Gino Moliterno. Encyclopedia of Contemporary Italian Culture

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cent of national average in 1951 and to 78 per cent in 1989. Today, while the regions in

the Po valley are amongst the richest in Europe, the Mezzogiorno still ranks as one of the

poorest. Unemployment in the North is about 6 per cent (roughly half the European

average), but reaches 20 per cent in the South, a fact that underlines the close connection

of the ‘Southern Question’ with the unemployment issue.

Explanations of the relative underdevelopment of the South range from national

economic policy failures to poor Southern financial institutions, from cultural differences

between North and South to the social costs of organized crime. Its high unemployment

is also explained by a variety of factors: rigid labour markets, welfare state failures and

outdated education system. While changes in all these areas have been very slow in

coming, nevertheless the spread of a buoyant small enterprise system from the northeast

down the Adriatic coast all the way to Apulia bodes well for the future of the southern

economy. Today, the Mezzogiorno is far from being just one homogeneous zone of

underdevelopment, as it incorporates ever increasing patches of rapidly developing and

modernizing areas.

Further reading

Barca, F. (ed.) (1997) Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, Rome: Donzelli.

Rossi, N. and Toniolo, G. (1996) ‘Italy’, in N. Grafts and G. Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in

Europe Since 1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 427–54.

GIANNI TONIOLO

education

For Italy, the end of the war in 1945 meant also a recovery from more than twenty years

of fascist rule. In the educational system two kinds of changes were supposed to follow

the return to democracy. First, the ideological contents of the curricula, often permeated

by nationalistic and illiberal views, had to be modified. This was done immediately,

while the Allied troops still were occupying part of the country; an important contribution

came from Carleton Washburne, who was at the same time a member of the Allied

Control Commission and a prestigious scholar in education. Second, the whole structure

of the school system had to be revised: in fact, even in the pre-fascist era emphasis had

always been placed upon a selective curriculum, one based on the humanities and

reserved for the happy few, rather than on mass education (in 1951, 12.9 per cent of the

population aged over six years was illiterate). Thus, the constitution of the new-born

Republic asserted the right to education of all citizens and called for positive action by

the state to overcome difficulties due to social inequalities. However, the implementation

of the constitutional principle remained extremely slow, mainly due to the conservative

nature of the Christian Democrat Party (DC) which, as the ruling party, effectively

controlled the Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (Ministry of Education). Given the

extremely centralized nature of the school system until very recent times, the Education

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Ministry provided excellent opportunities for expanding the influence of the Party (see

clientelism), which thus discouraged the implementation of any major reforms.

The structure of the educational system inherited by the Republic dates back to the

Gentile reform of 1923. Excepting higher education (see universities), it is divided into

four sectors, called cycles: infant school, age 3–6; elementary school, 6–11; lower

secondary, 11–14; and upper secondary, 14–19. This overall structure has been retained

well into the late 1990s though significant changes have taken place at the infant and

secondary level; the elementary sector has remained more stable, since from the

beginning it was the only one attended almost universally by the corresponding age

group.

The infant school, though not compulsory, is extremely well attended (in 1996, by 97

per cent of children, compared with 35 per cent in 1945). It has undergone a radical

transformation, since it used to be a mainly socially oriented institution, receiving

children whose families could not care for them during the day, whereas it has now

acquired a high pedagogical value. Originally it was not included in the state educational

system: the public schools were run by the local authorities (comuni), the private ones

mainly by Church institutions. However in 1968, after a long struggle against those who

were protecting the dominance of the private sector, the infant school was added to the

state system and the results have been quite positive. In all recent international reports,

the Italian Infant School has ranked high; a school run by the Municipality of Reggio

Emilia recently won first prize in a comparative test, and the average value is not much

lower.

Table 1 shows the huge quantitative development of the secondary school system

during the decades from the 1950s—the years of the economic miracle—to the late

1970s, reaching a plateau around the beginning of the 1990s as the increase in schooling

rate began to be counter-balanced by a decrease in the birth rate. Around the middle of

the 1990s, the ratio of upper secondary students to the general population in the

corresponding age group was above 75 per cent, whereas the degree (maturità) was taken

by 65 per cent of the nineteen-year-old population; both figures were still slowly

increasing.

Compulsory schooling till the age of fourteen, as established by the constitution,

became effective in 1962 when a centre-left coalition government instituted the Scuola

Media Unica, a unified lower secondary school. Thus, the age for choosing between a

general education, a technical education, vocational training or school leaving was shifted

from eleven to fourteen or fifteen years; after being in place for a third of a century, there

is now a general consensus that the Scuola Media open to all children has turned out to be

a very effective instrument for homogenising Italian society.

On the other hand, no structural reforms accompanied the expansion of the upper

secondary school. It still includes separate channels called Licei (general education),

Istituti Tecnici (technical education), Istituti professional! (vocational training), and other

specialized institutions mainly in the fields of art and music. Of course, some curricula

have been more or less modernized; but this has been done independently, inside each

channel, without a global strategy Such a strategy would have been required for at least

three reasons: the impact of the change from a school system aimed at the ruling class to

a system for everybody; the presence of the Scuola Media Unica (previously, the various

upper secondary institutions were connected to different lower secondary schools); the

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admission of all secondary school graduates to higher education, as decreed by the 1969

law concerning the university.

This last factor in particular, which could not help but deeply influence the very

mission of technical and professional establishments, led to repeated calls for a general

secondary school reform. Although a number of legislative proposals were introduced

into the Parliament, none came to fruition. The continual blocking of this reform has

often been taken as the typical, and perhaps most dramatic, example of a general

weakness in the decision-making process of Italian political institutions.

Another complication of the Italian educational system is that vocational education

takes place also outside the state school system, namely in centres, or in more flexible

training programmes, administered by the regions. The regional system, being more

directly connected with the labour market, is rather important with regard to adult

education and re-training; it is less relevant for the age group 14–18 years, as the

percentage of students proportional to the total in the school system is only 6 per cent,

and even the proportion relative to the state Istituti professionali is less than 30 per cent.

In spite of this limited weight, the very existence of two completely different public

institutions in charge of the same activities, without a clearcut distinction of goals and

responsibilities, leads to conflicts and to financial waste; moreover, it makes it extremely

difficult to plan coherently the development of the whole system.

Consequently, in the late 1990s there are a number of major issues which are on the

education agenda, both at the political and administrative level as well as within the

ambit of education professionals. Uppermost is an insistent demand for a decentralization

of the system, relating to two separate aspects of the present situation. The first is the

need for an increase in school autonomy, and some initial steps in that direction have

already been taken. Schools are becoming more directly responsible for their day-to-day

running (previously managed by state bureaucracy) and moreover, the national

curriculum, embedded in the Napoleonic tradition which was absorbed by the Italian

administration upon unification, is strongly under pressure to change. A compromise

curriculum is partly operating in a large number of experimental situations: a few

subjects, and some kind of ‘core chapters’ within each subject, are uniform all over Italy

but other subjects and chapters are decided locally and teachers have more scope for

individual choice. One should note, however, a strong perceived need to retain some

common core to the curriculum in order to ensure a reasonable national homogeneity and

also as a cultural reply to the separatism that circulates in the North of Italy in the wake

of the successes of the Lega Nord.

A second aspect of decentralization requires crucial political resolution since it

involves the very structure of the Republic. Present proposals for major constitutional

reform suggest a movement towards an almost federal state; consequently, only the

fundamental choices concerning education would remain national, whereas the regions

and other local authorities would be responsible for decisions not directly devolved to the

responsibility of individual schools. The exact location of the borders between state

responsibilities and regional jurisdiction, and of those between regions and schools, is, of

course, extremely controversial. Furthermore, for some political parties, and for a part of

public opinion, autonomy for individual schools should also involve a change of the rules

concerning private schools (almost all Catholic), making them fully equivalent to public

ones; up to now, according to the constitution private schools may be authorized to award

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certification having full legal value but they may not be publicly financed. In fact, the

number of students in private schools is rather small (it only exceeds 10 per cent for

infant school), whereas Catholic ideas and teachers are widely present inside the public

schools (for those who do not refuse it, Catholic religion is a compulsory subject, taught

by priests or other catechists appointed by the bishop and paid by the state).

Consequently, the call to finance private schools has been in the past rather weak, coming

only from clericalist movements, and received little political support even when the

Christian Democratic Party was in power.

Instead, there is general consensus about a radical change in pre-service training of all

teachers; after a long delay, the implementation of a 1990 law is beginning. It provides

that elementary and infant school teachers should have a university qualification, whereas

previously the maturità at the end of secondary school was sufficient. Furthermore, it

provides for attendance of a postgraduate pedagogical specialization school by secondary

school teachers-to-be, whereas previously the subject qualification (laurea) was sufficient

without any further competence or pedagogical training.

Finally, with a new centre—left majority in government since 1996 and with a good

chance that the Parliament will run its five-year course, the possibility of a general school

reform has been put forward. There is widespread agreement about some points: the end

of secondary school should be reached at the age of eighteen instead of nineteen, as in

almost all European countries; school attendance should be compulsory at least up to the

age of fifteen or sixteen, not necessarily according to a unified curriculum; the system

should become much more flexible, without insurmountable barriers between different

curricula; and programmes integrating general and vocational education need to be made

available.

A legislative proposal submitted by the government to the Parliament in 1997

addresses these points, integrating them into a major transformation of the cycles which

presently form the structure of the school system. The text passed by one house of the

Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, but still under scrutiny by the Senate as of the

autumn of 1999, unifies elementary and lower secondary schools in a seven-year cycle

(scuola di base), and thus sets the five-year secondary school ending at the age of 18; the

final outcome is however difficult to predict.

At the same time, further debate is taking place concerning the weight that each

subject, and topics inside each subject, should have in the curricula. In general education,

the Italian school tradition has always granted a predominant role to the humanities: even

the Liceo Scientifico has Latin at its centre. Modern subjects like sociology or

cinematography, and even economics, are absent. Moreover, in each subject the

contemporary aspects are treated only marginally. However, some changes are occurring:

computer science has been receiving considerable attention and in history the last year of

each cycle has been devoted to the twentieth century. However, there has been strong

dispute even about these limited novelties; the road to real modernization of the Italian

education system is still a long one. There are official proposals to have English as a

compulsory language in all schools, and to have science strongly present for its

fundamental cultural values (and not only as technology, in the technical schools). A real

struggle about these innovations is going on, and the quality of Italian education will

ultimately depend on the results of this struggle.

See also: student movement; universities

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Further reading

Cives, G. (ed.) (1990) La scuola italiana dall’Unità ai nostri giorni (The Italian School from

Unification to the Present), Florence: La Nuova Italia (a general history).

Gattullo, M. and Visalberghi, A. (eds) (1986) La scuola italiana dal 1945 al 1983 (School in Italy

Table 1

Lower secondary schools (since 1962, Scuola Media

Unica)

Upper secondary

schools

Year Number of students Number of students

1945–

508,418 370,575

1950–

718,604 391,987

1955–

905, 768 593, 796

1960–

1,414,177 768,205

1965–

1,795,214 1,258,758

1970–

2,167,539 1,656,117

1975–

2,778,597 2,096,582

1980–

2,884,759 2,423,230

1985–

2,764,635 2,607,749

1990–

2,261,569 2,860,983

1995–

1,901,208 2,693,328

1996–

1,893,476 2,644,291

Source: yearbooks by ISTAT (Istituto nazionale di Statistica)

from 1945 to 1983), Florence: La Nuova Italia (essays on various aspects

of postwar Italian education).

Moscati, R. (1998) ‘The Changing Policies of Education in Italy’, Journal of Modern Italian

Studies 3 (1):55–72.

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Ricuperati, G. (1995) ‘La politica scolastica’ (The Politics of the School), in Storia dell’Italia

repubblicana (History of Republican Italy), vol. II, La trasformazione dell’ Italia: sviluppo e

squilibri (The Transformation of Italy: Developments and Lack of Balance), Turin: Einaudi

(education policies in postwar Italy).

Soldani, S. and Turi, G. (eds) (1993) Fare gli Italiani. Scuola e cultura nell’Italia contemporanea

(Creating Italians: School and Culture in Contemporary Italy), Bologna: Il Mulino, 2 vols

(essays about education and culture in Italy 1920–90).

Visalberghi, A. (1994) ‘Italy: a system of education’, in The International Encyclopedia of

Education, 2nd edn, Oxford: Pergamon, vol. 5, 302836.

GIUNIO LUZZATTO

Einaudi

Founded in 1933 by Giulio Einaudi, son of the senator Luigi Einaudi, this publishing

house soon became the most prestigious in Italy. Giulio Einaudi’s first collaborators

included Leone Ginzburg, and the initial anti-fascist leanings bore fruit after the war

when Pavese, Vittorini and Calvino worked with Einaudi to open Italian culture to the

latest international developments. Il Politecnico, which led the way in translating

American and English novels banned under Fascism, was published by Einaudi, whose

subsequent list of writers reads like a who’s who of Italian literary talent: Beppe

Fenoglio, Lalla Romano, Carlo Cassola, Leonardo Sciascia, Italo Calvino and Natalia

Ginzburg. It also played a major role in introducing new currents in Marxism, such as

Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. However by the end of the 1970s Einaudi was in

serious financial trouble, and even Calvino moved to Adelphi shortly before his death. In

1989 Einaudi was taken over by Elemond, part of the Berlusconi-controlled Mondadori

group, and faced the difficult task of maintaining an authoritative name and addressing

new emergent readerships.

Further reading

Cinquant’anni di un editore. Le edizioni Einaudi negli anni 1933–1983 (Fifty Years of a Publisher:

Einaudi Publications in the Years 1933–1983) (1983), Turin: Einaudi.

ROBERT LUMLEY

electoral systems

Since 1861, Italy has experimented with many variations on both types of electoral

system—plurality and proportional representation—in the hope of solving political

problems. Their history falls into five periods. Between 1861 and 1919, variations on the

Encyclopedia of contemporary italian culture 276

plurality system—giving victory to candidates with 50 per cent plus one of votes cast—

were tried. In 1919 proportional representation (PR)—matching party representation in

Parliament to the percentage of votes received—was introduced. In 1923 this system was

greatly modified by the Fascist Party to reward the most successful party, provided it

gained at least one-quarter of valid votes. After 1946 a particularly pure form of PR was

established for most levels of election in order to provide the fairest system for a deeply

divided society. Finally, between 1991 and 1995 widespread disillusion with the apparent

consequences of PR led to its replacement everywhere by variations on the plurality

system which nonetheless retained a PR component. The full ‘electoral system’ also

contains, inter alia, the rules which regulate the funding and activities permitted to

parties during election campaigns (Fusaro, 1995): here, too, major changes were made in

the 1990s as the Mani pulite (Clean Hands) investigations revealed the extent of political

corruption, and the successful entry into politics of the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi

made the issue of fair access to the press and television during election campaigns a

central concern.

The pre-1991 electoral system and the need for reform

The postwar PR system for national elections established multi-member constituencies,

preferential voting for up to four candidates from party lists, and a very low threshold for

party representation in Parliament. Even small parties were therefore assured of

representation and bargaining power, and no party was likely to win an outright majority.

Governments thus came to consist of unstable multi-party coalitions. In 1953 the DC

tried to make governments stronger, and improve its own position, by the Legge Truffa

(Swindle Law) which assigned two-thirds of seats in Parliament to the party or party

alliance that had received 50 per cent plus one of votes cast. In the ensuing election,

however, the DC-led list narrowly failed to reach the necessary threshold and the law,

strongly opposed by the PCI and PSI, was repealed. PR was subsequently extended to

municipal elections in all towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants (from 1964), regional

elections (from 1970) and European Parliament elections (from 1979), reproducing at

every level many of the features of weak central government and creating popular

resentment by placing ever more power in the hands of the political parties. Multiple

preference voting enabled local political bosses to determine the winning combinations of

candidates, and factiondriven party leaders, not policy-scrutinising electors, made and

unmade governments. How much blame for the associated clientelism and corruption

(see Tangentopoli) of the postwar political system should actually be attributed to the

electoral rules rather than political culture, party organization or institutions poorly

designed to cope with rapid social and economic change remains controversial. However,

since electoral systems can be altered more easily than culture or institutions, reform

began there.

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The reforms of 1991–5 and their consequences

In 1991, after years of inconclusive Parliamentary discussion, renegade MPs led by

Mario Segni from the DC harnessed popular pressure for political change by organising a

referendum to reduce preference choices. Overwhelming success encouraged bolder

initiatives. In 1993 a further referendum established a plurality system for the election of

the Senate, which in turn forced change to the PR rules for the Chamber of Deputies in

order to avoid the possibility of different rules producing different political majorities in

the two branches of Parliament. The resulting Mixed Member Proportional System

(MMPS) provided for the election of three-quarters of MPs by plurality voting and one-

quarter by PR, ostensibly retained to protect minority voices. Also in 1993, a plurality

system with direct election of mayors was introduced for municipal elections, and a new

mix of plurality and PR was later created for regional elections. By 1995 seven different

systems for elections, ranging from neighbourhood to European levels, were in use.

High expectations accompanied the shift from PR to plurality voting. Party

identification would matter less to candidates than individual reputation; electoral

alliances between parties would give voters a direct choice between alternative

governments; new composite parties would emerge from the alliances, eliminating

coalitions and guaranteeing government stability (Gambetta and Warner, 1996). Such

hopes were not immediately realized. The complexity of the rules for aggregating votes

made it difficult for electors to predict the consequences of their choices and thus reduced

the desired transparency of the electoral process. Small parties, protected by the partial

retention of PR, refused to dissolve into more inclusive groupings. Furthermore, the first

post-reform Berlusconi government, elected in 1994, had an even shorter life than most

of its PR-based predecessors and, like many of them, was forced out of office by the

defection of a coalition member rather than by popular vote. The failure of the new

electoral system to deliver fundamental change by itself should have come as no surprise.

Under the plurality system of 1861–1919, fifty-two governments had held office with an

average life of thirteen months, only a marginally better record than the forty-nine

governments with an average twelve-month life under PR between 1946 and 1994. By

the late 1990s, therefore, reform of the recently reformed electoral system was already

under Parliamentary consideration.

Further reading

D’Alimonte, R. and Bartolini, S. (1997) ‘“Electoral Transition” and Party System Change in Italy’,

West European Politics 20 (1):110–34 (how electoral reform influenced the Italian party system

in the 1990s).

Donovan, M. (1995) ‘The Referendum and the Transformation of the Party System’, Modern Italy

1 (1):53–69 (the context for the 1991 referendum).

Fusaro, C. (1995) Le regole della transizione (The Rules of the Transition), Bologna: Il Mulino

(detailed account of Italy’s twentieth-century electoral systems).

Gambetta, D. and Warner, S. (1996) ‘The Rhetoric of Reform Revealed (or: If You Bite the Ballot,

It May Bite Back)’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 1 (3):357–76 (review of the aims and

outcomes of the 1993 electoral reform).

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Hine, D. (1993) Governing Italy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (the structure and working of the

Italian political system until 1991).

Parker, S. (1996) ‘Electoral Reform and Political Change, 1991–1994’, in S. Gundle and S. Parker

(eds), The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi, London:

Routledge.

Sani, G. and Radaelli, C. (1992) ‘Preference Voting: Before and After the 1991 Referendum’, Il

Politico 57 (2):193–203.

DAVID MOSS

emigration

Emigration is one of the great themes of the first century of national Italian history after

1860. Already before 1914 Italians had moved in great numbers, mostly to North and

South America but also to many other parts of the world. The Fascist regime, however,

restricted emigration on both opportunist and ideological grounds and, on one occasion,

boasted that it had removed the word ‘emigration’ from Italian vocabularies. However, as

soon as the Second World War was over, emigration resumed in a way which bore strong

similarities to the situation in Liberal Italy, except that entry to the USA had by now

become difficult. For twenty years after the war the United States preserved most of the

restrictions which it had originally applied against Italian immigration in 1921 and 1924,

although it did make some exceptions for migrants from Trieste and the border territories

lost to communist Yugoslavia as a result of the war. In the three decades after 1945, only

15,000 immigrants entered the USA each year.

Given these restrictions, at first Argentina became the most favoured destination for

Italian migrants after 1945: in 1949, almost 100,000 Italians flocked there. But in the

1950s and 1960s, Canada and Australia, in the past relatively minor sites of Italian

immigration, also attracted tens of thousands of immigrants. However, extra-continental

emigration was rapidly supplanted by migration to Western Europe, where the long

postwar economic boom had begun. The peak year for European migration was 1961

when almost 330,000 Italians emigrated, more than 140,000 to Switzerland and 114,000

to West Germany.

At the same time, a huge migration process was occurring within Italy itself as

workers, especially from the South, moved to the industrial centres of the North. Indeed

Italy’s own economy began growing at such a rate that emigration outside the national

borders, first to overseas countries and then to Europe itself, soon dwindled to a trickle.

In 1952, 17,000 had left for Brazil, but in 1964 there were only 233; Canada was the

choice for 28,000 emigrants in 1958, but only 3,600 went there in 1976. In that year, even

the United States received only 6,000 Italian immigrants. The number going to

Switzerland reached its maximum in 1962 at 143,000; by 1975 only 30,000 went there.

Indeed, from the mid-1970s Italy became a country both of return migration and of active

immigration, a situation that was to continue throughout the 1990s. Nonetheless, by this

time millions of people of Italian origin were residing outside the borders of the nation

state.

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An appropriate policy towards these emigrants has remained a matter of debate in Italy

itself. In the period of mass departure up to the mid-1960s, the parties of both the far Left

and the Right tended to object to emigration, while the parties of the centre, namely those

which were governing Italy, tended to favour it. For the PCI, migration was the

‘international capitalist exploitation of the subaltern classes’. The neo-fascists of the MSI

continued to inveigh against what they perceived as the loss of Italian ‘blood’ and

increased their complaints about the surrender of the East African colonies which had

been one of the results of Italy’s defeat in the Second World War. The Christian

Democrats (see DC) and their allies, by contrast, regarded emigration as a ‘safety valve’,

a hard necessity which would bring material benefit both to the emigrants themselves and

to Italy as a country burdened with excess population.

These political differences in turn favoured regional distinctions in the pattern of

emigration. Calabria, Sicily, Campania and the Veneto (this last not yet having

experienced its eventual extraordinary economic development), all ‘white’, socially

conservative and politically Christian Democrat regions, became (or remained) the

classic sites of exodus of postwar emigration. By contrast, ‘red’ regions such as the

Emilia-Romagna, Umbria and Tuscany, experienced very little emigration. Thus 67,000

left the area around Naples in 1961, while only 8,800 moved out of the Emilia-Romagna.

Men were still much more likely to emigrate than women. In the decade from 1956 to

1965, for example, an average of 240,000 men left each year, as against 77,000 women.

This pattern did begin to vary in countries like Australia and Canada, where the

motivation to increase the population was as great as the need for economic development

and policies of family reunion gradually increased female immigration.

Nonetheless, migration remained what it had always been for most emigrants, a matter

of temporary sojourn. The overwhelming majority first defined themselves as ‘birds of

passage’ and envisaged an early return to Italy, or rather, to their village, town or city of

origin. Vast numbers did indeed return. From 1955 to 1975, more than 140,000 emigrants

repatriated each year and at least one-third of those who had departed to continents

beyond Europe now returned. By the 1970s Italy was regularly receiving more returnees

from such countries than the number of migrants it was sending out.

The most vexed question about the emigrant experience, wherever it occurred, was the

extent to which the emigrants remained, or became, ‘Italian’. In the first decades after

1945, most countries outside Europe accepted immigrants on the condition that they

would ‘assimilate’, that is, they would abandon their ‘old ways’ in order to adopt the

national characteristics of their ‘new world’. In the ‘melting pot’ of their new life, they

would shed their Italian-ness. Within Europe, by contrast, \ immigrants were usually

received as ‘guest workers’, obliged to fulfil a work contract and not envisaged as ever

acquiring full citizenship. Germany and Switzerland were notably rigorous in denying

their immigrants such basic rights as the vote. Quite often immigrants were also not given

access to much welfare, and local unions typically did little for them, whether out of

racial prejudice or a fear that the guest workers were, as leftist theory held, the playthings

of a ruthless international capitalism.

Gradually, however, it became clear that planners of all types—planning had seemed

another of the undisputedly good results of the Second World War—were not always

achieving what they had initially predicted, and that migrants were an evident example of

human beings who stubbornly took agency for their own lives in ways that neither

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