Adams J.T. Empire on the Seven Seas. The British Empire 1784-1939
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DEVELOPMENT IN
NEW
ZEALAND
which
the
latter
are
properly
held,
and
I
know of
no
other
case
in
which
a
conquered
native
and alien
race
was
at once offered
seats
in
the
legislature
ruling
both
peoples.
The
magnanimous
settle-
ment
with
the Boers
after the
South African
War
at the
end of
the
century
was to
be
one
of
the
wisest
and
most notable events
in
the
history
of
empire,
but a
precedent
on a small
scale
may
be
found
in
New Zealand
at the
end
of the
long
native
wars.
Meanwhile,
constitutional
government
had
proceeded
rapidly
and
in British fashion.
Responsible
self-government
had been
granted
in
1856
to each of the
far-scattered six
provinces
of the
federal
union.
Owing
to
distance and
lack
of
communication
the
provinces
were
far
more
important
and the
central
government
less
so
than
in
Canada,
but
by
1876
population
and communication
by
rail had so
increased that
the
local
provincial
governments
were
abandoned
entirely
and
instead of
a
federal
state New Zealand
became
a
single
unitary
one.
The islands are
so much smaller in
extent
than
either Canada or Australia that
as
settlements
became
connected with
one another
this was
a natural
development
and
is
an
example
of
how,
in
the vast
variety
of
the
Empire,
institutions
can be made to fit
local
conditions. If
the
first
Empire
was
lost
by
attempted
administrative
rigidity,
the
second has
been
saved and
developed by
flexibility.
Each
race has
its
individual
characteristics.
Perhaps
no
other has
so
strong
an
instinct
for
the
art
of
governing
as
the
British,
but also
no other
has ever
been called
upon
to
administer
so
enormous and
varied
an
empire.
Just
as
in America the
forty-eight
individual
States of the Union
act
as
laboratories
for
political experiment,
so
the
unexampled
number of
British
possessions
forts,
ports,
islands,
great
continental
tracts,
and even
a
continent
itself with
all
conditions
of
climate, race,
religion,
and
economics,
have
given
the
British a world
laboratory
in
which to
experiment
and
train
themselves.
They
have been in
the
happy position
of
a man
who
has
certain
innate
abilities
and
has
found
himself
from
circum-
stances
through
a
long
and
rich
life
experience
in
one
situation
after another
in
which
he
has
had
to
adapt
his
capacities
to con-
stantly
changing
conditions.
It
is
this,
and not mere romance
or
197
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN SEAS
historical
detail,
which
renders
the
story
of
the
Empire
of
interest
to
all
the world
and not
only
to
the British
themselves.
X.
DIFFICULTIES
IN
SOUTH
AFRICA
In
South
Africa
we
find in this
period
the
same forces
at
work
as
elsewhere.
There
was
the
same
lack of
interest
in
extending
the
Empire
or
desire
to
assume
further
responsibilities.
The
govern-
ment,
in
addition,
was
tired of
the difficulties
between
English
and
Dutch
and
between
the
blacks
and
both.l
However,
the form
of
government
developed
as
usual,
and
Cape
Colony
was
granted
first
representative
government
and
then
full
responsible
govern-
ment
by
1
8
72.;
Not
only
the
two
white
races
but
also
the
natives
were
given
the
franchise
with
a
small
property
qualification.
In
Natal,
the second
of the
four
European
South African
states,
the
situation
was
wholly
different.
The
white
population
was
very
small as
compared
with
the
natives
within
its
borders,
and
just
across these
was the land
of
the
powerful
and warlike
Zulus,
who
were
rising
to
power
again
under
the
new
chief
Cetywayo.
It
was
uncertain
whether,
when
he
might
get
ready,
he
would
attack the
British
or
the
Boers
in
the
Transvaal but in
any
case
the
native
problem
was
an
imminent
danger
of
the
first
magnitude.
Even
in
Natal
the blacks
outnumbered
the whites
over
twenty
to
one
and
should the vast hordes
of
Africa be
put
in
motion
the
result
might
be
massacre on a colossal scale.
'
For
this
reason
Natal remained a Crown
Colony
and
did
not
join
Canada,
Australia,
New
Zealand,
and
Cape
Colony
on
the
road
to
self-government
until
1893.,
The
&&&
Boer
republics,
and
the
two
British
colonies,
with
the
mixture
of Dutch
and
English,
and
the native
question
seemed
to
make
an
almost insoluble
prob-
lem. Yet
it
would
not
have
been
had
England
not
been
opposed
to
imperialism.
There was
a
moment
when
the
whole
question
could
have
been
settled
and
the later
tragic
and
unhappy
story
of
the
Boer
War
been
avoided.
Just
as
in
colonial
America the
selfishness
and
jealousies
of
the
colonies
prevented
any
common
policy
fieing
adopted
toward
the
Indian
menace,
so
in South
Africa
the
four
colonies or
states could
198
DIFFICULTIES IN
SOUTH
AFRICA
not
agree,
though
what each
did
might
menace
the
very
life of
the
others.
In
1858
Sir
George
Grey,
who
had vision
and
had
done
excellent
work
in
Australia and
New
Zealand,
advised
that
the
four
states
should
join
in a
federal
union.
Although,
as
we
have
seen,
federalism
was
the order of
the
day,
the
experiment
was
a
bold
one
to
put
forward
for South
Africa,
where the
Boer
repub-
lics
would
have to federate
with
the
British
colonies.
The
moment,
however,
was
propitious.
Natal
would
willingly
have
joined
with
the
Cape,
while the
Orange
Free
State,
which
had never
craved
independence
on
account of
the menace
of the
wild
Basuto tribes
between
her and
Natal,
would
have come
in.
At
that
moment,
in
spite
of
the
strong
anti-British
feeling
in
the
Transvaal,
that
state
would
also
probably
have
agreed.
Unfortunately
the
British
Government
saw
no
use
in
colonies;
it wanted to
reduce
expenses;
it did not
want
the added
responsi-
bilities
which
incorporation
of
the
Boer
republics
might
-entail;
and the
moment
for
the
happy
solution
of all
the
problems
passed^)
Such moments
rarely
recur to
give
humanity
a
second
chance,
and
did
not
in this
case. The
failure
to
assume
responsibility
in
1858
eventually
entailed
far
more
in the future and one of the most
unfortunate
wars Britain has
ever
been called
upon
to
fight.
Within
a
few
years
the
farming republic
of the Free
State
had
its
fourth
struggle
with
the
Basutos,
who
appealed
to
the Governor
of
Cape Colony.
Basutoland
had
once been
a
British
protectorate
and in
spite
of
the
resentment
of the Boers
a
treaty
was
made
by
which,
reduced
in
size,
it
again
passed
to
Britain,
and
the
natives
were
taken under British
protection.
The
arrangement proved
greatly
for
their
good
but
alienated
the
Dutch.^
Next,
in
1867,
came
one ^e
^ata
^
accidents
of
history
which
no
one
could foresee and
the effects
of
which
proved
illimitable.
Diamonds in
quantity
were found
in
the
valley
of the lower
Vaal
near the
modern
Kimberley
on
the
edge
of the
uncertainly
defined
borders
of
the
Free
State.
There
immediately
ensued
a
rush
of
characters
of all
sorts
and
in
great
numbers to
the
new source
of
wealth.
Although
there was a
question
as
to whether the Free State
or
the
native tribe
of
Griquas
owned
the
territory,
the
Free State
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN SEAS
claimed
it
and
tried
to
maintain
a semblance
of order but
failed.
The Boer
government,
adequate
for the
ordinary
farming
popula-
tion,
was not
so
for
the
new
conditions.
Confusion ensued.
The
chief
of the
Griquas,
in
the
hope
of
peace,
offered
their
lands
to
Queen
Victoria,
and Britain
accepted
both
the
diamond field
and
the
responsibility
of
maintaining
order
in
it.
In
1871
Griqualand
West
was
annexed
to
the
Crown
on the
theory
that the
Griquas
and
not
the
Boers
had
valid
title
to
it.
It would
be difficult if
not
impossible
to decide which
did,
and the
payment
by
Great
Britain
five
years
later of
90,000
to the
Free
State
indicates
that
the
question
was at
least debatable.
J
There
are, however,
two
points
to
consider
and one
is reminded
of the
story
of
India.
England
had
shown within
the few
previous
years
that
she did
not
want
more
territory
or
responsibility
in
Africa. It
had, indeed,
even been
suggested
by
Lord
Grey
that she
retire
entirely
and
merely
maintain a
naval
station at the
Cape.
Nevertheless she did
have
responsibilities
whether she
wanted
them or
not. There
were
already
some
200,000
British
and
Dutch
living
harmoniously
in
Cape
Colony
and
perhaps
another
10,000
in Natal
under
the
British
flag.
There was also
the native
question
and the
new
one
of
Europeans
of
all
nationalities
who
were rush-
ing
to the
diamond
fields. Whether the Free
State held
a
valid
title or
not
it could
not maintain order.
The
few hundreds
of
thousands
of
white
men,
British,
Dutch,
and
other,
living
in
South
Africa were
nothing compared
with
the
countless
blacks who could
roll
southward from
the
vast
interior of Africa
like the
endless
waves of
the sea.
As in India
the
British started with no
wish to
become the
"paramount
power"
but
they
were
the
only power
which
could
maintain
order.
This
was
shown
even
more
clearly
in
the case of
the Transvaal.
We
speak
of
it as
a
unit,
but,
although
the
men
who-
had
trekked
into
it,
and
who
were the most
stubborn
and
recalcitrant
of
the
Boers,
numbered
perhaps
not more
than
10,000,
there were
prac-
tically
four
governments
in the so-called
republic,
and
civil
war
between
the
parties
for
some
years.
Martin
Pretorius
tried
to effect
unity
as
President
with Paul
Kruger,
"Oom
Paul,"
as
head
of
the
200
DIFFICULTIES IN
SOUTH AFRICA
military
forces,
but
the
state,
if
it
may
be so
called,
remained
in
a
condition
of more
or
less
anarchy,
bankrupt,
unable to collect taxes
or
to
enforce
law. To
their
own
misfortune and
to
the
great danger
of
all
the other
states,
the
Boers were
constantly starting
wars with
one
native tribe
and
another,
in
which
they
were
unsuccessful.
There
was
only
one
power
to
which
the
natives
looked
with
trust,
and
that was
the
British.
As
the
difficulties
increased
and the
Transvaal Boers resorted
to
atrocious
cruelties
in
their
raids on
the
natives,
chiefs of
many
tribes
petitioned
the
British Government for
protection.
When
finally
the Boers
attempted
to
seize
territory
claimed
by
the
Zulus
it was
clear that
something
had to be
done,
for,
if the
powerful
Zulus were forced to
fight
the
whites,
the ear of
imagination
and
statesmanship
could catch the
rumbling
of
the war drums from
far
up
into central Africa and
the mass of black
humanity
might
roll
over the
states
of
all
South Africa like
an
engulfing
tidal
wave.
To
complete
the
story
of
the
British
in
Africa
in this
period
we
must
trespass
a
few
years
into the
next.
In
1874
the
then
ministry
of
Disraeli
sought
to
solve
the
problem
by
the
plan
of federation
which
England
had turned
down
nearly
twenty years
before,
but
it
was too
late,
and so
able
a
negotiator
and
administrator as
Sir
Bartle Frere could
not
recapture
the
lost
opportunity.
Meanwhile,
however,
many
even of the
Transvaal Boers
themselves
were
alarmed
over
their
situation
and in their
fear
of
the Zulus had
asked
to be taken
under British
protection,
as
many
of
the
native
chiefs
had.y
Others were
still
opposed,
but in
1877
the
Transvaal
was
declared
annexed to
the
Crown
as a
step
toward
possible
fed-
eration
and
as
a
gesture
toward
the natives.
Unfortunately
the
belated
move
of the
government
solved neither the Boer nor
the
Zulu
problems,
and with
the end
o
this
chapter
we
enter
upon
a
wholly
new
period
in
world
politics.
\
The
high hopes
of the
early
fifties
and of
the
Great
Exhibition
were
turning
into ashes.
The
period
had
seen
the
union
of
a
-free
Italy,
the
unification of
Germany,
and
the
solidifying
of the Union
in
America,
with
the slaves
freed,
as
well
as
long
steps
taken
toward
the
unification
and freedom
of
important
parts
of
the
Empire.
The
20
1
EMPIRE
ON THE SEVEN
SEAS
stage
of
idealism,
however,
had
passed,
to
be
replaced by
high
finance
instead
of
business,
by
restrictive
tariffs
instead
of
increasing
free
trade,
by power
politics
instead of intellectual
liberalism
in
international
affairs,
and
of
a
new
and sordid
imperialism
instead
of
the
former
indifference.
Owing
to
her
long
seclusion after
her
husband's
death,
the
Queen
had
lost
her
popularity,
and
the trend
toward
a
republican
form
of
government,
under
the
leadership
of such men
as
Joseph
Chamberlain,
Charles
Dilke,
Charles
Bradlaugh,
and
others
was
stronger
than
ever before
or
since,
if
we
except
the
Cromwellian
period.
This was to
pass,
but
although
the
period
was to
be
one
of
great
prosperity,
activity,
and false advance
during
the
whole
of
it,
from
1871
to
the
World
War
in
1914,
none
of
the
nations
solved
satisfactorily
a
single
problem
of
the
first
order. A
mecha-
nistic
philosophy
of
the
universe,
an
undermining
of
old
religious
beliefs and of
morality, policies
based
on
power,
prestige
and
race,
and
a
wholly
materialistic view
of
progress,
all
worked
together
to
bring
on
the
great catastrophe
which
was to
change
the
world
and
endanger
the
foundations
of
civilization itself.
202'
CHAPTER
X
NEW
POWERS
AND NEW FORCES
I.
THE THRESHOLD
OF
OUR
OWN
DAY
WE
HAVE
now
in our
story
definitely
reached
the threshold
of
our
own
day
and its
problems.
As
we
have often
said,
history
is
a
continuous
stream. It
is
not cut
into definite
periods,
such
as
ancient,
medieval,
and
modern,
or
short
ones such
as
reigns
of
monarchs. But
just
as rivers
may
at certain
points
definitely
change
their
direction
and
even
character
so
may
the
stream
of
history
be
deflected
and alter
though
the
fact
may
not
be
recognized
at
the time.
We
have
already
mentioned some of
the
determining
factors
which came
to
the
front
in the
overlapping
decade discussed
in
the
previous chapter
and
in
this.
\pne
of the
most
powerful
and ominous was
the Franco-Prussian
War
of
1870
yith
its immense
effects.
Among
these
was
the
pass-
ing
of
the
concert
of
Europe
organized
in Vienna
after
the defeat
of
the first
Napoleon.
Although
the Danish
question
had
appar-
ently
been settled
by
agreement
among
the
Great
Powers in
1852,
no
power
intervened
when
Prussia and
Austria
broke
the
agree-
ment
by
sheer
brute
force. Prussia had learned
the lesson
that if
she struck
powerfully, swiftly,
and
ruthlessly
enough
the
world
would
stand
aside.
When
four
years
later
she struck
at
France,
again
she
had her
way.
France
had
created bitter
feeling
in
Eng-
land
by
earlier
suggesting
to
Bismarck that she be
allowed
to
annex
Belgium.
Therefore, Britain,
so
far
from
supporting
her when
the
203
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN
SEAS
swift
Prussian
attack
was
made
upon
her,
merely
intervened to
an
extent
sufficient
to
secure
from
both
the
combatants
a
new
guarantee
of
Belgian
neutrality.
In
fact
Britain
was
afraid
of
France
and
of
the
rising
Germany.
Louis
Napoleon
had
failed
in his
policies
both
at
home
and
abroad
and
had
abandoned
his liberal
tendencies.
The
English
saw
this,
but
with
rare
exceptions
failed
to
see
the
growing
German
menace
for
the
future.
Bismarck
had
developed
a new
form
of
tyranny
unlike
that
of
the old
absolutist
monarchs
or of statesmen like
Metternich.
Although
ruling
with
a
rod
of
iron and
suppressing
freedom
and
all liberal
movements,
he at the same
time built
up
an
overwhelming
following
by
appealing
to
the
desire on the
part
of
a
large part
of
the
people
for national
power
and
prestige.
It
was
a
sinister
warning
of the
dictators
and their methods in our
own
post-war
world.
The
overthrow
of
Napoleon
and
the
crushing
of
the
new French
Republic
had
solidly
united modern
Germany,
which
now
took
the
place occupied
for
two
centuries
by
France as the
most
power-
ful
nation
on
the
Continent.
A nation
essentially
liberal and
civi-
lized was
replaced by
one that
was
to
pursue
the
policy
of
"blood
and iron." The
speed
and
completeness
of
the
victory,
and
its
spoils
of
Alsace-Lorraine
and
an
indemnity
which
paid
all
costs,
also
showed the
possibilities
of
modern
warfare
as
an
instrument
of
policy.
Further
it
indicated
the
superiority
for
quick
success
of
large
bodies
of
conscript
reservists
over
the small
professional
armies
which
had
hitherto
been the
standing
military
forces
of
Europe,
and
marked
the
beginning
of
conscription
among
most
of
the
large
Continental
nations,
and of
the
modern arms
race. Ger-
man
teachers,
historians,
and
even
philosophers
set
themselves to
inoculating
the
German
people
with
the
Bismarckian
Realpolitik.
This
rise
of
a
new
Germany
with such
ideals to
the
position
of
the
leading power
in
Europe,
combined
with
the
new
imperialism
which
we
shall
discuss
later,
led
straight
from
1870
to
1914
and
or?,
to
the
Hitlerian
savagery
of
today.
On
the
other
side
of
the world
there
was also
a
great
new
power
emerging.
Japan
had
been
forced
out
of
her
isolation
to
learn
204
THE
PARTITION OF AFRICA
something
of
Western
civilization
by
an
American
fleet
in
1853.
Others
followed
and
taught
her more
by
bombarding
her
ports.
By
1868 the
decision,
so
fateful for all the
world,
had
been
made.
Japan
determined
to
change
a
culture
which had
endured
for
two
thousand
years
and
to remodel
herself
completely. Specialists
from
many
countries,
tKe
United
States,
Britain,
France,
Germany,
and
others,
were
brought
in
to
help
with
the
unique
transformation.
In
the
next
quarter
of a
century
it had been
accomplished,
but
so
rapidly
that
the
Western world did
not
yet
realize its
reality
or
significance.
^
II. THE
PARTITION
OF
AFRICA AND THE
NEW
IMPERIALISM
Nevertheless
everywhere
a new
alignment
of forces
was
taking
place.
Even
geography
was
being
altered. The
opening
of the
Suez
Canal
in
December,
1869,
changed
the
trade routes
of the
earth,
and the
significance
of
the
Mediterranean,
through
which
now
lay
the
way
to
India,
instead
of around Africa.
However,
that
continent was
about
to
assume a new
importance. Although
ships
had been
cruising
along
its coasts
for
centuries little was known
of
its
vast
interior,
but
by
one of
those
curious
coincidences
by
which
one
phase
of
history
grows
from
another,
for
about
twenty-five
years
after
1850,
a
succession
of
great
discoverers,
the
most
notable
of
whom were
British,
opened
the secrets of the
dark and unknown
continents
Among
the
leaders of the
British
were
Livingstone,
Stanley
(first
sent
out
by
an American
newspaper), Speke,
Cam-
eron, Baker,
and
Grant,
who with
others were
exploring
and
mapping
the
whole central
region,
crossing
the
Sahara,
charting
such
great
rivers
as
the
Niger,
the
Zambesi,
and the
Congo,
dis-
covering
the
vast
lakes
such as
Nyasa,
Victoria,
and
Tanganyika,
all
in
what had
hitherto
been
only
an
empty
white
space
on
the
maps.
]
[Although
the
work more or less coincided
with the
exploration,
or
the
interior
of
Australia,
which makes this
one of
the
great
exploring
periods
in
all
history,
Australia had
already
become
definitely
British.
]lhe
populous
and
vastly
rich interior
of
Africa,
however,
was still a
no
man's
land and unclaimed
by any
nation
onr
EMPIRE
ON
THE
SEVEN
SEAS
save
in so
far
as
such
shadowy
demands
as
that
of
Portugal
might
afford
basis
for
the
ownership
of
what
was now
being brought
to
light
by
other
peoples.
The
discovery
of the
non-European-owned
resources
of
the
ter-
ritory
now
opened
to
the
world
came
at a
critical
moment.
We
shall
note
presently
how
other
nations were
increasing
their rela-
tive
industrial
and
trading
positions
at the
expense
of
Britain.
Other
cc
workshops
of the
world"
were
rising
with a
resultant
scramble for
both
raw
materials
and
markets.
An
imperialism
of
a
wholly
new
type
was
in
the
making.
In earlier
centuries
Spain
had
been
a
great
imperial power,
as
had
also
France,
but
Spain
had
decayed,
France had
lost
India and
North
America to the
British,
and
the
British
themselves,
in
spite
of
their
wide-flung
empire,
had,
as
we have
seen,
come
to
consider most of
it
as
of
negligible
value.
However,
the
new
type
of
industrial
competition
between
na-
tions
developed
a
new
attitude
in
all toward
the
ownership
of
the
remaining empty spaces, speaking
in terms of
spaces
not
definitely
controlled
by
some of the
European powers.
Even in 1866
there
had
appeared
the
Greater
Britain,
by
Sir
Charles
Dilke,
which
advocated
the
value
of
imperial
possessions,
and
only
a
few
years
later
W. E.
Forster
was
advocating
the
impossible
but
for
a
time
popular
idea of
imperial
federation as
the
future Dominions
were
rising
in
importance.
Even
Disraeli,
who had
sneered
at
the
Empire
but was
now
entering
on the
great period
of his
career,
made
a
complete
volte-jace
and became
rampantly
imperialistic.
What
was
happening
in Britain
was
happening
in other
coun-
tries,
partly
due
to their
becoming
industrial
states and
partly
to
the
fact
that
in
the rush
to
seize
valuable
portions
of
the
non-
civilized
world,
prestige
was now
involved.
To be
reckoned
as
a
"great
Power"
meant
no
longer
a
great
Power
in
Europe
but
a
great
imperial
Power
on
the
globe
at
large.
The race
was
so
swift
that in
the
next
quarter
of a
century,
practically
all
the inhabitable
world,
unoccupied
or
occupied by
races
with
a low
grade
of
culture,
became
portions
of
one of
a
half-dozen
great
empires
dependent
on
one
or
another
of
the
European
Powers.
206