Weingast B.R., Wittman D. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
662 democratization
over the party leaderships, centralized power within the parties, streamlined extensive
memberships and organizations, and committed themselves to democracy. The result
was that these parties re-entered power within a few years of the Communist collapse,
this time by winning democratic elections with appeals to secularism, moderation,
andtechnocraticcompetence.
In a second example, both the former authoritarian elites and their opponents can
build in informal economic and political advantages for themselves that last long
beyond the transition. In the post-Communist setting, control over the enormous
assets of the state (which comprised almost the entire industrial and service sectors of
the economy) began to slip as the Communist regime began to collapse. As a result,
there were numerous instances of “spontaneous privatization,” as managers and party
hacks took advantage of murky property rights to claim entire state enterprises at
fire prices. The most notorious examples of such practices have occurred in the
former Soviet Union, where entire sectors of the economy were bought at below-
market prices by individuals (known widely as “the oligarchs”) who gained enormous
economic power and political influence under President Boris Yeltsin (e.g. Hoffman
2002).
Nor is the deliberate use of such structures confined to the years surrounding the
regime collapse. Once new democratic institutions are in place, elites can continue
deliberately to exploit any loopholes to their advantage, leading the way back to
authoritarian practice in some cases. The letter, if not the spirit, of the democratic law
is followed. For example, in Russia, President Vladimir Putin’s steady move to gain
greater control and authority over the media, and to discredit potential competitors,
did not actually violate the country’s formal legal institutions and in some cases has
actually strengthened them (Smyth 2002). Similarly, Slobodan Milo
˘
sevi
´
cinSerbia
and Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia proceeded largely by exploiting legal loopholes and
interpreting them in distinctly favorable ways, and rarely proceeded by obviously or
directly violating formal institutions.
This is not to say that all structural legacies will either have the same impact on elite
action, or be as available for exploitation. These structural legacies are not uniform.
First, no transition is a tabula rasa, but neither is it ineffably determined by the
overwhelming weight of the past. The legacies of authoritarian regimes vary in their
half-lives, with some disappearing virtually overnight (for example, consumer behav-
ior and self-censorship), and others persisting well into the new regime (Grzymala-
Busse 2002). Second, these legacies differ by regime: even within the supposedly
homogeneous Communist empire, distinct economic, political, military, cultural,
and geographic legacies continued to make their mark and launch these countries
on divergent trajectories (e.g. Kopstein and Reilly 2002; Ekiert and Hanson 2003).
Moreover, elites are constrained in their use and exploitation of the institutions
they have created—not necessarily by other institutions or structures, but by elite
competition itself. Where ancien régime elites never had to exit power, or even to
expand their existing constituency and basis for legitimacy, both economic and de-
mocratic reforms are stifled, as entrenched political actors continue to seek private
rents and to extract resources from the state and its assets (e.g. Ganev 2001;Motyl
anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones luong 663
1997). Where elites never faced a threat of replacement from a credible and well-
organized set of opposition forces, this despoilation could go on unchecked, as in
central Asia (Jones Luong 2002). Indeed, the post-Communist context demonstrates
that democratic contestation, rather than undermining economic reform, enables it
(e.g. Hellman 1998;Fish1998).
Representative elite competition, then, is one key to the successful introduction
of both market reform and democracy (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002).
This is not simply a question of elite turnover, but of a mutual holding in check,
and the generation of incentives to appeal to broader constituencies. This effect is
predicated on the representativeness of elites, and on their contestation, not simply on
fragmentation or divisions among elites. As both Latin American and African cases
show, political fragmentation per se can pose major obstacles to economic reform.
4
In
contrast, an active and well-organized opposition limits the excesses of the governing
elites, by creating a credible threat of replacement to the government.
2.3 The Roles of the State and Informal Institutions
Both structure- and agency-based accounts of democratization have tended to focus
on the formal institutions of representation and accountability. Given that without
elections and contestation, we cannot speak of democratization, this is not an unrea-
sonable emphasis. However, it overlooks the other institutional aspects of successful
democratization: specifically, the role of the state and informal institutions.
First, with few exceptions, the state has long been ignored in the study of democ-
ratization and of market reforms.
5
The emphasis has been on the pluralization of
politics, economics, and civil society (e.g. Dahrendorf 1990;Fatton1999), rather than
on the institutions of the state, such as centralized bureaucracies and the networks of
security, redistribution, and market regulation, that they administer.
Yet, the post-Communist experience demonstrates that the type and extent of state
structures found in the countries undergoing transition profoundly influence democ-
ratization (e.g. Carothers 2002; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002; O’Donnell
1996). For example, a clear division between state and society generates powerful
incentives both for elites to appeal to outside constituencies, and for these con-
stituencies to hold elite despoliation in check. Moreover, the more the state had
grown independent of the party during Communist rule, and the more it developed
the capacity to administer (through implementing economic reforms, co-opting
potential opposition, etc), the more successfully it could navigate the simultaneous
transition to market and democracy. And a more apolitical state whose representa-
tives have experience in administering liberalization has been a key contributor to the
success of democratization.
⁴ Similar arguments have been raised about the lack of reform progress in Ukraine (Motyl 1997).
Haggard and Kaufman 1995 and van de Walle 1999 go as far as to argue that in these contexts, dominant
party systems are more likely to initiate and sustain reform.
⁵ These exceptions include Linz and Stepan 1996 and O’Donnell 1993.
664 democratization
A focus on the state can also resolve a key puzzle for scholars of democratization:
why has rapid and simultaneous economic and political liberalization been a recipe
for success in the post-Communist world, in contrast to other regions including
Africa (e.g. Bienen and Herbst 1996) and Latin America? All the leaders of post-
Communist reforms, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic,
underwent simultaneous and radical reforms of both the planned economy and the
authoritarian polity. In contrast, the notorious laggards on economic reform in the
former Soviet Union (e.g. Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) opted for gradual
political liberalization, if any. The answer lies in the strong correlation with state
organizational capacity and impartiality. The relatively strong and impartial states in
east–central Europe made rapid and simultaneous transitions a far more manageable
challenge than in the former Soviet Union where the state is subservient to entrenched
interests and unable to administer public goods. In Africa, where the state is further
weakened by low population density and competing sources of authority, the chal-
lenge of simultaneous market and democratic reforms becomes next to impossible
to meet.
A second and related omission is that of informal institutions. In the context
of rapid regime change, informal institutions—unwritten and unenforced by the
state—are often the ones that exert greater influence on elite behavior and popular
expectations.
6
For example, where they did not inherit the central state institutions
that previously governed their respective states, post-Communist elites have relied
primarily on informal structures (such as patronage networks and unofficial policy-
making channels) to establish their authority. As a result, there is little of the pro-
cedural predictability necessary for initiating, let alone establishing, a democratic
system. Similarly, the real purpose of formal institutions may be to serve informal
ends: in nearly all of the post-Communist states, for example, electoral systems have
been designed with precision and multiple elections have been held since 1989.Yet
in several cases, such rules only stabilized the existing distribution of power and
secured the privileged political and economic status of the participating elites (Jones
Luong 2002).
7
Thus, the termination of scheduled elections and the increasing use
of referenda to extend presidential rule throughout central Asia is not evidence of
a failure to consolidate democracy. Rather, it reflects the lack of any intention to
build democracy in the first place. More broadly, the focus on formal democratic
institutions tends to conflate formal institutions, in particular elections and electoral
institutions, with a transition to democracy (Carothers 2002). Elections are viewed
as both the initiation of the democratization process and the hallmark of successful
democratization.
8
However, elections and electoral rules themselves tell us far less
than we would like about the level of elite commitment to democratization.
⁶ Note that this is not only true of “new democracies,” as others have argued (see e.g. Bunce 2000;
O’Donnell 1998) but also of many with long histories, for example, Argentina (Levitsky and Murillo
2004).
⁷ In other cases (e.g. Moldova), democratization was the unintended consequence of a polity in
which elections could produce no clear winners (Way 2003).
⁸ Variants of the notions of “founding elections” and the need for a peaceful transfer of power, which
were introduced by O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, have continued to be used (see, e.g., Huntington
1991; Przeworski 1991).
anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones luong 665
3 Conclusion
.............................................................................
In the end, then, which approach better explains the variation in democratization?
Both structural preconditions and elite agency have been found to play critical roles in
democratization. Yet, if elite action and mass mobilization catalyze democratization,
structural preconditions profoundly influence its eventual success. They do so in two
ways: first, structural legacies enable elite action by determining individual elite ca-
pacities to forge a successful democratic transition. Second, they provide elite agency
with organizational resources and strategic templates, such as state administrations
and informal institutions, respectively, which implement, enforce, and legitimize elite
democratization projects.
References
Bernhard,M.2000. Institutional choice after communism: a critique of theory-building in
an empirical wasteland, East European Politics and Societies, 14: 316–47.
Bienen,H.,andHerbst,J.1996. The relationship between political and economic reform in
Africa. Comparative Politics, 29: 23–42.
Bratton,M.,andvan de Walle,N.1992. Popular protest and political reform in Africa.
Comparative Politics, 24: 419–42.
1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspec-
tive. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bruszt, L., and Stark,D.1991. Remaking the political field in Hungary: from the politics of
confrontation to the politics of competition. Journal of International Affairs, 45: 201–45.
Bunce,V.1994. Should transitologists be grounded? Slavic Review, 54: 111–27.
1998.Regionaldifferences in democratization: the east versus the south. Post-Soviet
Affairs, 14: 187–211.
2000. Comparative democratization: big and bounded generalizations. Comparative Po-
litical Studies, 33: 703–34.
Callaghy,T.1994.Africa:backtothefuture?Journal of Democracy, 5: 133–45.
Carothers,T.2002. The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13: 5–21.
Collier,D.,andLevitsky,S.1997. Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in
comparative research. World Politics, 49: 430–51.
Colomer,J.M.1994. The Polish games of transition. Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
27: 275–94.
Colton,T.J.,andHough,J.F.(eds.)1998. Russia’s Protodemocracy in Action: Perspectives on
the Election of 1993. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
and McFaul,M.2003. Russian democracy under Putin. Problems of Post-Communism,
50: 12–21.
Dahl,R.1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press.
Dahrendorf,R.1990. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto and
Windus.
Diamond,L.1992. Economic development and democracy reconsidered. American Behavioral
Scientist, 35: 450–99.
666 demo cratization
1996. Illusions about consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7: 34–51.
2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13: 21–35.
Di Palma,G.1990. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions.LosAngeles:
University of California Press.
Easter,G.M.1997. Preference for presidentialism: postcommunist regime change in Russia
and the NIS. World Politics, 49: 184–211.
Ekiert,G.1991. Democratization processes in east central europe: a theoretical reconsidera-
tion. British Journal of Political Science, 21: 285–313.
and Hanson,S.2003. Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster,J.,Offe,C.,andPreuss,U.K.1998. Institutional Design in Post-communist States:
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fatton,R.1999. The impairment of democratization: Haiti in comparative perspective. Com-
parative Politics, 31: 209–30.
Fish,M.S.1994a. Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolu-
tion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
1994b. Russia’s fourth transition. Journal of Democracy, 5: 31–42.
1998. The determinants of economic reform in the postcommunist world. East European
Politics and Societies, 12: 31–78.
2001. Putin’s path. Journal of Democracy, 12: 71–8.
Freedom House 2003. Nations in Transit 2003: Democratization in East Central Europe and
Eurasia. Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Frye,T.1997. A politics of institutional choice: post-communist presidencies. Comparative
Political Studies, 30: 523–52.
Ganev,V.I.2001. The Dorian Gray effect: winners as state breakers in postcommunism.
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34: 1–25.
Geddes,B.1996. Initiation of new democratic institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin
America. In Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America,
ed. A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Gel’man,V.1999. Second Europe-Asia lecture. Regime transition, uncertainty and prospects
for democratization: the politics of Russia’s regions in comparative perspective. Europe–Asia
Studies, 51: 939–56.
Gill,G.J.,andMarkwick,R.D.2000. Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to
Yeltsin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grzymala-Busse,A.2002. The Regeneration of Communist Successor Parties in East Central
Europe: Redeeming the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2003. Political competition and the politicization of the state in east central Europe.
Comparative Political Studies, 36: 1123–47.
2004. Transforming the party-state: formal reform and informal practices. Unpublished
manuscript.
and Jones Luong,P.2002. Reconceptualizing the state: lessons from post-communism.
Politics and Society, 30: 529–54.
and Innes,A.2003. Great expectations: the EU and domestic political competition in
east central Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 17: 64–73.
Haggard,S.,andKaufman,R.R.1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hahn,J.W.1997. Democratization and political participation in Russia’s regions. In Demo-
cratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova,ed.
K. Dawisha and B. Parrott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones luong 667
Hellman,J.1998. Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions.
World Politics, 50: 203–34.
Hoffman,D.2002. The Oligarchs: Wealth & Power in the New Russia.NewYork:PublicAffairs.
Holmes,S.1997. What Russia teaches us now: how weak states threaten freedom. American
Prospect, 33: 30–9.
Huntington,S.P.1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Ishiyama,J.T.1997. Transitional electoral systems in post-communist eastern Europe. Political
Science Quarterly, 112: 95–115.
Jones Luong,P.2002. Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia:
Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2003a. Economic decentralization in Kazakhstan: causes and consequences. In The Trans-
formation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence,ed.P.Jones
Luong. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
2003b. The Middle Easternization of Central Asia. Current History,Oct.:333–40.
2003c. Political obstacles to economic reform in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan:
strategies to move ahead. Paper prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the World Bank
CIS-7 Initiative.
Jowitt,K.1992. New World Disorder: The Leninist Legacy. Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
1996. Dizzy with democracy. Problems of Post-Communism, 43: 3–8.
Karl, T. L., and Schmitter,P.1991. Modes of transition in Latin America, southern, and
eastern Europe. International Social Science Journal, 128: 269–84.
Kilson,M.1987. The anatomy of African class consciousness. In Studies in Power and Class in
Africa, ed. I. L. Markovitz. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kirkow,P.1995. Regional warlordism in Russia: the case of Primorskii Krai. Europe–Asia
Studies, 47: 923–47.
Kitschelt,H.1992. Structure and process-driven explanations of political regime change.
American Political Science Review, 86: 1028–34.
Kopstein,J.,andReilly,D.2000. Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-
communist world. World Politics, 53: 1–37.
Lardeyret,G.1991. The problem with proportional representation. Journal of Democracy, 2:
30–5.
Lerner,D.1958. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Levitsky
,S.,andMurillo,M.V.2004. Theory building in a context of institutional instabil-
ity. In The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Argentine Democracy in Comparative Perspective,
ed. S. Levitsky and M. V. Murillo. Unpublished manuscript.
Lijphart,A.1991. Constitutional choices for new democracies. Journal of Democracy, 2: 72–84.
1992. Democratization and constitutional choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and
Poland, 1989-91. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4: 207–23.
Linz,J.1990. The perils of presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1: 51–69.
and Stepan,A.1996. Problems in Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Lipset,S.M.1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.GardenCity,NY:Doubleday.
Luebbert,G.M.1991. Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political
Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
McFaul,M.1999. The perils of a protracted transition. Journal of Democracy, 10: 4–18.
668 demo cratization
McFaul,M.,Petrov,N.,andRyabov,A.2004. Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian
Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
McMann,K.2000. Symbiotic transitions: democratic development and economic indepen-
dence in post-Soviet provinces. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan.
Mainwaring,S.1993. Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: the difficult combina-
tion. Comparative Political Studies, 26: 198–228.
Moore,B.1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making
oftheModernWorld. Boston: Beacon Press.
Motyl,A.1997. Structural constraints and starting points: the logic of systemic change in
Ukraine and Russia. Comparative Politics, 29: 433–47.
Munck,G.,andLeff,C.S.1997. Modes of transition and democratization: South America
and eastern Europe in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, 29: 343–62.
O’Donnell,G.1993. On the state, democratization, and some conceptual problems: a Latin
American view with glances at some postcommunist countries. World Development, 21:
1355–69.
1994.Delegativedemocracy.Journal of Democracy, 5: 55–69.
1996. Illusions about consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7: 34–51.
1998. Horizontal accountability in new democracies. Journal of Democracy, 9: 112–26.
and Schmitter,P.1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about
Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
O’Loughlin,J.,Ward,M.D.,Lofdahl,C.L.,Cohen,J.S.,Brown,D.S.,Reilly,D.,
Gleditsch,K.S.,andShin,M.1998.Thediffusion of democracy, 1946-1994. Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, 88: 545–74.
Orttung,R.1995. From Leningrad to Saint Petersburg: Democratization in a Russian City.New
York:StMartin’sPress.
Przeworski,A.1991. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
and Limongi,F.1997. Modernization: theories and facts. World Politics, 49: 155–83.
Alvarez,M.E.,Cheibub,J.,andLimongi,F.2000. Democracy and Development: Polit-
ical Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Quade,Q.L.1991. Proportional representation and democratic statecraft. Journal of Democ-
racy, 2: 36–41.
Reddaway,P.2001. Will Putin be able to consolidate power? Post-Soviet Affairs, 17: 23–44.
Schmitter, P., with Karl,T.L.1994. The conceptual travels of transitologists and consolida-
tionologists: how far should they attempt to go? Slavic Review, 53: 173–85.
Schumpeter,J.1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.NewYork:HarperandRow.
Shevtsova,L.2001. Russia’s hybrid regime. Journal of Democracy, 12: 65–70.
Smyth,R.2002. Building state capacity from the inside out: parties of power and the success
of the president’s reform agenda in Russia. Politics and Society, 30: 555–78.
Starr,H.1991. Democratic dominoes: diff
usion approaches to the spread of democracy in the
international system. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35: 356–81.
Stepan,A.,andSkach,C.1993. Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation:
parliamentarism versus presidentialism. World Politics, 46: 1–22.
Vachudova,M.2001. The leverage of international institutions on democratizing states: the
European Union and eastern Europe. RSCAS Working Paper No. 2001/33.
van de Walle,N.1999. Economic reform in democratizing Africa. Comparative Politics,Oct.:
21–41.
2002.Africa’srangeofregimes.Journal of Democracy, 13: 66–80.
anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones luong 669
Way,L.2003. Weak states and pluralism: the case of Moldova. East European Politics and
Societies, 17: 454–82.
Widener,J.1994. Political reform in anglophone and francophone African countries. In Eco-
nomic Reform and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. J. Widener. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Zakaria,F.1997. The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76: 22–43.
part x
..............................................................
HISTORICAL
AND
COMPARATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
AND NON-
DEMOCRATIC
REGIMES
..............................................................