Adams J.T. Empire on the Seven Seas. The British Empire 1784-1939
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BRITAIN AND
THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR
III.
BRITAIN
AND
THE AMERICAN
CIVIL
WAR
Across
the
ocean
in
America
another
great
new
power
was
aris-
ing though
threatened
with
extinction,
and,
again,
British
states-
men,
including
even the
increasingly
liberal
Gladstone,
did
not
realize
what
was
at stake.
Anglo-American
relations
in
any
case
were
bad,
and to
understand
them we have to
think
ourselves back
into
the
situation
of
1860,
largely
different from
that
of
1940,
though
even
now
English
lack
of
knowledge
of
American
history,
institutions,
and
culture is
amazing.
In
the earlier
period,
how-
ever,
the
two
peoples
knew each other
only by
prejudice
and
ran-
kling
memories. There
had
been
the
bickerings
leading
up
to the
Revolution and
independence,
the
years
of
quarrelling
over the
infringements
of
the
Treaty
of
Peace,
the
War
of
1812,
the
boundary
disputes,
the McLeod
incident and
others,
and
more
threatened wars.
The
United
States,
still
young
as
a nation
and
to
a
large
extent
crude and
raw
though
proud
in
the
consciousness of its
potential
strength
and
unexploited
resources,
had
the
touchiness
of
youth
and
had
deeply
resented
the unfair criticisms of such
English
travellers as Dickens and Mrs.
Trollope.
The
days
of trans-
Atlantic tourism
had not
yet
begun,
or those
of international mar-
riages.
Socially
the
first-hand
knowledge
which the two
peoples
had
of one another
was
negligible.
The
English upper
class,
which
has
always
tended
to consider
colonials
as a
breed
inferior
to
themselves,
looked
upon
the
Americans
as still
lower,
colonials
who had
broken
away
from
the
Empire
and
had
also established a
social
democracy
which
was
even
more
abhorrent to the
English
conservatives
than
the
American
political
system.
Such
was the
position
when
after
increasing
tension
for two
decades
the
United
States was
at last rent
by
civil
war.
It
was
distinctly
sectional,
the
free States
lying,
roughly,
north
of latitude
40
and
the
slave States south
of
that
line,
except
Kansas which
was free
though
south
of the line.
Maryland
and
Delaware,
also
south,
were both
slave but were
saved
to
the
Union
in the
struggle.
In
spite
of more
or less
differences
of
individual
opinion,
which
177
EMPIRE
ON THE
SEVEN SEAS
split
families
in the
two
sections,
the
Union and
the
Confederacy
Were
practically
units
in
their
divergent
views.
Each
section
had
for a
century
and a
half
or
so
been
developing
an economic
system
and
particular type
of culture of
its
own. To
this
end
soils,
climate, education,
and
other
factors had
combined
with
slavery,
which had
proved
economically
profitable
on the
great plantations
of
the
South
but
not in the small
farm,
industrial,
and
mercantile
culture of
the North.
As
part
of
the
general
reform
and
humanitarian
movement
of the
mid-nineteenth
century
there
had also
been
increasing
feeling
in the North
against slavery
as
a
system.
The British
Government
and
the
Royal
African
Company
in
the
earlier
days
had
fastened
the
system
on
America,
and
Brit-
ain's
contrasting
of its
own
freeing
of
the slaves
in the
West
Indies
with
the
continued
use
of slaves
in America
was
not
justified.
To
free
slaves
in
a
single
small
section
of
empire
and
buy
out
a
handful
of
owners
for
20,000,000
was
a
very
different
problem
from
that
which
confronted America where
4,000,000
blacks,
with a
market
value of
about
300,000,000,
formed
the
basis of the economic
sys-
tem
and
whole
way
of life
of over
6,000,000
whites and
to some
extent
that,
through
trade,
of
the
entire
nation.
It
must
be
recalled,
also,
that the
freeing
of
the
Jamaican slaves,
noble as
the act
was,
resulted not
only
in
great
economic
difficulties
but
in
the
necessity
of the
whites
yielding up
their
self-government
and
becoming
a
Crown
Colony.
Multiply
the
Jamaican
situation
by
the American
scale
and
it
is easier to
understand
the American
problem.
But
there was
also
another
issue at stake.
Few
Europeans
grasp
the fact that America
has
a dual
form
of
government,
and that
it
is
at
once
a federal union
of
sovereign
States
and
a
nation
which
derives
powers
direct
from
the
people
as a whole
and not
as
citizens
of the
separate
States.
The
Southern States in
claiming
the
right
of
secession stressed the
federal nature
of
the
Union,
whereas
the
North
stressed its
popular
basis.
The
question
was
whether
the
United States
was
a
nation
or
merely
a
league
of
States which
could
be
broken
up
at
any
time
by
the
action
of
any
one of them.
In
a
country
like
the
United
States,
with such
a vast
extent
of
territory
and
such diverse
interests,
the
danger
of
sectionalism
is
178
BRITAIN
AND
THE
AMERICAN
CIVIL
WAR
always
present,
and if
the
right
to secede were
allowed,
it
would
inevitably
fall
to
pieces,
and
the
experiment
of
self-government
and
democracy
on
the
greatest
scale
the world
has ever
attempted
would fail.
That
issue the
British
upper
classes
largely
failed
to
recognize,
and
many
who
did
recognize
it
would have wel-
comed the
disintegration
of
the
great
democracy
whose exam-
ple
they
feared
might
have a
dangerous
effect
on
Old
World
institutions.
They
felt
also that
it
would
be
impossible
for the
North
to win
or,
if
it
did,
to
remake a
free and
united
nation
by
force. This
point,
that
of
the
saving
of the
great
democratic
experi-
ment,
although
seen
by
some
of the
upper
classes
and
statesmen,
such
as
notably
John
Bright,
was for the
most
part
more
clearly
recognized
by
the
laboring
classes,
even
those who
suffered most
from
the "cotton
famine"
incidental
to the
war,
and
America
owes
them
and
their
leaders
a
great
debt.
For the
most
part,
however,
upper-class opinion,
including
such
newspapers
as
The
Times,
turned
against
the North
when
Lincoln
announced in
his
Inaugu-
ral Address that
he had
nothing
to
do with
slavery
but
that
his
task
was
to
preserve
the
Union.
It
should
be added that
the
issues
of
the war
were
confused even
in the minds of
many
Americans
themselves,
and the
evil
effect,
long
to
last,
of what
from
across the
ocean
seemed
the almost
unanimous
and
hostile
opinion
of
upper-class England,
was
due
to
its
apparent
unanimity
and
bitterness.
The
attitude of
the
govern-
ment
was
for
the
most
part,
however,
coldly
correct.
Russell
promptly
proclaimed
British
neutrality,
which
was
maintained
throughout
the
struggle.
In
1861
an
incident
occurred which
nearly precipitated
war.
The Confederate
'States,
wishing
to
enlist more active British
sym-
pathy,
dispatched
two
agents,
Mason
and
Slidell,
to
London.
Having
successfully
reached
Havana,
they
embarked on
the Trent
,
a British
vessel
carrying
mail,
which
was
forced
to
stop
by
a
United
States
warship,
the
captain
of
which,
Wilkes,
took
off
the two
agents.
His
act
was
wholly
unauthorized
and
of
course
illegal,
but
the
North was
jubilant.
Although
the
two
men
were
in
fact
never
to
accomplish
anything
of
importance
their
capture
was
consid-
179
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN SEAS
ered
to
be
a
blow
to
the
enemy
rendered
all the
more
palatable
by
having
involved
a twist
in the
Lion's
tail.
The
Lion,
however,
emitted
a
maddened
and
wholly
justifiable
roar.
Approximately
15,000
troops
were
ordered
to Canada and
a
sharp
note
dispatched
to
Washington,
which was
happily
toned down
somewhat
by
Prince
Albert.
Although
a number
of
public
officials,
and
even
Congress
itself,
had
acted
hastily
in
praising
the
captain
who had
made
the
seizure,
Lincoln
had
been
dubious and had
kept
his head.
The
agents
were
turned
over
to a British vessel
as
requested,
and
the
incident
was
happily
closed
though
feeling
on both sides
had
been
made
still
worse.
War
had
been
narrowly
averted,
but
Russell
and Palmerston had stood
out
against
enraged
opinion
in
Eng-
land,
as Lincoln
and
Seward
had in
America,
and
in
the absence
of
cable or radio the
slowness
of communication
gave
each side
time
to cool off.
Although
from time
to
time the British
Cabinet discussed the
possibility
of
intervention
as
the
struggle
went on
year
after
year,
it
never made
any
proposal,
and
Lincoln's
proclamation
freeing
the
slaves
in
the
South
as of
January
I,
1863,
had
a
favorable
effect on a
large
section
of British
opinion.
After
the
Trent
affair
the
only
time
that the
two nations
came close
to
possible
war
again
was
in connection
with vessels
built at
Liverpool,
the most
famous
of
which.
was
the
Alabama.
Although
it was
illegal
to
equip
any
vessels
of
war
in
British
ports
for the
use
of
belligerents
in
a
war
in
which Britain
was a
neutral,
two
smaller
ships
had
been
built
in
spite
of
the
protests
of
the
American Minister
and had been
allowed
to
put
to sea
unarmed,
taking
on arms later
and
doing
much
damage
to Northern
shipping.
The
more
important
Alabama,
known in
the
building
yards
and
records
only
as
No.
290,
was launched in
May,
1862. While
it
was
being completed,
the American
Minister,
Charles
Francis
Adams,
kept
sending
evidence
regarding
the
mattter to the British
Foreign
Office,
which was
dilatory,
and
in
some cases
referred
the
documents
to the
port
authorities
at
Liverpool,
notoriously
South-
ern
in
sympathy.
Adams
presented
more
evidence,
which the
dis-
tinguished
solicitor
Sir
Robert
Collier
declared
absolutely
convinc-
180
BRITAIN
AND
THE
AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR
ing
and which
Russell
later
admitted
he should
have
accepted
and
stopped
the
ship,
but
the
law officers
of
the Crown took
a
different
view.
Finally
a
new
case was
presented
which
went
to Sir
John
Har-
ding,
the
Queen's
Advocate,
the
law
officer
having
particular
.cog-
nizance of
naval
affairs.
Unfortunately
he had
just
gone
insane,
although
no
one
knew
except
Lady
Harding,
who
kept
the
fact,
and
unluckily
the
papers,
secret for
five
days.
As soon
as
they
reached Russell
he and
other members
of
the
Cabinet
realized that
the evidence
was
unquestionably
conclusive
and
that
the
vessel
must
be
seized
immediately.
Some
one
gave
warning,
however,
and
the
Alabama,
still
unfinished,
slipped
out
to
sea,
to
inflict
untold
damage
on
the
North,
the
direct
damages
being
estimated,
as
we
shall see
later,
at
over
3,000,000.
Adams
later
exonerated
Russell
and
the
government
from
any
desire to
let
the vessel
escape,
but
the
affair,
quite apart
from
Harding's
insanity
and
Lady
Harding's
carelessness,
was
delayed
and
bungled through-
out,
and
at the last
moment,
when haste
and
secrecy
were
essen-
tial,
somebody
must
have let the secret out.
The
very
week
that the Alabama
sailed,
the same
builders,
the
Lairds,
had
begun
work
on two
more
vessels
to
be
equipped
with
rams,
and
to
be
the
most
powerful
vessels
afloat. The
danger
was
great,
for
Slidell
had made it
appear
that
the
ships,
which
had been turned over to
a
French
banking
firm,
were
being
built
for the
Pasha
of
Egypt.
We cannot
enter
on
all
the
complicated
details
of the
transactions or
of
Adams'
negotiations
with Russell
and
the
government.
Finally
a
ram
was
launched
and the other
was
nearing
completion,
when
Adams tried
one last
desperate
throw and sent a
brief note to
Russell,
reiterating
his
demand that
the
rams
be
detained
and
adding
that
if allowed
to
go
to
sea "it
would
be
superfluous
in
me to
point
out
to
your
lordship
that
this
is
war.
3'
The
note
was
probably
not
the
determining
factor
in
the
gov-
ernment's
decision.
Russell,
having
burned
his
fingers
with
the
Alabama,
was
genuinely
desirous
of not
getting
caught
again.
He
probably agreed
with
Adams
that
the
evidence was
conclusive
to
181
EMPIRE
ON THE SEVEN
SEAS
him
but
it
was
not
capable
of
legal proof,
and,
if
the vessels
did
not
belong
to the
Confederacy,
the
government
might
lay
itself
open
to
heavy damage
if
it seized
them.
However,
the
North
was
at
last
beginning
to win
important
victories,
and
a
convenient
rebellion
started
in Poland which
might
realign
the
relations
of
powers
on
the Continent.
This
time
Russell
decided
to leave
legal
evidence
alone,
and the
government
bought
the
rams,
paying
225,000
for
them
from
the
Lairds.
Russell
had in
fact
given
orders to
detain
the
rams
four
days
before he
got
Adams'
note
but
was
waiting
for the
additional
evidence which
did
not
come.
The
most
serious
crisis
in connection with the American
war
thus
passed
on the
basis
of
expediency
and
not
of
law. Had
Russell
not
taken
the course he did
there would almost
unquestionably,
in
view of
Adams'
note,
been a third
Anglo-American
war.
Instead,
peace
was
maintained
and the
way
opened
for
the
North
to win
and
for
the Union to be
preserved.
Had
it
been
split
into
two nations
and
the
theory
of
peaceful
secession become
legalized
by
a decision
of
war,
I
think
there
is
little
question
that
the
un-
ravelling
process
might
well
have
gone
farther
and
the
North
American
continent
become
split
into a
number
of hostile
nations.
In
any
case there
would
not
have been that vast free-trade
area
of
3,000,000
square
miles
and
130,000,000
people
which
more
than
almost
any
other
factor has
built
up
the
power
and
wealth
of
the United
States. One
has
only
to
consider the
reservoir
of wealth
and
resources
which
were utilized
by
the
Allies
both
before
and
after the
United
States
entered
the
World
War,
and
the
present
relations
between
that
country
and
Canada,
to realize
that the issue
of the Civil
War,
and
the
reaffirmation of
the
Union
instead of the
Balkanizing
of
the
continent
meant much to the
Empire
as
well as
to
the
United States.
IV.
RISE
OF
GERMANY
Incidentally
the
winning
of the war
by
the North
prevented
the
possible development
of
a French
Empire again
in
the
New
World.
Napoleon
had been
far more
friendly
to the
Confeder-
acy
than
had the
English
statesmen,
but
in
1861
Britain
had
182
RISE
OF
GERMANY
joined
France
and
Spain
in
an
expedition
to secure
redress for
foreign
bondholders in
Mexico.
The
immediate
object
secured,
France alone
remained,
but
Palmerston had
no
objections
to
Napoleon
setting up
an
empire
in
Mexico under the
unfortu-
nate
Austrian
Archduke
Maximilian
as
Emperor,
believing
that
the
American
venture
might
divert
his
strength
and
attention
from
Europe.
The United
States,
restored as a
powerful
nation,
caused
French
withdrawal,
and
again
Napoleon
was
left to
spin
his
schemes in
the
new
alignments
of
the old
Continent.
Meanwhile
the Prince
Consort
had
died
at the end
of
1861,
and
Palmerston
foresaw that
the
Queen
would
be
more
difficult
to deal
with
than when
Albert had
been
able
to use
his
tact
on
occasion,
as
in
the
case
of the Trent note
to
the
United
States.
The
position
of a
Royal
Consort is
always
a
most difficult
one
for
a
man
and
in Albert's case
it was
peculiarly
so. The
Queen
had
been
utterly
devoted
to
him and believed his
opinions
on
every
subject
to be
the
only
wise
and
correct
ones,
although
she
did
not strain
the
constitution
by
opposing
the Cabinet
when it
was
united. The
Prince was a serious-minded
man
who
cared little
for
sport
and
society
but much
for
the advancement of
the
scien-
tific and commercial
life of
the
country. Although
essentially
a
liberal,
Albert,
who was
German,
had
a better
understanding
of
the
difficulties
in
the
way
of German
unity
and
of liberalism on
the
Continent
than
Palmerston,
who,
as
Foreign
Minister or as
Prime
Minister,
had
to
fight
for his
own views
against
both the
Queen
and the
Consort,
who took
a
special
interest in
foreign
affairs
and
insisted on
seeing
all the
dispatches.
Owing
to
her
adoration of her
dead husband
it was
clear
that
the
Queen's
views
on
such
matters
would
become
static
at
the
point
where
they
had
been
left
by
Albert.^
;
-
Palmerston
did
not
understand Bismarck and
his
policy,
and
because
of that
and
the
Queen's
sympathy
for
everything
German,
England
failed to
intervene
in the
Danish
war and
the
Schleswig-
Holstein
controversy
with
Austria.
;
Britain had
no
allies,
both
Napoleon
and
Russia
having
been
alienated
by
Palmerston
and
Russell,
and
she
declined to
enter on a
contest
with
Prussia
and
183
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN
SEAS
Austria,
and
left
the
field
to
Bismarck.
It
was
the
end of the
Palmerstonian
period
of
British
interference,
usually
on the
side
of
liberalism,
on
the
Continent,
and
Palmerston
himself died
in
1865.
Meanwhile
Gladstone
as Chancellor
of
the
Exchequer
had
per-
formed
the
remarkable
feat
of
lowering
taxation
for three
years
in
succession
and
was
becoming
increasingly popular, though
his
impulsiveness
was
still
mistrusted.
Palmerston,
facing
death,
is
said
to
have
remarked that
"Gladstone
will soon
have
it
all
his
own
way,
and
whenever
he
gets
my place
[Prime Minister]
we shall
have
strange
doings."
It
was
indeed the
end
of
an era but the
strange
doings
were
rather
to
be
on
the
Continent,
where
Palmer-
ston's
policy
as
to
Germany
had
unwittingly
done much to
help
Bismarck
create
his
empire
of
blood
and iron
and to
overwhelm
France
in
a
few
years
and to create
conditions
which
led to
1914.
V. ECONOMICS
AND
LABOR
At
home
the
Empire
was
rapidly increasing
in
wealth
in
spite
of the
financial
crises
of
1857
an<i
1866
and
the
"cotton
famine"
due
to the
American
war.
Recovery
from
both
the
panics
was
rapid,
but
for a
while
the
textile
operatives
in
Lancashire
suffered
severely
owing
to
the almost
complete
cessation
of
shipments
of
cotton
from
the
Confederacy,
which
was the
sole
source
of
raw
material
for
one
of
England's greatest
industries.
In
the
winter
of
1861-62
it
is
said
that
500,000
people
were
being supported
by
public
and
private charity,
and
by
1
863
it
was
necessary
to
start
public
works,
the
government making
a loan
of
1,500,000
and
private
subscribers
helping
to
the
extent
of
about
2,000,000.
As
usually
happens,
however,
scarcity
and
high
prices
developed
new
sources,
and
the
situation
began
to
improve
when cotton
came
from
Egypt
and
the East/ That
the
suffering operatives
during
the two
years
of the
crisis should
have
remained,
on
the
whole,
the
staunchest
English
friends of
the Union
speaks
much
both for
their
ability
to
understand
large
issues and
for
their
belief
in
democracy.
We
may
well
link their
attitude
with
the
passage
of
the
new
Reform
Bill,
which
we shall
discuss
presently.
184
ECONOMICS AND LABOR
By
1860
Peel's
work for free
trade
had been
completed
by
Gladstone.
All
export
duties
had
been abolished
and
practically
all
hindrances
to
imports.
England
had
not
only
led
in
the
Industrial
Revolution
and
the
Machine
Age
but she was
the
first
to
open
the
commerce
of the
rapidly
expanding
world
markets
to
her
traders.
There were insistent
demands
for cotton
goods
in
India,
for
iron
and
other
manufactured
goods
in
the
rapidly
growing
United
States,
and
in
outer
portions
of
the
Empire
whose
development
far
outran
their
domestic
capacity
to
meet their own
manufacturing
needs.
British
factories
were
roaring
with
activity
and
British
ship-
ping
and
commerce
rose
likewise until
all reached
their
zenith,
as
compared
with
all
other
nations,
in
1870,
from
which
year
the
lead was
to be
lost.
An
interesting
point,
unnoted
by
historians,
was
that
two
years
earlier
a
discovery
had
been
made
which
in
time
was to
change
the
machine
age
into
the
chemical
age
of
today
with
profound
effects
in all nations
A
In
1868
a new
material,
alizarin,
a
synthetic
com-
pound
used in
dyeing,
was
produced
commercially.
This
proved
to
be
one
of
the most
significant
events
in
world
history,
for
it was the
first
substitution of
a
chemically produced
article for a
naturally
grown
one. Almost unnoticed
by
the
public
one
new
chemical
sub-
stance after another
was
found until the
process
culminated
in
what some chemists consider the
greatest
discovery
in the
whole
story
of
man,
the
fixation
of
atmospheric
nitrogen
by
Haber and
Bosch in
Germany
in
1913.
This,
by making Germany independent
of
Chilean
saltpetre,
helped
to
bring
on
the
World
War,
and
initiated
a
wholly
new
age.
jThough
no
one
realized it at
the
time
the
world
of
old-fashioned
politics,
old-fashioned
war,
and
oppor-
tunities
for
commercial success under
machine-age
conditions,
was
doomed
by
the
discovery
o 1868 and its
successors.
Meanwhile
the
world
went
on
unwittingly
and
prices
were
rising
rapidly,
owing
to the discoveries
of
gold
in California
in
1849
anc
^
*
a Australia in
1851.
The
enormous addition
to the
world's
supply
had
its usual
inflationary
effect,
equalled
only
by
the
huge
imports
of South American
gold
by
Spain
after
its con-
quests
of Mexico and
Peru
in
the sixteenth
century.
Almost
more
185
EMPIRE
ON THE
SEVEN SEAS
important
was
the
introduction
in
the
1850'$
of
the
use o
checks,
which had
the
same
effect
of
adding
to the
currency.
In
the
same
period
came
the invention
of Bessemer's
process
for
making
steel,
causing
a
complete
transformation
of the
industry,
with
considerable
changes
in
population.
/The
208
miles of rail-
ways
in
Britain
in
1833
had
r*
sen to
14?
by
1873,
and
steel as
well
as
other
products
was
being
exported
to
all
parts
of
the
world.
With the
enormous
exports
of
goods
went
an
increasing
investment
in
foreign
countries,
rising
from
approximately
300,-
000,000
in
1850
to
at
least
1,200,000,000
by
1875.
Britain
had
become
not
merely
the
work-shop
but the banker
of
the
world.
In
spite
of free
trade,
agriculture
continued
prosperous
until
after
1875,
although
the number
of
agricultural
workers
declined
owing
to
improved
methods of
farming,
and their
wages
did
not
advance
as
rapidly
as
those
in
other
lines of
work.
The
cities
were
growing
fast
as
were
the
numbers
engaged
in
manufacturing.
One
of the most
notable
features
in
changing
incomes
and
position
was
the
great
increase
in
the
middle
and
professional
classes,
and
as an evidence of
increasing
wealth the
number of
domestic serv-
ants rose
from
900,000
in
1851
to
1,500,000
in
1871,
although
as
we have
seen
the cost of
maintaining
them had
much in-
creased.
In
that
period
also the trades-union
movement
took
on
a
wholly
new
aspect.
The
older
men
had been
largely
Chartists and
Socialists but
the
young generation
was much more
conservative
and,
as
the
Amalgamated Society
of
Carpenters
and
Joiners
an-
nounced,
it was their
object
to
become
"respectful
and
respected."
This
was
typical
of
the
changed
movement,
in
spite
of
some out-
rages
which
endangered
it.
It
took
on,
indeed,
the
form
it
was to
maintain
for a
half
century
or
so,
and
the
first
Trades-Union
Congress,
which
is
officially
recognized
by
labor
as
such,
was
held
in
1868.
From
this
period
likewise date
the
great
number of co-
operative
societies
and
shops
which
were
specially
favored
by
Parliament
as
contrasted with the
unions.
The work
and
propa-
ganda
of
the
Society
for
the
Diffusion
of Useful
Knowledge,
al-
though
it
ended in
1847,
had
begun
to
tell
heavily
a
decade
later
186