Walbank F.W., Astin A.E., Frederiksen M.W., Ogilvie R.M. The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 7, Part 1: The Hellenistic World
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CONCLUSION
217
communities not previously hellenized, Seleucid policy was directed
primarily towards the aristocracies; and it was at this level that more or
less fragile agreements could be concluded. The classic case of a
hellenizing movement, which did not penetrate the more dense strata of
the population and, although it made headway among some of the
aristocracy, ran up against national and religious resistance with strong
popular support, was the hellenizing policy pursued by Antiochus IV in
Judaea. Elsewhere, however, for example in the previously hellenized
area of western Asia Minor, which had its own distinct and characteristic
political traditions, Seleucid policy was not exclusively directed at an
understanding with the aristocracy and higher classes. There on the
contrary Seleucid policy could present itself in a variety of hues and
offered the possibility of broader political alliances which sometimes (as
in the Romano-Syrian war) reached down to, and involved, even the
lowest classes of the population. Thus hellenization and politicization
did not always and everywhere mean a break with the popular base.
They varied according to regions and also according to periods and
situations. Where the dynasty succeeded in its intention of creating large
urban centres, the conditions could arise for a certain cultural fusion
between Greeks and natives. This follows from the considerations put
forward above on the basis of recent studies concerning the forms and
effects of Seleucid colonization. Furthermore, we have slightly better
documentation (and information) than was available in Rostovtzeff's
time on at least two aspects of the policy of the Seleucids: first, their
policy towards the temples, cities and temple properties can be shown to
be more respectful than was previously thought and, secondly, the
spread of Greek culture and aspects of Macedonian culture (as seen from
the cults and place names) was larger and more potent than was
previously thought. The Graeco-Macedonian colonists and their de-
scendants show a capacity to express their culture which is seen to be
proportionately greater, the more archaeological and epigraphical
documentation we have available. Of course this does not prove that
there was a strong and deep hellenization of the natives, although the
evidence for this too is constantly increasing (for example in the most
recent studies and publications on the cultural situation in Hellenistic
and Roman Cappadocia). However the cultural vitality of the Graeco-
Macedonian colonies and settlements was a remarkably widespread
phenomenon.
On the other hand, hellenization does not seem to be an adequate
criterion for judging the historical success of the creation of the Seleucid
kingdom. Altogether, the Seleucid state, if one looks both at the top and
at the base, appears to be
a
society of the asiatic or' ancient oriental' type,
of which the fundamental characteristics are a monarch who is 'lord of
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2l8 6 SYRIA AND THE EAST
the land', on the one hand, and an immense peasant population, which
inhabits it in a condition of dependence but
not
of
slavery,
on the other. In
this society the causes of
crisis
are introduced and develop alongside the
introduction of new economic forms at variance with the 'ancient
oriental' aspects, which however remain the basic ones. The new forms
consist in the development of urbanization and trade together with a
limited development of
slavery.
Seleucid society does not seem however
to have been able to develop these new forms to the point of a fully
established system of slavery, which would have been to its own profit.
Syria was to become rather the great reservoir of slaves for the
western Mediterranean, where slavery flourished from the second
century B.C. at least to the end of the first century
A.D.
As for the causes of the decline and fall of the Seleucid empire, for
which Rostovtzeff stresses (not without some uncertainty and contradic-
tion) both the external (aggression by Rome and the Parthians) and the
internal factors (poor cohesion, dynastic conflicts, internal anarchy), it
now seems that they are to be looked for chiefly in the internal structure
of the Seleucid world, and in the strong attraction which this structure
exercised on a state like Rome which was orientated towards rule over
other areas of the Mediterranean world, and on the needs and the social
forces operative within the Roman state.
In this context Rostovtzeff's definition of Posidonius as a pheno-
menon completely extraneous to the history of Syria becomes a little less
probable. True, Posidonius grew
up
and expressed himself in antithesis to
the society of Seleucid Syria. But for that very reason his experience as a
historian was in vital relation (though of a dialectical character) to
Syria's historical experience. In the light of what has been said above, it
will for example become clear how the interest in social history
—
and in
the history of slavery in particular - which characterizes Posidonius'
work, arose, what it reflects and what, in a complicated fashion, it is
reacting against. To complete his literary, historiographical and general
cultural education, Posidonius certainly had to leave Syria and move to
the old Greek
cities,
such
as
Athens and Rhodes. But
as
regards his special
place as a historian, he can be understood and he receives the full
recognition that is his due only when he is seen against the background
of the political, social and economic history of Syria. It is therefore no
accident that the most important evidence which we possess on these
historical aspects, comes to us from the geographical work of Strabo,
who derived it largely from Posidonius of Apamea.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
APPENDIX:
THE SECESSION OF BACTRIA AND PARTHIA 219
THE DATE OF THE SECESSION OF BACTRIA AND
PARTHIA FROM THE SELEUCID KINGDOM
{see
pp. 213—16)
The chronology of the secession of Bactria and Parthia from the Seleucid realm
is obscure owing to the inconsistent information afforded by the sources, and
opinion has swung between a 'high' dating, which places the initial events in
the reign of Antiochus II, and
a
'low' dating which brings them down to that of
Seleucus II. There is a reference to the
'
War of
the
Brothers',' duorum fratrum
regum, Seleuci et Antiochi, discordia', in Justin
(XLI.4.3
ft".).
There is also a
curious reference to an Antiochus called Callinicus (who was apparently
also
called Seleucus) in the Byzantine historian Syncellus (p. 284 Bonn). The 'high'
dating is decidedly the more probable; considerations in favour of the 'low'
dating are sometimes based on forced interpretations of the fundamental texts.
Without going into all the particulars, I limit myself here to making some
observations about some aspects of the exegesis of our texts, which do not seem
to me to have been sufficiently exploited.
(i) There is a clear reference to the period of Antiochus II regarding the
Parthian secession
in
a
fundamental text of Arrian
{Parthica
fr. 1). The name of the
Seleucid governor in this text is Pherecles, whereas in Syncellus it is Agathocles,
and elsewhere it is Andragoras, but this is a difficulty, or rather
a
variant, which
remains on any chronology. But Justin (xLi.4.3) also refers to the consulate of
Manlius Vulso and Atilius Regulus as the date of the beginning of the invasion
of Parthyene. It is true that he also speaks here of Seleucus II, but the consular
date (256 or 250) represents a chronological element independent of Seleucid
chronology. Wolski interprets that as an element of weakness, but in fact,
because it is a 'foreign body', it could constitute an element of strength. It is
certain that we cannot claim Justin's reference to thefratrum
discordia
as proof
of
a late date (Seleucus II) for the
beginning
of
the
invasion of the Parni into Parthia,
because Justin (with noteworthy coherence here) himself distinguishes two
phases: (1) a first phase linked to the consulate of Vulso and Regulus (though
indeed dated anachronistically under Seleucus II), which is the date of the
beginning
ofthe Parnian invasion and the secession of Parthia; (2)
a
second phase,
in which the discordia fratrum
'dedit
impunitatem':
that is, in which the secession
was consolidated, but in the
course
oj
time.
(ii) It is not certain nor is it indeed probable that the fragment of Strabo xi.9.2,
c. 515 contains any mention of the War of the Brothers of
c.
240/39—237.
70
The
70
Strabo xi.9.2.0 515: vtuiTtpiodbnutv Sk
TWV
i£ui
TOV
Tavpov Sto
TO
npos aMois etvai
TOVS
TIJS
Eupi'as teal
TJf%
M-qSias fiaoiXias
TOUS
cxovras nal ravra,
npotTOv
jitv rtjv BaxTptavr/v aireorrjoav ol
irenioreviUvoi
KO.1
TTJI>
iyyvs alrrrj; iraoav ol ncpl Ev8v8i)iu>v,
CTTUT'
'Apaaicqs, avijp
ZKVBTJS
KTX.
On
the
fragment cf. also the analysis of Will 1979, 1.305-6: (A 67) (who suggests a different
chronological
view);
and the edition of
F.
Lasserre,
Strabon,
Geographic
(Livre xi)
(Paris,
1975) 91
and
140.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
22O 6 SYRIA AND THE EAST
correction
irpbs aXX-qXovs
instead ofvpos
aWr/Aois
of the manuscript tradition,
represents a modification of
the
traditional text which is almost as slight as the
other proposed correction (irpos aAAois),
but it
presupposes
a
distinction
between the king of Media on the one hand, and the king of Syria on the other,
which does not correspond to that between Seleucus II (who was king of Syria
and Media, etc.) and Antiochus Hierax (the sovereign of western Asia Minor).
However, the presence of
the
words
/ecu
raOra ('these regions as well') renders
the correction npos
aXAois
(the kings of Syria and Media were busy with ' other
regions'
or
'other affairs') somewhat attractive. On the other hand, from the
chronological point
of
view, the whole passage
of
Strabo labours under the
difficulty created by the reference to Euthydemus of Bactria and consequently
by the chronology (which is far too late) that Strabo appears to attribute to these
events. In addition the meaning of
<f£co
rov
Tavpov is
open to limitless argument,
but
in
principle one must surely admit
a
reference
to
those oriental regions,
Bactria and Parthia, about which Strabo goes on in the same passage to mention
particular, individual events.
(iii) We therefore have no clear and decisive evidence in favour of putting the
defection of Parthia 'under Seleucus II'. For Justin's first piece of evidence is
linked with the chronology of the consuls
of
256 (or 250) B.C. and thus one
solution is at
least
as good as the other. His second testimony, moreover, that
relative
to
the
discordia
fratrum, clearly refers
to
the conclusive stage
of
the
Parthian rebellion. And finally Syncellus' evidence is not in the form given by
Wolski ('a Seleucus whose second name was Antiochus'), but, if
we
follow the
text, exactly the reverse ('an Antiochus whose second name was Seleucus').
Certainly there
is the
attribute Callinicus which
we
know
was
given
to
Seleucus II. But how far is an epithet in honour of
a
victory decisive for singling
out
a
particular sovereign? On the other hand there
is
at least one strong piece of
evidence in favour of Antiochus II, that of
Arrian;
and there is also the consular
date given by Justin. Furthermore the official beginning of the Parthian era was
1 Nisan 247 B.C.,
a
year which falls firmly within the reign
of
Antiochus
II.
However, even
if
it began under Antiochus II (and that would be almost in
the logic of things, given the reduced commitment to an Iranian policy under
this sovereign), the secession of Bactria and Parthyene took place over
a
period
of years, and that was apparently the period stretching from the last years of
Antiochus
II to the
period
of
the war between Seleucus
II
and Antiochus
Hierax.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHAPTER
7
MACEDONIA AND GREECE
F.
W. WALBANK
I. ANTIGONUS GONATAS AND PYRRHUS
His victory over
the
Gauls
at
Lysimacheia left Antigonus Gonatas
master
of
Macedonia;
but for
several years
his
hold
on the
country
remained precarious, and was threatened by rivals whose elimination
was his first concern.
Of
these the most dangerous were Cassander's
nephew Antipater and Ptolemy, the surviving son
of
Lysimachus and
Arsinoe; there was also
a
certain Arrhidaeus. Furthermore the port of
Cassandreia was held
by a
Greek demagogue, Apollodorus. Using
Gaulish mercenaries Antigonus had dealt with all the pretenders within
a year.
To
expel Apollodorus
he
employed
an
arch-pirate, Ameinias,
who later entered his regular service. Apollodorus was executed and
Ptolemy, the son
of
Arsinoe, took refuge with Ptolemy II; he and his
descendants
are
later found ruling
the
town
of
Telmessus
in
Lycia,
which was assigned
to
him
by
Ptolemy
II.
Hardly were these rivals
disposed
of,
however, when Antigonus
had to
face
a
more serious
challenge.
In the
later months
of
275 Pyrrhus,
the
king
of
Epirus,
returned home from the fiasco
of
his wars
in
Italy and Sicily (see vol.
VII.2),
and
soon afterwards, perhaps
in
spring
274, he
invaded
Macedonia. Having defeated Antigonus
at a
spot Plutarch calls
'the
Narrows'
- it
may be the Aous gorge south
of
Tepeleni
in
southern
Illyria
—
he pursued him into Macedonia, whereupon the Macedonian
army defected to the invader. Antigonus had to
flee
to Thessalonica, and
very soon Pyrrhus was
in
control
of
both Macedonia and Thessaly.
The view has been advanced
1
that
in
invading Macedonia Pyrrhus
was acting
as
agent
for
Ptolemy
II
who,
it is
assumed, being now
mafried to his half-sister Arsinoe, Lysimachus' widow, will have sought
to secure the Cyclades against Macedonian attack by setting Arsinoe's
son Ptolemy
on
the Macedonian throne.
It
seems, however,
far
more
likely that Pyrrhus was acting on his own
behalf.
He was a man given to
impulsive acts, and a raid undertaken in the first instance for plunder
—
since
he
needed pay
for
his soldiers
-
may well have developed into
something more when
he
encountered weak resistance. But Pyrrhus
failed
to
consolidate his gains, and the violation
of
the royal tombs
at
1
By Tarn 1913, 259^"., 445: (D 58); against this see Leveque 1957,
560—1:
(c
46).
221
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
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Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
224
7
MACEDONIA
AND
GREECE
Aegae by the Gaulish garrison which he installed in the town turned
feeling against him. Very soon he withdrew to Epirus where, on the
invitation of Cleonymus, the son of Cleomenes II and a pretender to the
Spartan throne,
he set
about preparing
to
invade the Peloponnese.
Macedonia he left in the hands of
his
son Ptolemy, who there inflicted a
further defeat on Antigonus. A passage
in
Teles' diatribe On
Poverty
2
-
records some impartially cynical, if somewhat unjust, comments of Bion
of Borysthenes on Pyrrhus' role as a tomb-robber and on the cowardly
flight of Antigonus.
In 272 Aetolian neutrality, coupled with positive help from Achaea
and the goodwill of Megalopolis and Elis, enabled Pyrrhus to cross into
the Peloponnese, where most
of
Antigonus' Peloponnesian allies
quickly fell away. Pyrrhus then advanced
on
Sparta
by
way
of
Megalopolis. But meanwhile, having regained control
of
Macedonia,
Antigonus quickly conveyed
an
army south
by sea to
Corinth,
determined even to assist Sparta, if that was the best way to make an end
of Pyrrhus' ambitions. Sparta offered a successful resistance to Pyrrhus
and in the autumn he was diverted to Argos, where the anti-Macedonian
faction offered
to
deliver up the town
to
him. On the way his son
Ptolemy, who had rejoined him from Macedonia, perished in an ambush
laid by Areus, the king of Sparta; and at Argos Pyrrhus found Antigonus
camped
on a
nearby hill and
the
Argives anxious
to
assert their
neutrality. The town was essential to him as a base, however, and with
the help of partisans he forced an entry by night. Antigonus thereupon
sent in his son Halcyoneus with Macedonian forces, Pyrrhus was trapped
and soon after dawn was killed by a tile flung by a woman from a
roof-
top.
So perished a man notable for his instability of purpose and failure
to follow up any policy to its conclusion, yet for all that outstanding
among
the
figures
of
his generation. Antigonus sent Pyrrhus' son
Helenus back to Epirus, where his elder brother Alexander succeeded to
the throne. Pyrrhus' mercenaries were incorporated in Antigonus' army.
II.
ANTIGONUS AND MACEDONIA
Only now, with Pyrrhus dead, could Antigonus turn his attention to the
rehabilitation of
his
kingdom. Since Cassander's death twenty-five years
earlier Macedonia had been devastated by Gaulish invasion and torn
apart by the successive attempts of Demetrius, Pyrrhus, Lysimachus,
Seleucus and Ptolemy Ceraunus
to
seize and hold
it.
Now
at
last
it
possessed a firm and capable ruler; and though his task was no easy one
he enjoyed some advantages not shared by his fellow-kings in Antioch
and Alexandria. By this time the Macedonian people over whom
he
2
Telttis reliquiae
1
(ed. Hense), 43.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ANTIGONUS AND MACEDONIA 225
ruled had long since coalesced into
a
homogeneous population and
he
was himself one
of
them. The separate elements
of
Thracian, Anatolian
or Illyrian origin
had now
been absorbed;
the
outlying principalities
were subordinated
to the
central government
at
Pella,
and the
upper
class
at any
rate was strongly hellenized.
Alexander's expedition and the subsequent wars had imposed a heavy
burden on Macedonian resources and manpower. At a single stroke half
the men of military age had been swept from their native land; casualties
had been heavy and
of
the survivors many never returned.
A
few,
it is
true,
came back rich, but they were
a
minority, and such wealth as they
brought with them could hardly compensate
for the
losses which
Macedonia continued to sustain from the emigration
of
younger men
to
the new kingdoms
in
Asia
and
Egypt during
the
fifty years following
Alexander's death. Antigonus' cautious policy
in
Greece
(see
below,
pp.
229—32) was probably designed to allow Macedonia to recover from
her exhaustion.
In
such fighting
as
was necessary
he
quite deliberately
spared his national troops by leaving them
to
farm the land and calling
them
up
rarely; instead
he
relied chiefly
on
mercenaries
-
Greeks,
Illyrians
and
Gauls from
the
Balkans
- to do his
fighting
and
garrisoning. Unfortunately there
are no
firm figures
for
Macedonian
manpower under the Antigonids before the reign
of
Antigonus
III
and
Philip
V
over half a century later. Some scholars have argued that
the
minting
of an
adequate
and
reliable silver coinage
by
Antigonus
II
shows his reign
to
have been a time
of
Macedonian prosperity;
3
but the
argument is of limited validity, for Antigonus is unlikely to have minted
with commercial ends in view, but rather to meet military demands, and
in
any
case
the
volume
of
Antigonus' coinage
has
been exaggerated.
4
Certainly Macedonia never attained anything like
the
level
of
wealth
found
in
Egypt and some other Hellenistic states; a hundred years later,
in
168,
the land tax brought in only a little over 200 talents a year.
5
There
were
of
course other sources
of
national wealth besides agriculture and
pasturage. The still extensive forests (furnishing timber and pitch, both
essential
for
ship-building), the silver mines
of
Mt Pangaeum and a little
gold were all capable of contributing to the wealth of
the
kingdom once
conditions were stable. Whether mines
and
forests were
a
royal
monopoly
is not
clear. There was certainly
'
king's land'
out of
which
domains were granted;
but on the
conditions
of
land tenure
in
Macedonia
the
sources tell
us
virtually nothing.
Within Macedonia,
in
contrast
to the
other Hellenistic states,
the
king's autocratic power was subject to the restriction of certain vestigial
3
For example, Rostovtzeff 1953,1.253:
(A
52); on Gonatas' coinage see iMerker i960, 39-52:
(B
240),
with
the
criticism
of
Ehrhardt 1975, 75-8: (D
14).
4
Cf.
Ehrhardt 197;, 75-109: (D
14). 5
pi
ut
Aem 28 4
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
226 7 MACEDONIA AND GREECE
popular rights.
It was a
traditional prerogative
of the
Macedonian
people, operating very often through the army-assembly,
to
appoint
a
new king by acclamation and
to
act as judges
in
cases
of
high treason.
6
But
how far
these rights were exercised under Antigonus
and his
successors is another matter. Of the circumstances attending Antigonus'
accession no record remains; but fifty years later Antigonus III is said by
Plutarch (Aem.
8.2) to
have been raised
to the
throne
by
'the leading
Macedonians', and
in
practice
it
was probably some such group rather
than
any
popular assembly which
in
time
of
crisis took
the
decision.
Their advice,
it is
true, may have been validated
by the
people
or
the
army;
but
nothing
of
the sort
is
recorded,
nor
has any decree
by
any
Macedonian assembly been found. Once
he
was appointed,
the
army
took
an
oath
to the
king,
but its
wording
has not
survived;
nor is it
known whether
the
king swore
a
reciprocal oath,
as the
king
of
the
Molossians
did.
There
is
evidence that constitutionally
'the
Macedonians' were
an
element
in
the Macedonian state, however slight and however ineffect-
ive their powers.
A
fragmentary treaty between Antigonus
III and
Eleutherna
(SVA 501) was
made with 'Antigonus
and the
Mace-
donians';
a
dedication
set up on
Delos
to
celebrate Antigonus Ill's
victory over Sparta
in
222 (SIG 518) reads: 'King Antigonus,
son of
King Demetrius and
. . .
and the allies from (the spoils of) the battle of
Sellasia
to
Apollo'
—
where
the
missing words
can
only
be 'the
Macedonians',
as in the
treaty
of
215 between Philip
V
and Hannibal
(Polyb.
VII.9.1);
Philip
V is
honoured
on a
Delian inscription
by the
'corporate body
(koinori)
of the
Macedonians'
(SIG 575); and a
dedication to the Great Gods on Samothrace
is
made on his behalf by the
Macedonians
(Hesperia
48
(1979) 16). Furthermore,
the
Macedonians
were included among the members of the Hellenic Symmachy set up by
Antigonus III in 224/3 alongside the Greek federal states (Polyb. iv.9.4);
and towards the end of Philip V's reign coins were issued in the name of
' the Macedonians' as well
as
by various regional groups and cities inside
Macedonia.
7
But
in
reality the powers of the Macedonians amounted
to
very little. Treaties were normally made
in
the king's name alone.
The
exceptional mention
of
the Macedonians
in
those with Eleutherna and
Hannibal
may
connect with
the
reference
to the
Greek allies which
occurs
in
both documents. There
is
moreover
no
hint anywhere
in
Polybius that the Antigonids had to take account of any popular rights;
and though, following
a
long-standing custom,
the
Macedonians
in
contact with
the
king displayed
an
outspokenness
in
addressing
him
6
For a
sceptical view
of
these rights
see
Errington 1978, 77-133: (D
17).
7
See Walbank 1940, 265:
(D
43).
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