
compel its opponents to fulfill its will, the United States has been in an almost constant
state of warfare since 1945. That both accurately apply to the United States characterizes
the nation’s equivocal approach to war in the last half of the twentieth century.
One aspect of the country’s ambivalence was the proliferation of conflicts that stopped
short of being full-fledged wars. The overarching framework for the first forty years o
the US after the Second World War was the
“Cold War,”
a term used to designate the
prolonged struggle with the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree the People’s Republic o
China
. Although this “war” shaped and structured American politics, economics, social
institutions and, especially military policy the US and the Soviet Union never sent troops
against each other and the US and Chinese only fought against each other in the
Korean
War
. There were also a series of “covert” or “surrogate” wars, such as those against the
governments of Guatemala and
Iran
in the 1950s, Cuba in the 1960s and Nicaragua in
the 1980s. These were armed conflicts sanctioned by the US and often conducted by US
intelligence agencies
(CIA)
. Although not publicly involved, US personnel performed
assassinations,
mined harbors, engaged in psychological operations, as well as supplying
arms, training, logistical support and intelligence to groups engaged in overt hostilities
against US
enemies
. A second feature was the increasing power of the presidents to
unilaterally decide whether to engage in a conflict and how exactly that conflict would be
conducted. Harry
Truman’s
decision to lead the country to war in Korea under UN
auspices, rather than seek a formal declaration from Congress, provided a blueprint that
both George
Bush
in the
Gulf War
(1990) and Bill
Clinton
in Bosnia (1996) and
Kosovo (1999) followed. In each case the president chose when to start and when to
conclude hostilities and left Congress to cast largely symbolic votes whether to support or
denounce the policy Although the
Vietnam War
was not a UN operation, both Lyndon
Johnson
and Richard
Nixon
also followed Truman’s example of ignoring Congress,
arguing that the Constitution gave the president war-making powers in his role as
commander in chief. There was an attempt to undercut this tactic by passage of the War
Powers Act (1973), which held that the president could send troops into battle for sixty
days, but then had to seek congressional approval. However, this proved largely
ineffectual.
A third effect, related to the second, was the use of euphemisms, like “police action” in
Korea (1950–3) and Vietnam (1962–74), “peacekeeping mission” in the Dominican
Republic (1965) and Bosnia (1991–3) and “rescue operations” in
Grenada
(1984) to
describe events that were, for all intents and purposes, wars. These often grew out of the
Cold War and were situations where the two superpowers would actively involve
themselves on opposing sides of a regional conflict, but did not wish to take the final step
of declaring war. On the other hand, the government began to increasingly characterize
non-military social-
olicy initiatives in explicitly military terms. From the 1960s to the
1980s there were a number of “wars” declared by the government on such things as
poverty drugs,
crime, AIDS
and
cancer
.
A fourth feature of this ambivalence was the way it contributed to the rise of what
Eisenhower
called the military-industrial complex; a relationship that grew to include the
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