Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1807]
CAMPAIGN
OF ETLAU
AND
FEIEDLAND. 225
order
;
be was
only
able, bowever,
to
remedy
single
abuses
;
even
Nicholas,
who manifests a
degree
of
severity
from
which
Alexander
sbrank
back,
is
not able
to reach the
source
of
the
evil.
Towards
the end
of
May,
Benningsen thought
his
troops already
sufficiently
reinforced
to make an
attack
upon
the
Trench,
and drive
them
across the
Vistula;
whilst the
com-
bined
army
of
English,
Swedes,
and
Prussians,
were to
make
an
attack from
Pomerania. Tbe
French
army,
lying
from
Dantzig
to
tbe
Narew,
was
brought,
before the
beginning
of
June,
when the
campaign
commenced,
to
150,000
men,
whose
pay
and sustenance
were drawn
from the
requisitions
and
contributions
imposed
on Prussia. In
April,
1807,
the
Prench senate
passed
a
decree
levying
80,000
conscripts,
60,000
of whom were to be
immediately
sent to
the
army
;
and the
Poles,
too,
deceived
by
the
bope
of
the
restoration of
their
nationality,
raised a
body
of between
25,000
and
30,000
men,
among
whom
were
whole
regiments
recruited
by
the
Polish
nobility,
or
formed
exclusively
of nobles who volun-
teered
their
service,
although
Napoleon
limited all the
expec-
tations
of the Poles to
the
country
on
this side
of
the
Vistula.
As
soon
as
Benningsen,
in the
beginning
of
June,
made a
serious movement
in
advance
towards
the
Vistula,
a
series of
murderous
engagements
began,
similar to
those
which
pre-
ceded the battle of
Eylau
;
on the
9tb,
the main
body
of both
armies came in
sight
of
each other at
Heilsberg,
and on
tbe
10th the
French made an
attempt
to drive tbe Russians from
their
position.
The
united
corps
of Soult
and
Lannes,
sup-
ported
by
tbe
cavalry
under
Murat,
made
repeated
attempts
to
force the
Russians to
give
way
;
they,
however,
kept
their
ground,
and
it
was
confidently expected
that the
attempts
of
tbe
French,
which had
failed on the
10th,
would be renewed
on
the 11th.
The
Prench
give
very
good
reasons
why Napo-
leon
had as little
inclination
to
renew the
contest
as
Ben-
ningsen.
We
shall
quote
the words of a writer
of
the
Napoleon
school,
who,
on
this
occasion,
neither
lies
nor
boasts
:
"
Oji
the 11th
the
two armies
were so near
as
to be
within
grape-shot
range,
and it
appeared
as if the
struggle
would
again
commence.
That,
however,
neither of
the
com-
manders
wished.
Benningsen,
weakened
by
a
considerable
loss of
men,
was afraid
that
his
right wing
might
be cut
off
from
Konigsberg,
and he
therefore
retired
from
his fortified
vol.
xi.
q
22G
HISTOBY
OE RUSSIA.
[CH.
LVI.
position
at
Heilsberg
on the
morning
of the
11th."
(He
also
hoped,
by
this
movement,
to form
an earlier
junction
with
the
division sent to
Konigsberg,
under
Labanof,
and
anticipate
the arrival of
Napoleon's
reserves.)
"
Napoleon
had, however,
no reason
to risk
the loss of
so
many
men,
by
an
attempt
to
storm
the fortified
position
of the
Russians,
as
he
was
sure that as soon
as he threatened
Konigsberg
the
Russians would
give up
their
trenches."
Benningsen
afterwards
heard,
at
"Wehlau,
that the
French
had
separated
into two
divisions,
and he
resolved
on
the
13th,
instead of
continuing
his
route
on the farther
side
of the
Alle,
to wheel about before
Wehlau,
and
attack the
French.
By
this
step,
as
all writers
admit,
he
gave
himself
into the
hands of
his
great opponent,
who
never suffered his
enemy
to
commit
a
fault with
impunity.
The
position
taken
up
by
Benninfjsen
was such
as to leave him no alternative
between
victory
and
destruction,
for
he had the
Alle
in his
rear,
and
a
marsh on
one flank.
Napoleon
took
advantage
of
this
mistake,
as usual
;
and the
orders
which he issued
before
the
battle
prove
that he was sure of the
victory.
About
five
o'clock
in the
evening
of
the
14th of
June,
a
battery
of
twenty
guns
gave
the
signal
for the
fight
;
it was
bravely
maintained
on
both
sides,
and
both
armies suffered
great
loss. The
French
accounts
exaggerate,
to a
most
extraordinary
extent,
the
number
of the
Russians
who
were
led into the
battle
of
Friedland,.
as
well as
the
number
of
prisoners
f*
certain
it
is, however,
that
17,000
Russians were either
killed or
wounded.
f
After the battle
of
Friedland,
there
was no
longer any
account to
be taken of
the Prussians
;
and
it
was
a
piece
of
great good
fortune
that such a
sovereign
as Alexander
reigned
*
The statements in
the note
to the
"
Geschiehte des
Kriegs
von
Preussen
und Russland
gegen
Frankreich
in
den
Jahren 1806
and
1807"
(Berlin.
1835), p.
249.
appear
the most
probable:
"At
the recommence-
ment
of
hostilities
the Russian
army
amounted to
75,000
fighting men,
from
which,
if
we
deduct
10,000
previously
lost,
as
well
as the
corps
of
Kamenskoi, only
about
55,000
could have
been
brought
into
the
field
at Friedland."
f
The French
and
the
bulletins,
according
to
their
custom,
add
to
the
17,000
killed
and
wounded,
"and
as many
taken
prisoners,"
when,
in
fact,
no
prisoners
were
taken,
as was
natural,
from the nature and
locality
of
the battle.
A.D.
1807]
CAMPAIGN
OF
EYLATT
AND
FItlEDLAND.
227
in
Russia,
otherwise
Prussia
would have heen
wholly
lost.
Lestocq,
with
his
Prussians,
was
obliged
hastily
to
cross
the
Haaff
to
Memel
;
and their
magazines,
considerable
stores of
powder
and
ammunition,
together
with
100,000
muskets,
which
the
English
had sent
by
sea to
Konigsberg,
fell,
with
the
town,
into
the hands
of the
French.
Benningsen
was not
very
closely
pursued
on
the other side
of the
Alle
;
he
passed
the Niemen on
the
19th,
and
burnt
down the
bridge
behind
him
;
immediately
afterwards,
Bonaparte
arrived
in
Tilsit.
Of
all
the Prussian
fortresses,
Colberg
alone
might
have been
able to
maintain
itself
for some
weeks,
and
G-raudenz
was
saved
merely
by
the
peace.
The
treaty
with
England,
which
the Prussian
minister
signed
in London on the l7th of
June,
and
by
which
1,000,0002.
sterling
was
promised
in
subsidies,
came
too late.
Schladen
informs
us that all those who were about the
king
of Prussia
had
so
completely
lost
courage,
that von
Harden-
berg,
von
Stein,
Schladen
himself,
and
many
others who re-
commended
perseverance,
found none
upon
whom
they
could
reckon. "With
respect
to the
Russians,
he informs us that
there was a
party
who assumed a
threatening
aspect
—
that
the
army
was dissatisfied
with
the war
—
that
the
grand-duke
Constantino
behaved
often
very
rudely
towards
the
Prussians,
and
allowed
himself to
be used as an instrument
for
working
on the
fears of
his brother
Alexander.* On the 7th of
June,
the
emperor
manifested
a
disposition
altogether contrary
to
the
agreements
and
partition-projects
of the convention of
Bartenstein.
He
was dissatisfied
with
England,
and
per-
ceived
that the Austrians
had no
other
object
than to fish
in
troubled
water,
and
he
was,
therefore,
desirous,
as
much
as
possible,
to
withdraw
from
the whole
afiair. He
proposed
*
Premsen,
p.
277. Von
Schladen,
under date
of
the 7th of
June,
observes:
"
People
here
(Tilsit)
remark
;i
surprising
alteration in
the
opinions
of the Kussian
authorities,
and
of all those who have
any
in-
fluence
with the
emperor;
and it is
obvious that
they
wish for a
peace.
It
is a
question
whether
his
imperial
majesty possesses
strength
of
mind
enough
to stand
upright
alone,
in
the midst
of
such
a circle as
that
by
which
he
is
surrounded.
The
emperor
has assured the
mi-
nister,
von
Ilardenberg,
that
he
will
go
for a time to
Wilna,
to
hasten
the arrival of
Russian reinforcements
and
provisions,
but
will
soon be
here
again,
and
that no one
shall
induce him to
depart
from
the
path
which lie has
proposed
to
himself."
Q2
22S
HISTOET
OF EUSSIA.
[CH.
LVII.
a
truce
for
himself,
with
a clause
that
the
Prussians also
should
obtain
a cessation
of
hostilities
;
but
the
Russians and
Prussians
were to
negotiate
each for
themselves
respecting
the
conditions.
Napoleon
having
entertained the
proposal,
Russia
agreed,
that
during
the continuance
of
the
truce,
the
French
should
retain
possession
of the whole of
Poland,
ex-
cept
the circle
of
Bialystock.
The
agreement
was
signed
on
the
21st,
and
a four
weeks'
notice
of the renewal
of
hostilities
was
reserved.
By
the terms
of the truce
granted
to
Prussia,
the
Prench
remained
in
possession
of the whole
kingdom
;
and
the
few fortresses
which
were not
yet
reduced,
were not
to
be
supplied
either
with
new
works, ammunition,
or
provi-
sions.
Bliicher,
who
commanded
the Prussian
auxiliary
forces
in
Pomerania,
was to
leave
the
king
of Sweden to his
fate.
The
peace
was
to
be
negotiated
at
Tilsit,
and for that
purpose
one-half
of
the
town was
to be declared neutral.
CHAPTER
LYII.
TREATY OF
TILSIT
—
CONQUEST
OF
FINLAND.
Napoleon
had a
much
easier
game
to
play
with the em-
peror
Alexander
than with
the
good emperor
Prancis of
Austria.
The former was
an idealist and
mystic,
who idolised
men
and
women,
after his
visionary
fashion,
and afterwards
let
them
fall in the mud
in order to follow
the same course
towards
others,
whom
in their
turn he
neglected
as
quickly
as
their
predecessors.
The
emperor
Prancis
was a
plain
matter-of-fact
man,
and had
neither an
idea nor
a
fancy
;
he
was therefore not to be
taken on
that
side.
Alexander
had
previously
held
the
king
of Prussia
in a sort of
enthusiastic
admiration
as a
pious
and honourable
man
;
he now
exhibited
a
degree
of
veneration,
bordering
on
idolatry,
for
Napoleon,
as a
hero and a ruler. The
first
meeting,
therefore,
of
the
two
emperors,
on
the
raft
constructed
on
the
Niemen for
the
occasion,
was
altogether
calculated
to
produce
a
great
effect
upon
the romantic
disposition
of
the
Russian
emperor
;
we,
however,
leave
to the
French
the rhetorical
and dramatic
details
of
the first
greeting,
and make no
pretension
to
rival
A.D.
1807]
TREATY OF
TILSIT.
229
them
in
depicting
such scenes.
We
are
somewhat
surprised,
indeed,
at
the
great
importance
laid
by
them
on
every
word
spoken
(and
also not
spoken)
by
the
emperor
Alexander,
since
they
themselves
have
repeated
without
end,
that
their
Napoleon
declared
Alexander
to be
as
false as a
Byzantine
Greek.
The
king
of
Prussia
was not
present
at
the first
meeting
on the
25th,
which lasted
some
hours
;
he
was,
how-
ever,
at the
second,
which took
place
on
the
next
day.
The
negotiations
respecting
the
peace
began
on
the
28th,
and the
king
of
Prussia,
during
their
course,
played
merely
a subor-
dinate
part.
The
emperor
of
Bussia,
with
all his
religious
sentimentality,
was as
great
a
stranger
to
the
true
principles
of
morality
as
his
opponent
;
lie suffered
himself to be
won,
by
having
his attention
directed
to
Turkish,
and
especially
to
Swedish
provinces,
almost
indispensable
to
the
safety
of
his
capital,
and consented
to be
enriched,
even
at
the
ex-
pense
of his friend
the
king
of
Prussia.
He
appeared
at
the same
time as
a friend of the
Prussian
royal
family,
and
as a
worshipper
of
Napoleon,
who
had treated
them
with the
greatest cruelty.
The
peace
oi' Tilsit*
was
arranged
on the
special
meetings
between
Alexander
and
Napoleon,
after the
king
of
Prussia
had
retired.
The actual
treaty
was
afterwards
settled
by
Talleyrand,
with
princes
Labanof
and Kurakin.
Talleyrand,
on the other
hand,
dictated,
word
for
word,
the
peace
for
Prussia,
to counts
Kalkreuth and
Golz,
who had
full
powers
to conclude
it.
Besides
the two
patent
treaties,
there
were
secret
articles
added
to that
between
France
and
Bussia,
*
The
treaty
is
given
in
Martens,
vol. iv.
p.
43G
;
but
essential
portions
are
wanting.
Bignon
also denies
the existence
of these
essential
points.
The
author
of
the article
"
Alexandre,"
in
the
"
Biographic
Univcrselle,"
vol.
hi.
(supplement),
alleges
that
he
has
given
them for
the first
time;
hut
they
are
not even
there
in
a
full,
authentic
form.
Schnitzler,
in
the notes
to
his
"
Histoire
intime
de
la
liussie,"
No.
x.
vol. i.
p.
445,
has
reprinted
the
article
from the
' :
Biographic"
Lcfebvre,
in vol. iii.
of
his
"
Histoire
des Cabinets
de
l'Europe,"
quotes
everything
which
was
agreed
on
either
positively
or
contingently
—
even
what
affected
Sicily,
the
partition
of the
Turkish
empire,
and
the
combined
expedition
of
the
Russians
and
French
against
the
English
East
Indies,
but
says
nothing
of
the
quarter
whence
he derived
his
information,
or how
much of
it
was
really
written
down.
230
HISTORY
OF RUSSIA.
[CH.
LTII.
some
of
which,
in
part
verbally
agreed
upon
and
in
part
written,
have been
steadfastly
denied,
and were never
offi-
cially
published.
Most
of
them,
such as the
joint
expedition
to
India,
and the
partition
of
the territories of
powers
not
engaged
in
the
war,
are
so
extravagant,
that we cannot
help
doubting
that such
things
were
even
seriously
meant
;
still,
much
was
done,
and that was
bad
enough.
If
we
might
draw a line of
distinction more
minutely,
in
a case in
which
the
originals
of
the treaties are not before
us,
we
might say
that there
were,
properly speaking,
one
patent,
and
three secret
treaties concluded with
Russia,
which
were,
at
later
periods,
partly acknowledged
and
partly
denied.
"We
shall
proceed
to
give
all that is
known of these secret
agree-
ments,
or
is
given
by
the
director
in the
department
of
foreign
affairs,
who
has written
the
history
of the cabinets of
Eu-
rope,
as the
summary
of the results of the
verbal consulta-
tions
between the
two
emperors.
In
the
patent
treaty,
a
compliment
is
paid
the
emperor
of
Russia
;
Napoleon,
for
his
sake,
agreeing
that Prussia
should
lose
only
some four millions
and a
half
of
subjects,
and
one-
half
its income.
The
city
of
Dantzig,
occupied by
the French
with a
small
army,
and ruled
by
a Trench
governor,
is
de-
clared
to be a free
republic,
and a
territory assigned
it of some
six or
eight
miles
in circumference.
The
king
of
Prussia
shall
allow a
military
road
from
Saxony
to
Warsaw,
and
neither Prussia nor
Saxony
shall
impose
or
collect
any
tolls
on the
Vistula.
The new
republic
of
Dantzig
is to be
placed
under the
protection
of
the
king
of
Saxony
(for
whom
War-
saw
is to be
erected into a
duchy)
and of the
emperor
of the
Prench,
who remains
master of
the
town,
and furnishes
an
army,
whose
commander-in-chief is
to
have
unlimited rule
over
everything.
That
portion
of
Poland which on
the
last
partition
had
fallen to
Prussia,
shall
form the
duchy
of War-
saw,
which
Prance cedes to
the
king
of
Saxony.
Prom the
part
of
Poland, however,
thus wrested
again
from
Prussia,
the district
between the
Bug,
the
Lassassna,
and
the
Bobra,
as well
as
the
districts of
Bialystock,
Bielsk,
and
Debriczyn,
are to be
given
over to
Russia,
which is
thus
to share
in the
spoil
of her
ally.
Oldenburg,
Coburg,
and
Mecklenburg
are
to
be
restored to
their
princes,
with
this reserve
alone,
that
the harbours
in
Oldenburg
and
Mecklenburg
are to re-
A.D.
1S07]
TKEATY
OF
TILSIT. 231
main
in the hands
of the Trench
till
the establishment of
a
general
peace.
The
emperor
Alexander
acknowledges
Louis
Bonaparte
as
king
of
Holland,
and
Joseph Bonaparte
as
king
of
Naples,
the confederation
of the
Rhine,
and the
titles
and
possessions
of the
individual
princes
who
compose
it
;
and
thus
quietly
gives up
Orange,
Fulda, Piedmont,
and
Naples,
and
all
the
demands
which Russia
had made on
behalf of
these
princes
since
1803. Alexander
also
recognises
Napo-
leon's
brother, Jerome,
as
king
of
"Westphalia
—
as
rightful
possessor
of
the
kingdom
hastily
formed
out
of
the
patri-
monial states of German
princes.
Alexander cedes
to
Holland
the
lordship
of
Jeverj
which
his
grandmother,
Ca-
tharine,
as a
princess
of
Zerbst,
had inherited from her
bro-
ther
;
and Holland also receives
East Friesland from Prussia.
In
order to deceive
Austria,
all
sorts of
settlements were
afterwards made in reference to
the
peace
with the
Turks,
as
well
as to Moldavia and Yallackia
;
all
which
were
abolished,
and
declared
null,
by
a secret
treaty agreed
to
at
the same
moment.
The
first
of
the secret treaties
changed
the
simple treaty
of
peace
into an
alliance,
offensive
and
defensive,
according
to
the
conditions of
which
Napoleon gave
up
the Turkish em-
pire,
with the
exception
of
Constantinople*
and
its
neigh-
bourhood,
to the
Russians
;
while
they,
on
their
part,
uncon-
ditionally acknowledged
whatever
Bonaparte
might
choose
further
to
undertake
on the continent.
In another
article,
Alexander
promised
his assistance
against
England,
and
his
*
"
One
day
the
two
emperors,
on their return from a
long
ride,
shut
themselves
up
in
Napoleon's
cabinet,
where there
were
numerous
maps
spread
out.
Napoleon,
apparently
in
brisk
conversation
with
Alex-
ander,
asked M.
Mencval for the
map
of
Turkey, opened
it,
then
re-
newing
the
conversation,
and
placing
his
finger
suddenly
on
Constan-
tinople,
said
several
times,
without
regarding
his
being
heard
by
the
secretary,
in
whom
he
had
perfect
confidence,
'Constantinople!
Con-
stantinople!
never! It is
the
empire
of the world.'
"
—
Thiers'
Hist,
of
the
Consulate,
and
Empire.
Alexander
pressed
hard
to have Constan-
tinople.
Pie could
not
be satisfied '-without the
keys
of his
house,"
the
Dardanelles.
Speaking
of
Alexander at St.
Helena, Napoleon
said,
"
I
[e
coveted
it
(Constantinople)
much,
and would
have
cajoled
me
on the
subject,
but
I
always
turned a deaf ear. That
empire,
im-
paired
as
it
is,
formed
the
point
of
separation;
it
was
the marsh
which
prevented
my
flank from
being
turned. As
to
Greece,
that
is another
affair."
232 HISTORY
OP EUSSIA.
[CH.
LVII.
accession to the
continental
system.
He
consented,
not
only
to close
all his
ports
against
the
English,
and to forbid all
trade,
but also that
Sweden
(whose
destruction was
verbally
agreed
on,
the intention
being
to divide
it
between Russia
and
Denmark)
was
to be
forced to
co-operate,
and close
all
the
ports
of the
Baltic,
or be reduced
by
Avar.
The
second secret treatv
—
the existence of which
Bimon
boldly
denies,
although Savary
appeals
to it in reference to
Spain
and
Portugal,
and
although
the
English
did
so,
in the
manifesto which
they
issued
immediately
after their
expedi-
tion
against
Denmark,
gave
up
Portugal
and
Spain,
Malta,
and the north
coast
of
Africa,
to
Napoleon's arbitrary
dis-
posal.
The
Russians
might,
indeed,
have
very
well sub-
scribed
all
this,
even
if
they
had
been enemies
of
Napoleon,
because
these colossal
plans
were
prodigiously
wild,
and must
have
necessarily
ended in the same manner as the winter
campaign against
Moscow. The
English
applied
a
very
con-
siderable
sum,
as
they
had done once
before,
to
purchase
a
tran-
script
of this secret
treaty
from
the
French
department
of
foreign
affairs.
They
never
published
the
text
of
the
pur-
chased
treaty
;
they
alleged,
however,
that
by
virtue
of
an
article
in
it,
Denmark was to be
compelled
to
give
up
her
fleet to
France,
and was
to
receive
compensation
for
the
loss
by
the
possession
of
the
Hanse
Towns.
In the third
secret
treaty,
the
evacuation of
Cattaro,
and
the
cession of the
republic
of the
Ionian
Islands,
was
pro-
mised
to
France
;
and in
another
article,
a new
signification
was
given
to the
acknowledgment
of
Joseph Bonaparte
as
king
of
Naples.
He was
acknowledged
as
king
of
Naples
and
Sicily
;
and
Ferdinand IV. was
to
be
compensated
for
the
loss
of
Sicily,
by
the
island of
Candia,
the north coast
of
Africa,
and
the Balearic isles
;
that
is,
by possessions
in the
moon.
In other secret
articles,
Napoleon
is said
to have
agreed,
even as his friends
admit,
that
although
the
article of
the secret
treaty,
in reference to the
partition
of
Turkey,
was
not to be
fixed,
on
account of
Austria,
the
emperor
of
the French
was not to
insist
upon
the evacuation
of
Mol-
davia and
Vallachia,
as
settled in
the
public
treaty,
and
not
even
to throw
obstructions
in
the
way
of
any
farther
con-
quests
made
from
the
Turks. In
the
celebrated
conversa-
tion
which
Napoleon
had
in
Bayonne
with canon
Escoiquiz,
A.D.
1S07]
'
TEEATY OE
TILSIT. 233
the
notoriously
knavish mentor
of
Ferdinand VII. of
Spain,
he
alleged
that the
emperor
of
Russia,
at
Tilsit,
had also
ap-
proved
of
the
expulsion
of the
house
of Bourbon from
Spain,
and the
house
of
Braganza
from
Portugal.*
As to
Prussia,
the
main
points
of the
peace
to be concluded with
the
king
were
already
contained
in
the
treaty
with
Russia,
and
only
a few
remaining
points,
which we
shall
presently
mention,
were
to be
added
;
which,
as
Napoleon says,
was
conceded to Prussia
merely
out
of
friendship
to
Russia.
Concerning
the
honour,
or
regard
to common
morality
and
the outward
appearance
of
right,
of
which the two
emperors
gave
a
conspicuous
example
to the whole
world,
on
this
oc-
casion,
a
distinguished
French
diplomatist
pronounces
his
opinion
in terms
even
as
strong
as we
ourselves
would be
disposed
to
use,
judging,
as we
do,
from the
point
of view of
plebeian morality
.f
By
the
peace
with
Prussia,
which was
signed
on
the
9th
of
July,
the
king
received
back
a
kingdom,
reduced
by
one-half,
and
even
the
future
possession
of
this was in
no
way
secured.
Prussia
was
deprived
of
all her
possessions
between
the
Elbe
and the
Rhine,
and,
on the east of the
Elbe,
South
Prussia,
New East
Prussia,
New
West
Prussia,
and
the
circle of
Cotbus,
in
Lusatia.
Out of this
territory,
taken
away
from
*
"
L'empcreur
Alexandre,
a
qui j'ai
fait
part
a
Tilsit
de
mes
projets
sur
l'Espagne, qui
remontent a
cette
e'poque,
les
approuva;
j'ai
recu
sa
parole
d'honneur
qu'il
ne
s'y
opposera pas."
See
Appendix
to l)e
I'radt's
Memoires.
"
Sur la
Revolution
de
l'Espagne."
f
Lefebvre,
"
Histoire des Cabinets
de
l'Europe,"
vol.
iii.
p.
114.
"
Jamais
il
ne
fut
donne aux
hommes
d'assister a un tel
spectacle;
maifl
toute cette
grandeur
ne
nous
eblouit
point.
Jamais
les combi-
naisona
de la force
materielle
ne
preValurent
avec
plus
d'audace sur
les
principes
du
droit
et de
1'equite; jamais
on ne vit des
pouvoirs
hu-
mains
disposer
avec
une
autorite
plus
arbitraire des
destinc'es des
peuples,
violer avec un
plus
effroyable
cynisme
cette morale
vulgaire
qui
defend
de
sacrifier
l'ami
qui
s'est
devouc
a vous
et
qui
a recu vos
serments.
Toute
notre
ame se
rcvolte
a
la vue
de
ces
deux
souverains,
les
plus
puissanta
de ce
monde,
hier
ennemis
acharnea,
allies
aujourd'hui,
donnant
pour
ciment
a
leur
union
l'ingratitude
et la
deloyaute,
se
livrant
iimtuellcinent,
a
L'exatnple
des
triumvirs de
Rome,
les
depouilles
de
leurs
proprcs
allies
que
naguere
ils
avaient
arrachea
a
leur
repos
et
traincs
violemmcnt
ii leur suite
dans
l'arene des combats—
nouvelle
et
terrible
lecoo,
qui
apprend
aux
peuples
'a
quel
prix
s'acbetent
les
con-
quetes
et
la
grandeur.''
231
HISTOEY OF
BITSSIA.
[CH.
LVH.
Prussia,
there
was
erected
the
duchy
of
Warsaw
for the
elector of
Saxony,
elevated to the
rank
of
king
;
and,
not-
withstanding
the
much-lauded
constitution
granted
to
the
duchy,
it
merely
continued an
advanced
posb against
Eussia
and
Austria,
and
was
completely
exhausted
by
dotations and
the
reservation of
domains for
French
soldiers,
courtiers,
and
diplomatists.
In
addition to
the
loss of
territory,
and
enor-
mous
exactions in
money,
other
very
hard
conditions
were
imposed
on
Prussia,
especially
ingratitude
towards
England.
Russia
and
Prance
had
entered into
a
regular
alliance
against
that
power,
and
resolved
to shut all
their
ports
against
her
ships,
and
prevent
trade of all
kinds with
her
: Prussia was
compelled
to do
the same.
They
did not
stop
even
here.
Con-
ditions
were to be
proposed
which
they
knew
England
would
reject
;
and it
was
agreed,
that
if
these conditions
were not
accepted
by
the end
of
November,
war was
to be
declared.
The
king
of
Sweden,
too,
was
to fall a
sacrifice to this alli-
ance.
His
kingdom
was
to be divided
between
Denmark and
Russia,
provided
he did not
join
the alliance
;
and
this,
it
was
well
known
beforehand,
he
would refuse
to do. In all this
the
king
of
Prussia was
compelled
to
concur,
and to
promise
that
he,
too,
would
declare
war,
in
December,
against
Eng-
land.
It
has been
affirmed in a
Russian state
paper
that
the
peace
of
Tilsit was
concluded to
save
the
Prussian
monarchy
;
but if
this was the
only object,
it
is difficult
to
understand
how
the
surest means of
obtaining
it
should
have
been in
Alexander's
personal
aggrandisement.
In
adoptingNapoleon's
continental
system,
and
helping
to
impose
it
on
his
neighbours,
Alexander
overlooked
the
interests of
his own
country.
"
As-
suredly,"
says
Schnitzler,
"he
bought
the
peace
of Tilsit at
a
price
much more
heavy
than would
have
been
paid by
a
disastrous
campaign. Nothing
could
be more
menacing
and
serious
to
Russia
than a
rupture
with
England.
That manu-
facturing
country
is
the
chief market for her raw
materials.
The
Russian
proprietors,
kept continually poor by
their
habits of
pomp
and
ostentation,
are
always
eager
to
sell,
and
cannot at best
find
sufficient market for
their
produce
;
ac-
cordingly,
the
two
countries
are
necessary
the one
to
the
other. The
commerce
established
by
the ordinance
of
nature
is
advantageous
to
England,
but it
is
indispensable
to the Rus-