Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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religion and science as two completely separate

disciplines that were each legitimate in their own

right but which explained or described completely

different realms of experience. Of these, the earliest

was the theological movement of neo-orthodoxy,

championed in particular by Swiss theologian Karl

Barth (1886–1968), but widely represented in both

Europe and the United States. Neo-orthodox the-

ologians emphasized revelation as the primary

means of knowing God, and they emphasized the

separateness of this revelation from all other

spheres of knowledge. This emphasis on the

uniqueness of theology with respect to the sciences

tended to also be supported by existentialist the-

ologians such as Paul Tillich (1886–1965) and

Rudolf Bultmann (1813–1855).

Independence models of religion and science

received a further boost from the mid twentieth-

century development of linguistic philosophy, de-

riving primarily from the later works of Ludwig

Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who argued that human

discourse and knowledge could best be under-

stood as separate and incommensurable language

games that each possess a unique vocabulary and

logic. In some versions of this, science could be

said to be about facts, religion about values. Both

areas of practice and experience are equally legiti-

mate, but cover completely separate spheres of

life. In some later writings, this mode of independ-

ence received metaphorical support from the idea

of complementarity derived from the Copenhagen

interpretation of quantum physics championed by

Niels Bohr (1885–1962). Just as modern physics

was forced to alternatively describe subatomic par-

ticles as either waves or particles, but not both si-

multaneously, so too could religion and science be

understood as giving complementary but distinct

accounts of reality. Once again, both religion and

science are legitimate areas of inquiry and practice,

but are pursued and understood separately.

Forms of these independence models remain

championed today. Neo-orthodoxy’s emphasis on

the separate character of religion strongly influ-

enced British theologian Thomas Torrance and,

more recently, Alistair McGrath. Paleontologist and

science writer Stephen Jay Gould (1941–2002) also

attempted to revive the linguistic philosophy ver-

sion of independence. Despite this, these are now

minority views for a number of reasons. Indepen-

dence views presume that a clear distinction can

be made between the provinces of science and re-

ligion, with an implication either that religion does

not rely on facts about the world or that the facts

of religion and the facts of science are completely

different. Historically, however, this has not been

the case, and most modern theologians believe

that there are at least important border areas where

science and religion overlap. Moreover, the more

general theological and philosophical frameworks

(particularly neo-orthodoxy and linguistic philoso-

phy) are no longer seen to be nearly as persuasive

as they once were, with the result that their more

specific claims about the relationship of science

and religion are found wanting.

Critical realism as a default view

Among current views of the relationship of religion

and science, the most prominent has been that of

critical realism. This prominence is due in no small

part to its advocacy by three of the most important

contributors to the field of science and religion: Ian

Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne,

all three originally practicing scientists who later

wrote on issues of religion and science. On the crit-

ical realist view, both religion and science describe

the world as it is, and so there is some correspon-

dence between the statements of religion and sci-

ence and the real world that such statements de-

scribe. Critical realism differs from a naïve realism,

however, in its recognition of the role of the possi-

bility of error, bias, and partiality in all descriptions.

The most elaborate defense of critical realism

within the field of science and religion has been

given by Ian Barbour. Drawing on the philosophy

of science of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) and oth-

ers, Barbour argues that both science and religion

have elements of subjectivity in their models of the

world. While theories are based on evidence, they

consistently overdetermine it. Consequently, the-

ory choice is never simply a matter of verification

or falsification, but includes criteria of coherence,

scope, and even beauty. The way that a theory

speaks of the world may thus be rather indirect,

depending on data but not determined by it.

For critical realists, science and religion both

provide partial views of the world that may overlap

on a range of issues. Arthur Peacocke has argued

that theology can be placed along a hierarchy of

knowledge, with physics providing the most basic

facts at the lowest level and theology providing

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the most general at the highest level. Because there

can be significant overlap between science and re-

ligion on particular issues such as cosmic origins

and human nature, critical realism is committed to

providing theological perspectives that are capable

of harmonizing with modern science.

While critical realism has been highly influen-

tial within the field of science and religion, it has

also been the subject of significant criticism. The

issue of how exactly scientific and especially reli-

gious models can be said to correspond to reality

has been especially problematic. The more one

acknowledges the critical element in any theory or

model, the less realist it seems to be, a problem

that is well recognized more broadly in the philos-

ophy of science. Despite much early work in pro-

moting critical realism, its advocates have yet to

provide a sophisticated response to its critics, and

for this reason its appeal has languished some

since the 1990s.

Alternative methodologies from the

philosophy of science

Despite the perceived shortcomings of the critical

realist movement, it has been highly influential in

its view that science and religion (and, more

specifically, theology) can be said to employ simi-

lar methods of exploring reality, thus providing a

basis for dialogue and engagement between the

two areas of experience. Reasons for this view

stem not only from critical realism, but also from

more general developments in the philosophy of

science, from which critical realism also drew.

Consequently, there has been widespread support

for employment of insights from the philosophy of

science for explaining the nature and relationship

of religion and science, even though significant

disagreement remains as to whose philosophy of

science should be employed and to what extent.

While critical realists such as Ian Barbour were in-

fluenced by the work of Thomas Kuhn, German

theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg utilized the earlier

philosophy of science of Karl Popper (1902–1994),

arguing that theological claims should be capable

of being falsifiable, just as Popper argued that sci-

entific claims should be. A number of theologians

and philosophers of religion, including Philip

Hefner, Nancey Murphy, and Philip Clayton, have

preferred to build on the thought of Hungarian

philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (1922–1974).

Influenced by both Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos ar-

gued that science should be understood in terms

of competing research programs, each with an un-

falsifiable core, which nevertheless must prove to

be progressive over time.

Notable in these approaches is an abandon-

ment of a strong commitment to a metaphysical re-

alism for explaining the nature of both science and

religion. Murphy has been the most vocal in re-

jecting realism as an explanatory category, and has

argued, following philosopher W. V. O. Quine

(1908–2000), that foundationalism, the view that

knowledge claims can be deductively built one on

another, must be abandoned. Rather, human be-

ings build webs of belief that are complexly inter-

connected, but with only a weak sense (if that) of

some beliefs being more primary than others. Nev-

ertheless, there remain clear criteria for preferring

some beliefs and theories over others.

Philosophy of science and post-modernism

The abandonment of both foundationalism and re-

alism are important elements of the broad set of

movements characterized as postmodern. A gen-

eral feature of post-modern movements have been

an increased skepticism towards certainty of

knowledge, especially with regard to the sciences,

combined with a deep awareness of hidden ide-

ologies in apparently objective knowledge claims

that influence power relations of race, class, and

sex. Feminist philosophers of science such as San-

dra Harding and Evelyn Fox Keller have noted

how sexual bias can pervade scientific theory and

practice. Advocates of the strong program of soci-

ology of science such as Steve Fuller have argued

that science, in essence, has no objective basis and

is simply one discourse among others. Taken to

extremes, such views are debilitating to a science

and religion dialogue, as they destroy any possible

ground of knowledge. There are, however, pro-

found insights to be derived from these postmod-

ern approaches, and these have been, to varying

degrees, employed by some science and religion

scholars. Theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen has

attempted to carefully incorporate a postmodern,

postfoundationalist critique while still maintaining

the legitimacy of both science and religion as in-

tellectual endeavors. Distinctly feminist perspec-

tives have had a harder time entering into the

mainstream of religion and science scholarship, al-

though a number of elements of feminist thought

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(e.g., an abandonment of dualism, rejection of

foundationalism, and an acknowledgement of ide-

ological bias) are now widely acknowledged.

An alternative approach to a number of char-

acteristically postmodern perspectives has been

provided by process theology, which received ini-

tial inspiration from the philosophy of Alfred North

Whitehead (1861–1947). Rather than drawing on

the philosophy of science, process theology is

based on a broader metaphysical perspective that

encompasses both science and religion. Theolo-

gian David Ray Griffin has argued at length for a

new understanding of naturalism that is based on

process theology and does not exclude God. Be-

cause of its metaphysical commitment, process the-

ology does not share the skepticism of other forms

of postmodernism, and claims some confidence

about providing a robust understanding of the

world and, consequently, of religion and science.

Prospects

The 1980s and 1990s saw a particularly rich dis-

cussion of religion and science methodological is-

sues. Despite this, there remains a considerable

array of opinions about the proper relationship of

religion and science, both within the field of reli-

gion and science proper as well as outside of it. It

should be expected that the philosophy of science

will continue to play an important role in method-

ological research, particularly since most of the

philosophy of science research currently cited in

the field of religion and science dates before 1980.

Among perspectives from philosophy of science

that may play an increasing role are characteriza-

tions of the practice of science as a process of in-

ference to the best explanation (employed by

some) and characterizations based on information

and probability theory.

A number of methodological perspectives re-

main under-represented in the field of religion and

science. Most notable of these may be the philo-

sophical movement of pragmatism, founded by

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and William

James (1842–1910) and now widely represented in

the United States and abroad. Likewise, more rad-

ical forms of postmodernism need to be engaged

at a more serious level than has been the case to

date. A further complicating factor is the growing

engagement of a number of the world religious

traditions, whose different presuppositions will

likely alter perceptions of how religion and sci-

ence should, in the end, be related.

See also SCIENCE AND RELIGION; SCIENCE AND

RELIGION, HISTORY OF FIELD; SCIENCE AND

RELIGION IN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION; SCIENCE

AND

RELIGION, MODELS AND RELATIONS; SCIENCE

AND

RELIGION, PERIODICAL LITERATURE; SCIENCE

AND

RELIGION, RESEARCH IN

Bibliography

Barbour, Ian. Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Compara-

tive Study in Science and Religion. San Francisco:

Harper, 1974.

Barbour, Ian. Religion and Science: Historical and Con-

temporary Issues. San Francisco: Harper, 1997.

Clayton, Philip. Explanation from Physics to Theology.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989.

Fuller, Steve. Social Epistemology, 2nd edition. Indianapo-

lis: Indiana University Press, 2002.

Gould, Stephen Jay. Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion

in the Fullness of Life. New York: Ballentine, 1999.

Griffin, David Ray. Religion and Scientific Naturalism:

Overcoming the Conflicts. Albany: State University of

New York Press, 2000.

Harding, Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?

Thinking from Women’s Lives. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 1991.

Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Lakatos, Imre. “Falsification and the Methodology of Sci-

entific Research Programmes.” In Criticism and the

Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and Alan

Musgrave. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press, 1970.

Murphy, Nancey. Theology in the Age of Scientific Reason-

ing. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Theology and the Philosophy of Sci-

ence. Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press, 1976.

Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York:

Basic Books, 1959.

Torrance, Thomas. Theological Science. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1969.

van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. The Shaping of Rationality: To-

ward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science.

Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1999.

GREGORY R. PETERSON

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SCIENCE AND RELIGION,

ODELS AND RELATIONS

A number of categories have been proposed for

classifying diverse views of how science and reli-

gion can be related to each other. John Haught has

suggested the categories of Conflict, Contrast, Con-

tact, and Confirmation. A more detailed eightfold

classification has been offered by Ted Peters. This

article uses a fourfold typology proposed by Ian

Barbour: Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and

Integration.

Conflict

The trial of the Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei

in 1633 is often cited as the first prominent exam-

ple of the conflict of religion with modern science.

However, several factors in this trial were not typ-

ical of conflicts in subsequent centuries. Galileo

challenged the respected authority of Aristotle

who had held that the sun and planets revolve in

orbits around the earth. Galileo also challenged

the authority of the Catholic church at a time

when it felt threatened by the Protestant Reforma-

tion. He did indeed challenge the literal interpre-

tation of scripture, but this was not crucial in his

day because metaphorical and allegorical interpre-

tations of scriptural passages had been widely ac-

cepted since the writings of Augustine of Hippo in

the 5th century.

Responses to Charles Darwin’s On the Origin

of Species (1859) provide examples of Conflict, but

also examples of alternative responses. A long,

gradual process of evolution clearly conflicts with

the seven days of creation in Genesis, which some

theologians interpreted literally. Some religious

conservatives accepted a long evolutionary history,

but insisted on the special creation of the human

soul, whereas liberals were soon speaking of evo-

lution as God’s way of creating. The evolutionary

origins of humanity seemed a threat to human dig-

nity, especially when “the survival of the fittest”

was used by several social philosophers to justify

ruthless economic competition and colonialism.

After all, the idea of an impersonal process of vari-

ation and natural selection challenged the tradi-

tional idea of purposeful design. Darwin himself

did not believe that every species had been specif-

ically designed by God, but he did believe that

God had designed the whole process through

which differing species had evolved.

The Conflict thesis is represented today by two

views at opposite ends of the theological spec-

trum: creation science and scientific materialism.

Each gains a following partly by its opposition to

the other. The popular image of “the warfare of

science and religion” is perpetuated by the media,

for whom controversies provide dramatic stories.

Creation Science. Fundamentalism, started as a

movement in the United States since early in the

twentieth century that took a strong stand defend-

ing biblical inerrancy. In the Scopes trial in Dayton,

Tennessee, in 1925, fundamentalists argued that

the teaching of evolution in the schools should be

forbidden because it is contrary to scripture. Be-

ginning in the 1960s, proponents of creation sci-

ence have claimed that there is scientific evidence

against evolutionary theory and evidence for the

sudden appearance of creatures in their present

forms. Several state legislatures passed laws re-

quiring that creationist theory be given equal time

with evolutionary theory in public high school bi-

ology classes. But in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court

ruled that creation science does not constitute le-

gitimate science and that it has been promoted in

order to support a particular religious viewpoint,

which is prohibited by the separation of church

and state in the U.S. Constitution.

More sophisticated critiques of Darwinism have

appeared in recent years, focusing on the rarity of

transitional forms between species in the fossil

record, and pointing to the sudden burst of new

species in the early Cambrian period. According to

the biochemist Michael Behe, the complex se-

quences of molecular reactions in organisms today

could not have arisen gradually because if even

one step were missing the sequence would not ful-

fill an adaptive function. Proponents of intelligent

design, such as William Dembski, assert that such

complexity could only be the product of purpose-

ful intelligence. A number of biologists have replied

that there are plausible Darwinian explanations for

many of these phenomena, and that where such

explanations are lacking one should seek more ad-

equate testable hypotheses rather than positing su-

pernatural intervention, which would inhibit rather

than encourage further research.

Scientific materialism. Materialism is the asser-

tion that matter is the fundamental reality in the

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universe. Materialism is a form of metaphysics (a

claim concerning the most general characteristics

and constituents of reality). Scientific materialism

makes a second assertion: The scientific method is

the only reliable path to knowledge. This is a form

of epistemology (a claim concerning inquiry and

the acquisition of knowledge). The two assertions

are linked; if the only real entities are those with

which science deals, then science is the only valid

path to knowledge.

In addition, many forms of materialism ex-

press reductionism. Epistemological reductionism

claims that the laws and theories of all the sci-

ences are in principle reducible to the laws of

physics and chemistry. Metaphysical reductionism

claims that the behavior of any system is deter-

mined by its component parts, which alone are

causally effective.

Two well-known sociobiologists have ex-

plicitly defended scientific materialism. Richard

Dawkins argues that evolution provides proof that

there is no purpose in the universe. He holds that

our actions are determined by our genes, which

are the product of deterministic laws and chance

events. He asserts that religion has always been

harmful to human welfare. Edward O. Wilson be-

lieves that all human behavior can be explained by

biological origins and genetic inheritance. He ac-

knowledges that religious traditions served a useful

function in the past by uniting groups around com-

mon loyalties, but he argues that this function can

be better served today by loyalty to science. Critics

suggest that scientific materialism is an interpretive

philosophical position that conflicts only with

other philosophical and religious positions, not a

scientific theory that is part of science itself.

Independence

Conflicts between science and religion can be

avoided if they are taken to be inquiries in separate

domains. They employ differing languages fulfill-

ing contrasting functions in human life. Science

asks about lawful regularities among events in na-

ture, whereas religion asks about ultimate meaning

and purpose in a wider interpretive framework. If

both science and religion are selective, neither can

say that its account of reality is complete.

Separate domains. Starting in the nineteenth

century, biblical scholars used historical methods

to study the cultural context in which various parts

of the Bible were written. They noted that the cre-

ation stories of the Bible made significant affirma-

tions that the world is good, orderly, and depend-

ent on a purposeful God. These convictions were

conveyed through a symbolic and poetic story that

assumed the prescientific cosmology of its day,

which included a seven-day creation, an earth-

centered astronomy, and a three-part universe with

heaven above and hell below the world. But the

central message of Genesis can be accepted today

because it is not dependent on its ancient cosmol-

ogy, and it is also quite independent of modern

scientific cosmology. Its message is not actually

about events in the past, but about the fundamen-

tal relation of God to the world and to persons in

every moment, which is not a scientific question.

Cultural anthropologist point out that creation sto-

ries around the world provide models for human

behavior. Communities participate in such stories

by enacting them in rituals. The role of creation

stories is primarily to provide patterns for human

life in the present rather than to provide explana-

tory accounts of events in the past.

The idea of separate domains has also been

defended by some natural scientists. The biologist

Stephen Jay Gould uses the Latin word magis-

terium to refer to a domain of teaching authority.

“The magisterium of science covers the empirical

realms, what is the universe made of (fact) and

why does it work this way (theory). The magis-

terium of religion extends over question of ulti-

mate meaning and moral value” (p. 6). Each do-

main has its own distinctive questions, rules, and

criteria of judgment. Gould is critical of scientists

who try to derive philosophical, theological, or

ethical conclusions from science. He points out

that Darwin’s idea of natural selection has been

misused to defend war, colonialism, ruthless eco-

nomic competition, and eugenics.

Differing languages. Among philosophers in

the 1950s, the logical positivists took scientific

statements as the norm for all cognitive assertions

and claimed that any statement not subject to em-

pirical verification is either meaningless or purely

emotive. In response, the analytic philosophers in-

sisted that differing types of languages serve dif-

fering but equally legitimate functions in human

life, and each has its distinctive rules. Science and

religion do different jobs and neither should be

judged by the standards of the order. Science asks

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strictly delimited questions in the interest of pre-

diction and control. Religious language expresses a

way of life through the rituals, stories, and prac-

tices of a religious community. The analytic

philosophers have usually accepted an instrumen-

talist account of both science and religion. Both

forms of language serve useful practical functions

and neither of them need to make truth claims that

might lead to conflict.

Critics reply that religious language presup-

poses distinctive religious beliefs. Classical realism

had taken both scientific theories and religious be-

liefs to be descriptions of reality in itself. At the op-

posite extreme, instrumentalism took theories and

beliefs to be useful fictions serving pragmatic

human purposes. Critical realism has defended a

middle ground in which conceptual models in

both fields make tentative cognitive claims as

imaginative representations of aspects of reality in

its interaction with human observers.

Science and religion are sometimes said to offer

complementary perspectives on the world that sup-

plement rather than compete with each other.

Some authors draw a more specific analogy to the

Complementary Principle in physics. Physicist Niels

Bohr noted that a subatomic entity such as an elec-

tron or a photon of light sometimes behaves like a

wave and sometimes like a particle; it cannot be

represented by a single model. Some authors have

extended the principle to characterize the relation

between science and religion. The idea of comple-

mentarity is a reminder that no set of concepts pro-

vides an exhaustive description of reality.

Dialogue

Dialogue portrays more constructive relationships

between science and religion than does either the

Conflict or the Independence view, but it does not

offer the degree of conceptual unity claimed by ad-

vocates of Integration. Independence emphasizes

differences between science and religion, whereas

Dialogue emphasizes several kinds of similarity in-

cluding the presuppositions and boundary ques-

tions of the scientific enterprise and methodological

and conceptual parallels between the two fields.

Presuppositions and boundary questions.

Historians have wondered why modern science

arose in the Judeo-Christian West among all world

cultures. Some suggest that the doctrine of creation

helped to set the stage for scientific activity. Both

Greek and biblical thought asserted that the world

is orderly and intelligible. But the Greeks held that

this order is necessary and therefore one can de-

duce its structure from first principles. Only biblical

thought held that God created both form and mat-

ter, so the world did not have to be as it is, and the

contingent details of its order can be discovered

only by observation. Historians say that many fac-

tors contributed to the rise of modern science, in-

cluding the humanistic interests of the Renaissance

and the growth of commerce and trade, but they

point out that the idea of creation gave religious le-

gitimacy to scientific inquiry. Many of the founders

of modern science believed that they were study-

ing the handiwork of the Creator.

Boundary questions are raised but not an-

swered by science. Why is the universe intelligible?

Why is there a universe at all? The cosmologist

Stephen Hawking writes: “What is it that breathes

fire into the equations and makes a universe for

them to describe? The usual approach of science of

constructing a mathematical model cannot answer

the questions of why there should be a universe

for the model to describe” (p. 174).

The cultural contexts of both science and reli-

gion have been explored by feminist authors. They

have pointed to correlations among the polarities

that have been pervasive in Western thought:

mind/body, reason/emotion, objectivity/subjectiv-

ity, domination/submission, power/love. In each

case, the first term of each pair (mind, reason, ob-

jectivity, domination, power) is identified in our

culture as male, the second term (body, emotion,

subjectivity, submission, love) as female. A histori-

cally patriarchal culture in which men have held

most of the positions of power perpetuated a pre-

dominantly male image of God. Moreover the first

term of each pair has been prominent in science,

especially in its attempt to dominate and control

nature. Feminist sensibilities, it is said, might lead

to new topics for scientific research, more holistic

theoretical concepts, and more ecological tech-

nologies. On the religious side, radical feminists

turn to indigenous cultures for feminine symbols of

the divine and for recovery of the sacred in nature.

Reformist feminists, on the other hand, believe that

the patriarchal features of historic Christianity can

be rejected without rejecting the whole tradition,

and they seek to relate this understanding to new

possibilities in science.

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Methodological and conceptual parallels. It

has often been assumed that science is strictly ob-

jective. It is said that theories are validated by their

agreement with indisputable theory-free data that

are unaffected by individual preference or cultural

influences. By contrast, religion seems to be highly

subjective and strongly influenced by individual

and cultural assumptions. But historians and

philosophers have called into question this sharp

contrast, arguing that science is not as objective

nor religion as subjective as had been assumed.

There are indeed differences of emphasis between

the fields, but the distinctions are not absolute.

Philosophers of science have maintained that

all data are theory-laden, not theory-free. Theoret-

ical assumptions enter the selection, reporting, and

interpretation of what are taken to be data. More-

over, theories do not arise from logical analysis of

data but from acts of creative imagination in which

metaphors and analogies often play a role. Models

help one imagine what is not directly observable,

especially in the realm of the very large (astron-

omy) and the very small (quantum physics). In the

case of religion such data as religious experience,

rituals, and scriptural texts are even more heavily

laden with human interpretation. In religious lan-

guage, metaphors and models are even more

prominent.

The term paradigm was used by Thomas Kuhn

to refer to a cluster of conceptual, metaphysical,

and methodological presuppositions embodied in a

tradition of scientific work. With a new paradigm

the old data are reinterpreted and seen in new

ways, and new kinds of data are sought. An estab-

lished paradigm is resistant to falsification, since

discrepancies between theory and data can be set

aside as anomalies or reconciled by introducing ad

hoc hypotheses. Religious traditions can also be re-

garded as communities that share a common para-

digm. Their interpretation of data (such as religious

experience and historical events) is even more par-

adigm-dependent and resistant to falsification, but it

is not totally immune to challenge.

Many authors have also explored conceptual

parallels between particular scientific and religious

ideas. Recent discussion of human nature has

drawn from both theology and science. The dual-

ism of body and soul in classical Christianity has

been questioned by theologians who find in the

Bible itself a more integral view of the person as

an embodied unity of thinking, feeling, and acting.

Some scientists, on the other hand, have chal-

lenged reductionism and look on the person as a

multileveled psychosomatic unity. Neuroscientists

studying the brain have found that emotional as

well as rational capacities are important in human

life, as the biblical tradition has long maintained.

The social character of selfhood is a theme com-

mon to biblical thought and research in cognitive

psychology and anthropology.

Parallels between the holism of quantum

physics and the holism of Eastern mysticism have

often been noted. The quantum description of an

atomic system must be given for the whole system,

which cannot be analyzed as the sum of its sepa-

rate parts. Nonlocal connections are evident in ex-

periments in which two particles originating in a

single event continue to be entangled with each

other when they reach widely separated detectors.

The physicist David Bohm and in a more popular

vein, Fritof Capra, have seen a striking similarity

between quantum holism and the experience of

undifferentiated oneness encountered in the depth

of meditation. In quantum physics the observer and

the observed are inseparable; so, too, the mystic

tradition speaks of the union of subject and object.

Because these writings stress personal experience

and the limitations of human knowledge, they can

be considered as forms of Dialogue, but in their

more systematic and metaphysical elaboration they

might be considered as examples of Integration.

Integration

Advocates of Integration call for reformulations of

traditional theological ideas that are more exten-

sive and systematic than those envisaged by advo-

cates of Dialogue. In natural theology it is claimed

that the existence of God can be inferred from

(or is supported by) the evidence of design in na-

ture. In a theology of nature, the main sources of

theology lie outside science, but scientific theo-

ries strongly affect the reformulation of certain

doctrines. In a systematic synthesis, both science

and religion contribute to the development of

an inclusive metaphysics, such as that of process

philosophy.

Natural theology. The medieval theologian

Thomas Aquinas held that some of God’s charac-

teristics can be known only from revelation in

scripture, but the existence of God can be known

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by reason alone. His teleological argument (from

telos, Greek for purpose or goal) starts from order-

liness and intelligibility as general characteristics of

nature, but he goes on to cite specific evidence of

design in nature. Scientists in the seventeenth cen-

tury, including Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle,

saw God’s hand in the details of natural systems

from the structures of animals to the solar system.

In the early nineteenth century, an Anglican priest,

William Paley, said that if one finds a watch on a

heath one is justified in concluding that it was de-

signed by an intelligent being; if in the eye many

complex parts function together to achieve a single

end, it, too must have had a designer. Darwin dealt

a serious blow to the traditional design argument,

for he showed that adaptation can be explained by

random variation and natural selection. But Darwin

himself accepted a revised version of the argu-

ment; he said that God did not design the particu-

lar details of individual species, but designed the

laws of evolutionary processes through which the

species were formed, leaving the details to chance.

Traditionally, design referred to the execution

of a detailed preexisting plan. But chance seems to

have played a large role in evolutionary history.

Mutations are random and the overwhelming ma-

jority are harmful. Some changes were the product

of contingent circumstances, such as the comet

that was probably responsible for the extinction of

the dinosaurs. Yet evolutionary history dos show

an overall trend toward greater responsiveness

and awareness. The capacity to gather, store, and

process information has steadily increased. Design

can now be identified with an open-ended direc-

tion of change rather than with an exactly speci-

fied end product.

The Anthropic Principle in writing by contem-

porary cosmologists can be interpreted as a new

form of design argument. The fundamental param-

eters of the early universe seem to be fine-tuned

for the conditions needed for the emergence of life

and intelligence. If the expansion rate one second

after the Big Bang had been smaller by even one

part in a hundred thousand million million, the

universe would have recollapsed before evolution

could have occurred. If the expansion had been

even a tiny fraction faster it would have dispersed

too rapidly for galaxies and planets to have

formed. The universe seems to be balanced on a

knife-edge, too improbable to be a fortunate

chance occurrence.

Most defenders of natural theology, such as

Paul Davies, do not claim to offer proofs for the ex-

istence of God, but argue that a cosmic designer

who does not intervene is a more plausible ultimate

explanation than naturalistic alternatives. Some

proponents of a modest natural theology combine

it with adherence to a theistic religious tradition.

But critics point out that in itself natural theology

leads only to the God of deism who started the uni-

verse and was inactive thereafter, not to the God of

theism who is actively involved in the world.

Theology of nature. A theology of nature does

not start from science, as natural theology usually

does. Instead, it starts from a religious tradition

based on religious experience and historical reve-

lation. But it holds that some traditional doctrines

need to be reformulated in the light of current sci-

ence. Here science and religion are considered to

be relatively independent sources of ideas, but

with some areas of overlap in their claims. An ex-

tensive literature has addressed the question: How

could God act in the world described by the laws

of science without intervening supernaturally and

discontinuously?

Our understanding of the general characteris-

tics of nature will affect our models of God’s rela-

tion to nature. In contemporary views, nature is

understood to be a dynamic evolutionary process

with a long history of emergent novelty, character-

ized throughout by both law and chance. The nat-

ural order is ecological, interdependent, and mul-

tileveled. These characteristics will modify our

representation of the relation of both God and hu-

manity to nonhuman nature. This will, in turn, af-

fect our attitudes toward nature and will have prac-

tical implications for environmental ethics. The

problem of evil will also be viewed differently in

an evolutionary rather than a static world.

For the biochemist and theologian Arthur Pea-

cocke the starting point of theological reflection is

past and present religious experience in an ongo-

ing religious community. But Peacocke is willing to

reformulate traditional beliefs in response to cur-

rent science. He discusses at length how chance

and law work together in cosmology, quantum

physics, nonequilibrium thermodynamics, and bio-

logical evolution. He gives chance a positive role

in the exploration of potentialities at all levels. Pea-

cocke describes the emergence of distinctive forms

of activity at higher levels of complexity in the

multilayered hierarchy of organic life and mind.

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God creates through the whole process, not by in-

tervening in gaps in the process. Peacocke defends

the idea of top-down causality within organisms

and goes on to speak of God as a top-down cause.

Another proposal starts from the indeterminacy

of quantum theory. In contrast to the determinism

of classical physics, quantum physics gives only a

range of probabilities rather than exact values in

predicting individual events in subatomic systems.

Some physicists think this unpredictability is attrib-

utable to the limitations of current quantum theory.

But most physicists hold that indeterminacy is a

property of the atomic world itself. Physicist and

theologian Robert John Russell has argued that if

quantum events are not completely determined by

the laws of physics, the final determination could

be made by God. God would not have to inter-

vene to alter a determinate state, but would actu-

alize one of the multiple potentialities present, all

of which have identical energy, so that no input of

energy would be required. In many situations in-

determinacies at the atomic level average out to

give predictable behavior for larger groups of

atoms. But in some cases very small differences

can be greatly amplified. A genetic mutation could

change the course of evolutionary history. Where

science finds only chance, the theist can see prov-

idential guidance. Traditionalist critics of such

views hold that by representing God’s action as a

subtle influence that is not scientifically detectable,

rather than as a more dramatic supernatural inter-

vention, these authors have accommodated too

much to science.

Systematic synthesis. A more systematic inte-

gration can occur if both science and religion con-

tribute to a coherent world view elaborated in a

comprehensive metaphysics. Metaphysics is the

province of the philosopher rather than of the sci-

entist or the theologian, but it can serve as an

arena of common reflection. In the thirteenth cen-

tury, Thomas Aquinas articulated an impressive

metaphysics that has remained influential in

Catholic thought. His voluminous writings system-

atically integrated ideas from earlier Christian au-

thors with the best philosophy and science of his

day, derived largely from the works of Aristotle.

The process philosophy of Alfred North White-

head and his followers is a promising candidate for

a mediating role today. Whitehead was familiar

with quantum physics and its portrayal of reality as

a series of momentary events and interpenetrating

fields rather than separate particles. For him, as for

evolutionary thinkers, nature is a dynamic web of

interconnected events, characterized by novelty as

well as order. Process thought holds that the basic

constituents of reality are not two kinds of endur-

ing entity (mind/matter dualism) or one kind of

enduring entity (materialism), but one kind of

event with two aspects or phases. All integrated

events have an inner and an outer reality, but these

take very different forms at different levels. Viewed

from within, interiority can be construed as a mo-

ment of experience, though conscious experience

occurs only at high levels of organization.

According to process philosophy, God elicits

the self-creation of individual entities, thereby al-

lowing for freedom and novelty as well as order

and structure. Process thinkers reject the idea of di-

vine omnipotence; they portray a God of persua-

sion rather than coercion, and they have provided

distinctive analyses of the place of chance, human

freedom, evil, and suffering in the world. Christian

process theologians such as John Haught point out

that the power of love, as exemplified in the cross,

is precisely its ability to evoke a response while re-

specting the integrity of other beings. The thought

of Jesuit paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

shows some similarities with process theology, in-

cluding affirmation of an evolutionary cosmos and

postulation of interiority in all beings, though his

approach is less philosophical and more poetic—

and sometimes more mystical—than that of au-

thors indebted to Whitehead.

Process theology has been criticized for de-

parting too far from classical Christianity. It does

emphasize divine immanence (without excluding

transcendence), whereas classical Christianity em-

phasized transcendence. More philosophers have

abandoned the search for a unifying metaphysics,

though there has been some revival of interest in

questions once dismissed as metaphysical. The

majority of authors who want to move beyond

Conflict and Independence hold that we will have

to be content with Dialogue or with less philo-

sophical forms of Integration.

See also CHRISTIANITY; INTELLIGENT DESIGN; SCIENCE

AND

RELIGION, HISTORY OF THE FIELD

Bibliography

Barbour, Ian G. Religion and Science: Historical and Con-

temporary Issues. San Francisco: Harper, 1997.

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Barbour, Ian G. When Science Meets Religion. San Fran-

cisco: Harper, 2000.

Behe, Michal. Darwin’s Black Box. New York: Free Press,

1998.

Bohm, David. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Boston:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.

Capra, Frijof. The Tao of Physics. New York: Bantam

Books, 1977.

Cobb, John B., and Griffin, David Ray. Process Theology:

An Introduction. Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press,

1976.

Darwin, Charles. The Origin of Species (1859). New York:

Bantam Classic, 1999.

Davies, Paul. The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a

Rational World. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Dawkins, Richard. The Blind Watchmaker. New York:

Norton, 1987.

Dembski, William A., and Kushiner, James M., eds. Signs

of Intelligence: Understanding Intelligent Design.

Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2001.

Gould, Stephen Jay. Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion

in the Fullness of Life. New York: Ballantine, 1988.

Haught, John F. Science and Religion: From Conflict to

Conversation. Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1995.

Haught, John F. God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolu-

tion. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000.

Hawking, Stephen. A Brief History of Time. New York:

Bantam Books, 1998.

Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd

edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Peacocke, Arthur. Theology for a Scientific Age, enlarged

edition. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993.

Peters, Ted. “Science and Theology: Toward Consonance.”

In Science and Theology: The New Consonance, ed.

Ted Peters. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Polkinghorne, John. The Faith of a Physicist. Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Russell, Robert John. “Special Providence and Genetic Mu-

tation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution.” In Evo-

lutionary Biology and Molecular Biology: Scientific

Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Rus-

sell, William R. Stoeger, and Francisco J. Ayala.

Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Theology and the Natural

Sciences; Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 1998.

Southgate, Christopher, et al. God, Humanity, and the Cos-

mos. Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1999.

Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. The Phenomenon of Man,

trans. Bernard Wall. New York: Harper and Row, 1959.

Wilson, Edward O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.

New York: Knopf, 1998.

IAN BARBOUR

SCIENCE AND RELIGION,

ERIODICAL LITERATURE

Every major field of human discourse spawns a lit-

erature proportional to the intensity of the conver-

sation. Science and religion is no exception. Fasci-

nating topics, historic and contemporary, have

arisen at the intersection of these two very differ-

ent fields, and a periodical literature has emerged,

both to facilitate communication among scholars

who have entered into this conversation, and to re-

port the conversation to a larger audience.

Given the diversity within science and among

religions, it is no surprise that the field’s periodicals

address the disciplines differently. In some journals

religion means theology, and the editorial ap-

proach is primarily theoretical. Some periodicals

intend religion to include all world religions,

whereas others intend it as a synonym for a partic-

ular brand of faith. Still other publications address

issues of applied religion, meaning spirituality or

public morality, and applied science, such as med-

icine, politics, or economics.

The field’s most scholarly journal is the quar-

terly Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science,

founded in 1965. Zygon has three sponsors: the In-

stitute for Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS), the

Center for Advanced Study in Religion and Science

(CASIRAS), and Rollins College in Winter Park,

Florida. Zygon construes religion broadly as any-

thing that relates to the human quest for purpose

and the journal has an exceptionally broad base of

scholarly contributions.

The Center for Theology and the Natural Sci-

ences (CTNS) in Berkeley, California, launched a

new journal, Theology and Science, in 2003, with

an intellectual focus on Christian theology. This

journal is the continuation of the quarterly CTNS

Bulletin, founded in 1982. Animated and enduring

conversations have arisen within the Christian

evangelical camp, which continues to debate vig-

orously the truth and significance of Darwinism.

The most substantial journal in this category is the

quarterly Perspectives on Science and Christian

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