Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , Hoboken, New Jersey, 2005,
384 p.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Foreword
Introduction
Introduction to Nanotechnology
Understanding Nanotechnology
The Industrial Structure Giving Rise to Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology Policy and Regulation
Societal and Ethical Implications
Environmental Regulation
The Patent and Trademark Office
FDA Regulation
National Security and Export Controls
Federal Funding
Conclusions
Nanotechnology Business
Starting a Nanotech Company
Business Plans and Strategy
Early Stage Financing
ntellectual Property
Corporate Partnering and Globalization
Consolidation and Standardization
Exit Opportunities
Conclusions
Notes
About the Authors
Index
Foreword
On January 21, 2000, President Clinton unveiled the National Nanotechnology
nitiative (NNI) in a major policy address at Caltech. In his
speech, he announced that his budget would propose almost doubling the
federal investment in nanoscale science and engineering, from $270 million
n FY2000 to $495 million in FY2001. He asked his audience to imagine
materials with 10 times the strength of steel and only a fraction of the
weight; shrinking all the information at the Library of Congress into a device
the size of a sugar cube; detecting cancerous tumors that are only a few cells
n size. The next week, with 51 million Americans watching, Clinton again
referred to the promise of nanotechnology in his State of the Union address.
(His speech writers tried to take this section out to shorten the 89-minute
speech, but Clinton insisted on leaving it in! )
As a strong supporter of the NNI, I was thrilled that President Clinton
had decided to embrace it as one of his top science and technology priorities.
had the privilege of working for President Clinton and Vice President Gore
for eight years, and eventually served as the Deputy Director of the White
House National Economic Council and the Deputy Assistant to the President
for Technology and Economic Policy.
was convinced that there is a strong intellectual case for increasing the
federal govement’s investment in nanoscale science and engineering. First,
nanotechnology has the potential to be what economists call a general purpose
technology—similar in the size and scope of its economic and societal
mpact to the steam engine, electricity, the transistor, and the Inteet.
Second, long-term, high-risk research will be needed to realize the potential
of nanotechnology. Some of this research is beyond the time horizons of individual
firms, and govement support for research is critical when firms cannot
fully capture the benefits of investing in research and development.
Third, the NNI can help address the growing imbalance between biomedical
research and the physical sciences and engineering by increasing support for
critical disciplines such as condensed matter physics, chemistry, materials
science, and electrical engineering. Fourth, the NNI will help create the
workforce of the twenty-first century, since most of the govement funds
support university research. Furthermore, as Nobel Laureate Rick Smalley
has observed, nanotechnology might get our young boys and girls excited
about science and engineering, in the same way that Sputnik or the space race
captured the public’s imagination in previous generations. Finally, global leadership in nanotechnology is up for grabs, and increased federal investment
will help strengthen the U.S. position in this key area.
The development of the NNI began in eaest in September 1998, when
the White House created a working group on Nanoscience, Engineering,
and Technology under the auspices of the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC). I served as the White House Co-Chair, and Mike Roco,
the point person on nanotechnology for the the National Science Foundation
(NSF), served as the Chair. In January 1999, the NSTC convened a workshop
with experts from industry and academia. University researchers such as
UC Berkeley’s Paul Alivisatos and industrial researchers such as Hewlett-
Packard’s Stan Williams helped identify the most important and promising
R&D opportunities in nanoscale science and engineering.
Throughout 1999, dedicated public servants like Mike Roco (NSF), Jim
Murday (Naval Research Laboratory), Iran Thomas (Energy), Meyya
Meyyapan (NASA), Jeff Schloss from the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
and Kelly Kirkpatrick from the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), worked tirelessly to develop a concrete proposal for the President’s
FY2001 budget. My colleagues at the OSTP and I met with senior officials
from the science agencies; we convinced them that we would fight to protect
any increases in nanotechnology research that they proposed as part of their
budget submission to the Office of Management and Budget. We also asked
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology to review our
proposal, which they strongly endorsed.
also began to ask federal program managers and leading researchers in
the field to identify potential grand challenges—ambitious but plausible
outcomes from increased research in nanoscale science and engineering.
Although I knew that it was impossible to predict what might eventually
come out of the NNI, my time in the White House had taught me that it was
essential to identify some exciting possibilities that could be easily understood
by politicians, reporters, and the general public. Armed with these examples
(several of which wound up in Clinton’s Caltech speech and State of the
Union address), I started briefing the most senior White House staff about
nanotechnology—people like Gene Sperling, the head of the National
Economic Council, John Podesta, the President’s Chief of Staff, and David
Beier, Vice President Gore’s Chief Domestic Policy Adviser.
n the fall of 1999, the White House staff began to identify possible initiatives
for consideration by President Clinton. I convinced Gene Sperling that
nanotechnology should be one of the priorities in the President’s FY2001
budget, as part of a larger increase in support for science and technology that
we called the 21st Century Research Fund. Neal Lane, the President’s
Science Advisor, was also a staunch advocate for the NNI. Working together,
the National Economic Council and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy made a compelling case to President Clinton to support a large increase for the NNI in his budget. In a December 1999 meeting in the White House
Cabinet Room, President Clinton approved the NNI.
Although hardly an impartial observer, I believe that President Clinton’s
decision to launch the NNI served as a catalyst for increased investment by
universities, large companies, venture capitalists, and state govements.
Federal expenditures have continued to rise during the Bush administration,
and will reach nearly $1 billion in the FY2005 budget. Media coverage of
nanoscience and nanotechnology has exploded, and Congress has passed legislation
that authorizes the NNI for four years. Many foreign govements
have also increased their investments in nanotechnology research.
Of course, only time will tell whether these increased public and private
nvestments in nanotechnology will lead to revolutionary advancements in
computing and communications, clean energy, health care, transportation,
advanced materials, environmental applications, national security, and space
exploration. As President Clinton noted in his Caltech speech, some of these
research goals will take 20 or more years to achieve. There is always the risk
that advocates of nanotechnology, whether in govement, industry, finance,
or academia, will overpromise and underdeliver.
What is clear is that we must now address the ethical, legal, policy, regulatory,
and business issues associated with the commercialization of nanotechnologies.
This is why The Handbook of Nanotechnology is so timely. John Miller,
Ruben Serrato, Jose Miguel Represas-Cardenas, and Griffith Kundahl have
done a terrific job of analyzing the key economic and societal issues facing
nanotechnology. How should the EPA regulate nanomaterials, which may
have different environmental and human health effects than the same materials
n bulk? Will the Patent and Trademark Office be able to handle the
rush to file nanotechnology patents without slowing down the rate of innovation?
How can the govement most effectively manage its investment in
nanoscale science and engineering? How can entrepreneurs successfully
launch nanotechnology start-ups? The Handbook of Nanotechnology is invaluable
for anyone who is seeking to move nanotechnology from the lab to the
marketplace in an ethical and responsible fashion.
THOMAS A. KALIL July 2004
Contents
Acknowledgments
Foreword
Introduction
Introduction to Nanotechnology
Understanding Nanotechnology
The Industrial Structure Giving Rise to Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology Policy and Regulation
Societal and Ethical Implications
Environmental Regulation
The Patent and Trademark Office
FDA Regulation
National Security and Export Controls
Federal Funding
Conclusions
Nanotechnology Business
Starting a Nanotech Company
Business Plans and Strategy
Early Stage Financing
ntellectual Property
Corporate Partnering and Globalization
Consolidation and Standardization
Exit Opportunities
Conclusions
Notes
About the Authors
Index
Foreword
On January 21, 2000, President Clinton unveiled the National Nanotechnology
nitiative (NNI) in a major policy address at Caltech. In his
speech, he announced that his budget would propose almost doubling the
federal investment in nanoscale science and engineering, from $270 million
n FY2000 to $495 million in FY2001. He asked his audience to imagine
materials with 10 times the strength of steel and only a fraction of the
weight; shrinking all the information at the Library of Congress into a device
the size of a sugar cube; detecting cancerous tumors that are only a few cells
n size. The next week, with 51 million Americans watching, Clinton again
referred to the promise of nanotechnology in his State of the Union address.
(His speech writers tried to take this section out to shorten the 89-minute
speech, but Clinton insisted on leaving it in! )
As a strong supporter of the NNI, I was thrilled that President Clinton
had decided to embrace it as one of his top science and technology priorities.
had the privilege of working for President Clinton and Vice President Gore
for eight years, and eventually served as the Deputy Director of the White
House National Economic Council and the Deputy Assistant to the President
for Technology and Economic Policy.
was convinced that there is a strong intellectual case for increasing the
federal govement’s investment in nanoscale science and engineering. First,
nanotechnology has the potential to be what economists call a general purpose
technology—similar in the size and scope of its economic and societal
mpact to the steam engine, electricity, the transistor, and the Inteet.
Second, long-term, high-risk research will be needed to realize the potential
of nanotechnology. Some of this research is beyond the time horizons of individual
firms, and govement support for research is critical when firms cannot
fully capture the benefits of investing in research and development.
Third, the NNI can help address the growing imbalance between biomedical
research and the physical sciences and engineering by increasing support for
critical disciplines such as condensed matter physics, chemistry, materials
science, and electrical engineering. Fourth, the NNI will help create the
workforce of the twenty-first century, since most of the govement funds
support university research. Furthermore, as Nobel Laureate Rick Smalley
has observed, nanotechnology might get our young boys and girls excited
about science and engineering, in the same way that Sputnik or the space race
captured the public’s imagination in previous generations. Finally, global leadership in nanotechnology is up for grabs, and increased federal investment
will help strengthen the U.S. position in this key area.
The development of the NNI began in eaest in September 1998, when
the White House created a working group on Nanoscience, Engineering,
and Technology under the auspices of the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC). I served as the White House Co-Chair, and Mike Roco,
the point person on nanotechnology for the the National Science Foundation
(NSF), served as the Chair. In January 1999, the NSTC convened a workshop
with experts from industry and academia. University researchers such as
UC Berkeley’s Paul Alivisatos and industrial researchers such as Hewlett-
Packard’s Stan Williams helped identify the most important and promising
R&D opportunities in nanoscale science and engineering.
Throughout 1999, dedicated public servants like Mike Roco (NSF), Jim
Murday (Naval Research Laboratory), Iran Thomas (Energy), Meyya
Meyyapan (NASA), Jeff Schloss from the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
and Kelly Kirkpatrick from the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), worked tirelessly to develop a concrete proposal for the President’s
FY2001 budget. My colleagues at the OSTP and I met with senior officials
from the science agencies; we convinced them that we would fight to protect
any increases in nanotechnology research that they proposed as part of their
budget submission to the Office of Management and Budget. We also asked
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology to review our
proposal, which they strongly endorsed.
also began to ask federal program managers and leading researchers in
the field to identify potential grand challenges—ambitious but plausible
outcomes from increased research in nanoscale science and engineering.
Although I knew that it was impossible to predict what might eventually
come out of the NNI, my time in the White House had taught me that it was
essential to identify some exciting possibilities that could be easily understood
by politicians, reporters, and the general public. Armed with these examples
(several of which wound up in Clinton’s Caltech speech and State of the
Union address), I started briefing the most senior White House staff about
nanotechnology—people like Gene Sperling, the head of the National
Economic Council, John Podesta, the President’s Chief of Staff, and David
Beier, Vice President Gore’s Chief Domestic Policy Adviser.
n the fall of 1999, the White House staff began to identify possible initiatives
for consideration by President Clinton. I convinced Gene Sperling that
nanotechnology should be one of the priorities in the President’s FY2001
budget, as part of a larger increase in support for science and technology that
we called the 21st Century Research Fund. Neal Lane, the President’s
Science Advisor, was also a staunch advocate for the NNI. Working together,
the National Economic Council and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy made a compelling case to President Clinton to support a large increase for the NNI in his budget. In a December 1999 meeting in the White House
Cabinet Room, President Clinton approved the NNI.
Although hardly an impartial observer, I believe that President Clinton’s
decision to launch the NNI served as a catalyst for increased investment by
universities, large companies, venture capitalists, and state govements.
Federal expenditures have continued to rise during the Bush administration,
and will reach nearly $1 billion in the FY2005 budget. Media coverage of
nanoscience and nanotechnology has exploded, and Congress has passed legislation
that authorizes the NNI for four years. Many foreign govements
have also increased their investments in nanotechnology research.
Of course, only time will tell whether these increased public and private
nvestments in nanotechnology will lead to revolutionary advancements in
computing and communications, clean energy, health care, transportation,
advanced materials, environmental applications, national security, and space
exploration. As President Clinton noted in his Caltech speech, some of these
research goals will take 20 or more years to achieve. There is always the risk
that advocates of nanotechnology, whether in govement, industry, finance,
or academia, will overpromise and underdeliver.
What is clear is that we must now address the ethical, legal, policy, regulatory,
and business issues associated with the commercialization of nanotechnologies.
This is why The Handbook of Nanotechnology is so timely. John Miller,
Ruben Serrato, Jose Miguel Represas-Cardenas, and Griffith Kundahl have
done a terrific job of analyzing the key economic and societal issues facing
nanotechnology. How should the EPA regulate nanomaterials, which may
have different environmental and human health effects than the same materials
n bulk? Will the Patent and Trademark Office be able to handle the
rush to file nanotechnology patents without slowing down the rate of innovation?
How can the govement most effectively manage its investment in
nanoscale science and engineering? How can entrepreneurs successfully
launch nanotechnology start-ups? The Handbook of Nanotechnology is invaluable
for anyone who is seeking to move nanotechnology from the lab to the
marketplace in an ethical and responsible fashion.
THOMAS A. KALIL July 2004