Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1S07]
COLLUSION
BETWEEN"
THE
TWO
EMPEKORS.
245
as
protector
of the
republic
of the seven
united
islands to
Napoleon,
and
the latter
was
busy
making
preparations
thence
to
extend his
operations
and his dominion farther
to
the east.
Marmont,
who administered
the
province
of
Dalmatia,
re-
ceived
orders to
fortify
Ragusa
more
strongly,
and
to make
a
report
on the
best
plan
to be
adopted
in case it should
be
desirable
to send an
army
quickly
from
Corfu,
through
Albania,
Macedonia,
and Thrace.
The
Russians continued
to be
quiet
observers of all
this,
and
in the
mean
time made
firm their
footing
in the
provinces
on
the
Danube.
They
made
a
pretence
of the
conduct
of
the Turks
on the
occupa-
tion
of
Galatz,
and their ill-treatment
of the
inhabitants
of
Moldavia,
for not
fulfilling
the
agreement
entered
into
at
Slobozia.
The
Russian
troops,
who,
according
to
the terms
of
the
treaty,
were
already retiring,
received
contrary
orders
;
and
the
Turks,
again
driven
out of
the two
provinces,
occu-
pied
Galatz
anew.
The
conduct of the
negotiation
respecting
the division
of
the
Turkish
booty,
was
committed
to the
chief of
Napoleon's
secret
police,
who had
been
actively
engaged
in the murder
of the
due
d'Enghien.
He now held
a
princely
rank as
the
duke of
Rovigo,
and
was sent to
Petersburg
with this
and
similar
commissions.
In
the Russian
capital
the
emperor
Alexander and the
duke acted
as
rivals
in the
art of dissimu-
lation
;
the
emperor
loaded him with civilities
of
all
kinds,
as
some
compensation
for the
coolness
and
contempt
with
which
he was at
first
treated,
to a
surprising
extent,
by
the
empress-mother
and the
Russian
nobility.
He
was,
indeed,
soon
consoled,
for the
slaves
of
the czar were as
zealous in
showing respect
in
the
presence
of
their
master,
as
they
were
gross
in their
insolence when not under his
observation.
The
accounts
which
Savary
gives
us
of the
political
principles
of the
pious emperor
and his
chancellor,
and their
complete
agreement
with
Napoleon's
morality
and
his
own,
would bo
quite
incredible to
us,
did lie
not
literally quote
their words.
Savory's
secret
report
to
the
emperor Napoleon, partly
written in
the form
of
a
dialogue,
is to be
found
among
the
fragments
of
Napoleon's
imprinted
correspondence.
A
con-
tempt
for
public
agreements,
and the
plunder
of
Sweden,
even
before
the
declaration
of
war,
astonish
us
less than
Roinanzof's
audacious
contempt
of
the
opinion
of
all
Europe
;
216
HISTORY OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LTIII.
he
thought
it
not
worth a
moment's
consideration;*
and
this
was
quite
in
accordance
with
the
language
held
by
his
master
in
speaking
on
the
subject
of
Turkey,
t
Thibaudeau
has
given
so
correct an
opinion
of
both the
emperors
—
of the
nature of
their
consultations
—
of
Savary
and
Eomanzof,
that
we
cannot do
better
than
refer the reader
to
the
words
of
that
writer.
J
Turkey
would
at that time
undoubtedly
have
been
par-
titioned,
had
Austria been
willing
to
follow the
numerous
gentle
hints
to
join
the alliance
of the
emperors,
who
imagined
themselves able to make
their
will
the
right
and
law
of all
nations
;
or
if
Napoleon
had
not
found it
incon-
sistent
with
his
plans
to
bring
on
at
an
unfavourable
moment
*
"
L'Europe
ne
dira rien.
Qu'est
l'Europe
?
Qu'est
elle,
si
ce n'est
entre vous
et
nous?"
f
For
Savary's
report
to the
emperor,
see
"
Correspondence
inedite
de
Napoleon
Bonaparte,"
&c.,
vol.
vii.
pp.
364-384. In
page
375
it
proceeds
as
follows:
"Ala lecture
de
cette derniere
replique
de
ma
part,
l'empereur
Alexandre se
prit
a
rire et me dit:
Ma
foi,
tout ce
que
l'empereur
voudra.
Je
compte uniquement
sur lui.
Je vous
dirai
meme,
que,
dans
nos conversations de
Tilsit,
il m'a
souvent
dit,
qu'il
ne
tenait
pas
a
l'evacuation de la
Moldavie et de la
Wallachie,
qu'on
la
trainerait
en
longueur pour
se
dispenser,
et
qu'
il
n'
etait
pas
possible
de
souffrir
phis
longtemps
les
Turcs
en
Europe,
il
me laissait
meme entrevoir le
projet
tie les
jeter
en
Asie
•
ce n'est
qu'ensuite quil
est
revenu
a
leur
laisser
Con-
stantinople
et
quclques
provinces
environnantes."
%
Thibaudeau,
"
Empire,"
vol. iii.
p.
222.
"
Cette affaire
fut traite'e
verbalement
dans
des entretiens de
Savary
avec
Alexandre,
et
ensuite
avec
le
ministre Romanzow. Mettant
de coli
toute
finesse diplomatique,
on
s'expliqne
franchement
comme
deux
chefs
de
bande sur un
partage
de
butin.
Alexandre
disait
qu'a
Tilsit
Napoleon
lui
ayant promis
les
prin-
cipautes,
il
reclamait l'effet de
cette
promesse,
parce qu'il
valait
mieux
les
garder
pendant
qu'on y etait,
que
de les
e'vacuer
pour y
revenir.
II
s'e'tait
deja.
assez
depopularise'
aux
yeux
de
sa nation
en declarant
la
guerre
a
l'Angleterre
et a la
Suede;
il fallait du
moins
qu'il
put
lui
pre'-
senter
les
principaute's
comme
compensation.
II
s'agissait,
non de
chicaner,
mats
de
s'obliger
a
l'envi l'un
l'autre.
On
pouvait
aider
heaucoup
Napoleon,
on
le
voulait,
il
serait
content,
toujours
content.
S'inquieterait-on
de
l'Europe?
Elle
ne dirait
rien.
Qu'etait l'Europe?
Ou etait
elle? si
ce n'e'tait
entre
la
Kussie et la
France?
La
logique
de
Savary
e'tait faible
contre
ees
arguments;
il ne dit
ni oui ni
non.
Toute
l'annee se
passa
a
disputer
sur
le lieu
ou se tiendraient
les
ne-
gociations;
la
Russie
les
voulait
en
Moldavie,
Napole'on
a
Paris."
Compare
with this
Bignon's
miserable
trash in
vol. vii.
ch. lxxiv.
of his
work.
A.D.
1808]
AFFAIES
OF TUEKET. 247
a new war
with
Austria,
which
he
clearly
foresaw in 1808.
The
Eussians,
in
the
mean
time,
remained,
throughout
the
whole
of
the
year
1808,
in
quiet
possession
of
the
provinces
which
had heen
previously
evacuated
by
them,
and ruled
not
only
in
them,
but
extended
their dominion as
far as
Bel-
grade,
for the new
prince
of Servia
was likewise under
Russian
protection.
The
army
under the
command of
the
grand
vizier,
which
lay
at
Adrianople
during
the winter of 1807-
1808, dwindled,
during
the
continuance
of the truce of
Slobozia,
to a few thousand
men,
because,
according
to
ancient
custom,
the Janissaries
returned to
their
homes
in
winter;
it
again
increased,
however,
in the
beginning
of
summer.
Bairactar's
army,
which
was
organised
on
the
new
European principle,
was
computed
at from
twenty
to
thirty
thousand men
;
it
remained
on
the Danube
till its
leader,
at
length,
resolved
to
put
an end
to the
anarchy pre-
vailing
in
Constantinople.
He
deposed
Mustapha
IV.,
who
supported
the
faction of
the
Janissaries,
and
placed
his
brother,
Mahmoud,
on the
throne.
Bairactar
perished,
however,
in an
insurrection
(Nov. 14),
and
Mahmoud, too,
would have
been
murdered,
had he not
been the
last
scion
of the
imperial family.
But he Avas
compelled
entirely
to
change
his
ministry,
and
to
resign
the
government
into the
hands
of those who
enjoyed
the favour
of the ulemas and
the
Janissaries.
During
the
disturbances
in the
internal affairs
of
the
Turkish
empire,
the
foreign
relations continued
the
same as
they
were
in the
year
1S07,
immediately
after the
truce of
Slobozia.
When
Napoleon's
plan
of
removing
the
nego-
tiations
respecting
a
peace
between
the
Eussians and the
Turks
to Paris
failed
of
success,
he found
it
advisable,
in
consequence
of an
impending
Avar
with
Austria,
to
give
the
Turks
into
the
hands
of the Eussians. One of the chief
causes
of
the
Avar
between France
and
Austria in 1809
was
the close
union
between
the
latter
power
and
England
in
reference to
Turkish
affairs,
which
appeared
in
the
co-opera-
tion of
lord
Paget
and
baron
von
Stunner,
the
English
and Austrian
ambassadors
in
Constantinople.
It
was
the
Austrians
Avho mediated
the
peace
between
England
and
the
Porte of
the
5th of
January,
1809,
after
the conclusion
of
24S
HISTORY
OF RUSSIA.
[CH.
LIX.
which
the Turks refused
to
cede Moldavia and
Vallachia
to
the
Russians,
at
the
congress
of
Yassy,
as
they
had
formerly
done
at
Bucharest.
This
led to a
new
war,
of
which
we
shall
have to
speak
hereafter.
CHAPTEE
LIX.
CONGRESS
OF
ERFURT
INCIPIENT
ENMITY. BETWEEN
NAPO-
LEON AND ALEXANDER
CAMPAIGN OF
WAGRAM WAR
WITH
TURKEY,
1809-11
—
TREATY OF
BUCHAREST.
In
consequence
of
the
complete stoppage
of
trade
which
followed
the declaration of war
in
1S07,
Russia
suffered much
more
severely
than
England,*
and the
Russian
magnates,
supported by
the aversion of the
emperor's
mother to
Napo-
leon,
were
very
far
from
showing
that
good-will
to the French
which
their
emperor
manifested for
Napoleon
and his
repre-
sentatives. This was soon
experienced
by
Savary,
duke
of
Rovigo,
who,
though
overloaded with
marks of
politeness
by
the
emperor,
in
reality
proved
unable
to make
any way
at
the court of St.
Petersburg.
Caulaincourt,
duke of
Vicenza,
was afterwards deceived for some
years
by
appearances,
and
by
Alexander's
masterly
art of
dissimulation
;
but
Napoleon
soon
came to
experience
in
Spain
that the
personal proofs
of
friendship
exhibited
by
the
emperor
were
by
no
means
always
in
accordance
with
the
Russian
policy.
The
emperor
Alexander
himself,
for
example,
on the
urgent
request
of
Caulaincourt,
acknowledged Joseph
Bonaparte
as
king
of
Spain;
whilst
Strogonof,
the Russian ambassador
in
Madrid,
alleged
that
he had no instructions to that
effect,
and
corresponded
with
the
insurgents.
In
the
same
way,
admiral
Siniavin,
who,
on
the
breaking
out
of
war
with
England,
had taken
refuge
in
Lisbon with nine
ships
of the line
and
a
frigate,
not
only
refused
to
render
any
assistance
to
marshal
Junot,
who was
threatened
in
that
city
by
the
English,
but
even
to
make
a
demonstration
as if
he
were
prepared
to assist
him. The
manner
in which he
afterwards
capitulated,
on
the
3rd
of
*
Russian
exports
this
year
amounted
to about
2,615,147
rubles;
and
its
imports
to about
10,672,793
rubles.
A.D.
180S]
NAPOLEON
AND ALEXANDER.
249
September,
1808,
to admiral
Cotton,
who caused
his
ships
to
be
taken
to
England,
might
indicate
a
very
different
dispo-
sition,
especially
as
the
ten
ships
were afterwards
given
back.
There
was,
indeed,
no
want
of
interchange
of civilities
between
the two
emperors.
"Whoever
compares
the atten-
tions and
marks of
regard
which
have been
recorded as shown
by
the
one
to the
other,
with
the secret
intrigues
which
they
were at
the same
moment
weaving against
each
other
in
Turkey
and
Spain,
and
with
the
open
enmity
which was
shown
as
early
as
1811,
will
learn
from such
a
comparison
what is
the
real worth
of
diplomatic
and
princely
friendships.
The
emperor
of Eussia
made
presents
to
his
imperial
brother
of
vessels and ornaments
of malachite
and
other
precious
stones,
which the latter
exhibited
in
the Salon
du
Paix
in the
Tuileries,
in
order to be
able
to boast
of
the
friendship
of the
emperor
of
Eussia in
presence
of
the circles
of
the
faubourg
St.
Germain.
Busts of
Alexander
were
manufactured
in the
imperial
porcelain
manufactory
at
Sevres,
and were
every-
where
to
be seen
in the
palace
and
rooms
of the
imperial
family.
All
who
had access
to
the
court,
or
wished
to make
themselves
agreeable
to the
emperor,
found it
necessary
to
purchase
these
ornaments,
and
place
them
conspicuously
in
their
houses. The
friendship
was
so
intimate,
that
one of
the
emperor
of
Eussia'
s
adjutants
accompanied
the
emperor
of the
Prench when he went
to
Bayonne
to
set aside the whole
reigning
family
of
Spain.
This
adjutant,
however,
was the
same
Tchernitchef
who was
engaged
in
constantly travelling
backwards and forwards
between
Petersburg
and
Paris,
who
surrounded
Napoleon,
in
spite
of all
his
police,
with a
net
of
Eussian
espionage,
and bribed
all the
employes
who
were
venal
in order to obtain
papers.
He
intrigued
with
ladies to
elicit
secrets from
them;
and
finally,
in
1812,
he even
pur-
chased
a
copy
of
the
plan
of
operations
for the
war,
when it
was too
late to
change
it.
Napoleon
knew
that
Austria was
thinking
of
taking
advan-
tage
of
the
general
discontent
and the
secret associations
in
Germany
to frustrate
the
plans
of Prance and Eussia
with
respect
to Poland
and
Turkey
;
lie
was,
therefore,
very
de-
sirous of
assuring
himself
once
more
of the Eussian
emperor
before
his
journey
to
Spain.
This
design
was
a cause of
250
HISTOET
OF RUSSIA,
[CH.
LIX.
great anxiety
to the
very
numerous
partisans
of the
English
and
Prussian
policy
at the Russian
court,
when
the
question
was raised of a
conference between the
two
emperors
in
Erfurt. Von
Sladen,
the friend of the
minister
Von
Stein,
therefore
presented
a memorial to
the
emperor
of
Russia,
shortly
before
his
departure
to
Erfurt on the
7th of
Sep-
tember,
1808,
in
which Alexander was
forewarned of
all
that
would take
place
there. Erom this
it
may
be seen that the
emperor
of Russia was
continually
receiving
secret counsel
and
warning
from
the enemies of
the
French,
and
that he
played
his
part
in Erfurt
more
ably
than
Napoleon,
from
whom he
separated,
as even the French
writers
report,
with
all
the
outward
signs
of
indescribable
friendship
and
esteem,
but
inwardly
full
of distrust.
Von Sladen
says
very
freely
to
the
emperor,
that
he
had
given
him
the advice laid down
in his
memorial,
"
in
order that he
might
see
through
the
sophisms,
falsehoods,
and
deceptions
which
were
prepared
for
him
by Napoleon,
and
awaited him in
Erfurt."
On his
way
to
the
congress,
the
emperor
visited the
king
and
queen
of Prussia in
Konigsberg,
and
arrived
on
the 26th
of
September
in
Weimar,
where his brother
Constantine
had
been
staying
since
the
24th. On the
27th
Napoleon
entered
Erfurt,
and
at one
o'clock drove out a distance
of several
miles
from
the
town to meet
the
emperor
of
Russia,
who was
coming
from
Weimar.
Our
modest
object
does
not
permit
us
to
incorporate
in our
prose
the
poetry
of
the
subsequent
festivities,
nor
in
glowing language
to
extol the
skill
displayed
by
the masters of the ceremonies. That
splendour
enough
was
exhibited
in Erfurt
may
be
sufficiently
gathered
from the
fact,
that the four
vassal-kings
of the
Confederation
of
the
Rhine,
thirty-four
princes,
twenty-four
ministers
of
state,
and
thirty
generals,
were
by express
command to summon
up
for
the
•
occasion
everything
which
imagination
could
suggest
in
the
way
of
courtly splendour
and
extravagance.
Talma
and
the
Parisian
company
of actors had
been sent
to
Erfurt,
to
act,
as
Napoleon
said,
before
a
pit
of
kings.
Two arm-
chairs
were
placed
for
the
two
emperors,
whilst
the other
rulers
sat
behind
them
on common chairs. We
know
not
what
truth
there
was
in the
story,
which
was
at that
time
in
every
mouth,
and
related in all
the
French
works
written
for
effect,
that
the
emperor
Alexander,
whilst
Talma
A.D.
1808]
CONGEESS
OF
EEEUET.
251
was
being
applauded
on the
stage, played
his
own
part
with
Napoleon
in the
pit
in
quite
as
masterly
a
manner.
The
latter,
amidst immense
applause, pronounced
the
following
line
:
"
L'amitie
d'un
grand
homme est
un bienfait des
dieux
;"
when the
emperor
seized
Napoleon's
hand,
made
a
profound
bow,
and
feelingly
exclaimed
:
"
That
I
hate nevee moee
TEULY
EELT TIIAH AT THE PEESENT
MOMENT."
The
festivi-
ties continued from the 27th
of
September
till
the 14th
of
October,
and
furnished
to. the Germans the most
melancholy
spectacle
of their
princes
and nobles
conducting
themselves
publicly,
not
only
as
slaves
of
Napoleon,
but even
as servants
and
flatterers
of all his
generals
and
courtiers.
In order
to flatter the
emperor
of
Russia,
Napoleon
acted
as if he had
been influenced
by
Alexander's
application
in
favour of Prussia
;
but
in
reality, oppressed
the
king
and his
subjects
afterwards
just
as
before. He
profited
by
Alexander's
admiration and
friendship
to make a show of
his
pretended
willingness
to
conclude
a
peace
with
England.
Though
he
had written three
times
directly
to
the
king
of
England,
and
had
always
been
referred
to
the
minister,
he nevertheless
prevailed
upon
Alexander to unite with him in
signing
another letter
addressed to
king
George.
The result was
such as
might
have been
foreseen
;
the
object,
however,
was
attained
;
the
letters and
answers
were
printed,
and
officially
commented
upon
in the
journals.
The
negotiations
wire
carried on
personally
in Erfurt
between
the two
emperors
themselves,
and
much
was
agreed
upon
which neither
the one nor the
other intended to
observe.
A
written
treaty
of alliance was
besides concluded
by
Romanzof
and
Cnampagny,
which
was
calculated
with
a
view
to a
new Avar
with Austria. The
substance of the
agi'eement
consists
in
a
closer alliance of
the two
powers
against Eng-
land,
and
the cession of
Moldavia and
Vallachia to Russia.
Hitherto
Napoleon
bad
only
been
willing
to concede
this
last
point
on
conditions
which
referred
to
Silesia. In
the
fifth
article
of the
treaty
of
Erfurt,
which
was
kept
strictly
secret,
the two
emperors
agreed
to
conclude a
peace
with
England
on
condition
only
that
that
country
should
acknowledge
-Moldavia and
Vallachia
as a
part
of the
Russian
empire.
Then
252
history
or
Russia,
[en.
eix.
follow
several
articles
on
the
cession
of
those
Turkish
pro-
vinces.
In
the
eleventh
article it
is
stated,
that
further
negotiations
were to
be
carried
on
respecting
a
further
partition.
It was
agreed,
too,
that
the
treaty
was
to be
kept
secret
for ten
years.
Buturlin
boasts,
with
reason,
that
the
emperor
Alexander
in
Erfurt,
by
his
Greco-Sclavonian
arts
of
deception,
gained
a
victory
over
the
Italo-
Gallic
talents
of
Napoleon
; and,
in
fact,
the
very
highest
triumph
is to
outwit
the
deceiver.
Even as
early
as
this
Napoleon
is
said
to
have
thrown
out
the
idea
of
a
marriage
with
Catherine
Paulovna,
Alexander's
sister,
which
inferred,
of
course,
a
previous
separation
from
the
empress
Josephine.
Alexander,
on
his
part,
is
said to
have
raised
difficulties
on
the
question
of
religion,
and
to
have
referred
the
matter to
his
mother,
who
very
speedily
had the
princess
betrothed
to
duke
Peter
of
Oldenburg.
Moreover,
the
reception
of the
duke
of
Oldenburg
into
the
Confedera-
tion
of
the Rhine
was one
of
the
results of
the
meeting
in
Erfurt.
The
war
which
broke
out
in
April,
1809,
between
France
and
Austria
put
the
sincerity
of
the
Eusso-Erench
alliance
to a
practical
test.
Eussia
complied
with
the
letter
of
her
engagements
to the one
belligerent
power
by
declaring
war
against
the
other;
but
prince
Galitzin,
who was
to
have
made
a
powerful
diversion in
Gallicia,
came
so
late
into
the
field,
and
his
movements
were
so
dilatory,
that it
was
evident
he
had no
desire to
contribute
to
the
success
of
his
sove-
reign's
ally.
_
There
was
no
longer
any
show
of
cordiality
in
the
diplomatic
intercourse
between
France
and
Eussia
;
but
both
parties
found
it
convenient
for
the
present
to
dissemble
their
mutual
alienation.
By
the
treaty
of
Schonbrunn,
signed
by
vanquished
Austria
(Oct.
14,
1809),
that
power
ceded,
partly
to France
and
partly
to
the
Confederation of
the
Ehine,
several
towns
in
Germany
and
Italy,
with
their
dependencies ;
she
was
despoiled,
in
favour
of the
duchy
of
"Warsaw,
of
all
"Western
Gallicia
and
the
city
of
Cracow
;
and
surrendered
to
Eussia
a
territory
whose
population
was
estimated at
400,000
souls.
The
emperor
of
Austria,
more-
over,
recognised
the
rights
which
Napoleon arrogated
over
the
monarchies of the
south
of
Europe,
adhered to
his
conti-
A.D.
1810]
WAR WITH
TURKEY.
253
nental
system,
and renounced
all the
countries
comprised
under the
name of
the
Illyrian
Provinces. But the house of
Hapsburg,
true to
the
adage,
Tu,
felix
Austria, nube,
re-
trieved
its fortunes at the
expense
of its
pride,
by bestowing
a
daughter
in
marriage
on the
conqueror.
Immediately
after
Alexander's
return from Erfurt
orders
were
given
to
open
negotiations
with the Turks. The
con-
ference took
place
at
Yassy
;
but it was
immediately
broken
off after the
Russian
plenipotentiaries
had
demanded,
as
preliminary
conditions,
the cession of Moldavia and
Vallachia,
and
the
expulsion
of the British
minister from Constanti-
nople.
Hostilities
were then
resumed. The Eussians were
commanded
by
prince
Prosorofski,
and after his death
by
prince Bagi'ation.
With
the
exception
of
Griurgevo,
all
the
fortresses
attacked
by
them fell into
their
hands,
until
they
encountered
the
army
of the
grand
vizier,
near
Silistria,
and
being
defeated
with a
loss of
10,000
men
(Sept.
26),
were
compelled
to
evacuate
Bulgaria.
The
grand
vizier,
without
taking
advantage
of
his
victory,
retired to winter
quarters.
In
May,
1810,
the
Eussian main
army,
uuder
Kamenskoi,
again
crossed
the
Danube at
Hirsova,
passed
through
the Do-
brudsha,
and marched
straight
against
the Turkish
main
army
to
Shumla
and
Varna. At the
same
time,
the
corps
of
ge-
nerals
Langeron
and Sacken
proceeded
to
blockade
Silistria
and
Eustchuk.
The
Turks could nowhere
keep
the field.
At Kavarna
they
were
routed
;
at
the
storming
of
Bazardjik
they
lost
10,000
men
;
at
the
storming
of
Easgrad
3000.
Silistria was
reduced in seven
days by Langeron.
So
far
everything
was
favourable for the
Eussians.
If
they
had
added
to
their
advantages
the
conquest
of
Eustchuk,
the
passes
of
Tirnova and of
Sophia
towards
Adrianople
would
have
been
open,
the
fortress of Shumla would have
been
avoided,
and
the
main
army
of
the
enemy
would have
been
manoeuvred
out of it.
The
taking
of
Eustchuk,
and above
all the
sparing
of
the
troops,
was
consequently
the next
pro-
blem
for
general
Kamenskoi.
Instead
of
doing
this,
the
Eussians
attempted
to
storm
almost
simultaneously
the for-
tifications
of
Varna,
Shumla,
and
Rustchuk,
were
repulsed
from
these
three
places,
the
defence
of
which
was
conducted
251
HISTOET OF
EUSSIA.
[CH.
LIX.
by
English,
officers,
and
suffered so
enormously,
that the
Turks felt
themselves
strong enough
to come out
from
be-
hind their
entrenchments,
and attack the
Bussian
camp
before
Shumla.
They
failed,
however,
in their
attempt
to
storm
it.
To relieve
Eustchuk,
the
grand
vizier sent
Muctar Pasha
with
picked
troops, by
way
of
Tirnova,
to the
Danube. But
if
the
Turks
with
their
united
forces
were
too weak
to
force
the Russians to
abandon the
entrenchments
before
Shumla,
they
could
certainly
not
expect
with
a
part
of
their
army
to
rout
the
enemy
near
Eustchuk,
where
he stood
with
his
united forces
between their
separate
wings.
Only
in
case
Muctar
Pasha,
who had
increased his forces
to
40,000
men,
entered
Vallachia
at
Turna,
and marched
against
Giurgevo,
could
the
offensive
have a
meaning,
or
any
influence,
upon
the
siege
of
Eustchuk,
because here it met
with
the
weak
point
of the
enemy.
But
to enter
upon
the
offensive
with an
army
in
Vallachia,
whilst
the Eussians stood
before the
fortresses of the
Danube
in
Bulgaria,
never came into the
heads
of the
Turks.
Muctar Pasha
entrenched
himself
at
the mouth
of
the
Yantra to
cover
the
passes
of
Tirnova
and
Sophia.
On the
7th of
September
he was attacked
in
front,
llank,
and
rear,
held
out
with
his best
troops
till
the next
morning,
and then
surrendered with
5000
men,
and all
his
artillery.
After
this Sistovo and
Cladova
capitulated,
and
on
the 27th
September
Eustchuk and
Giurgevo
surrendered.
The road to
Adrianople
was
now
open
for
the
Eussians,
but their
enormous
losses,
caused
by
their own
folly,
would
have
prevented
their
assuming
the
offensive
beyond
the
Balkan for this
year,
even if the
season had not
been
so
far
advanced.
Eeinforcements for the next
year
could
not be
expected,
as
Napoleon
was
preparing
to
attack
Eussia,
and
therefore
they began
to
negotiate.
Another insurrection of
the
Janissaries
interrupted
these
negotiations,
but did not
induce
the
grand
vizier to
profit
by
this
opportunity,
and fall
with his
whole
force
upon
the
Russians,
who,
at this
time,
were scattered
over
the
country
from Widdin
to
Sophia
and
thence
as
far as
Varna.
Not
until
Czerny
George,
in
Fe-
bruary,
1811,
had
placed
the
principality
of
Servia under
the
protection
of
Eussia,
did
the
grand
vizier
awake from
his
apathy
in
Thrace,
and
cross
the
Balkan,
witli
only
15,000
men.
He, however,
proceeded
so
slowly,
that
Ivamenskoi