Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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PANTHEISM

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Russell, Robert John; Murphey, Nancey; and Peacocke,

Arthur R., eds. Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Per-

spectives on Divine Action. Berkeley, Calif.: Center for

Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995.

Tillich, Paul. The Courage to Be. New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University Press, 1952.

Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology, 3 Vols. Chicago: Univer-

sity of Chicago Press, 1951–1963.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World.

New York: Macmillan, 1925.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in

Cosmology (1929), corrected edition, ed. David Ray

Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: Macmil-

lan, 1978.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York:

Macmillan, 1933.

DAVID H. NIKKEL

PANTHEISM

Derived from the Greek words pan (all) and theos

(God), thus meaning “all is God,” pantheism is the

view that the universe or nature as a whole is di-

vine. In relation to rival views, pantheism is de-

fined as the doctrine that God is neither externally

transcendent to the world, as in classical theism,

nor immanently present within the world, as in pa-

nentheism, but rather is identical with the world.

As a religious position, pantheism holds that

nature is imbued with value and worthy of respect,

reverence, and awe. As a philosophical position,

pantheism is the belief in an all-inclusive unity,

variously formulated. Historically, the nature of the

unity has been defined quite differently in Ploti-

nus’s “One,” Baruch Spinoza’s “Substance,” Georg

Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s “Geist,” and Charles

Hartshorne’s “All-Inclusive Totality.” Due to ambi-

guities in the chief analogies used by philosophers

(whole-part; mind-body) the line between panthe-

istic and panentheistic positions is often difficult to

draw. In general, pantheism represents an alterna-

tive to the classical theistic notion of God in West-

ern philosophy and theology, and has close coun-

terparts in Taoism, Advaita Vedanta, and certain

schools of Buddhism. It is also the ism closest in

spirit to Native American religions.

Types of pantheism

Two broad types of pantheism may be distin-

guished: monistic pantheism and pluralistic pan-

theism. Examples of monistic pantheism are classi-

cal Spinozistic pantheism, which devalued the

importance of dynamic and pluralistic categories,

and Hindu forms of pantheism, which have rele-

gated change and pluralism to the realm of the il-

lusory and phenomenal. In addition, the romantic

and idealistic types of pantheism that flourished in

nineteenth-century England and America were

generally monistic.

The pluralistic type of pantheism is found in

William James’s A Pluralistic Universe (1908) as a

hypothesis that supersedes his earlier “piecemeal

supernaturalism” in The Varieties of Religious Expe-

rience (1902). James’s conception emphasizes the

full reality of insistent particulars, embedded in a

complex web of conjunctive and disjunctive rela-

tions in which manyness is as real as oneness. Re-

ligiously, pluralistic pantheism affirms that evil is

genuine, the divine is finite, and salvation, in any

sense, is an open question. Further exemplifica-

tions of pluralistic pantheism are found in a series

of late twentieth-century movements, including

James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis that the earth

behaves like a single entity, the deep ecology

movement, the feminist spirituality movement, and

the New Age movement. In 1990 American histo-

rian Catherine Albanese, canvassing diverse forms

of pantheistic piety since the early republic, con-

sidered nature religion in America “alive and well,

growing daily, and probably a strong suit for the

century to come” (p. 198).

Challenges to pantheism

The chief challenge to pantheism, according to

critics, is the difficulty of deriving a warrant for the

criteria of human good. How is one to establish

any priority in the ordering of values and commit-

ments if nature as a whole is considered divine

and known to contain evil as well as good, de-

struction as much as creation? In light of this con-

cern, John Cobb and other process theologians

recommend a fundamental distinction between

creativity as the ultimate reality and God as the ul-

timate actuality. In this way, the divine character is

identified only with the good. Other theologians,

like David Tracy, view such a metaphysical dis-

tinction as dubious and point out that the denial of

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any identity between ultimate reality and the di-

vine may foster the view that ultimate reality is not

finally to be trusted as radically relational and self-

manifesting (Tracy, p. 139). The pantheistic model

is capable of countering both of these concerns.

On the first point, pantheism underscores the blunt

fact that the rain falls on the just and the unjust

alike, whatever model of the divine one holds.

Critics of pantheism observe that human efforts to-

ward compassion and justice are frequently not re-

inforced by ultimate reality. Nature is often indif-

ferent to human desires and deaf to moral

urgencies. Pantheists say this is indicative of the re-

morselessness of things, not of the superiority of

either the theistic or the panentheistic model. In

the second place, by collapsing the distinction be-

tween creativity and the divine, pluralistic panthe-

ism does identify the religious ultimate with the

metaphysical ultimate, but this identification may

or may not entail the further (Christian) specifica-

tion of ultimate reality as radically relational and

self-manifesting. Due to its extreme generality, the

pantheistic model is susceptible to multiple speci-

fications of various kinds, on lesser levels of gen-

erality as found within the more concrete symbols

and images of the world’s religious traditions.

For secularist critics, the most significant ob-

jection to pluralistic pantheism is the semantic

question. Why call it “God” or divine? According to

nineteenth-century German philosopher Arthur

Schopenhauer, calling nature or the universe God

does not explain anything, but only serves “to en-

rich our language with a superfluous synonym for

the word ‘world’” (p. 40). Pantheists are apt to con-

cede this point but to urge attentiveness to nature’s

terrible beauty all the same. In the words of the

early twentieth-century American poet Harriet

Monroe, “Call the Force God and worship it at a

million shrines, and it is no less sublime; call it Na-

ture, and worship it in scientific gropings and dis-

coveries, and it is no less divine. It goes its own

way, asking no homage, answering no questions”

(p. 454). Recoiling from anthropomorphic myth-

making, modern pantheists like Monroe express

astonishment over the way religious creeds impose

a name and person-like traits upon the creative

force animating the universe. Avoidance of per-

sonalistic imagery and preference for vague talk of

a “force” in nature is characteristic of contemporary

pantheism.

Science and religion

Without using the term pantheism, many people

who are not traditionally religious acknowledge

the feeling that nature is sacred. While panenthe-

ism is a theological construction, pantheism prob-

ably has more grass roots appeal among ordinary

people, artists, and scientists. As the most impor-

tant challenge that the sciences pose to traditional

religion is their skepticism about the existence of

“another world” not of human making or open to

human inquiry, supernaturalism is less and less an

option among scientifically educated populations.

In the engagement of science and religion issues,

the relevant religious alternatives tend to reduce ei-

ther to pantheism or to panentheism. Astrophysicist

Carl Sagan spoke for those who prefer a straight-

forward pantheistic orientation over what they re-

gard as the equivocations of panentheism: “A reli-

gion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of

the universe as revealed by modern science, might

be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and

awe untapped by the conventional faiths. Sooner

or later, such a religion will emerge” (p. 52).

See also CREATION; DEEP ECOLOGY; FEMINIST

COSMOLOGY; GAIA HYPOTHESIS; GOD; NATURE;

UPERNATURALISM; THEODICY

Bibliography

Albanese, Catherine. Nature Religion in America: From

the Algonkian Indians to the New Age. Chicago: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1990.

Cosby, Donald. Wings of the Morning: A Religion of Nature.

Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.

James William. The Varieties of Religious Experience

(1902). New York: Scribner, 1997.

James, William. A Pluralistic Universe (1908). Lincoln: Uni-

versity of Nebraska Press, 1996.

Levine, Michael P. Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of

Deity. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

Monroe, Harriet. A Poet’s Life: Seventy Years in a Chang-

ing World. New York: Macmillan, 1938.

Sagan, Carl. Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future

in Space. New York: Random House, 1994.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. “A Few Words On Pantheism.” In

Essays from the Parerga and Paralipomena, trans. T.

Bailey Saunders. London: George Allen and Unwin,

1951.

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PARADIGMS

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Tracy, David. “Kenosis, Sunyata, and Trinity: A Dialogue

with Masao Abe.” In The Emptying God: A Buddhist-

Jewish-Christian Conversation, eds. John B. Cobb Jr.,

and Christopher Ives. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1990.

NANCY FRANKENBERRY

PARADIGMS

The word paradigm comes from the Greek pa-

radeigma: evidence, example, pattern, model, ar-

chetype. In linguistics, a paradigm provides an ex-

ample of a conjugation or a declension. In

philosophy, its meanings include an archetype, a

standard of measurement, a typical case or sug-

gestive example, and a dominating scientific orien-

tation. The term paradigm is frequently used in

the social sciences. In popular understanding, par-

adigm often simply means a collection of ideas, a

cluster of theories, models or actions representing

a guiding idea, or a conceptual framework.

The concept of paradigm since

Thomas S. Kuhn

Thomas S. Kuhn’s seminal work The Structure of

Scientific Revolutions (1962) initiated intense dis-

cussions on the concept of paradigm, making the

word paradigm part of the general intellectual dis-

course, though not always in the sense intended by

Kuhn. According to one of the definitions given by

Kuhn, paradigms are “universally recognized sci-

entific achievements that for a time provide model

problems and solutions to a community of practi-

tioners” (p. x). A paradigm consists of a group of

fundamental assumptions forming a shared frame-

work that provides the scholar with instruction on

what to view as issues of inquiry and how to deal

with these issues. Hence, a paradigm works as a

criterion for choosing problems that, as long as the

paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to

have a solution. Paradigms structure observation

and define reality. Kuhn’s perspective is historical:

Preparadigmatic periods in science are followed by

a time where a valid paradigm allows “normal sci-

ence” (to use Kuhn’s terminology) to take place.

Under the conditions of normal science and its

“strong network of commitments—conceptual, the-

oretical, instrumental and methodological” (p. 42),

the community of researchers concentrates on the

routine activity of “puzzle-solving” without testing

the paradigm itself. However, an increasing num-

ber of observed anomalies leads to a crisis and

eventually to a revolution and to the establishment

of a new paradigm that is incommensurable with

the old one. A paradigm shift has traits of a con-

version. New candidates for paradigms are often

presented by young scientists or scholars who are

new to the field.

Kuhn’s book created enough interest to make

it a classic. Criticisms targeted the vagueness of his

concept of paradigm both in definition and in use,

the alleged incommensurability of the old and the

new paradigm, and the notion of revolution as a

description of development in science. Kuhn was

charged with subjectivity, irrationality and rela-

tivism. The change of paradigm, which Kuhn de-

scribed as “the selection by conflict within the sci-

entific community of the fittest way to practice

future science” resulting in “an increase in articula-

tion and specialization” (p. 172), was said to be-

long to the realm of the social psychology of dis-

covery rather than to the philosophy of science

because the change follows values rather than for-

mal rules. Kuhn’s overstatement of revolution at

the expense of the cumulative aspects of develop-

ment in science and his emphasis on the consecu-

tive at the expense of the simultaneous were mod-

ified to allow for the coexistence and even the

interaction of different paradigms. Kuhn himself

specified his notion of paradigm in two ways: a

broad sense, also called a disciplinary matrix,

which includes all the components of scientific

consensus; and a narrow sense, which denotes ex-

emplary solutions to problems. A paradigm has

both descriptive and prescriptive functions, and it

implies commitment by those who work in and

under it.

Kuhn’s concept of paradigm both in its initial

and its modified shape has contributed to a num-

ber of achievements. The concept highlighted the

historical situatedness of scientific research and the

role of consensus in rationality. It lifted up the in-

terplay of scientific and nonscientific components

in the development of science. It focused on the

ambiguity of commitment as that which can both

undercut rationality and make scientific work suc-

cessful. It acknowledged the circularity of abstract-

ing data into a paradigm that informs the selection

and interpretation of new data. Thus it contributed

to fostering an interest in the sociology of scientific

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knowledge and in the hermeneutics of holistic

nonuniversalist rationality. In the philosophy of

science, the concept of paradigm has been fol-

lowed by alternative concepts, such as competing

research programs (Imre Lakatos) and research

traditions (Larry Laudan).

The concept of paradigm in science and

religion

The exploration of the concept of paradigm has

had an impact on the relation between science and

religion. The study has broadened the concept of

rationality and affirmed its complexity and contex-

tuality. It has nourished the discussion of the trans-

latability of various discourses. It has also inspired

a process of paradigm critique that questions the

self-assuring power of paradigms and calls for an

examination of the role of race, gender, culture,

and political and economic power in the process

of forming guiding ideas. In Myths, Models, and

Paradigms (1974) and Religion and Science (1997),

Ian G. Barbour uses the central features of the

Kuhnian paradigm to argue that some of the same

spirit of inquiry found in science also applies to re-

ligion: Religious experiences depend on a paradig-

matic interpretive framework, religious paradigms

are highly resistant to falsification, and no univocal

rules exist for the choice between religious para-

digms. These analogies presuppose a flexible def-

inition of paradigm communities and of continu-

ities versus discontinuities in paradigm shifts.

Referring to paradigms as universal phenomena

that provide comprehensive contexts for interpre-

tation, Sallie McFague demonstrated in Metaphori-

cal Theology (1982) that metaphorical thinking is

basic to human understanding of the world. In

Christianity (1995) Hans Küng used the concept of

macro-, meso-, and microparadigms to structure

the history of Christian theology around five major

paradigms—Jewish Apocalyptic, Ecumenical Hel-

lenistic, Mediaeval Roman Catholic, Protestant

Evangelical, and Modern. Nancey Murphy used the

Lakatosian concept in Theology in the Age of Scien-

tific Reasoning (1990) in her contribution to the di-

alogue between science and religion.

In numerous areas of academic and nonacad-

emic research, paradigm is used in a variety of

ways. It is frequently spoken of in terms of new,

emerging, or shifting paradigms. In the wake of a

more pluralistic approach, an increasingly

metaphorical use of the concept can be noted. The

word paradigm has come to describe more or less

well-defined bodies of knowledge or beliefs,

world views, and guiding or dominant standards

that are apt to change over time and that need not

always be explicit. Nuances of paradigm are often

value-laden: Paradigms are described both as en-

hancing creativity and as restricting creative

thought and action.

See also PHYSICS, QUANTUM

W. MICHAEL DICKSON

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Philosophy of religion can be broadly described as

an inquiry into problems involved in religion or

originated by religion from a philosophical point of

view. Since, however, there are various under-

standings of religion and of philosophy and of the

relation between them the field of philosophy of

religion has become vast and varying. As a sepa-

rate subject it originates from the European en-

lightenment, but its content can be traced back to

the early stages of European philosophy, and there

are rich traditions related to Hinduism, Buddhism,

and Chinese religions. Islamic philosophers have

also played an important role in the development

of the subject. The focus of this entry lies on the

Western philosophical tradition and its interplay

with the Jewish and Christian religions.

The competence of reason. There is a wide-

spread view according to which human reason

lacks all ability to form any adequate idea of God.

In the twentieth century the incompetence of rea-

son in religious questions was clearly stated by the

Swiss Protestant theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968)

and his followers. The existence and actions of

God can only be adequately dealt with in answer

to the revealed word of God. Accordingly, religion

and science belong to quite different sections of

human activity, and ordinary philosophy is of

minor importance compared to true religion. The

bankruptcy of reason can hardly be defended by

reasonable arguments, but it has an anchorage in

feelings and experiences from various periods of

the Christian tradition. The dominant view in Chris-

tian and Jewish traditions is that human reason is

important for clarification of religious questions

and that philosophy of religion provides a meeting

ground for religion and science. A string of mysti-

cism, however, often accompanies the religious

thinking among those who defend the competence

of human reason in the realm of religion.

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Analysis of religious language. The use of

symbols, metaphors, and analogies in religious lan-

guage has attracted much philosophical interest,

Thomas Aquinas’s (c. 1225–1274) doctrine of anal-

ogy being an example. Analysis of language has

been a main theme in modern philosophy of

religion. Similarities to, and differences from,

scientific language have been discussed. An ana-

lytic philosopher like Alfred J. Ayer denied the

theoretical meaningfulness of religious language,

but this was defended by John Hick, for

example. A noncognitive view was developed by

Richard B. Braithwaite, seeing God-talk as a com-

mitment to an agapeistic form of life. Similar theo-

ries, as represented by D. Z. Phillips, have been de-

veloped on the basis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later

philosophy.

God in philosophical systems. The idea of

God provides a cornerstone in the philosophical

construction of the world by Plato and Aristotle.

The influence from Plato and Aristotle in Western

religious traditions can hardly be underestimated.

Aristotle especially has often been a common

point of reference both for scientists and theolo-

gians. Muslim philosophers, such as Averroës

(1126–1198), brought the Aristotelian heritage to

Christian scholasticism. Many arguments frequently

used in later philosophy and relevant to the reli-

gion-science discussion are presented in the dia-

logue De Natura Deorum of Cicero (106–43

B.C.E.).

In the further development of European philoso-

phy, different concepts of God have played a de-

cisive role, and the western philosophical tradition

is hardly understandable without noticing the in-

fluence of Jewish and Christian theology. To the

classical heritage from philosophy of religion be-

long Aquinas’s philosophical arguments for the ex-

istence of God, the so-called Five Ways, the most

influential being the cosmological and the teleo-

logical arguments.

René Descartes (1596–1650), who had great in-

fluence on the rise of modern science, offered

many arguments for the existence of God, includ-

ing the ontological one. An interesting pantheistic

concept of God is important in Baruch Spinoza’s

(1632–1677) philosophy. He equates God and na-

ture. A philosophical discussion that is especially

fruitful for elucidating the relationship between re-

ligion and science followed the rise of so-called

physico-theology and deism in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, its peak being Bishop

George Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732), Bishop But-

ler’s Analogy (1736), and David Hume’s Dialogues

Concerning Natural Religion (1779). An idea of

God separated from the theoretical and scientific

realm is found in the philosophy of Immanuel

Kant (1724–1804). God is a practical postulate,

necessary for the development of morals. In

twentieth-century philosophy, God as a principle

involved in the development of nature can be

encountered in Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861–

1947) complicated system.

Some modern philosophers of religion, in-

cluding Frederick Copleston, Bernard Lonergan,

and Richard Swinburne, argue that the tradi-

tional arguments for the existence of God can

give a higher probability to the God hypothesis.

Other modern philosophers, following Søren

Kierkegaard (1813–1855), see the parallel between

belief in God and a scientific hypothesis as com-

pletely misleading. According to Gordon Kauf-

man, the religious belief in God proceeds from an

encounter with the holy, or, as William Alston ar-

gues, it can be founded on direct god-experi-

ences. Inspired by the later Wittgenstein many

philosophers have argued against all attempts to

see doctrines of God as analogous to scientific

theories.

Philosophical criticism of religion. The tradi-

tion of philosophical criticism of religion is often

related to scientific development. It has been ar-

gued by Karl Marx (1818–1883), Sigmund Freud

(1856–1939), and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917),

among others, that the world can be understood

without religious suppositions and the existence of

religious ideas is explained by scientific arguments

that contain no religious suppositions. A consider-

able part of the critical philosophy of religion, as

represented by Hume, Kant, and Bertrand Russell

(1872–1970), consists of criticism of the positive ar-

guments indicated above. There are also classical

debates focusing on contradictions in religious sys-

tems of doctrines; the best known is the relation

between belief in a good God and the apparent

evils of the world, as discussed by Gottfried Wil-

helm Leibniz (1646–1716) and Voltaire (1694–

1778). Since the 1970s, the religious consequences

of the new evolutionary biology have been seri-

ously debated, with some, like biologist Richard

Dawkins, stating their atheistic implications, while

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others, including theologian Keith Ward, argue

their compatibility.

Philosophical tools in religious thinking. The

development of religious doctrines from the church

fathers and onward is highly dependent on philo-

sophical concepts. The tools from different branches

of analytical philosophy have been used by Basil

Mitchell and Antony Flew to clarify religious rea-

soning in the twentieth century. The same holds

true for existentialism and other branches of con-

temporary philosophy, including postmodernism.

Many key questions in debates about the rela-

tion between religion and science emerge from the

various fields of philosophy of religion presented

above. Is it reasonable, for example, to seek a co-

herent model of the world, or is it impossible to

advance further than developing good linguistic

tools for different activities in life, such as prayer or

physics? Can one base a worldview solely on sci-

entific reasoning, and does it then contain or ex-

clude the idea of a creator? Are there points of ac-

cess to the real world other than purely empirical

observation—religious and moral experiences for

example? What happens when coherence is used

as a criterion of truth in the totality of scientific, re-

ligious, moral, and aesthetic ideas?

See also ARISTOTLE; AVERROËS; COSMOLOGICAL

ARGUMENT; DESCARTES, RENÉ; LANGUAGE;

NTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; PANTHEISM; PLATO;

ELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; THEODICY; THOMAS

AQUINAS

Bibliography

Flew, Antony, and MacIntyre, Alasdair, eds. New Essays in

Philosophical Theology. New York: Macmillan, 1955.

Hick, John. Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice Hall, 1973.

Phillips, D. Z. Faith after Foundationalism. New York:

Routledge, 1988.

Smart, Ninian. Historical Selections in the Philosophy of Re-

ligion. New York: Harper, 1962.

Swinburne, Richard. Is there a God? London: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 1996.

Tracy, David. The Analogical Imagination: Christian The-

ology and the Culture of Pluralism. New York: Cross-

road, 1981.

ANDERS JEFFNER

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The phrase “philosophy of science” can be used

most broadly to describe two different, though re-

lated, sorts of inquiry. On the one hand it can be

used to describe the philosophy of particular sci-

ences, such as the philosophy of physics, biology,

or economics. On the other hand, it can be used to

describe the study of epistemological issues in sci-

ence more generally. Although an increasing ma-

jority of work in the philosophy of science is being

done in the philosophy of particular sciences, it is

this latter construal of the philosophy of science

that remains the heart of the field and is the focus

of this entry.

Scientific methodology

In a tradition that can be traced back to John Stuart

Mill (1806–1873) and Francis Bacon (1561–1626),

many have taken the scientific method to be in-

ductive. An inductive inference is ampliative (i.e.,

the content of the conclusion goes beyond the

content of the premises) and nondemonstrative

(i.e., all true premises do not guarantee a true con-

clusion; at best they render the conclusion more

probable). For example, suppose that one has ob-

served a large number of mammals and every kind

of mammal that one has observed has teeth; from

this evidence one might make the inductive gener-

alization that all mammals have teeth. It is possible,

however, that the next mammal one observes (say,

an anteater) might turn out not to have teeth. The

fallibility of inductive inferences is often referred to

as Hume’s problem of induction, after the philoso-

pher David Hume (1711–1776).

Carl Hempel (1905–1997) argues that the sci-

entific method begins not with observations but

with hypotheses. According to this hypothetico-de-

ductive method one deduces certain observational

predictions from the hypothesis and then rigor-

ously tests them through further observation

and experimentation. If the predictions are borne

out, then the hypothesis is confirmed. Thus

Hempel’s method is still broadly inductive. Al-

though the conclusion of an inductive argument is

not certain, one would like to determine quantita-

tively how probable the conclusion is, given its

premises (the evidence). The logical positivist

Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) sought to develop such

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a logic of confirmation. Other models of confirma-

tion, such as Bayesian and bootstrapping models,

are reviewed in John Earman’s Testing Scientific

Theories (1983).

Karl Popper (1902–1994) insists that the scien-

tific method is deductive, not inductive. Observa-

tion always requires a prior point of view or prob-

lem. Like Hempel, Popper believes science begins

with a bold hypothesis or conjecture. The way in

which the scientist comes to the hypothesis (con-

text of discovery) is irrelevant (e.g., it could come

to the scientist in a dream); all that matters is the

way in which it is tested (context of justification).

Unlike Hempel, Popper does not think that hy-

potheses can be confirmed. If the observational

prediction is borne out, deductively the scientist is

unable to conclude anything (to conclude that the

hypothesis is confirmed is to commit the deductive

fallacy of affirming the consequent). If, however,

the predictions are falsified, then, by the valid de-

ductive inference modus tollens (if p then q, not q,

therefore not p) one can conclude that the hypoth-

esis is falsified. Hence, Popper’s method is known

as falsificationism. According to Popper, the scien-

tist should not seek to confirm theories but rather,

refute them. A theory that has survived repeated at-

tempts of falsification—especially in those cases

where it has made risky predictions—has been

corroborated, though not confirmed. On this view,

a theory is demarcated as scientific if there are ob-

servational conditions under which one would be

willing to reject the theory as falsified.

As a matter of historical fact, however, scien-

tists typically do not abandon their theories in the

face of falsifying evidence. Furthermore, in many

cases it turns out to be sound scientific judgment to

continue developing and modifying a theory in the

face of recalcitrant evidence. In response to these

sorts of difficulties, Popper’s student, Imre Lakatos

(1922–1974), developed a sophisticated falsifica-

tionism known as the “methodology of scientific

research programs.” For Lakatos, instead of evalu-

ating an individual theory or modification of a the-

ory as scientific or ad hoc, one should evaluate a

whole series of theories developed over time. This

series, called a research program, consists of a

hard core, which defines the research program

and is taken to be irrefutable, and a protective belt,

which consists of auxiliary hypotheses and back-

ground assumptions to be modified in the face of

falsifying data, thereby protecting the hard core.

According to Lakatos, a research program is de-

marcated as scientific if it is progressive—that is, it

continues to make new predictions that become

corroborated. Once a research program ceases to

make new corroborated predictions it becomes de-

generative and its hard core should be abandoned.

Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) was a close

friend of Lakatos and also a student of Popper’s. In

his book Against Method (1978) he denies that

there is such thing as the scientific method. He

writes, “the idea of a fixed method, or a fixed the-

ory of rationality, rests on too naïve a view . . .

there is only one principle that can be defended

under all circumstances. . . . It is the principle:

anything goes” (pp. 27–28). Feyerabend’s view is

known as epistemological anarchism.

Scientific rationality and theory change

Beginning in the early 1960s there was a shift

away from concerns about scientific methodology

towards concerns about scientific change. This

shift was in large part due to the publication in

1962 of Thomas Kuhn’s (1922–1996) The Structure

of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argues that the phi-

losophy of science ought to be the product of a

careful examination of the history of science. This

involves recognizing the integrity of the science

within its own time and not simply viewing it in

relation to one’s contemporary perspective. This

new historiographical approach leads Kuhn to re-

ject much of traditional philosophy of science: the

confirmationist and falsificationist accounts of the-

ory evaluation, the view that science is cumulative,

the distinction between context of discovery and

context of justification, and the idea of a crucial

experiment.

Kuhn argues that science is characterized by

three sorts of phases: pre-paradigm science, nor-

mal science, and revolutionary science. Central to

understanding these phases is his notion of a par-

adigm, which he uses in two primary ways. First,

he means an exemplar, a concrete problem solu-

tion or scientific achievement that serves as a

model for solving other scientific problems (e.g.,

the planetary dynamics laid out in Isaac Newton’s

Principia). Second, and more broadly, he means

by paradigm a disciplinary matrix, which includes

not only exemplars, but laws, definitions, meta-

physical assumptions, and values (e.g., Newton’s

dynamical laws, the definitions of mass and space,

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and the mechanical philosophy). The paradigm de-

termines what is to count as an acceptable scien-

tific problem and an acceptable scientific solution.

In the process of normal science, anomalies

emerge that resist solution within the framework of

the paradigm; if these anomalies persist and prolif-

erate, they can lead to a state of crisis. Revolution-

ary science is described as “those noncumulative

developmental episodes in which an older para-

digm is replaced in whole or part by an incompat-

ible new one” (p. 92). Kuhn refers to the pre- and

post-revolutionary periods of normal science as in-

commensurable, and says that there is a sense in

which scientists from different paradigms work in

different worlds. Kuhn polemically refers to the

conversion from the old to the new paradigm as

being analogous to a Gestalt switch or religious

conversion. Ian Barbour draws analogies between

Kuhnian paradigms and religious paradigms in Re-

ligion and Science (1997).

In the 1969 postscript to The Structure of Sci-

entific Revolutions and in the article “Objectivity,

Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (1977) Kuhn

responds to charges that his account of science

makes science irrational and leads to relativism.

Against the charge of irrationality, Kuhn notes that

values (such as predictive accuracy, simplicity, in-

ternal consistency, and coherence with neighbor-

ing theories) provide scientists with a shared basis

for theory choice. Against the charge of relativism,

Kuhn notes that ultimately paradigms are to be

evaluated by their ability to set up and solve “puz-

zles.” In this sense Kuhn does believe that there is

objective progress in science: Newton solves more

puzzles than Aristotle, and Albert Einstein more

puzzles than Newton. What Kuhn rejects is realism,

which claims that there is a coherent direction of

ontological development and that science is getting

closer to the truth.

Subsequent philosophers of science influenced

by Kuhn developed different strands of his thought

in different directions. Feyerabend, who developed

an incommensurability thesis around the same

time as Kuhn, came to later embrace the label of

relativist. Others, such as Larry Laudan, sought to

preserve the rationality of science against the threat

perceived in Kuhn’s holist picture of scientific

change. According to Laudan, a closer look at the

history of science shows not a wholesale exchange

of one paradigm for another, but rather the com-

ponents of the disciplinary matrix (e.g., methods,

values, and ontology) being negotiated individu-

ally. Regarding theory choice he writes, “there is

enough common ground between the rivals to en-

gender hope of finding an ‘Archimedean stand-

point’ which can rationally mediate the choice”

(1984, p. 75). He calls this alternative view the

reticulated model of scientific change.

Scientific realism versus antirealism

The labels realism and antirealism are each used

to cover a wide spectrum of views. The main po-

sitions can be roughly distinguished by their an-

swers to three questions: (1) Is there a mind-inde-

pendent world? (2) What is our epistemic access

to that world? (3) What is the aim of science? Re-

alists (along with many antirealists) accept the ex-

istence of a mind-independent world. Those anti-

realists who deny this advocate some form of

idealism. While realists tend to be optimistic about

epistemic access to the world, antirealists argue in

various ways that this optimism is unwarranted.

Realists typically see the aim of science being

truth, whereas antirealists argue the aim is some-

thing less.

At one end of the realist spectrum is naïve re-

alism—the view that science is a perfect, undis-

torted mirror of the mind-independent world and

that scientific theories are literally true. More so-

phisticated versions of realism, such as the view of

Ernan McMullin, hold that realism means the long-

term success of a scientific theory gives reason to

believe that something like the entities and struc-

tures postulated by the theory actually exist (p.

26). According to McMullin, an important part of

the aim of science is the development of fruitful

metaphors. Many have argued for realism on the

grounds that it provides the best explanation for

the success of science; the widespread success of

science would be “miracle” if scientific theories

were not at least approximately true (Boyd 1984,

Putnam 1975). Others argue that the proper ques-

tion for realism is not whether some theory is true

or approximately true, but whether some entity ex-

ists. According to Ian Hacking’s entity realism, one

can conclude, for example, that electrons exist be-

cause researchers experimentally build devices that

use electrons to investigate other parts of nature.

Between theory realism and entity realism is an-

other view known as structural realism. This view,

which John Worrall attributes to Henri Poincaré

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(1854–1912), affirms a mind-independent world

but takes epistemic access to that world to be lim-

ited to its structural features. Thus, there is a con-

tinuity of structure across theory change despite

radical changes in ontology. Although what is

meant by structure is not entirely clear, in the

physical sciences it is typically taken to be the

structures expressed in the mathematical formalism

of the theory.

Challenges to realism come from many

sources and have led to a variety of antirealist

views. Both Kuhn (1962) and Laudan (1981) argue

that the history of science undermines realism.

Kuhn’s view can be classified as a form of instru-

mentalism, according to which scientific theories

are merely useful instruments for making predic-

tions and solving problems. Other antirealist

views, such as Bas van Fraassen’s constructive em-

piricism, come out of the empiricist tradition. Ac-

cording to van Fraassen (1980), science only aims

to give theories that are empirically adequate and

a theory is empirically adequate if what it says

about observable things is true, that is, if it saves

the phenomena (p. 12). On this view, one is not

compelled to accept the existence of unobservable

entities, such as electrons.

A third strand of antirealism, known as social

constructivism, comes from sociology. The social

constructivist seeks to understand scientific prac-

tice in the laboratory in a manner similar to an an-

thropologist seeking to understand a foreign cul-

ture. Social constructivists, such as David Bloor of

the Edinburgh School, reject the philosophical un-

derstanding of knowledge as justified true belief,

and instead take knowledge to be whatever is col-

lectively endorsed by a particular group of people

at a particular time (p. 5). This makes social con-

structivism a form of relativism. It is called con-

structivism because it takes scientific knowledge

and facts to be constructed rather than discovered.

Stronger and weaker versions of this view are ob-

tained depending on whether this process of con-

structing scientific knowledge is, or is not, taken to

be purely social. Arthur Fine, who argues that so-

cial constructivism has important methodological

lessons for the philosophy of science (1996), him-

self rejects both realism and antirealism. Instead

Fine advocates a minimalist position he calls the

natural ontological attitude, which prescribes ac-

cepting the claims of science in the same way that

one accepts the evidence from one’s senses, with-

out adding any additional claims such as “and it is

really true” or “and it is only a useful fiction”

(1986, p. 127).

Feminist philosophies of science

Since the 1970s, many feminist philosophers, his-

torians, and scientists have been asking why there

have traditionally been so few women in science

and whether certain sexist, racist, or nationalist bi-

ases have shaped the practice and content of sci-

ence. Detailed case studies, a representative sam-

ple of which can be found in Janet Kourany’s The

Gender of Science (2001), reveal many ways in

which such biases have affected science. In re-

sponse to these findings, many feminists sought to

develop a new epistemology or philosophy of sci-

ence. Following Sandra Harding (1986), feminist

philosophies of science can be roughly divided

into three traditions: feminist empiricism, feminist

standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism.

Helen Longino, whose work falls largely

within the feminist empiricist tradition, introduces

a view known as contextual empiricism. Longino

sees empirical data as constraining, but nonethe-

less underdetermining, theory choice. This gap be-

tween theory and evidence is bridged by value-

laden background assumptions belonging to a

particular context. These contextual assumptions

are one way biases can enter science. Longino crit-

icizes traditional portrayals of the scientific method

as individualistic. Instead she sees the objectivity of

science being secured by its social character (e.g.,

peer review, replication of experiments, and an

openness and responsiveness to criticism). She ar-

gues that diversity in science is important for mak-

ing these often invisible assumptions explicit and

open to criticism.

Harding takes this point about diversity in sci-

ence a step further in her feminist standpoint the-

ory. In contrast to empiricism, standpoint theory

argues that the legitimacy of the knowledge claim

depends on the social identity of the knower.

Harding writes, “women’s subjugated position pro-

vides the possibility of more complete and less

perverse understandings. Feminism . . . can trans-

form the perspective of women into a ‘stand-

point’—a morally and scientifically preferable

grounding for our interpretations and explanations

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