RELIGION,THEORIES OF
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Greek and Roman pagans, (2) Jews, (3) Muslims,
and (4) Christians. These four could be arranged
in a unified narrative by any of the three latter
groups. Christians, for instance, could view Jews
as stiff-necked people who refused to accept the
gospel, and Muslims as schismatics who split
Christ’s Church. In his poem The Inferno (c. 1308),
Dante Alighieri consigns Mohammed to the circle
of hell reserved for “sowers of scandal and
schism” (p. 326). Finally, Christians assimilated
Greek mythology to biblical history by arguing
that the Greek gods were actually demons, that
the Greek myths were actually biblical stories
about biblical characters but were corrupted
through transmission, or that the Greek myths
were allegories representing biblical or Christian
virtues. Jews and Muslims had their own unifying
narratives. Indeed, the Qurhan itself carefully posi-
tions Jews and Christians in relation to Islam. It
claims to confirm, continue, correct, and complete
earlier revelation.
This comparatively coherent religious horizon
eventually collapsed under the growing pressure
exerted by European expansion. The Age of Ex-
ploration and Empire increased European contact
with non-European cultures and non-Western reli-
gions. The reports of seafarers about exotic beliefs
and practices introduced ethnographic data that
could not easily be incorporated into the narratives
of premodern Europe. This new cosmopolitanism
eroded some of the inevitability clothing Western
forms of theism. Renewed attention to, and esteem
for, ancient authors (e.g., Lucretius and Cicero)
during the Augustan Age, moreover, supplied
sources for naturalistic explanations of religion, cri-
tique of ritual, and materialistic cosmologies.
Most importantly, perhaps, the Protestant Re-
formation shattered the relative uniformity of reli-
gious thought and culture in Christian Europe. It
produced different and warring “religions” (i.e.,
conceptions of piety and worship), justified by
competing criteria of religious authority. This im-
passe made necessary a neutral stance for assessing
religious claims. Only a standpoint that abstracts
from contested religious criteria could resolve such
a dispute. In the service of religious polemic, early
modern thinkers devised canons of inquiry and ar-
gument that were independent of religious presup-
positions. In order better to conduct religious de-
bate, early modern thinkers secularized inquiry.
Conceived by Jansenists to defend their theology
against papal condemnation, modern probability
theory, for example, both rendered religious pre-
suppositions optional, and facilitated modern sci-
ence (Stout, 1981). The social discord in which the
Reformation culminated made it necessary, further-
more, to privatize religion, to push it out of public
affairs for the sake of peace. Religion came to be
viewed as a discreet domain of culture, distinct
from morality, and ranged alongside law, science,
politics, and art. The general term religion reflects
this differentiation. The Reformation made possible
a nonreligious position from which to reflect criti-
cally on religion, conceived as a general category
identifying one aspect of human intellectual, emo-
tional, and social life.
The emergent theoretical study of religion had
its inception in apologetics and polemics. Religion-
ists of one persuasion or another sought out the ori-
gin of religion to defend their view from competing
religious accounts or irreligious explanations. The
bloodshed caused by religious violence and the
growing explanatory power of science led others to
adopt a nonreligious stance to try to explain reli-
gion in nonreligious terms, often with the intention
of hastening its supposed demise. Though the
polemical inspiration for theories of religion has re-
ceded in many quarters, one can nevertheless prof-
itably make a heuristic distinction between human-
istic theories of religion and religious theories of
religion. Humanistic theories explain religion in
terms of the humans who create or subscribe to
them. Religious theories explain religion in terms of
a religious object, entity, force, or ultimate reality.
This distinction provides only a provisional ori-
entation because humanistic theories can be given
religious significance. Ludwig Feuerbach, for in-
stance, argued in The Essence of Christianity (1841)
that humans unconsciously project the essential
characteristics of the human species outside them-
selves and reify them in the form of a divine being.
He insisted that humanity must overcome its self-
induced self-alienation by self-consciously restor-
ing its nature to itself. To this extent, Feuerbach’s
theory is humanistic. Feuerbach complicates mat-
ters, however, by insisting that theological state-
ments predicating attributes of God must be in-
verted. If God is conceived as love, for example,
humanity must come to see that love, as an essen-
tial component of human nature, is divine. Some