Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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NEWTON,ISAAC

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Newton’s distinction between absolute and rel-

ative space and time has a heretical corollary, since

in his theology God is equated with immovability

and the absolute, and Christ with motion and the

relative. It is also likely that Newton’s antitrinitarian

view of a unipersonal God supported his under-

standing of the unity of nature. That even the

heretical elements of Newton’s theology perme-

ated his natural philosophical program is made

plain by his General Scholium, which, although an

appendix to an ostensively purely natural philo-

sophical work, is embedded with antitrinitarian

biblical hermeneutics, in addition to its more overt

anti-Cartesian stance. For Newton, the feigned nat-

ural philosophical hypotheses of Descartes are no

different than the vain doctrinal hypotheses of

Trinitarianism. Corrupt interpretative practices in

natural philosophy and theology are linked, just as

the correct methods of arriving at Truth are unified.

Newton’s General Scholium epitomizes his dual

reformation, a grand program that sought to re-

store the original, pure forms of both natural phi-

losophy and religion.

Newton’s integrated program for science and

religion

The foregoing must not be taken as evidence that

it was only the case that Newton’s theology in-

formed his natural philosophy, but not the other

way around. The same considerations that explain

the first dynamic also make the reverse perfectly

reasonable. Thus, Newton’s methodological ap-

proach to the interpretation of prophecy may owe

something to his satisfaction with the results of

mathematics, although Whiston records that when

pressed Newton eschewed the notion that

prophecy could be demonstrated. It is also clear

that Newton’s conception of God was in part

based on a possibly unconscious desire to create

God in his own image: in his letters to Bentley

Newton spoke of the “cause” of the solar system as

not “blind & fortuitous, but very well skilled in Me-

chanicks & Geometry”—a characterization of God

in keeping with the views of Galileo and Johannes

Kepler before him, and one in which a vestige of

Platonism is in evidence.

Newton’s published and unpublished writings

demonstrate that his religion interacted with his

natural philosophy at a high level. Newtonian

physics cannot be disentangled from Newtonian

theology. Although it is clear that Newton recog-

nized disciplinary and methodological distinctions,

the lack of firm barriers within Newton’s intellec-

tual life suggests that it is problematic to speak in

terms of “influence” of one sphere on another. In-

stead, Newton’s lifework evinces one grand project

of uncovering God’s truth. Science and religion for

Newton were not two completely distinct pro-

grams, but two aspects of an integrated whole. For

Newton, the unity of truth meant that there was ul-

timately one culture, not two.

See also CLOCKWORK UNIVERSE; GOD; GRAVITATION;

ATURAL THEOLOGY; REVELATION; TWO BOOKS

Bibliography

Dobbs, Betty Jo Tetter. The Janus Faces of Genius: The

Role of Alchemy in Newton’s Thought. Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Force, James E. and Popkin, Richard H. Essays on the Con-

text, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theol-

ogy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1990.

Force, James E., and Popkin, Richard H., eds. The Books of

Nature and Scripture: Recent Essays on Natural Philos-

ophy, Theology, and Biblical Criticism in the Nether-

lands of Spinoza’s Time and the British Isles of New-

ton’s Time. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994.

Force, James E., and Popkin, Richard H., eds. Newton and

Religion: Context, Nature, and Influence. Dordrecht,

Netherlands: Kluwer, 1999.

Manuel, Frank. The Religion of Isaac Newton. Oxford:

Clarendon, 1974.

McGuire, J. E. Tradition and Innovation: Newton’s Meta-

physics of Nature. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer,

1996.

Newton, Isaac. Observations upon the Prophecies of

Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John. London:

Darby and Browne, 1733.

Newton, Isaac. Newton: Texts, Backgrounds, Commen-

taries, ed. I. Bernard Cohen and Richard S. Westfall.

New York: Norton, 1995.

Newton, Isaac. The Principia: Mathematical Principles of

Natural Philosophy, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and

Anne Whitman, assist. Julia Budenz. Berkeley: Uni-

versity of California Press, 1999.

Osler, Margaret J., ed. Rethinking the Scientific Revolution.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Snobelen, Stephen D. “‘God of Gods, and Lord of Lords’:

The Theology of Isaac Newton’s General Scholium to

the Principia.” Osiris 16 (2001): 169–208.

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NONFOUNDATIONALISM

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Stewart, Larry. “Seeing Through the Scholium: Religion

and Reading Newton in the Eighteenth Century.” His-

tory of Science 34 (1996):123–65.

Turnbull, H. W.; Scott, J. F.; Hall, A. Rupert; and Tilling,

Laura, eds. The Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton, 7

vols. Cambridge, UK: The Royal Society at the Uni-

versity Press, 1959–1977.

Westfall, Richard H. Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac

Newton. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

1980.

STEPHEN D. SNOBELEN

NONFOUNDATIONALISM

Nonfoundationalism (or anti-foundationalism) is a

philosophical view that is dialectically defined by

its negation of foundationalism. Rejecting the

asymmetric image of basic (immediately justified,

foundational) beliefs that support nonbasic beliefs,

nonfoundationalists prefer the image of a web of

mutually supporting beliefs, which are mediated

through a particular community. Nonfoundational-

ists in theology have drawn attention to the way in

which doctrine operates as an intrasystematic

grammar that regulates the form of life of a believ-

ing community. Insofar as they reduce doctrinal

beliefs to this function, they are susceptible to the

same objections that are generally raised against

relativistic forms of coherentism and pragmatism.

See also FOUNDATIONALISM; POSTFOUNDATIONALISM

F. LERON SHULTS

NONLOCALITY

See LOCALITY; PHYSICS, QUANTUM

ONREDUCTIVE

HYSICALISM

See P

HYSICALISM, REDUCTIVE AND NONREDUCTIVE

NUCLEAR ENERGY

Nuclear energy, strictly conceived, has received

rather scant attention within the literature of science

and religion. However, if the focus is broadened to

include nuclear technology—that is, nuclear energy

and nuclear weapons considered together—then

there is a modest increase in its treatment.

Benefits and risks

Nuclear energy has long been viewed as an alter-

native energy source to coal and petroleum, which

are currently the principal sources of energy. Coal

and petroleum provide efficient sources of energy,

but their combustion also generates considerable

carbon dioxide that escapes into the atmosphere.

Although a few dissenters remain, the vast major-

ity of climatologists hold that the build up of car-

bon dioxide in the atmosphere creates a green-

house effect. This greenhouse effect dramatically

warms the planet, which leads, in turn, to global

climate change, resulting in different impacts on

different regions of the planet.

Nuclear energy provides an especially attrac-

tive alternative to coal and petroleum because it

does not contribute to the concentration of carbon

dioxide in the atmosphere. Shifting to nuclear en-

ergy could potentially lead to a cleaner, healthier

environment without a reduction in the human

consumption of energy. However, the benefits of

nuclear energy must be weighed against its sub-

stantial costs and risks. The principal cost of nu-

clear energy occurs with the safe disposal of ra-

dioactive wastes. In addition to the costs of

disposal, there is the risk that nuclear radiation

could be released into the environment, either at

the nuclear power plant or at the site of waste dis-

posal. Such a release could be accidental, the re-

sult of equipment malfunction or human error.

There is also the risk of an intentional release of

nuclear radiation as an act of terrorism. Whether

accidental or intentional, such a release could po-

tentially destroy all biotic life in the affected area

and make the area sterile for life for the foresee-

able future.

Although as of 2002 there have been no inten-

tional releases of nuclear radiation into the envi-

ronment, there have been two serious accidents at

nuclear power plants. In 1979, there was an acci-

dent at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant

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NUCLEAR ENERGY

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in Pennsylvania. There was another accident in

1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in

Ukraine. Although very little nuclear radiation es-

caped from the Three Mile Island accident, nuclear

radiation did escape from the Chernobyl accident,

causing substantial ecological damage and the

deaths of a number of people.

Theological perspectives

Within the science and religion literature, Ian Bar-

bour provides one of the few focused treatments of

nuclear energy in his book Ethics in an Age of Tech-

nology (1993). Barbour begins his examination with

a discussion of risk. If risk is defined as the proba-

bility of an accident multiplied by the magnitude of

its consequences, then the risk posed by nuclear

energy is low, compared to other daily activities,

such as driving a car. However, Barbour argues that

evaluations of such technological risks must also be

influenced by assumptions about human nature and

social institutions. Taking a Christian religious per-

spective, Barbour argues that the individual and so-

cial sin inherent in the human condition calls for ex-

treme caution in the development of nuclear energy

because the risks and consequences are so high.

Shifting his focus to the safe disposal of ra-

dioactive wastes, Barbour identifies three ethical

issues. First, Barbour notes that an issue of regional

justice arises because radioactive waste disposal

imposes extreme risks for a local population in

order to provide a national benefit for everyone.

Intergenerational justice raises a second ethical

issue. The present generation would enjoy the

benefits of nuclear energy, but passes on some of

the burdens and risks of waste disposal to future

generations. Finally, Barbour identifies the loss of

public confidence in governments and the energy

industry as a third ethical issue. His point here is

that historically government and industry have

been secretive and have failed to protect the pub-

lic, rather than being transparent and promoting

public discourse concerning the benefits, costs,

and risks of nuclear energy. Barbour believes that

more promising energy alternatives lie in energy

conservation and in the use of other renewal en-

ergy sources, such as solar power.

In the 1980s, several religious writers warned

that nuclear weapons and nuclear war threatened

not only human life but the ecological viability of

the planet. Two Christian theologians, Gordon

Kaufman and Sallie McFague, argued further that

these interconnected challenges were rooted in

what has become a flawed understanding of God’s

power. In Theology for a Nuclear Age (1985), Kauf-

man argues that the threat of nuclear war and an-

nihilation elicits two contrasting responses from

traditional Christian conceptions of God. On the

one hand, nuclear annihilation is interpreted in es-

chatological terms as God’s action to bring the

present age to an end. On the other hand, the

threat of nuclear war is discounted because of the

view that an almighty creator God, who loves hu-

mans and the rest of creation, would not allow

such a disaster to occur. Kaufman notes that both

responses have the effect of obscuring and under-

mining the responsibility that humans have for

their actions. While the traditional understanding

of God as omnipotent may have been appropriate

for earlier times, Kaufman argues that this under-

standing is no longer appropriate in a nuclear age.

In light of the threat of nuclear weapons, Kaufman

proposes that Christian theologians need to recon-

ceive of God’s power, moving from a dualistic to

an interdependent understanding. This would re-

quire theologians to rethink their formulation of

the symbols “God” and “Christ.” McFague concurs

with Kaufman’s analysis in her book Models of

God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age

(1987). As alternative models for thinking about

God, McFague proposes mother, lover, and friend.

While both Kaufman and McFague were think-

ing initially of the threat of nuclear annihilation,

they both extend their analyses to include ecolog-

ical concerns. Thus, whether conceived broadly as

nuclear technology, or more narrowly as nuclear

energy, the literature of science and religion has

consistently seen critical ecological implications for

the planet.

See also E

COLOGY; ECOLOGY, ETHICS OF; ECOLOGY,

ELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS;

COLOGY, SCIENCE OF; GREENHOUSE EFFECT

Bibliography

Barbour, Ian. Ethics in an Age of Technology. San Fran-

cisco: Harper, 1993.

Kaufman, Gordon D. Theology for a Nuclear Age. Man-

chester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1985.

McFague, Sallie. Models of God: Theology for an Ecological,

Nuclear Age. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987.

RICHARD O. RANDOLPH

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OMEGA POINT THEORY

The concept of the Omega Point in science and re-

ligion discussions was introduced by Jesuit pale-

ontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955)

as a reference to Christ as the final goal of the evo-

lutionary process. The Omega Point Theory, in-

spired by the language of Teilhard, is quite distinct

from Teilhard’s original idea. This theory was put

forward by physicist and mathematician Frank

Tipler in a series of articles in the late 1980s and

popularized in his 1994 book The Physics of Im-

mortality. Tipler theorizes that all matter will con-

verge to an infinite all-knowing point at the end of

a closed universe and that this point to which the

universe is moving is the Omega Point. This

Omega Point is the “god” that necessarily exists

but is not the personal God of traditional theism.

See also CLOSED UNIVERSE; COSMOLOGY; TEILHARD DE

CHARDIN, PIERRE

Bibliography

Tipler, Frank J. The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cos-

mology, God, and the Resurrection of the Dead. New

York: Doubleday, 1994.

MARK WORTHING

OMNIPOTENCE

Divine omnipotence means that God possesses all

power and potency without any external limita-

tion. The notion of omnipotence indicates a basic

principle for the description of divine agency

within monotheistic thought. However, in a monis-

tic and emanative conception of God (e.g., as the

perfect One in the philosophy of Plato and Ploti-

nus, or Baruch Spinoza’s idea of the intrinsic unity

of perfection, necessity, and reality), there is no

need of divine action. Within theism, divine om-

nipotence means the power to do all possible

things that are not contrary to God’s will and

knowledge. The concept of God is often charac-

terized by omnipotence in the description that God

is the all-determining reality (Wolfhart Pannen-

berg), although others regard omnipotence as a

projection of human desires onto an illusory, usu-

ally male, godhead (Sigmund Freud).

The idea of omnipotence comprises not only

the actual reign over all human history as Pan-

tokrator (the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew

YHWH Sebaoth [Psalms 24:10], meaning “the

almighty” and “the ruler of all things”), but also

God’s unlimited potential for agency (Augustine of

Hippo), and for that reason it is religiously an argu-

ment for trusting God’s guidance of salvation his-

tory. Therefore, it relates the concepts of creation

and providence; the omnipotent God sustains the

created reality. Since medieval theology, a distinc-

tion is made between the potentia absoluta (by

which God can effectuate all non-self-contradictory

possibilities) and the potentia ordinata (power lim-

ited by God’s decision to create and maintain the or-

ders of nature and of grace). God’s creative power

is neither exhausted by creating the natural order

nor determined by it but makes room for the mirac-

ulous. The notion of ordained power signifies the

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OMNIPRESENCE

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complete absence of arbitrariness in God’s agency.

Sometimes theologians and philosophers neglected

the religious meaning of omnipotence by speculat-

ing on the boundaries of God’s absolute power,

whether, for example, laws of logic or mathematical

principles were created and maintained by divine

power like the laws of nature (René Descartes). Al-

though the notorious paradox of the stone (can an

omnipotent being make a stone that it cannot lift?)

seems to contradict the possibility of divine om-

nipotence, it is more a curious puzzle that has, how-

ever, a theologically more important equivalent.

That is: Can the omnipotent God create people who

are agents with a free will without simultaneously

losing the control of the course of human history?

This question relates to the problem of evil: Can

one believe in God almighty who is simultaneously

omniscient and perfectly good, and who creates

human agents with moral freedom and responsibil-

ity, and who permits suffering in the world? Is such

a concept of divine omnipotence consistent? Proc-

ess theologians, like Charles Hartshorne, try to

avoid this dilemma by claiming that God’s power is

finite and limited by the freedom and power of

human creatures. This kind of balance, however,

presupposes a quantitative distribution of power at

the same level, whereas providence entails divine

omnipotence sustaining the created power at a dif-

ferent level. The so-called “free will defense” argues

that the possibility of evil is given with the human

reality of moral responsibility (Alvin Plantinga). This

concept is compatible with God providing room for

human freedom by limiting divine omnipotence

(i.e., by not permanently actualizing it in all its re-

spects). But it does not touch the problem of natu-

ral evil (diseases, floods, etc.). In light of this, the

question can be raised whether we may refer to

God as perfectly good when this same God created

a universe in which moral and natural evil are pos-

sibilities. Moreover, when we consider the possibil-

ity that this may be a universe over which God,

after the act of creation, has no further control, and

thus cannot influence the outcome of events, we

might consider such a God morally blameworthy

for taking the initiative of creation.

See also AUGUSTINE; CREATION; DESCARTES, RENÉ;

IVINE ACTION; EVIL AND SUFFERING; FREEDOM;

REE WILL DEFENSE; FREUD, SIGMUND; GOD;

IRACLE; OMNISCIENCE; PLATO; PROCESS

THOUGHT; PROVIDENCE; THEODICY

Bibliography

Case-Winters, Anna. God’s Power: Traditional Understand-

ings and Contemporary Challenges. Louisville, Ky.:

Westminster Press, 1990.

Freddoso, Alfred J., ed. The Existence and Nature of God.

Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,

1983.

Hartshorne, Charles. Omnipotence and Other Theological

Mistakes. Albany: State University of New York Press,

1984.

Van den Brink, Gijsbert. Almighty God: A Study of the Doc-

trine of Divine Omnipotence. Kampen, Netherlands:

Kok Pharos, 1993.

LUCO J. VAN DEN BROM

OMNIPRESENCE

The divine attribute of omnipresence is the theo-

logical interpretation of God’s hiddenness, whose

presence in history is unlimited and transcends

local space. Concepts like transcendence, imma-

nence, agency, knowledge, indwelling, place, and

spiritual substance are basic to omnipresence.

God’s omnipresence is an active presence, which

means that creation and providence find their

place within God’s creative presence. Classical the-

ology distinguishes omnipresence by virtue of

power, knowledge, and being. Divine power fills

everything and God’s being is by nature wholly

present in all things, therefore God’s place is

where the divine power and activity manifests it-

self as dynamic omnipresence. Divine presence by

virtue of knowledge means that every entity is cre-

ated in accordance with divine ideas and is thus

mentally present to God.

After the demythologization of “heaven above,”

the question is how to imagine the relation be-

tween the divine sphere and the world of human

experience. Is God’s presence spatial or nonspatial?

An answer to this question depends on the theory

of space people handle. One can distinguish ideal-

istic, realistic, and relational theories. An idealistic

theory of space denies the independent existence

of space, but holds that one’s observing capacity

arranges objects spatially. A realistic theory holds

that space exists independently of the objects

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OMNISCIENCE

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therein or of any observer. A relational theory

claims that space is given with objects in their mu-

tual relations, as the order of coexistent things.

Three theories interpret God’s omnipresence

by means of a realistic theory of space. Absolute

monism imagines that God and created reality co-

incide (Baruch Spinoza: Deus sive natura). Or-

ganic monism interprets the relation between God

and the world as a psychosomatic unity, thus the

world is God’s body. God is both present in and all

over the world and transcends the world at the

same time (Grace Jantzen; process theology). Spa-

tial dualism conceives God’s omnipresence as ex-

tended in absolute space without coinciding with

the created world. God is thought of as active

everywhere and therefore God is also substantially

present everywhere as an omnipresent non-mate-

rial substance (no actio in distans, Isaac Newton).

Traditionally theologians have thought of

God’s active presence as the universal, nonspatial,

sustaining principle that prevents disintegration

(Anselm of Canterbury), or as the nonspatial, spir-

itual cause of the hierarchy of created causes

(Thomas Aquinas). Because God is “simple” or

nondivisible, God is, as a whole, in every place

(Augustine). Although these theologians presup-

pose a realistic theory of space, their view appears

to be compatible only with idealistic theory.

Given the scientific picture of the world, God’s

omnipresence is imagined as God’s own space

(Karl Barth). With reference to mathematical con-

ceptuality in natural science one can picture three-

dimensional space as a subspace of an infinitely

higher dimensional space in which God exists

(Karl Heim). Now omnipresence means that within

God’s own space of an infinite number of dimen-

sions, God is present in every position in three-di-

mensional space. Thus, God is simultaneous with

all objects in three-dimensional space, without

being contained by this three-dimensional space or

four-dimensional space-time (Luco van den Brom).

See also AUGUSTINE; GOD; MONISM; NEWTON, ISAAC;

HOMAS AQUINAS

Bibliography

Alexander, H. G., ed. The Leibniz-Clarke-Correspondence.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1956.

Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics (II. 1, Section 31). Edin-

burgh, UK: T&T Clark, 1957.

Fuerst, Adrian. A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the

Omnipresence of God in Selected Writings between

1220–1270. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of

America Press, 1951.

Jantzen, Grace M. God’s World, God’s Body. London: Dar-

ton, Longman, and Todd, 1984.

Taliaferro, Charles. Consciousness and the Mind of God.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles (III. 68), trans.

Anton C. Pegis; J. F. Anderson; V. J. Bourke; and C. J.

O’Neil et al. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Univer-

sity Press, 1975.

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae (Ia. 8), ed. Timothy

McDermott. London: Blackfriars, 1970.

van den Brom, Luco J. Divine Presence in the World: A

Critical Analysis of the Notion of Divine Omnipres-

ence. Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos; Louvain,

Belgium: Peeters, 1993.

van den Brom, Luco J. “As Thy New Horizons Beckon:

God’s Presence in the World.” In Understanding the

Attributes of God, eds. Gijsbert van den Brink and

Marcel Sarot. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter

Lang, 1999.

LUCO J. VAN DEN BROM

OMNISCIENCE

Omniscience concerns God’s (a priori) knowledge

about the course of people’s lives. More generally,

it concerns God’s knowledge about the whole

course of history, including the future. This ap-

pears in that aspect of prophetical literature that

expresses itself in a forecasting style, which, in

turn, rests upon divine foreknowledge.

In the biblical literature, knowledge of the fu-

ture is a distinctive characteristic of God over

against pseudo-gods. In Christian theology, the no-

tion of omniscience refers to the property by

which God knows all past, present, and future

things and all events, including all their circum-

stances and boundary conditions. Omniscience en-

compasses both the actual and possible things and

events in past and present, but it includes knowl-

edge of the possibilities that will be actualized as

well as those that will not be actualized. Divine

knowledge is therefore perfect as absolutely true.

But characteristic of divine omniscience is also its

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immediate (intuitive) nature: It will never be dis-

cursive by means of any mediating epistemological

process of experience and deduction.

The classical notion of divine omniscience

states that God knows all events in past, present,

and future simultaneously—in one perspective,

from the eternal (timeless) stance outside of time.

Therefore, God knows all things “from eternity” at

once because this knowledge transcends every

temporal order, including that of its epistemologi-

cal object, for example, the temporal course of the

historical process, as discussed by the Roman

philosopher Boethius (c. 480–524) and the Christ-

ian theologians Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274). Boethius’s meta-

phor describes the all-knowing God outside time

like a person who stands on the top of a mountain

and sees what happens along the road in the val-

ley. That person sees, as it were, simultaneously

the past, the present, and the future of people

walking along the road. A similar type of simul-

taneity was also defended by Wolfhart Pannenberg

(1928– ). Within omniscience one distinguishes a

scientia necessaria (knowledge about God and

about all possibilities) and a scientia libera sive vi-

sionis (complete knowledge or vision of actual re-

ality in past, present, and future).

One conceptual difficulty of this interpretation

of divine omniscience concerns its epistemological

range: Is experiential or existential knowing possi-

ble for an intuitively knowing God? Another diffi-

culty: Is knowledge of a nonexistent future real

knowledge? Knowledge of the future is conceiv-

able in an atemporal ontology, but that makes

time-experiences illusionary. Apart from that, such

a reality seems to be determined because of the

co-existence of past, present, and future. How is

human freedom related to God’s eternal knowl-

edge of it? Is human moral responsibility in such a

reality a real option? So-called incompatibilists will

answer in the negative: Absolute timeless divine

foreknowledge is incompatible with human free-

dom. Therefore, some of them argue against ab-

solute foreknowledge whereas others use it against

human freedom. Compatibilists will answer in the

affirmative: Human freedom and absolute fore-

knowledge are compatible. Some of them will

argue that there are alternative interpretations of a

scientia media (middle or consequent knowledge

about what each creature would freely do in any

possible situation) that might solve the problem of

compatibility.

See also GOD

Bibliography

Craig, William Lane. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility

of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.

Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987.

Fischer, John Martin, ed. God, Foreknowledge, and Free-

dom. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989.

Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The Possibility of an All-Knowing

God. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1986.

Pike, Nelson. “A Latter-day Look at the Foreknowledge

Problem.” International Journal for Philosophy of Re-

ligion 33 (1993): 129–164.

Swinburne, Richard. (1993). The Coherence of Theism. Ox-

ford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. The Dilemma of Freedom and

Foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press,

1991.

LUCO J. VAN DEN BROM

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Ontological arguments attempt to establish the ex-

istence of God by relying on one’s concept of God,

or the definition of the word God, without involv-

ing truths known through experience. Such argu-

ments have had many proponents in the history of

philosophy, notably Anselm of Canterbury

(1033/34–1109) and René Descartes (1596–1650),

as well as many detractors, including Thomas

Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) and Immanuel Kant

(1724–1804). Today ontological arguments are

widely considered flawed, but exactly what is

wrong with them remains a matter of controversy.

The locus classicus is chapter two of Anselm’s

Proslogion, where he calls attention to the idea of

a being greater (more excellent) than any other

conceivable being, that is, the idea of a maximally

great being. Anselm maintains that even those who

reject the existence of a maximally great being still

possess the concept of one. Now—and this is the

key premise—if there were no maximally great

being, one could conceive of something even

greater than it by conceiving of a maximally great

being that exists. But it involves a contradiction to

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say that one can conceive of a being greater than

a maximally great being. Hence, absurdity results

from the supposition that God does not exist.

A common response focuses on an assumption

behind the key premise, namely that something can

be greater than another thing simply by virtue of

existence. What is one to make of this thesis? It ap-

pears to be false for the simple reason that a com-

parison of greatness requires (at least) two existing

things to compare. But the proponent of the argu-

ment might reply that one can compare things

without assuming their existence—for example, the

strength of Achilles and Hector. It is therefore im-

portant how this is done. Perhaps it simply involves

a comparison of the relevant concepts. Then the

key premise means, “If nothing in existence corre-

sponded to one’s concept of God, one could gen-

erate a superior concept by representing God as

existing.” But this seems false; one’s initial concept,

which failed to correspond to anything, might well

have been the concept of God-as-existing.

More plausibly, to compare the greatness of

two things without assuming that they exist is to

ask which of them would be greater if both were to

exist. But if to compare the greatness of two things

they must both be thought of as existing, existence

itself cannot be considered a respect in which they

differ in greatness. Thus, as Immanuel Kant argued,

existence is not a “perfection”; it is not a property

that can contribute to something’s greatness.

There are at least two ways to avoid this ob-

jection: (1) one could claim that some objects of

thought possess a mode of being distinct from ex-

istence; or (2) one could alter the argument to

build on the claim that necessary existence (rather

than mere existence) is a perfection.

According to the first approach, there are such

things as, for example, unicorns; they just do not

exist. They are abstract objects of thought that lack

spatiotemporal location and causal powers. Thus,

one could really consider the “greater than” rela-

tion to involve two entities even if one or both of

those entities do not exist. And one can treat exis-

tence as a property that enhances the greatness of

something after all.

Another general objection to the ontological

argument, however, causes problems for this ap-

proach. Could one not use reasoning similar to

Anselm’s in order to establish the existence of all

kinds of things? Consider the idea of an island

greater than any other island that can be con-

ceived. Since such an island can be the object of

one’s thoughts, it must (on this view) be an ab-

stract entity, even if it lacks existence. If it does

lack existence, however, one could think of a

greater island, namely an island that also exists. So

a maximally great island must exist. But (unfortu-

nately) the greatest conceivable island does not

exist, so the argument form cannot be sound. This

parody was conceived by the monk Gaunilo, a

contemporary of Anselm’s.

Replying to Gaunilo’s parody, Anselm insisted

that the argument form can only establish the exis-

tence of that which is greatest or most perfect sim-

pliciter, and not the most perfect island or blue-

bird. The argument form, he suggests, will only

work if the concept one begins with is that of a

being that could not have failed to exist. But all is-

lands and other material objects are the sorts of

things that could be destroyed. A rejoinder might

alter the parody to involve the idea of a spiritual

entity with almost every perfection (e.g., a godlike

being lacking only a certain amount of knowledge

but nevertheless a necessary being).

Inspired by passages in Anselm that suggest a

different kind of ontological argument, some pro-

ponents avoid the above dispute by focusing on

God’s necessary existence rather than on God’s ex-

istence. This is the approach of Charles Hartshorne,

Norman Malcolm, and Alvin Plantinga. For any-

thing to count as God, they argue, it would have to

be absolutely perfect. But anything that exists and

yet might not have existed is thereby deficient in

some way. So if God exists, God exists necessarily;

it could never be that God just happens to exist.

Now, one can think of a necessary being as some-

thing that exists according to all the ways the world

might have been, or “possible worlds.” So either

God exists in every possible world or in none. But

this means that, so long as it is possible that God

exists, God actually exists; after all, the way things

actually are is one of the ways things can be. Thus,

the argument forces a dilemma between the neces-

sity of God’s existence and its impossibility.

The key question, then, is whether the exis-

tence of God (conceived of as a necessary being)

is even possible. Certain philosophers have held

that possibility is something conceptual, and that

unless the concept of God is somehow incoherent,

the existence of God is possible. Thus Charles

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Hartshorne has argued that either God exists or

else the term God is meaningless or self-contradic-

tory. And on the face of it, the existence of God

certainly does not appear to be incoherent, like

the existence of a round square. It seems perfectly

conceivable.

The trouble is that the nonexistence of God

also seems conceivable. And if it were even possi-

ble—assuming that God is by definition a neces-

sary being—it would follow that God does not

exist. So it would appear that the link between

conceivability and possibility in this case is tenu-

ous. And philosophers today are widely in agree-

ment that states of affairs may be metaphysically

impossible without involving any absurdity that is

accessible to a priori reflection. So it is hard to see

how one can assess the possibility of God’s exis-

tence unless one has reason to affirm or deny

God’s actual existence, which is the point at issue.

See also COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; GOD, EXISTENCE OF

Bibliography

Adams, Robert Merrihew. “The Logical Structure of

Anselm’s Arguments.” The Philosophical Review 80

(1971): 28–54.

Hartshorne, Charles. Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of

Theism. New York: Harper, 1941.

Kane, Robert. “The Modal Ontological Argument.” Mind

93 (1984): 336–350.

Lewis, David K. “Anselm and Actuality.” Noûs 4 (1970):

175–188.

Oppy, Graham. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Plantinga, Alvin. The Ontological Argument from St.

Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers. New York:

Doubleday, 1965.

van Inwagen, Peter. “Necessary Being: The Ontological

Argument.” In Philosophy of Religion: The Big Ques-

tions, eds. Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray.

Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999.

DAVID MANLEY

ONTOLOGY

Ontology is the study of being, insofar as being is

possessed by any kind of entity. Although the term

ontologia derives from the early seventeenth cen-

tury, ontology is as old as philosophy itself. While

German mathematician and philosopher Christian

Wolff (1679-1754) identified ontology with meta-

physica generalis (inquiry into the general cate-

gories of being), the relationship between ontol-

ogy and metaphysics has become less precise.

Some believe the two synonymous; others hold

that while metaphysics deals with the nature and

structure of all possible being, ontology only con-

cerns actually existing beings. Ontological ques-

tions permeate the science-religion conversation;

for example, what is the ontological status of the

divine, and of putative emergent properties (e.g.,

the mental)?