days when a radical fascism which still evoked the social policies enunciated, if not
carried through, in the Salò Republic (1943–5) had as its spokesperson, Giorgio
Almirante (d. 1988). In 1950, however, the party settled down under the moderate
secretariat of Augusto De Marsanich, for whom fascism meant a general authoritarianism
which could associate the MSI with the more conservative elements of the Christian
Democrat Republic. Radical fascism found its durable champion in Pino Rauti who,
typically, proclaimed that fascism stood for a revolutionary third way, separate from both
capitalism and socialism, systems which, in Rauti’s eyes, were incompatible with the best
side of national life. From 1950, Rauti headed an extra-parliamentary group called Ordine
Nuovo (New Order) and drew intellectual sustenance from the international far Right,
praising Nazism and the cloudy ideas of Romanian fascist C.Z. Codreanu (whose battle
cry had been ‘Long live death!’), as well as the less revolutionary and more straight-
forwardly authoritarian regimes of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal.
In 1954 Michelini was returned as MSI secretary and favoured, at least in the public
arena, the non-revolutionary aspects of fascism. He died in 1969, to be replaced by
Giorgio Almirante, who although seeming more radical (Rauti then re-joined the party),
soon pursued similar compromise policies. After 1987, when Almirante himself retired,
the story repeated itself again and, in a leadership battle, the moderate Gianfranco Fini
overcame Rauti. In 1994–5 Fini took the neo-fascists into coalition with Silvio
Berlusconi, bringing fascists into Italian government for the first time in fifty years. Fini
now explained that he stood for a ‘post-fascism’, of uncertain character. In 1995 he
dissolved the MSI into a new grouping called Alleanza Nazionale (AN; see National
Alliance). For the 1996 elections the AN joined Berlusconi’s losing Polo della Liberia
centre—right coalition. It was still challenged by a recalcitrant rump, the ‘MSI Fiamma’
led by Rauti. Such recalcitrance is not surprising given that fascism, an ideology
committed to a powerful state and to a version of welfare, is doubtfully compatible with
contemporary conservatism’s free market economics. Moreover, the South, which with
its system of patron-client networks (see clientelism) and its widespread ‘corruption’ has
provided the main pool of neo-fascist votes, is scarcely a society to be endorsed by a
literal follower of Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman.
The formal political activities of the neo-fascists are, however, only part of their
history, though the most visible and the best documented part. In many senses, the MSI
was merely the public and respectable face of believers in an ideology committed to
terrorism, murder and their own version of revolution. Even in the era of the Red
Brigades, a tradition of right-wing action flourished, though fascists preferred the
indiscriminate effect of a bomb to the more targeted killing practised by leftist terrorists.
The bombs placed in the Piazza Fontana in Milan in December 1969, in the Piazza della
Loggia in Brescia in May 1974, on the ‘Italicus’ express (August 1974) and on another
train stopped at Bologna station in August 1980, and further incidents (notably the riots
in Reggio Calabria during the summer and autumn of 1970), ensured that neo-fascist
terror took a terrible toll.
The intention behind such acts was to dismay fascism’s opponents and critics, and to
prompt some sort of armed intervention from fascism’s friends against the ambiguities
and confusions of the existing political order. This last hope was the greater because
pockets of a residual sympathy for some variety of fascism survived in many sections of
the ruling elite. Italy’s multiple secret services, despite their constant internecine warfare,
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