
Environmental Encyclopedia 3
Free riders
In March 2002, Parliament cast non-binding opinion
votes on the options. The House of Commons voted for a
ban. The House of Lord voted for licensed hunting. After
the vote, Rural Affairs Minister Alun Michael said that the
government would try to find a common ground before
trying to legislate fox hunting. The process of trying to reach
agreement was expected to take six months at most.
Fox hunting in other countries
The Scottish Parliament banned hunting in February
of 2002. The ban was to take effect on Aug, 1, 2002. The
Countryside Alliance announced plans to legally challenge
that ruling.
Fox hunting is legal in the following countries: Ireland,
Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Hunting with hounds
is banned in Switzerland. In the United States, the MFHA
was established in 1907. In March of 2002, the MFHA
reported that there were 171 organized hunt clubs in North
America.
[Liz Swain]
R
ESOURCES
B
OOKS
Pool, Daniel. What Jane Austen Ate and Charles Dickens Knew: From Fox
Hunting to Whist—The Facts of Daily Life in Nineteenth-Century Enland.
Carmichael, CA: Touchstone Books, 1994.
Robards, Hugh J. Foxhunting in England, Ireland, and North America.
Lanham, MD: Derrydale Press, 2000.
Thomas, Joseph B., and Mason Houghland. Hounds and Hunting Through
the Ages. Lanham, MD: Derrydale Press, 2001.
O
RGANIZATIONS
British Government Committee of Inquiry into Hunting with Dogs in
England and Wales, , England Email: huntingwithdogs@defra.gsi.gov.uk,
<http://www.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/mainsections/huntingframe.htm>
Countryside Alliance, The OldTown Hall, 367 Kensington Road, London
SE11 4PT, England (011) 44-020-7840-9200, Fax: (011) 44-020-7793-
8899, Email: info@countryside-alliance.org, <http://www.countryside-
alliance.org>
International Fund for Animal Welfare, 411 Main Street, P.O. Box 193,
Yarmouth Port, MA USA 02675 (508) 744-2000, Fax: (508) 744-2009,
Toll Free: (800) 932-4329, Email: info@iafw.org, <http://www.iafw.org>
Masters of Foxhounds Association, Morven Park, P.O. Box 2420, Leesburg,
VA USA 20177 Email: office@mfha.com, <http://www.mfha.com>
Nottingham Hunt Saboteurs, The Sumac Centre, 245 Gladstone Street,
Nottingham NG7 6HX, England
Free riders
A free rider, in the broad sense of the term, is anyone who
enjoys a benefit provided, probably unwittingly, by others.
In the narrow sense, a free rider is someone who receives
the benefits of a cooperative venture without contributing
to the provision of those benefits. A person who does not
participate in a cooperative effort to reduce
air pollution
597
by driving less, for instance, will still breathe cleaner air—
and thus be a free rider—if the effort succeeds.
In this sense, free riders are a major concern of the
theory of collective action. As developed by economists and
social theorists, this theory rests on a distinction between
private and public (or collective) goods. A public good differs
from a private good because it is indivisible and nonrival. A
public good, such as clean air or national defense, is indivisi-
ble because it cannot be divided among people the way food
or money can. It is nonrival because one person’s enjoyment
of the good does not diminish anyone else’s enjoyment of
it. Smith and Jones may be rivals in their desire to win a
prize, but they cannot be rivals in their desire to breathe
clean air, for Smith’s breathing clean air will not deprive
Jones of an equal chance to do the same.
Problems arise when a public good requires the cooper-
ation of many people, as in a campaign to reduce
pollution
or conserve resources. In such cases, individuals have little
reason to cooperate, especially when cooperation is burden-
some. After all, one person’s contribution—using less
gaso-
line
or electricity, for example—will make no real difference
to the success or failure of the campaign, but it will be a
hardship for that person. So the rational course of action is
to try to be a free rider who enjoys the benefits of the
cooperative effort without bearing its burdens. If everybody
tries to be a free rider, however, no one will cooperate and
the public good will not be provided. If people are to prevent
this from happening, some way of providing selective or
individual incentives must be found, either by rewarding
people for cooperating or punishing them for failing to coop-
erate.
The free rider problem posed by public goods helps
to illuminate many social and political difficulties, not the
least of which are environmental concerns. It may explain
why voluntary campaigns to reduce driving and to cut energy
use so often fail, for example. As formulated in Garrett
Hardin’s
Tragedy of the Commons
, moreover, collective
action theory accounts for the tendency to use common
resources—grazing land, fishing banks, perhaps the earth
itself—beyond their
carrying capacity
. The solution, as
Hardin puts it, is “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”
to prevent the overuse and destruction of vital resources.
Without such action, the desire to ride free may lead to
irreparable ecological damage.
[Richard K. Dagger]
R
ESOURCES
B
OOKS
Hardin, R. Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982.
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.