major and minor, and the levator anguli

oris. Eyelids, the degree to which the eyes are

closed, and the openness of the tear duct (i.e., the

lacrimal gland) are controlled by the orbicularis

oculi. Nasal dilation is controlled by the nasalis, le-

vator labii superioris alaeque nasi, and depressor

septi. The lips are controlled by the orbicularis

oris. Gaze direction is mediated by the extraocular

muscles, which are comprised of four rectus mus-

cles (superior, medial, inferior, lateral) and two

oblique muscles (superior, inferior).

Although there have been numerous studies of

human facial expression before and since the time

of Duchenne’s The Mechanism of Human Facial

Expression (1862) and Charles Darwin’s The Ex-

pression of the Emotions in Man and Animals

(1872), it did not receive great attention in modern

psychology until behaviorism waned (Rosenberg,

1997). Facial expressions are assessed using either

the maximally discriminative facial movement

coding system (MAX); the Facial Action Coding

System (FACS), or electromyography (EMG) of fa-

cial muscles. Both MAX and FACS rely on visual in-

formation about faces, while EMG depends only

on electrical outputs of facial expression muscles,

measured either at or under the skin. While MAX is

framed in terms of what are generally considered

universally recognizable features of emotional fa-

cial expression, FACS attempts to characterize all

“visibly discernible facial movement” (Rosenberg,

p. 12). However, FACS does not include gaze di-

rection as a parameter.

Using these methods in combination with

emotionally evocative stimuli and subject reports,

there is evidence that (1) facial expressions and re-

ports of some emotions cohere (Rosenberg and

Ekman, 1997; Ruch, 1997); (2) verbal instruction

can lead to the involuntary or voluntary suppres-

sion and enhancement of facial expressions relat-

ing to lower back pain (Craig, Hyde, and Patrick,

1997); (3) lowering the brows, tightening the areas

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around the eyes, and raising the lips are consistent

signs that a person is in pain (Prkachin, 1997); (4)

liars control their facial expressions more success-

fully than other bodily movements while lying; (5)

it is possible to detect smiles while lying if one al-

lows for different types of smile (Ekman, Friesen,

and O’Sullivan, 1997); and (6) untrained adults

have a difficult time distinguishing between what a

baby is tasting (e.g., bitter versus sweet) simply by

facial expression (Rosenstein and Oster, 1997).

See also HUMAN NATURE, RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL

ASPECTS

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MICHAEL L. SPEZIO

HUMAN NATURE,RELIGIOUS

AND

PHILOSOPHICAL

ASPECTS

The suggestion that there is such a thing as human

nature implies a specific stance with relation to

what a human being is. Do humans have some-

thing like a nature? If so, in what does human na-

ture consist? These questions can not be answered

from a sole description of specific characteristics,

which is one of the main reasons there is a contin-

uous debate over this issue. To say something

about what a human being essentially (or in na-

ture) is, implies saying something about what hu-

mans ought to be. Consequently, there is always a

kind of normative self-reference in the way the

question “What is human nature?” is answered. It is

not simply a question of how humans are to un-

derstand this or that case, but an articulation of

how humans understand, or ought to understand,

themselves.

Theories about human nature state something

about the place of humans in nature. They also try

to define what specifically makes a human being

different from other living things. However, as

made clear by theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg in

Anthropology in Theological Perspective (1985),

one has to distinguish between the human being

as part of nature, and the nature of the human

being. These two issues do not necessarily coin-

cide. The former implies a descriptive approach

and investigates different empirical and phenome-

nological aspects that help people better under-

stand their place in nature. The latter is a more

normative issue, related to the destiny of humanity

in general, as well as to the individual’s future and

the meaning of the individual life. Its importance is

thus also related to interpretation of the place of

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human beings in history and culture. Taken sepa-

rately, these approaches offer a basis for the inter-

pretation of human nature from a more naturalistic

or humanistic view. Consequently, the sciences

usually offer more material relevant to the under-

standing of the place of humans in nature than for

answering questions about human destiny.

A theory about human nature that also takes

into consideration an understanding of the human

place in nature usually has to account for some or

all of the following issues: What specifically makes

the human being as a species different from other

species? What does it mean to be a person? Do

human beings have free will? How does one un-

derstand morality, religion, and culture? How are

these elements related to language and to human

self-consciousness (subjectivity)? Is religion neces-

sarily connected to humanity? Are humans able to

act on reasons and principles that cannot be re-

duced to causes? What is one to think of death?

What is the basis for human dignity? Some of

these questions can be seen as attempts to differ-

entiate between issues that, in the past, were dis-

cussed with reference to the difference between

body and soul.

Human nature in non-Western world

religions

The variety of ways to understand human nature is

expressed also in different world religions. In Hin-

duism and Buddhism human nature is partly un-

derstood from the perspective of the self as part of

all that is, and given the task of becoming the non-

self. Like other pantheistic religions, both Hin-

duism and Buddhism affirm that human beings are

related to all that is and, simultaneously, how the

self is essentially divine. Beyond the empirical

human is the human essence, atman, which is

identical with the ultimate reality, Brahman. To

overcome individuality and to become part of the

encompassing world is the aim of human life. This

can be done by transcending the world of the

senses. This aim is realized when the self dissolves

into the whole after death, but also can be antici-

pated in different forms of meditational practices.

Whereas Hinduism and Buddhism emphasize

how human nature is related to divine nature, the

self is generally thought of as distinct from the di-

vine in Semitic religions such as Islam and Judaism.

Islam is the religion that most strongly stresses the

distinction between God and the world; humanity

is seen as dependent upon God and God’s will. As

in Judaism, God is the creator of humans. The aim

of humanity is to realize this dependence and live

accordingly—i.e., in gratitude toward God. In

Islam, sin is understood as disobedience (ma’siya)

and not as rooted in human nature. This is differ-

ent from the most dominant traditions in Christian-

ity. An original aspect of Islam is that all humans

are understood as to be born Muslim. It is the cul-

tural environment that changes their essentially

Muslim nature in to something else

The Bible offers no developed theory about

human nature. Genesis 1: 26–28 describes human

beings as created in the image of God (imago Dei);

this description has given rise to many different in-

terpretations through the history of doctrine. Who-

ever is made in the image of God is given the task

of representing God as the steward of creation,

thereby reminding others of God and taking care

of God’s creation on God’s behalf. Hence, human

beings are understood in terms of their relation

with God; it is this relation that is thought to make

humans unique compared to other species. In

Psalm 8, humans are placed between the angels

and God, indicating their high rank in the order of

creation.

Humans are accordingly responsible to God.

Simultaneously, they are themselves part of nature;

they are made of earth, and without the life-giving

breath of God they return to dust. The Bible de-

picts human life as dependent on the continuous

creative activity of God. Humans are not under-

stood in terms of the Greek dichotomy between

soul and body, but human life is viewed from dif-

ferent perspectives, such as flesh, body, heart—all

notions that can also take on different spiritual

meanings. There is a positive affirmation of human

embodiment in the Hebrew Bible, echoed in the

New Testament teachings on the resurrection of

the body and the human need for bodily health, as

well as spiritual salvation. One could suggest that

human nature from a Judeo-Christian point of view

is to be an embodied image of God. This position

is affirmed in Christianity, where Jesus Christ is

seen as the true human being, and thus reveals

what humans are meant to be.

When entering into dialogue with Greek

modes of thought, Christian theologians had to ar-

ticulate the relationship of humans with God from

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points of view offered by existing philosophical

knowledge. This challenged theology to develop

an understanding of what it meant to be created in

the image of God. The dominating point of view

through the Middle Ages became that human na-

ture is unique in rational faculties, understanding,

consciousness, and spirit. This view, as expressed

by Augustine of Hippo, draws on Platonism, which

emphasized rationality and the eternity of the

human soul. It also included the view developed

by Aristotle in ancient Greece and by Thomas

Aquinas during the Middle Ages that put humans

on the same level as the rest of nature, but with ra-

tionality as the species-unique skill. The eighth-

century theologian Johannes Damascenus ex-

presses the prevalent understanding of human

nature in the Middle ages: The human being is the

image of God because it has reason and free will

and is able to be its own master.

Philosophical patterns for a theory of human

nature

Two main philosophical trends have had a major

influence on understandings of human nature.

From the ancient Greek philosopher Plato on-

wards, the human being alone is able to under-

stand and grasp rationally the world as it is in itself,

beyond every change. This ability derives from the

rational faculties, expressed in the ability to think.

Thus, human nature is closely linked to the ability

to think, and to act with thinking as a guide.

Plato articulated the paradigm for a rationalist

understanding of human nature. He assumed a di-

chotomy between body and soul. The soul is the

site of reason, and as such it is understood as eter-

nal and (partly and potentially) independent of the

body. The body, on the other hand, is mortal and

will die. The central struggle in a person’s life is to

gain control over the physical by means of the ra-

tional. As a consequence, Plato sees the flourishing

of human nature in its ability to control life with ra-

tional means.

The importance of this paradigm is most

clearly seen in the seventeenth century rationalism

of the French philosopher and mathematician René

Descartes, who maintains a sharp dichotomy of

body and soul. Descartes claims that while the ex-

ternal world (res extensa) operates by mechanistic

principles, this is not the case with humans, who

are guided by reason. Animals are without reason

and hence to be understood according to mecha-

nistic causation only. This view separates the

human being sharply from the rest of nature, and

suggests that what is specifically human cannot be

investigated by the same principles that were uti-

lized by the emerging modern natural sciences.

Philosophically, theories of human nature be-

fore the Enlightenment are either rationalist or em-

piricist in outlook. The empiricist outlook puts

more stress on human experience as a condition

that shapes actual fulfillment in human life. Hence,

one’s participation in nature is given a larger role

when it comes to determining who a person is.

This approach also put more emphasis on the con-

tinuity of humans with the rest of nature, and,

combined with the experimental approach to in-

vestigation of nature, it contributed greatly to the

development of modern science. As a result,

human nature is here regarded as part of nature,

and not something unique. This view is consonant

with a religious position that sees the human soul

as a function of a complex physical organism

rather than as an independent substance.

Challenges from evolutionary thinking

A process similar to the one that began when

Christian theology met Greek philosophy devel-

oped with the rise of biological insights during the

nineteenth century. Theology had to articulate

views on human nature that were able to respond

to, oppose, and integrate the insights offered by

the research of Charles Darwin and others. Obso-

lete theological theories about the constancy of

human nature were now challenged; humans

could no longer be seen as a species directly cre-

ated by God outside of the evolutionary process.

Some theological traditions, however, were reluc-

tant to enter into a positive reception of what biol-

ogy could mean for understanding humanity as

part of natural history. Some continue to believe

that the biblical stories tell the actual prehistory of

humans. This view cannot, however, be held with-

out ignoring the massive amounts of data resulting

from scientific inquiry into the prehistory of hu-

mans and nature.

Following the rapid development during the

nineteenth century of more biologically informed

views on human nature, the first half of the twen-

tieth century gave rise to other ways of thinking

about human nature. In Germany a special disci-

pline developed called philosophical anthropology.

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Still tying to appropriate the insights of biology,

representatives of this movement attempted to

show how humans must be seen as a species that

participates in a spiritual realm and is able to relate

to the world in a way not available to other living

creatures. Some theologians, notably Pannenberg,

tried to direct this trend toward integration or me-

diation between scientific and humanistic insights.

Here, physiological traits of humanity are seen as

conditions for a religious attitude.

The ability of human beings to transcend

themselves is interpreted as the basic trait that can

relate us to and realize our divine destiny. On the

other hand, the estrangement from this destiny

(i.e., sin), is understood by Pannenberg to be con-

ditioned by our constitutional self-centeredness.

The content of human life, human identity, and

human will are developed in tension between self-

ishness and divinity.

Integrating scientific knowledge with

theological anthropology

Attempts to explain moral behavior (and also reli-

gion) in the light of biological evolution have stirred

much discussion in which human action is judged

by moral standards that reflect the extent to which

actions contribute to evolutionary advancement or

progress. Critics claim that proponents of this posi-

tion “fail to demonstrate why the promotion of bio-

logical evolution by itself should be the standard to

measure what is morally good” (Ayala, p. 47).

The interaction between science and theology

has generally consisted of two tasks: determining

the range of the validity of the claims offered by bi-

ology and sociobiology; and integrating these in-

sights into a more coherent pattern of interpreta-

tion of humanity that also takes into account other

realms that shape human life and development,

such as culture, sociality, history, and subjectivity.

The second task has led to more modest positions

on what theology can say about the place of hu-

mans in nature, and there has been no uncon-

strained reception of the evolutionary approach to

morality or religion in theological anthropology.

Generally, theological anthropology that is in dia-

logue with the sciences tends to navigate between

biological reductionism and cultural construc-

tivism. Here, the sciences are seen as elucidating

the conditions for a religious or moral position,

rather than actually explaining them solely on the

basis of biology.

The debate over morality in relation to human

nature also exhibits a basic challenge concerning

the relation between science and theology: Should

theology offer interpretations of insights from sci-

ence, or should theology try to balance, correct, or

contradict these in relation to its own definition of

humanity? An example of this problem can be

found in the discussion of altruism. Some scientists

consider acts of altruism to be contrary to the

mechanisms promoting human evolution, while

others sees altruism as a positive device for evolu-

tion. Theological anthropology seems bound to

contradict the first view, while it can relate affir-

matively to the second, claiming that evolution op-

erates on other, not naturally given, principles in

humanity. Here, culture is seen as a process that is

reducible to natural selection. Religion takes part in

this. “It makes human beings open to a greater re-

ality before which each individual has infinite

value and is absolutely equal” (Theissen, p. 49).

Again, a basic pattern seems to underlie any dis-

cussion of human nature: Is it to be determined

from the point of view of nature and the sciences

only, and in accordance with the principles given

there, or is it necessary to also establish other in-

dependent sources as a means for determining

human nature?

Recently, the discussion about human nature

has taken a new turn as new developments in bi-

ology, especially genetics, contribute to what can

be called an essentialist view of human nature.

This implies that what a human being is, or is to

become, is determined by his or her genetic dis-

positions. Thus, there is an identification of human

nature with the given genetic conditions. This view

puts little emphasis on the social impact on the

formation of humans.

An alternative view, social constructivism, em-

phasizes how humans become what they are as a

result of specific cultural conditions communicated

within a specific social, social-psychological, and

cultural context. Here the actual outcome of bio-

logical and other functions is seen as shaped by

socially determined conditions. This view is often

presented as anti-essentialist, and contains a tacit

program for emancipation as gender-based or

other socially ascribed roles and demarcations are

seen as the result of contingent social develop-

ments rather than biological conditions. In psy-

chology, this leads to emphasis on how human re-

lations and culture shape a person’s “inner world.”

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Hence, the way human beings relate to and inter-

pret the world is constituted by them as being re-

lational and social. People are more than “contain-

ers” of drives and desires that express themselves

in the social and cultural world.

From a phenomenological point of view, hu-

mans appear as participants in a multitude of

realms related to aspects of both nature and cul-

ture. Nature and history is deeply interwoven with

human life. This multidimensionality also influ-

ences the ways humans understand themselves

and relate to the world. However, this phenome-

non also suggests that to reduce the interpretation

of what human nature is to one or a few aspects

implies restricting the possibilities for human self-

understanding, and thus, in the long run, for

human self-fulfillment.

Consequently, one of the issues that theologi-

cal anthropology must address when integrating

elements from scientific understandings of human

nature is the possibility for understanding human

beings as more than a product of natural evolution.

This is partly due to tendencies towards naturalist

reductionism, but also in order to safeguard the

human ability to transcend the naturally given con-

ditions of life. This self-transcendence is an impor-

tant element in human personhood, and is closely

linked to the affirmation of human freedom.

Conclusion

There is presently no general agreement as to how

to relate to and appropriate insights from the natu-

ral sciences in the development of philosophical or

religious theories of human nature. Such an agree-

ment should not be expected as long as there is no

unified opinion about what a human being is.

However, it is possible to distinguish three differ-

ent models for developing the relationship be-

tween religious and philosophical theories of

human nature and the sciences:

(1) The natural sciences can be seen as the basis

for interpreting religious or philosophical

doctrines about human nature, with philoso-

phy and theology working in continuation

of what the sciences offer.

(2) A more dialectic or mediating approach tries

to incorporate different perspectives on the

human being within a coherent theoretical

(philosophical or theological) framework.

Here, informed by natural sciences, one can

formulate theological or philosophical in-

sights without giving them alone the task of

determining the overall hermeneutic frame-

work for the development of the theory or

doctrine.

(3) A non-dialogical approach denies the rele-

vance of natural science for the understand-

ing and development of philosophical and

religious theories of human nature. From the

point of view of the sciences, this position

can be reversed by one who denies the rele-

vance of philosophy or theology for the un-

derstanding of humanity, a position that usu-

ally implies a very strong empiricism

combined with traits of reductionism.

See also EVOLUTION, HUMAN; HUMAN NATURE,

HYSICAL ASPECTS; IMAGO DEI; PSYCHOLOGY;

OCIOBIOLOGY

Bibliography

Ayala, Fransisco J. “Human Nature: One Evolutionist’s

View.” In Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific

and Theological Portraits of Human Nature, eds.

Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton

Malony. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1998.

Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man. London: John Mur-

ray, 1874.

Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of the Species. Oxford: Ox-

ford University Press, 1996.

Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 1989.

Gergen, Kenneth J. An Invitation to Social Construction.

London: Sage, 1999.

Gregersen, Niels Henrik; Drees, Willem B.; and Görman,

Ulf. The Human Person in Science and Theology. Ed-

inburgh: T&T Clark, 2000.

Hügli, Anton; Grawe, Christian; Kiefhaber, M.; et al. “Men-

sch.” In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie Vol.

5, 1059–1106.

Jones, James W. Religion and Psychology in Transition:

Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Theology. New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996.

Knapp, Andreas. Soziobiologie und Moraltheologie. Kritik

der ethischen Folgerungen moderner Biologie. Wein-

hein, Germany: VCH, Acta Humaniora, 1989.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Anthropology in Theological Per-

spective. Philadelphia: Westminister, 1985.

Peacocke, Arthur. Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and

Becoming, Natural, Divine, and Human. London:

SCM, 1993.

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HUME,DAVID

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Scheler, Max. Man’s Place in Nature, trans. Hans Meyer-

hoff. New York: Noonday Press, 1961.

Stevenson, Leslie. Seven Theories of Human Nature. Ox-

ford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Theissen, Gerd. Biblical Faith: An Evolutionary Approach.

Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985.

van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Duet or Duel? Theology and

Science in a Postmodern World. London: SCM, 1998.

Wilson, Edward O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cam-

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Wilson. Edward O. On Human Nature. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1978.

JAN-OLAV HENRIKSEN

HUME,DAVID

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Edinburgh,

Scotland, on April 26, 1711. He was educated at

home in the Presbyterian parish of Chirnside, near

Berwick, and studied at the University of Edin-

burgh from 1723 until 1726, without taking a de-

gree. Before leaving the university, he had pro-

jected his Treatise of Human Nature, and between

the ages of fifteen and twenty-three he read widely

and methodically in philosophy and other

branches of learning, making the study of human

nature his principal concern and the source from

which he would draw all true conclusions in phi-

losophy, morality, and criticism. In 1734 Hume

went to France where he lived quietly for three

years composing his revolutionary systematic study

of human nature, which was published in three

volumes in London from 1739 to 1740. The first

volume concerns the understanding, the second

the passions, and the third morality.

Finding that the work “fell dead-born from the

press without reaching such distinction, as even to

excite a murmur among the zealots,” Hume

penned a review of his own work, which he had

anonymously published as a pamphlet: An Ab-

stract of a Book lately Published, Entitled, A Trea-

tise of Human Nature, &c. Wherein The Chief Ar-

gument of that Book is farther Illustrated and

Explained (1740). This remarkable pamphlet is still

the best brief guide to the central arguments and

conclusions of Hume’s theoretical philosophy, so it

is unfortunate that a copy of it did not come to

light until 1933. Though Hume’s Treatise was a

commercial failure during his lifetime, it is now al-

most universally regarded as one of the greatest

works of systematic philosophy in the English lan-

guage. However, because he was so disappointed

with its reception and was inclined to blame him-

self for this fact, he recast the first volume into An

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

(1748), and the third volume into An Enquiry Con-

cerning the Principles of Morals (1758), both of

which have become philosophical classics.

The Treatise is firmly within the empiricist tra-

dition of John Locke (1632–1704). No ideas are in-

nate: all are derived, either directly or indirectly,

from outer or inner experience. Experience is also

the arbiter of all belief. Hume may be regarded as

advancing a sophisticated Lockean viewpoint that

has benefited greatly from the acute criticisms of

Locke made by George Berkeley (1685–1753) and

others. The universally accepted maxim that “every

event has a cause” has no basis in reason. Nor

does the ubiquitous assumption that what has hap-

pened in the past will happen in the future have

any basis in reason. The problem of induction is

emphasized and shown to be insoluble by reason

alone. The faculty of reason is demoted from its

historical hegemony at the same time as the non-

rational faculty of imagination is promoted. The

imagination, however, does not associate or con-

nect ideas at random. It operates according to prin-

ciples and associates resembling ideas, or ideas of

objects that are contiguous in space and time or

that are causally related: “Here is a kind of attrac-

tion, which in the mental world will be found to

have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and

show itself in as many and as various forms.” Rea-

son gives way to instinct, custom, and habit. The

three types of association “are the only ties of our

thoughts,” so “they are really to us the cement of

the universe.” Many items that reason allegedly dis-

cerns are reduced to projections or expressions of

human nature. In the Abstract, Hume unequivo-

cally describes his system as “very sceptical”: “Phi-

losophy wou’d render us entirely Pyrrhonian,

were not nature too strong for it.” His considered

position is that of a moderate or mitigated scepti-

cism, or one whose otherwise extreme conclusions

have been somewhat “corrected” by common

sense. This is the Hume who woke Immanuel Kant

(1724–1804) from his “dogmatic slumber.”

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