Alex Hughes. Encyclopedia of Contemporary French Culture

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408

Her subsequent relationship with Jean

Tinguely led to less violent collaborations, such

as the ‘Stravinsky Fountain’ adjacent to the

Pompidou Centre, and her ‘Tarot Garden’, a

vast architectural-sculpture project in Tuscany.

Her early work and close relationship with

Tinguely might justify her inclusion in the

Nouveau Réaliste group, but her ‘feminist’ re-

working of Gaudi in her architectural ‘Tarot

Garden’ project is unrecognizable under such

a historical definition.

One should not allow the spirituality and

simplicity of Yves Klein’s aesthetic utopia to

obscure his thoughtful contribution to art prac-

tice, which, in spite of being somewhat mar-

ginal to the Nouveau Réaliste project, is none

the less beginning to receive its rightful critical

acclaim. His monochromes, painted in ‘Inter-

national Klein blue’, attempt to dematerialize

the art object, a meditative aesthetic experi-

ence designed to heighten awareness. His

anthropométries (prints of the female body

using the same binderless pigment) may be seen

as significant in their assertion of the post-per-

formance trace as symbolic signifying value,

replacing traditional figurative representation.

His insistence upon the medieval elements con-

tributes to a rigorously anti-industrial concep-

tion of the world, while his ritualized manipu-

lation of these materials as semantic vehicles

places him paradoxically within the avant-

garde. His performance with blow torch on

gilt canvas is particularly seductive, the

scorched molten trace invoking not only the

elements, the appearance of medieval religious

art and an alchemical metamorphosis, but also

emphasizing the transience of the creative

moment itself. Leap into the Void, his photo-

montage self-portrait, stands as a symbol

against materialism for our age.

‘Ben’ (Vautrier) (1935–) worked on the edge

of the Nouveau Réaliste grouping. He is often

dismissed as a ‘clown’, but this should be quali-

fied. He is a Shakespearean clown; he speaks

in jest more truths than the official court. His

now moss-lined bathtub, inscribed with the

words ‘40 years since Duchamp and still no

new ideas’ (1979) seems particularly poignant.

SIMEON HUNTER

Further reading

La Beaumelle, A. and Pouillon, N. (eds) (1987)

La Collection, Paris: Centre Georges

Pompidou/MNAM (a guide).

Lionel-Marie, A., Llopès, M-C. and Thomas,

M. (eds) (1981) Paris-Paris, Paris: Centre

Georges Pompidou/Éditions Gallimard (a

catalogue of a major exhibition).

Morris, F. et al. (1993) Paris Post War, Lon-

don: Tate Gallery.

Paris-Match

Magazine

This illustrated weekly news magazine, cre-

ated by Jean Prouvost in 1949, represents one

of the most outstanding successes of the post-

war French press.

Prouvost, a textile manufacturer, had built

his press empire in the 1930s, publishing

popular daily Paris-Soir and women’s maga-

zine Marie-Claire. In 1938 he bought the

sports weekly Match (created in 1928) and

turned it into a general-interest, glossy maga-

zine modelled on American Life. Sales soared

and by June 1940 the print run reached 1.7

million copies. During the Occupation, pub-

lication ceased and, owing to allegations of

collaboration against Prouvost, it was not

until March 1949 that he was able to

relaunch the magazine, now renamed Paris-

Match.

Following initial difficulties throwing off its

previous sporting image, Paris-Match rapidly

established a reputation for dramatic colour

photoreportage of international affairs, par-

ticularly the Korean and Indochina wars, but

also current affairs at home, scientific exploits,

cinema, fashion and show business. The lives

of film stars and members of royalty attracted

extensive photographic coverage, as did sol-

emn occasions like deaths and funerals of na-

tional and international leaders. The maga-

zine’s political line was conformist, even chau-

vinistic and, by 1958, strongly Gaullist. It was

Paris-Match

409

the historic edition devoted to the death of

General de Gaulle that brought all-time record

sales of just over 2.1 million copies in Novem-

ber 1970.

Average circulation peaked at 1.5 million

copies in 1960, but as television grew in

popularity the appeal of Paris-Match’s im-

ages was undermined. Competition from ri-

val news magazines intensified and, from

1969 onwards, sales fell. In 1976 Prouvost

sold to Daniel Filipacchi, who relaunched the

magazine with a new image and famous slo-

gan: ‘Paris-Match—Le poids des mots, le

choc des photos (Weighty words, photos that

shock). Filipacchi also recalled Roger

Therond, a member of the magazine’s former

successful team, as chief editor and director.

Circulation soared to over a million copies.

Following a decline in the 1980s, circulation

stabilized in the 1990s at over 800,000 cop-

ies—well ahead of other general-interest

weeklies.

Politically, Paris-Match is on the Right, but

focuses on personalities not policies. Main sec-

tions cover news (L’Actualité), with explicit

and sensational photoreportage on subjects

ranging from massacre in Rwanda to the

Paris-Dakar rally; and personalities (Gens), es-

pecially the private lives of the famous, such

as the controversial revelations about François

Mitterrand’s illegitimate daughter Mazarine in

November 1994. A fascination for death and

disaster has attracted accusations of bad taste,

as demonstrated in full-page spreads showing

distraught victims of the Paris bombings in

1995. The magazine defends its sensational

tactics in self-righteous terms, and enjoys such

a long-standing reputation as a pro-establish-

ment institution that it achieves massive boosts

in sales without risking lasting damage to its

considerable reputation. The cover pages of

half a century of Paris-Match are like a photo

album recording legendary figures and events

of postwar history.

PAM MOORES

Further reading

Addinall, N. (ed.) (1996) French Political Par-

ties: A Documentary Guide, Cardiff: Univer-

sity of Wales Press (an overview, with texts).

Chagnollaud, D. (ed.) (1993) La Vie politique

en France, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (contains

contributions by leading French specialists).

Flood, C. and Bell, L. (eds) (1997) Political

Ideologies in Contemporary France, Lon-

don: Cassell (contextualizes the doctrines

and underlying assumptions of the major

strands of French political life).

Furet, F., Julliard, J. and Rosanvallon, P. (1988)

La République du centre, Paris: Éditions du

Seuil (analysis by major political writers).

Morris, P. (1994) French Politics Today, Man-

chester: Manchester University Press (an

approachable overview of politics under

the Fifth Republic).

Rémond, R. (1993) ‘Droite-gauche: où est la

différence?’, L’Histoire 169 (January).

Wright, V. (1989) The Government and Poli-

tics of France, London: Unwin Hyman (a

good overall introduction).

parties and movements

414

parties and movements:

DOM-TOMs

Political activity in France’s départements et

territoires d’outre-mer (DOM-TOMs) takes

place within an institutional framework of

regular elections to the National Assembly and

Senate, as well as municipal, departmental and

regional councils or territorial assemblies.

Residents also cast ballots in French presiden-

tial and European Union elections. Debates

on the exact status of each DOM-TOM—in-

cluding demands for greater autonomy or in-

dependence in some areas—often dominate

political life. Especially in New Caledonia,

struggles between pro- and anti-independence

groups have led to periods of upheaval and

violence.

France today claims ten overseas outposts,

the remnants of its colonial empire.

Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West

Indies, French Guiana in South America and

Reunion in the Indian Ocean became

départements d’outremer in 1946. In princi-

ple, they have the same institutions, laws and

administration as metropolitan départements.

New laws are automatically applicable to the

DOMs unless legislative acts explicitly state

otherwise. The state is represented by a préfet,

although since the decentralization pro-

gramme of the early 1980s, elected conseils

départementaux and conseils régionaux look

after most day-to-day administration. French

Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and

Futuna, located in the South Pacific, became

territoires d’outre-mer under provisions of the

1958 constitution. Specific statutes for each

TOM, which vary considerably, were adopted

by the French parliament. A Haut-

Commissaire represents the state in New Cal-

edonia and French Polynesia (and a préfet in

Wallis and Futuna). The territorial assembly

in French Polynesia elects a president and gov-

ernment which, since 1984, have enjoyed a

great deal of autonomy, although Paris retains

control of such crucial areas as defence, mon-

etary policy and international relations. Wallis

and Futuna has a territorial assembly, but the

traditional ‘king’ of Wallis and the two ‘kings’

of Futuna play a significant role in local af-

fairs (particularly in relation to questions of

land use and Polynesian culture). Since 1989,

New Caledonia has been divided into largely

autonomous ‘provinces’ with elected councils

which deal separately with Paris; meeting to-

gether, the councils form the territory’s Con-

gress, although it has few powers. The Terres

Australes et Antarctiques (TAAF), which in-

clude the French zone of Antarctica (Terre

Adélie) and several sub-Antarctic islands, are

also a TOM; without a permanent population,

it is administered by a senior bureaucrat (as-

sisted by appointed councils) in Reunion. The

two other French outposts, St-Pierre-et-

Miquelon in the northwestern Atlantic, and

Mayotte in the southwestern Indian Ocean,

are collectivités territoriales; the former is es-

sentially a DOM, the latter a TOM. Both have

préfets and elected assemblies.

All of the metropolitan political parties are

represented in the DOM-TOMs, although they

do not have the same proportional strength as

in the metropole. The Parti Communiste

Réunionnais, for instance, has remained a pow-

erful rallying point for dissidents, despite the

decline of the French Communist Party; the

Front National secured more support in New

Caledonia in the 1980s than did its counter-

part in mainland France. The Rassemblement

pour la République monopolizes politics in

Mayotte and Wallis and Futuna. The Parti

Socialiste has not been particularly strong in

the DOM-TOMs, even though such local par-

ties as the Parti Progressiste Martiniquais have

lent support to the Socialists in parliament. The

proindependence movement has fragmented

into groups representing various ideological

tendencies, regional interests or religious and

social bases. Throughout the DOM-TOMs,

trade unions, religious groups and other asso-

ciations are a dynamic presence on the politi-

cal scene as well.

The issue of the DOM-TOMs’ relationship

with metropolitan France has dominated

much political activity. Most parties champion

greater administrative autonomy from Paris,

all the while calling for the maintenance of

parties and movements: DOM-TOMs

415

(and usually for an increase in) the govern-

ment transfers, subsidies, social security pay-

ments and salary bonuses for public servants

on which the largely unproductive local

economies depend. Some parties, which usu-

ally garner the majority of the vote, strongly

defend the attachment of the DOM-TOMs to

mainland France as a guarantee of economic

prosperity, public order and international se-

curity. Pointing out that residents of the DOM-

TOMs are fully fledged French citizens with

the right of abode in the metropole and duly

elected representatives in government, they

reject the claim that the DOM-TOMs repre-

sent cases of persistent colonialism and insist

that incorporation is a different form of

decolonization.

Opposition groups argue that the DOM-

TOMs are indeed vestiges of colonialism

which, immediately or in due course, ought to

gain independence. Independence movements

are absent only in the smallest DOM-TOMs,

St-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Wallis and Futuna, and

Mayotte. In Martinique and French Guiana,

and especially in Guadeloupe and Reunion,

there was considerable indépendantiste activ-

ity in the 1970s, but thereafter it diminished

markedly because of government crackdowns

on militant extraparliamentary protests, the

administrative decentralization of the 1980s,

and the waning of the radical views with

which pro-independence positions were

linked. In 1981, Aimé Césaire, poet of

négritude and long-time député from

Martinique, called for a moratorium on de-

bates concerning status, and many politicians

in the DOMs seem to have heeded his coun-

sel. Small indépendantiste groups remain ac-

tive but have failed to gain political power.

In New Caledonia, the struggle between

indépendantistes and ‘loyalists’ reached new

heights in the 1980s. Most indépendantistes

came from the indigenous Melanesian popu-

lation (Kanaks), who had been reduced to a

demographic minority by the immigration of

Europeans, Asians and Polynesians. The ex-

pansion of pastoral, mining and settler inter-

ests had led to the dispossession of

Melanesians from much of their ancestral

land. Not until the late 1950s were all

Melanesians granted the suffrage. Long-term

European settlers (Caldoches) and more recent

European migrants continued to monopolize

political power and pocket the profits

from the territory’s rich nickel mines. Deep-

seated Melanesian grievances fuelled

proindependence sentiment and led to the for-

mation of a Front Indépendantiste, which

briefly gained control of the territorial assem-

bly in the early 1980s. In 1984, a coalition of

political parties, a trade union and a women’s

group formed the Front de Libération

Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) under

the leadership of Jean-Marie Tjibaou; the

FLNKS and a smaller pro-independence party

won the support of four-fifths of Kanaks. The

majority of the Caldoches joined the

Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la

République (RPCR), led by Jacques Lafleur;

the RPCR secured the support of other ethnic

groups, worried about their future in an inde-

pendent ‘Kanaky’. In 1985, a proposal by the

government to move towards New Caledo-

nian ‘independence-in-association’ with

France satisfied none of the parties and aggra-

vated political polarization. The next few

years saw occasional boycotting of elections

by the FLNKS and violence—physical harass-

ment, riots, hostage-takings, and attacks by

newly formed militias—carried out by both

Kanaks and Caldoches; the police and army

often responded with heavy-handed tactics.

Tensions increased further during the period

of cohabitation after 1986, when Jacques

Chirac’s government cast its lot with the ‘loy-

alists’ and, particularly, with the RPCR, which

was affiliated with Chirac’s own party. A par-

ticularly tragic episode of hostage-taking by a

Kanak group on the island of Ouvéa, followed

by a bloody military attempt to free the hos-

tages, occurred in the midst of the presidential

campaign of 1988. Subsequently, the new gov-

ernment of Michel Rocard succeeded in con-

vincing the FLNKS and the RPCR to sign the

Matignon Accords, which divided New Cal-

edonia into three ‘provinces’ (two of which

came under Kanak control, although the ma-

jor city, Nouméa, and its region remained

parties and movements: DOM-TOMs

416

under Caldoche control). The agreement fore-

shadowed a supposedly final vote on the fu-

ture of the territory to be held in 1998; suf-

frage will be restricted to voters already regis-

tered in 1988 and their children who attain

voting age. Renegade Kanak indépendantistes

rejected the accords and Tjibaou was assassi-

nated; some Caldoches also opposed the com-

promise. Both the FLNKS and the RPCR have

since been racked by internecine quarrels. The

state has injected much money into the terri-

tory and tried to maintain peace. Yet unrest

festers, tensions between ethnic groups remain

high, economic problems loom and New Cal-

edonia’s future status is uncertain.

In French Polynesia, several independence

parties, the most important of which is now

the Tavini Huira’atira under Oscar Temaru,

were organized in the 1970s and 1980s. They

also condemned French nuclear testing in the

territory, denounced the ‘artificial’ transfer

economy and demanded greater recognition of

Maori language and culture. However,

indépendantistes succeeded in getting only one-

fifth of votes in most elections. Opponents of

independence divided into a number of small

parties, but the Tahoera’a Huira’atira, under

Gaston Flosse, became the leading party in the

territory. Flosse negotiated with Paris for a new

statute for French Polynesia in 1984; accord-

ing to the anti-indépendantistes, it gives the

territory an acceptable measure of self-govern-

ment and such symbols of national identity as

a flag (although it is always flown alongside

the French tricolour). Nevertheless, riots broke

out in Papeete in 1987, provoked by labour

disputes but touching on the question of inde-

pendence. In 1995, President Chirac’s decision

to end a two-year moratorium on nuclear tests

sparked major riots in Tahiti, and Temaru (who

emerged as the primary spokesman for the anti-

nuclear and pro-independence movement) re-

newed calls for independence. Chirac declared

in February 1996 that testing had definitively

terminated, and he promised extra funds to

French Polynesia to make up for the financial

shortfall the cessation of testing would un-

doubtedly create.

Mayotte presents a different debate scenario

on the status question. When the other three

islands of the Comoros archipelago voted to

become independent in 1974, Mayotte voted

overwhelmingly against independence. A very

small group in the island now promotes unifi-

cation with the Federal Islamic Republic of the

Comoros, but the majority support candidates

who favour complete integration of

Mayotte with the metropole through

départementalisation. Because of its economic

underdevelopment and the cultural differences

between mainland France and Mayotte—where

almost all of the population is Muslim, and

fewer than a third of Mahorais speak French—

authorities in Paris have refused to sanction such

an arrangement.

Many issues in DOM-TOM politics which

do not directly relate to the status of the out-

posts nevertheless are linked with their colonial

heritage. Disparities in income between ethnic

groups and geographical areas—with indig-

enous populations and residents of outer islands

and rural hinterlands disadvantaged when com-

pared with Europeans and inhabitants of larger

cities—evoke regular criticism, especially from

leftist groups. Political activists demand greater

recognition of local cultures, such as Creole lan-

guages and cultures in Reunion and the West

Indies. Calls for increased government finan-

cial commitments come from across the politi-

cal spectrum, since high labour costs and inter-

national competition make it vital to obtain high

subsidies and guaranteed prices for such pri-

mary products as bananas from the Antilles,

geranium from Reunion, vanilla from Tahiti and

ylang-ylang from Mayotte. Politicians agree in

urging Paris to align minimum wages, family

allocations and other social security payments

with those of the metropole, although levels for

all these transfers lag behind those current in

mainland France.

Nevertheless, much of local politics re-

volves around ‘bread-and-butter’ issues of ac-

cess to education and employment, provisions

for public services and regional development.

Office-holders, particularly mayors—who are

frequently also elected to departmental, re-

gional or territorial bodies, or parliament—

hold great power of influence and patronage;

parties and movements: DOM-TOMs

417

municipal governments count among the larg-

est employers throughout the DOM-TOMs,

for instance, and mayors have an important

say in dispensing jobs. Consequently, politics

in the DOM-TOMs bears many traits of

clientelism and patronage (and gives rise to

accusations of nepotism, voting fraud and cor-

ruption). Such politicians as Césaire, Tjibaou,

Lafleur, Flosse and Temaru have defined ide-

ologies, acted as powerbrokers in their respec-

tive areas, served as intermediaries between

the DOM-TOMs and Paris, and wielded con-

siderable economic clout because of their links

with business and the administration. Even

leaders of pro-independence groupuscules play

a larger role on the small stages of the DOM-

TOMs than they might elsewhere.

ROBERT ALDRICH

Further reading

Aldrich, R. (1993) France and the South Pa-

cific Since 1940, London: Macmillan (in-

cludes several chapters on politics).

Aldrich, R. and Connell, J. (1992) France’s

Overseas Frontier: Départements et

Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press (comprehensive study

of DOM-TOMs with a chapter on politics).

Belorgey, G. and Bertrand, G. (1994) Les

DOM-TOM, Paris: Éditions La Découverte

(most recent general study in French).

Constant, F. (1988) La Retraite aux

flambeaux: société et politique en

Martinique, Paris: Éditions Caribéennes

(study of Martinique, particularly local

political issues and clientelism).

Hintjens, H.M. (1995) Alternatives to Inde-

pendence: Explorations in Post-Colonial

Relations, Aldershot: Dartmouth (includes

chapters on Caribbean DOMs, French

Guyana and Reunion).

Miles, W.E.S. (1986) Elections and Ethnicity

in French Martinique: A Paradox in Para-

dise, New York: Praeger (a study of poli-

tics in Martinique).

Pasqua, Charles

b. 1927, Grasse

The son of a Corsican policeman, Pasqua can

claim Gaullist affiliations since the time of the

Resistance. He rose to public prominence as

Minister of the Interior in the Chirac govern-

ment of 1986–8, resuming this post under

Balladur (1993–5). His tough approach to

immigration, and to law and order issues,

identified him firmly with the right wing of

the neo-Gaullist RPR, and he achieved a de-

gree of notoriety in 1988 by claiming that the

Front National ‘shared the same values’ as the

mainstream Right. In the RPR’s factional in-

fighting before the 1995 presidential elections,

he associated himself with the Balladur candi-

dacy, and this eliminated him from considera-

tion for a ministerial post following Chirac’s

presidential victory.

BRIAN JENKINS

See also: Gaulle, Charles de; parties and move-

ments

Further reading

Desjardins, T. (1994) Pasqua, Paris: Éditions

No. 1 (currently the most recent of several

biographies in French).

Knapp, A. (1994) Gaullism Since de Gaulle,

Dartmouth (currently the most comprehen-

sive and up-to-date study in English of the

Gaullist inheritance in its RPR phase).

Patachou

b. 1918, Paris

Singer, real name Henriette Ragon

Having opened a cabaret-restaurant, Chez

Patachou, in Montmartre in 1948, and hav-

ing enjoyed the support of one of her clients,

Maurice Chevalier, this reincarnation of the

Patachou