Walbank F.W., Astin A.E., Frederiksen M.W., Ogilvie R.M. The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 7, Part 1: The Hellenistic World
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR
2
37
as some have supposed, have been incited by Arsinoe II, who had retired
to Egypt after
her
short-lived marriage
to
Ptolemy Ceraunus,
and had
there married Philadelphia, also
her
half-brother.
But the
reference
in
the decree
of
Chremonides
to
Ptolemy's acting
'in
accordance with
the
policy
of
his
ancestors
and his
sister' (lines 16—17)
is
perhaps
to be
interpreted mainly
as a
gesture
of
respect. Arsinoe
had
died
two
years
earlier
(in
270) and the hypothesis
26
that even after
her
death Ptolemy
II
continued
to
share
her
ambition
to
provide
a
kingdom
for her son by
Lysimachus seems less probable now that
it is
known that
the
Ptolemy
who figures
on
various papyri
and
ostraca
as
co-regent with Philadel-
phus between 267
and
259,
and
who perished
at the
hands
of
Thracian
soldiers
in
Ephesus after
a
revolt against
the
king,
was not the son of
Lysimachus.
27
If
Arsinoe
had
a
role
in the
Chremonidean
War,
it
has
certainly been much exaggerated, especially by those writing before
the
date
of her
death
was
known.
Others have argued that Ptolemy
was
induced
to
stir
up
a
revolt
against Macedonia from economic considerations
and
that
he
feared
to
see the Peloponnese dominated by Antigonus lest this should lead
to
the
drying
up of
an important market
for
Egyptian corn,
or
indeed that
he
suspected Antigonus
of
seeking to build up the Piraeus into a trade rival
of Rhodes
and
Delos.
28
Neither view
is
convincing. Indeed
a far
more
likely explanation
of
the war is
that Philadelphus
was
alarmed
at
the
prospect
of
Antigonus' restoring Macedonian naval power,
for
this
would constitute
a
manifest danger
to
the
ring
of
outposts
and the
Aegean protectorate with which
the
Ptolemies sought
to
secure
the
approaches
to
Egypt.
29
A
naval revival must have seemed
all the
more
dangerous
to
Ptolemy
in the
light
of
the
friendship
now
existing
between Macedonia and the Seleucids. However, Ptolemy's motives are
not easily discernible since after
the
initial impulse
the
assistance which
he rendered to the allies was half-hearted and inadequate.
30
At the outset,
however,
the
stimulus from Egypt struck
an
echoing note both
at
Athens, where
the
group around Chremonides cherished nostalgic
hopes of achieving complete independence with the recovery of Piraeus,
and also
at
Sparta, where Areus
I
clearly hoped himself
to
establish
a
domination over
the
Peloponnese.
31
The war
was fought with vigour,
26
Tarn 1913,
2C)off.:
(D }8); Sartori 1963,
uyff.:
(D
IOI).
27
On '
Ptolemy the Son' see RC, p.
75
(no.
14,1.
9); H. Volkmann,
PW,'
Ptolemaios (20)', cols,
1666—7.
His
identity remains uncertain.
28
See Tarn 1913,
24iff.:
(D
38); Rostovtzeff
1953,1.21
jff.:
(A
52); and against this view Will 1979,
I.i8off.:
(A 67), analysing Ptolemaic foreign policy.
29
Will 1979, 1.220-1:
(A 67).
30
Hence Habicht 1979,
111 —12:
(D
91) argues that the main impetus
for
the war came, not from
Ptolemy
at
all,
but
from Athens
itself,
bent
on the
recovery
of
the Piraeus.
31
For dedications
to
Areus
I
see SIG 453 (by Ptolemy II);
ISE
1.54 (Orchomenus). But SIG 430
(Delphi) is a dedication
to
Areus II, the infant son of Acrotatus; see De Sanctis 1911-12, 267-77
(D
125);
Flaceliere 1937, 457: (D 105);
contra
Will 1979, 1.223
(
A
67); Oliva 1971, 215—16: (D
132).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
238
7
MACEDONIA
AND
GREECE
except
by
Ptolemy;
but it
ended disastrously
for the
allies with
the
capitulation
of
Athens
in
the archonship
of
Antipater (perhaps 262/1).
32
Its significance lies in the fact that
it
was the last co-ordinated attempt of
the
two
traditional leaders
of
Greece, Athens
and
Sparta,
to
raise
a
comprehensive movement
of
revolt against
the
common enemy.
No coherent account
of the war
survives
and its
course
has to be
reconstructed from isolated events recorded
in
often indifferent auth-
orities. Antigonus' possession
of
Corinth
and the
Isthmus route
pre-
vented
the
Spartans
and
Athenians from linking
up by
land.
The
Spartans made several attempts
to
force their way through; the account
in Pausanias (in.6.4—6)
has
been plausibly interpreted
to
imply three
campaigns,
in 267, 266 and
265,
in the
last
of
which Areus
met his
death.
33
The Macedonians in Corinth reinforced the Isthmus lines with a
garrison
on Mt
Oneium
34
and directed attacks
by
land
and sea
against
Athens. These attacks are illustrated by an inscription discovered
in
the
temple of Nemesis at Rhamnus (which was in Athenian hands for at least
the early part
of the war).
This document
(SEG
xxiv.154), which
records honours voted
at
Athens
to
the general Epichares
for
his efforts
directed towards getting
in the
grain
and
other services, furnishes
evidence that Antigonus employed pirates against Attica, as he had done
earlier against Cassandreia
(see
above,
p.
22i).
35
The help accorded
by
Ptolemy was unimpressive. Probably
in
268/7
he despatched
his
admiral Patroclus
to
Greece, where
he may
indeed
have landed some troops
in
Attica
in
order
to
garrison one
or
other
of
the strongpoints, which have been identified as operative
at
this date,
at
Koroni, Heliupolis, Patroklou Charax
on the
island
of
Ghaidhouronisi
and elsewhere;
36
but this
is
not certain
for
the only place on the mainland
for which the actual presence of Ptolemaic troops is attested is Rhamnus.
Patroclus certainly brought
no
expeditionary force
to
Attica
nor
did
he
furnish Areus with
the
help
he had
promised; inscriptions
(IC
m.iv.3;
OGIS 44) show him operating from a base
at
Arsinoe (Coresia)
on
Ceos
and active
at
Itanus
in
Crete
and
also
in
Thera,
but on the
mainland
his
collaboration was half-hearted and unsuccessful. Either Ptolemy lacked
a firm commitment
to
the war
he had
provoked
or he
was diverted
by
unrecorded Macedonian naval activity
in
areas such
as the
Asia Minor
32
Cf.
Bousquet
1958,77—82:
(B
;I);
Heinen
197a, i8off.:
(A
21);
Etienne
and
Pierart
1975,
59-62:
(B
70), who
show that since
an
Athenian hierommmon last appears
on the
Amphictyonic Council
in
the year
of
the
Delphic archon Pleiston
and
that this
is in
262/1,
Athens cannot have capitulated
before that
year.
33
Cf. Diod. xx.29; Plut. Agis 3.4; Heinen 1972, 199-202: (A 21). A revolt by Galatian
mercenaries in Antigonus' employ is mentioned in Just. Epit. xxvi.2 (cf. Trogus, Pro/. 26).
34
Cf.
Stroud
1971,
I43ff-:
(B 207).
35
For concern for the crops see also IG n
2
.668,
11.
8-10 (265, archonship of Nicias of Otryne).
36
Cf. McCredie 1966, 113-15:
(D
93); Heinen 1972, 162-3 (with map on 164): (A 21).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR
2
39
coast which were more vital
to his
interests. Athens held
out
courageously
for
several years,
but
eventually was forced
to
capitulate,
probably in
262/1.
A Macedonian garrison was installed on the Museum
hill,
no
doubt,
as
Pausanias says (m.6.6),
as
a
condition
of
peace.
37
Whether
the
Piraeus
had
remained Macedonian throughout
the war is
not certain;
but
if
not
it
certainly became Macedonian
now.
While the war was going on in southern Greece, Alexander of Epirus,
encouraged by his recent success
in
warding off
an
attack by the Illyrian
king Mytilus, took advantage of Antigonus' preoccupation with Athens
and Sparta
to
invade Macedonia; whether Ptolemy
was
behind this
move
is
unknown. Antigonus withdrew briefly from Corinth
to
Macedonia and very soon Alexander was
not
merely expelled from that
country but also from his own
—
though from his refuge in Acarnania
he
soon regained
his
throne
(c.
260).
38
These events
are
perhaps
to be
connected with
a
treaty made about this time between Acarnania
and
Aetolia
(SVA. 480),
regulating frontiers
and
establishing
a
mutual
exchange
of
isopoliteia
and rights
of
intermarriage and
of
the acquisition
of land between citizens
of
the two
states.
A
plausible hypothesis
39
attributes this temporary rapprochement of the two usually hostile states
to
the
mediation
of
Alexander
of
Epirus,
who
may have played upon
their shared fear
of
Macedonia
to
bring them together and engineer
his
own restoration.
The Chremonidean War probably had
a
sequel
in a
naval victory
for
the Macedonian fleet over that
of
Ptolemy.
In
two
places Plutarch
attributes a story about 'Antigonus the second'
to
the occasion
of
a
sea-
battle off
Cos
(though in a third passage, where he speaks of'Antigonus
the old man', he links it with
a
battle of Andros).
40
The battle of Cos was
an important victory commemorated by Antigonus with the dedication
of
his
flag-ship
to
Apollo. About
its
date there have been many
hypotheses,
41
but if (as
seems likely)
it
fell
at the end of the
Chremonidean War, it was probably fought in the spring
of
261,
since on
the
one
hand
it
must come after
the
capitulation
of
Athens (since
Antigonus received petitions
in
that city after
his
victory)
42
and
on
the other
a
Delian inscription dated
to the
archonship
of
Tharsynon
(261) (IG xi.2.114) speaks
of
the existence
of
peace
in
the Aegean
at the
37
Cf.
Apollodorus, FGrH 244F44 (archonship
of
Antipater).
38
Just, fipit. xxvi.2.9-12, where Antigonus' defeat by Alexander is to be rejected as a doublet of
his defeat by Pyrrhus' son Ptolemy during the war with Pyrrhus; nor will Antigonus' twelve-year-
old
son
Demetrius have commanded
the
Macedonian army which invaded Epirus.
39
Klaffenbach 195 ;/6,
46-51:
(D 108).
40
Plut.
de
sup sum landando
j
45
B;
apoph. regum 183
c;cf.
Ath. v.209c; attributed
to
Andros
in
Plut.
Pel.
2.4.
41
Cf.
Momigliano and Fraser 1950, 113-14: (D
54).
42
Diog. Laert. iv.6.39 (life
of
Arcesilaus).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
24O
7
MACEDONIA
AND
GREECE
time.
If
Cos was fought
in the
spring
of
that year,
43
it
may have been
followed
by
a
Macedonian attack
on
Miletus mentioned
on
another
inscription {Milet 1.3, no. 139).
The
Ptolemaic admiral will have been
Patroclus who, according
to an
anecdote
in
Phylarchus,
44
challenged
Antigonus
to
meet
him
at
sea. The
date
of
Cos cannot however
be
regarded
as
firmly fixed;
but
if
it
does indeed belong
to
261
it
must
be
seen as setting the seal on Antigonus' victory in the Chremonidean War
by delivering a severe blow to the naval power of Egypt. Ptolemy's poor
showing
in
the war
may indicate that Cos was
not the
only advantage
that Antigonus'
new
fleet
had
brought
him.
VI.
THE RESULTS OF THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR
The Chremonidean
War
ended with
a
resounding victory
for
Mace-
donia,
but
the advantages which
it
undoubtedly brought
to
Antigonus
were greater in some areas than others. The failure of Athens and Sparta
to co-ordinate their attack left Corinth firmly
in
his hands,
or
rather
in
those
of
his half-brother Craterus.
In
addition Athens and Attica were
now also under Macedonian control. Chremonides
and
Glaucon both
escaped
to
Egypt, where they later pursued distinguished careers under
Ptolemy
II, and
their place
at
Athens was taken
by
politicians loyal
to
Macedonia.
45
More immediately Macedonian officers, including
an
epistates,
directly responsible
to
Craterus "were installed
in
Attica with
garrisons at several points- Munychia and the Piraeus, Sunium, Salamis
and
the
frontier posts
of
Panactum
and
Phyle;
and
inscriptions show
Antigonus appointing Macedonian officers
to
Athenian posts
of
hipparch or
strategos,
the appointment being subsequently ratified by the
people.
46
For Athens
it
was indeed a time
of
humiliation. The activity of
the assembly was curtailed
and
for
several years
few
resolutions were
passed which
did not
echo
the
wishes
of
Macedonia.
The
minting
of
coins
was
temporarily suspended,
47
and
this together with
the
Mace-
donian control
of
the harbours
and
ships contributed
to
a
progressive
economic decline. The military defeat also coincided with
the
end
of
a
cultural era. Zeno
of
Citium died around
the end
of
the
war and
the
comic poet Philemon about
the
same time. Philochorus stayed
on
in
43
Antigonus' flagship which sprouted parsley
and was
therefore called
the
Uthmia (Plut. Quaest.
conv. 676D)
may be
that dedicated after Cos;
but,
if
we
ignore
the
'miracle',
its
name need
not
imply
that
the
battle
was
fought
in
a
year with
an
'
even' number
in the
Julian calendar
(so
Will 1979,1.22 5:
(A
67);
Tarn,
CAH
vn
(1928),
862). The
ship
can
equally well have been built
at
Corinth
and
so
named
as
a
compliment
to
the
city
(so
Tarn
1913, 345: (D 38)).
44
FCrH
8IFI
=Ath. vm.334a.
45
See the
later decrees
of
Salaminian cleruchs
for
Heraclitus
{SIC
454),
the
Eleusinian decrees
for Aristophanes
{SIC 485) and the
Athenian inscription honouring Phaedrus
of
Sphettus
{IG
n
2
.682).
«
SEG
in.
122-3.
4!
Cf.
Hackens
1969, 706
and
n.
2:
(B
228).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE RESULTS OF THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR
2
4
J
Athens, but was executed
for
treasonable communications with Alexan-
dria,
and
with
his
death
the
pursuit
of
Attic local history, with
all its
pride in past achievements, came
to
an end.
48
In
256/5 Athenian freedom
was nominally restored;
49
but
what this really meant is unclear. Perhaps
the garrison
was
removed from
the
Museum hill;
50
but
there
was
no
relaxation
of
Macedonian control. Sparta suffered no comparable loss
of
freedom thanks
to
her
geographical situation,
but
the
failure
of
Areus'
attempt
to
impose
her
hegemony
on
southern Greece was compounded
by
the
death
of
Acrotatus while attacking Aristodamus
of
Megalopolis
(see above,
p.
231).
Spartan weakness
was
deep-seated
and
is
best
considered
in
relation
to
the
revolutionary movement which first made
itself felt under Agis
IV
twenty years later
(see
below,
pp.
252-5).
Antigonus' victory consolidated his hold
on
southern Greece and
the
Isthmus,
but the
situation further north
was
less satisfactory
for
Macedonia. During
the
Chremonidean
War
the
Aetolians, nominally
neutral,
had
in
fact favoured
the
allies.
An
inscription shows them
approaching Ptolemy
and
Antigonus impartially with
a
request
for the
granting
of
security
to
those attending the Pythian and Pylaic festivals;
51
but
the
recognition
of
the
Alexandrian
Ptolemaieia,
which proclaimed
Soter's divinity,
by
the
Amphictyonic Council
in
262/1,
almost twenty
years after
the
setting
up of
this festival,
but
coinciding with
the
capitulation
of
Athens,
52
can only indicate that the Aetolians were
at the
least unimpressed
by the
Macedonian victory
in
Attica
and
that they
were leaning more decidedly
to
the
side
of
Ptolemy. Meanwhile
the
League had been making further acquisitions.
In
the Delphic archonship
of Damaeus (265/4)
the
Locrians continued
to
exercise
one
vote
on the
Amphictyonic Council,
but
from
the
next year (that
of
Damosthenes)
this disappears
and
instead, under Damosthenes
and
Pleiston (262/1),
the Phocian vote rises from
two
to
three,
an
increase which evidently
reflects
the
annexation
of
Epicnemidian Locris
by
Phocis.
53
From
the
archonship
of
Peithagoras (probably 260/59) onwards, however, Phocis
is once more reduced
to
two votes, the lost vote having gone
to
Aetolia,
which
now
has seven;
the
conclusion will
be
that Epicnemidian Locris
has now joined
the
Aetolian Confederation, thus extending still further
the Aetolian seaboard
on
the Straits
of
Euboea.
54
Shortly afterwards
the
Aetolian votes rise
to
nine,
the
additional votes probably representing
the annexation
by the
League
of
the part
of
Phocis
to
the
south around
Mt Parnassus,
and
perhaps
the
western part
of
Phthiotic Achaea.
The
48
Cf.
Jacoby
1949,
IO-JS.:
(B 22).
49
Euseb. Chron.
n,
p.
120.
50
Briscoe
in
Garnsey
and
Whittaker
1978, 149: (H
73).
51
FD
m.1.479;
c
f-
Heinen
1972, I39ff.: (A
21).
52
1SE
11.75;
Etienne
and
Pierart
1975, S9ff-
:
(
B
7°)-
M
Cf.
Klaffenbach
1926,
68-81:
(D 81).
54
Cf.
Flaceliere
1937, 198: (D 105).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
242
7
MACEDONIA
AND
GREECE
fact that
the
units making
up the
confederation were cities with their
territory facilitated
its
acquisition
of
part
of a
state like Phocis
or
Phthiotic Achaea. The effect of these territorial acquisitions was to bring
the Aetolians gradually nearer
to
the Pagasean
Gulf.
Also
by
extending
the area controlled by Aetolia around the Malian Gulf they made
it
easier
to threaten Macedonian communications with southern Greece. In these
circumstances
the
continued control
of
Corinth became even more
important. So long as this fortress was
in
the loyal hands
of
Craterus
all
was well; but, as events were to show, so great a concentration of power
under
one man
might prove dangerous, should Craterus' eventual
successor waver
in his
fidelity
to the
king
of
Macedonia.
The war in the Aegean appears
to
have been less decisive than that on
land
—
though indeed there
is
little reliable evidence concerning
the
balance
of
naval power
in the
years following
the end of the
Chremonidean War.
It
has been widely assumed that
the
battle
of
Cos,
whether
it
was fought in
261
or
a
few years later, dealt a decisive blow
to
the Ptolemaic control
of
the Aegean.
55
Delos,
it is
pointed
out, now
becomes
the
scene
of
Antigonid dedications;
56
no
Ptolemaic nesiarch
is
attested after about
260:
57
and a number of inscriptions which mention a
King Antigonus
—
from Syros,
Ios,
Amorgos, Cimolos
and Cos
(together with
one
similar inscription from Ceos mentioning
no
royal
name)
58
—
suggest that Macedonia was
now the
dominant power
in the
Aegean. This evidence
is
inconclusive, however.
It is now
agreed that
no political conclusions
are to be
drawn from dedications
on
Delos,
which was open
to all
parties
for
such
a
purpose, regardless
of
political
affiliations.
59
The
Nesiote League moreover continued
to
exist
at
least
until
the
Second Syrian War between Antiochus
II and
Ptolemy
II (see
below, ch.
11,
pp.
418—19),
and this is hard to reconcile with the assump-
tion that Ptolemy lost control
of
the seas
at
Cos;
and
indeed
the
royal
register recorded
a
substantial
war
fleet
in
commission
at the
time
of
Ptolemy
II's
death, though this may have been built
in
250.
60
There
is
furthermore
no
evidence that Antigonus himself intervened
in the
Second Syrian War
nor
that
the
mysterious naval battle
of
Andros
(see
below, pp. 248—9) was
an
event in that war. Finally
it
remains uncertain
whether the inscriptions from the islands bearing the name of Antigonus
belong to Antigonus II or Antigonus III, and until this can
be
determined
56
Cf.
Cary
1951, 137: (A 10);
Huss
1976,
215-16:
(F
133).
56
For the
foundation
of
the Antigoneia
and the
Stratonikeia (the latter named after Stratonice,
the
bride
of his son
Demetrius)
by
Antigonus
in 253 see IG
X1.2.287B,
II. 124?.
57
Cf.
iMerker
1970,
159S".:
(c 50).
58
IG xi.4.105
2
(Syros); xn.;.; 70 (Ceos), 1008 (Ios); xn.7.221 -3 (Amorgos); Jacobsen and Smith
1968,
184ft".: (B 95) (Cimolos); GDI 3611 (Cos); cf. Will 1979,
1.232,
238-9: (A 67).
59
See
Fraser i960,
4ff.:
(B 76);
Bruneau
1970,
579S".:
(H 30);
Will
1979,
1.232-3:
(A
67).
60
Appian,
praef.
10; SB vi.9215.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ARATUS
OF
SICYON
AND THE
ACHAEAN LEAGUE
243
they cannot be safely used as evidence
for
a Macedonian thalassocracy in
this decade. As
far
as one can tell Ptolemy suffered a substantial defeat at
Cos,
but
it
has yet
to
be shown that he had been ousted from his general
control
of
the Aegean.
VII.
ARATUS OF SICYON AND THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE
The dearth
of
evidence which renders
the
Macedonian role
in
the
Aegean obscure during
the
years following
the
Chremonidean
War is
paralleled in southern
Greece.
There, as has been indicated, the peace left
Antigonus firmly
in
control
of the
Isthmus, while
a
pro-Macedonian
tyrant, Aristodamus, held Megalopolis
as a
bulwark against
any
initiative from Sparta.
All
seems
to
have remained quiet
for
about
ten
years.
Then,
in
251,
in the
Dorian town
of
Sicyon, which
had
recently
been subject
to
several violent political changes, a significant event took
place. Several years earlier,
in
264,
its
ruler Cleinias,
who
was
a
guest-
friend
of
both Antigonus
and
Ptolemy,
had
been murdered
by
one
Abantidas,
who set
himself
up as
tyrant; Cleinias' seven-year-old
son
Aratus was rescued
and
lodged
at
Argos, where
he
grew
up in
safety.
Twelve years later
in
252
Abantidas
was
himself murdered
by
tyrannicides and when his father Paseas attempted
to
rule
in
his place
he
too fell
at the
hands
of a
certain Nicocles,
who
seized
the
tyranny
for
himself.
There is no evidence that in themselves these changes had made
much impression
on
Antigonus; certainly Nicocles, though not directly
his man, was
not
hostile
to
Macedonia,
for
under
his
tyranny
the
royal
stud continued
to
be
maintained
on
Sicyonian territory.
Aratus
was
twenty
in
251 and
already busy plotting against
the
tyranny
in
Sicyon.
He and
a
group around
him,
which included
Ecdemus and Demophanes,
61
later famous as tyrannicides in their native
city
of
Megalopolis
and
for
the
constitution which they
set up
in
Cyrene,
62
seem
to
have gone about their plotting
at
Argos
in
complete
freedom, which probably indicates that
the
city
was not yet
under
its
later pro-Macedonian tyrants. Relying
on the
guest-friendship
of
his
family Aratus first appealed
to
Antigonus
for
assistance
in
liberating
Sicyon;
but
he,
while
not
rebuffing
him,
did
nothing positive.
63
Evidently Aratus assumed that Antigonus
had no
special commitment
61
Their names
are
variously recorded: Ecdemus
and
Demophanes (Polybius), Ecdemus
(or
Ecdelus)
and
Megalophanes (Plutarch), Ecdelus
and
Megalophanes (Pausanias).
62
On the activity
of
Ecdemus and Demophanes
at
Cyrene see Polyb. x.22.2 and Plut.
Philop.
1.
On Magas' death (see Ch. 11,
p.
419)
his
widow Apame called
in
Demetrius
the
Fair,
a
son
of
Demetrius Poliorcetes,
but he was
murdered
at the
instigation
of her
daughter Berenice,
subsequently wife
of
Ptolemy
III
Euergetes. Whether
the
Megalopolitans were invited
to
collaborate with Demetrius (like them
a
pupil
of
Arcesilaus
of
Athens)
or
after his overthrow
is
uncertain.
See
Will 1979, 1.245
6:
(A 67).
ra
Plut. Aral. 4.3.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
244 7 MACEDONIA AND GREECE
to Nicocles and might therefore be willing to give support to the son of
Cleinias. But when this was not forthcoming, he decided to act alone,
and in May 251 by a daring coup carried out with the help of
a
private
band of troops, he seized Sicyon; the tyrant fled and the liberators
confiscated his property. The liberation of Sicyon was a signal for nearly
600 exiles, victims of Nicocles or of earlier tyrants, to return home, and
faced with serious social and economic problems arising out of this
Aratus took the bold and, as it proved, far-reaching step of uniting
Dorian Sicyon to the Achaean League. His aim was to acquire for Sicyon
the strength and stability that would come from belonging to a larger
body; but the accession of Sicyon to the Achaean League was to prove
the first move towards the transformation of an ethnic confederacy into
a large body which was ultimately to embrace virtually the whole of the
Peloponnese. How far it was the return of
the
exiles which led Aratus to
take this step is not recorded; but insofar as they were all presumably
enemies of tyranny, their restoration cannot have pleased Antigonus,
who is indeed reported as eyeing Aratus with dislike because of the
liberation of Sicyon.
The Achaean League had only recently been reconstituted. After
being active as a federal body in the fifth century it had fallen into some
obscurity from around the middle of the fourth century and little is
recorded of its activities at that time. In 280, however, the cities of
Dyme, Patrae, Pharae and Tritaea came together, and in 275/4 Aegium,
which controlled the federal shrine of Zeus Homarios, rejoined the
confederacy, followed shortly afterwards by Bura, Ceryneia (both of
which had been under tyrants), and, it would appear, Leontium, Aegeira
and Pellene; an inscription (SEG 1.74) also shows Olenus joining as an
eleventh member after 272, but by the time Polybius was writing that
city no longer existed. Originally the revived league elected two generals
annually, but in 255/4 the constitution had been changed to provide for
the appointment of a single annual general, who entered office in May
and who might not be elected in two consecutive years; this move, for
which the Aetolian League was perhaps the model, made for greater
efficiency while maintaining safeguards against a concentration of too
much power in one man's hands. The first holder of
the
single office was
Margus of Ceryneia, a man clearly most influential in the early years, but
who then lapses into obscurity until Polybius reports his death in action
in 229.
Originally meetings of the League had taken place at the shrine of
Zeus Homarios outside Aegium; but from 255 onwards the assembly
met in the city of Aegium. According to Polybius (11.37.9-11) the
Achaeans had 'the same laws, weights, measures and coinage as well as
the same magistrates, council-members and judges'; but there is some
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ARATUS OF SICYON AND THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 245
exaggeration
in
this statement,
for the
cities kept their
own
laws
in
addition
to
those
of
the federation, and though their weights and coins
followed
the
Aeginetan standard, throughout
the
third century
all
minting was done by the separate cities, federal currency appearing only
from about
190
onwards. There were federal magistrates including
(besides the general) ten
damiurgoi,
a
secretary and
a
hipparch, as well
as
an under-general
(hypostrategos)
and an
admiral,
the
former apparently
responsible
for
commanding the forces
of
a
district
(Jelos),
such as those
existing
in
Aetolia.
There was also
a
primary assembly, which held four meetings
a
year
(synodoi),
open
to
all men
of
military age,
64
at
which the federal council
(boule),
open to men aged
30
and over, and magistrates were also present.
The magistrates are referred
to
collectively as the
sjnarcbiai
and include
the
damiurgoi
who formed
a
board along with the general. Elections were
held annually, in the spring during
mosp
of the third century; but at some
date after 217
(or in
that year) the time
of
the elections was changed
to
autumn
so
that,
as in
Aetolia, generals entered office
at the end of
the
campaigning season and could, if necessary, devote the following winter
to military preparations.
It
was perhaps
at
the same time as this change
was made that
a
new kind
of
meeting was introduced. Henceforth,
in
addition
to
the regular
synodoi
special meetings might be summoned,
in
certain clearly defined circumstances,
and
these 'summoned meetings'
were called
synkletoi.
The
only occasion when
a
synkletos
might
(and
indeed must) be summoned was to decide on war or alliance or to receive
a communication from the king of Macedonia (at the time when Achaea
was
a
member
of the
Hellenic Symmachy presided over
by
him:
see
below,
ch.
12,
pp.
467-8)
or, in the
second century, after Achaea
had
switched
its
allegiance
to
Rome,
to
receive
a
written communication
from the Roman Senate. Such special meetings normally consisted (like
synodoi)
of all men of
military
age, but
meetings
of a
more limited
composition (e.g. men
of
thirty
or
over) could be summoned
in
certain
circumstances. Since
the
League
was
often involved
in war the
army
could
act, and on
several occasions
is
known
to
have acted,
as an
assembly
of the
people.
The
changes mentioned above reflected
the
more delicate diplomacy necessitated
by the
domination
of
powerful
states such
as
Macedonia
or
Rome;
and the
clear definition
of the
circumstances
in
which
a
sjnkletos
was to be
called protected
the
Achaeans against dislocation
of
ordinary life
by the
mischievous
convocation of special meetings, but also against the rushing through of
ill-considered
and
dangerous measures
at
ordinary assemblies. These
91
The
composition
of
the Achaean assembly
has
been much debated.
For the
evidence
and
arguments
in
support
of
the interpretation given here
see
Walbank 1979, in.406-14:
(B
37).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
246 7 MACEDONIA AND GREECE
met normally at Aegium, but in the second century they began to be held
in other cities
as
well.
Polybius praises
the
Achaean League
as a
political system
dis-
tinguished by equality, freedom
of
speech and genuine democracy, and
its institutions give some grounds
for
the claim.
65
Nevertheless office-
holders appear
to be
drawn from
a
fairly narrow group
of
families,
probably belonging
to
the landowning class; nor is
it
likely that poorer
citizens could habitually make the journey to the assembly at Aegium (or
elsewhere) four times
a
year.
It is
noteworthy that
a
second-century
inscription from Olympia recording
a
boundary decision between
Sparta and Megalopolis refers
to
the democratic constitution of Achaea
but links
it
with
the
word
eunomia
('orderly government'), which
is
elsewhere characteristic
of
oligarchic governments. Socially
the
Ach-
aean League favoured stability and the
status quo
against calls
for
land-
distribution
or
debt-cancellation.
It was to
this confederation that
Aratus now united Sicyon and
in
which
he
was subsequently
to
play
a
major role.
VIII. ANTIGONUS, CORINTH AND ARATUS
Shortly after uniting Sicyon with Achaea Aratus received
a
gift
of
twenty-five talents from '
the
king', but Plutarch who reports this {Arat.
11.2) leaves
it
uncertain which king
is
meant
—
Antigonus
or
Ptolemy.
Either
is
possible. Ptolemy later became Aratus' paymaster;
but
Antigonus, though irritated that
a
young
man had
acted against
Nicocles
on his own
initiative,
may
have hoped
to buy his
support.
Whichever the donor was, Aratus used this money to ransom Sicyonian
prisoners
of
war.
It
thus
did
nothing towards solving
the
problems
created
by the
quarrels between
the
returned exiles
and the
present
occupiers of their land, and consequently soon afterwards and probably
in 251/50 Aratus undertook
a
voyage
to
Egypt
to
solicit support from
Alexandria. He arrived there after an adventurous voyage, in the course
of which
bad
weather forced
his
ship
to put in at a
port
on the
Macedonian-held island
of
Andros,
and
Aratus himself narrowly
escaped capture by fleeing to the larger neighbouring island of Euboea.
From Ptolemy Philadelphus Aratus obtained
a
gift
of
forty talents
immediately and the promise
of
110 talents
in
instalments,
a
method
of
payment
no
doubt designed
to
give
the
donor
a
chance
to
observe
whether he was going to receive his money's worth. Antigonus is said
to
have tried to counter this diplomatic setback by some remarks delivered
at a dinner in Corinth, in which he cast doubts on Aratus' attachment
to
Ptolemy and alleged that 'now that
he
has been behind the scenes and
65
Polyb. 11.38.6; 44.6;
iv.6.5;
XXII.8.6;
xxm.12.8;
cf. SIC
665.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008