In the postwar period, joining the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the
European Economic Community (1957) was part of a national strategy. At the
international level, this secured legitimacy, status and credibility for a country which had
come out of the war as a loser. Internally, European membership contributed to the
consolidation of the newborn Italian democracy and strengthened the solidity of the
Republic against the risk of a breakdown of democratic processes. The choice was not
without its own risks, as Italy was the only founding member of the Community with
such serious problems of poverty and illiteracy and with pronounced regional disparities
between the North and the South (see Southern Question). Ultimately, however,
integration did produce more benefits than costs.
Being—in terms of population—a large founding member of the European
Community, Italy gained the same formal status as the most important members, such as
France and Germany, in terms of voting power and numerical presence within the
European institutions. Yet the Italian influence on European policies remained limited.
Indeed, even under the best circumstances Italy merely played the role of mediator and
not of leader (Sbragia, 1992). Governmental instability and poor administrative resources
also severely constrained the capability of Italian negotiators to make a profound impact
on the trajectory of European integration. Italy as a country had a poor record of
implementation of European decisions, decidely at odds with the Euro-enthusiasm of
both Italian public opinion and policy makers. In fact, European integration had always
been strongly supported by Italians and even the Italian Communist Party (PCI), after an
initial period of opposition to the European Community, came to share in the general
enthusiasm for Europeanism. The pro-European attitude was only mildly challenged by
the Berlusconi government in 1994. All the same, it seems paradoxical that Italy often
agreed to European decisions which later were difficult to implement, although Italian
politicians were always able to capitalize on an Italian consensus which could be taken
for granted. The latter, in fact, proved to be a positive political investment of goodwill
and reputation at the table of European decisions, and Italian policy makers were able to
cash in the return on this investment when asking their European partners for more
leniency on pressing domestic problems, such as the closure of steel plants (see Ilva),
excessive milk production and state aids to ailing industries (Giuliani, 1996).
Notwithstanding the deficit in implementation and the difficulties in playing a
purposive role in European affairs, Italy was able to defend the national interest in crucial
episodes of European integration. Italy was at the margins of the Franco-German scheme
leading to the European Coal and Steel Community, but De Gasperi obtained subsidies
for the Sardinian mines, access to Algerian iron ore and, most crucially, free movement
of workers. In a country where the ‘Piano Vanoni’ (Vanoni Plan) assumed that 800,000
workers would leave Italy each year, free movement of labour within the Community was
indispensable. Hence this fundamental concession was a typical Italian mark on the shape
of European integration. Italy was also instrumental in the creation of the European
Social Fund and the European Investment Bank, two instruments of the Community
designed to tackle the problems of unemployment and regional disparities, and Italian
industry also gained from the progressive establishment of the single market. By contrast,
Italian interests in the Common Agricultural Policy yielded to those of central and
northern countries: fruit and vegetables, the typical Italian products, were far less
protected by the Common Agricultural Policy than cereals and meat.
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