Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1854]
BALAKLAVA
SEIZED
BY THE ALLIES. 493
wounded
on our
side.
The Eussians' retreat
was covered
by
their
cavalry,
but if
we
had had an
adequate
force we
could
have
captured
many
guns
and
multitudes
of
prisoners."
It
appears
from
papers
found
in Prince Mentchikof's
carriage,
that he had counted
on
holding
his
position
on
the
Alma
for at
least three weeks.
He
had erected scaffolds
from
which his
ladies
might
view
the
military exploits
during
the
period
of obstruction
he had
provided
for
the
invading
force,
but
he was
hurried
away
in
the
midst of a
flying army,
in
little more
than
three
hours.
Without
sufficient
cavalry,
and
having
exhausted
the am-
munition of the
artillery,
the allies
did not
pursue
the
de-
feated foe
;
but
rested for a
couple
of
days,
to
recruit the
able-bodied,
succour the
wounded,
and
bury
the
dead.
Then
they
went forward
towards
Sebastopol.
A
change
now took
place,
as remarkable an incident
as
any
in the
campaign.
Learning
that the
enemy
had established
a work
of some
force on
the
Belbek,
and that
this river could
not
readily
be
rendered a
means of communication
with the
fleet,
and
cal-
culating
that
preparations
would be
made for the defence
of
Sebastopol chiefly
on the north
side,
the commanders re-
solved
to
change
the line of
operations,
to turn the whole
position
of
Sebastopol,
and establish
themselves
at
Balaklava.
After
resting
for a
couple
of
days,
they
started on
the
march,
turned to
the
left
after the first
night's
bivouac,
and struck
across
a
woody country,
in
which
the
troops
had to steer
their
way by
compass
;
regained
an
open
road
from
Bagtche-
3<
rai
bo
Balaklava;
encountered
there at Khutor
Mackenzia
(Mackenzie's
Farm)
a
part
of the Russian
army,
which
fled
in consternation
at
the
unexpected
meeting
;
and
were
in
possession
of
Balaklava on
the
26th
—
within four
days
after
leaving
the
heights
above the
Alma.
Thus an
important
post
was
occupied
without a
blow.
Balaklava
is a close
port,
naturally
cut
by
the
waters
in
the
living
rock
;
so
deep
that
the
bowsprit
of a
ship
at anchor
ran
almost
be
touched
on
shore,
so
strong
that the force
pos-
sessing
it
could
retain
communication with the
sea
in
spite
of
any
enemy.
It is a
proof
of Mentchikofs
want
of
fore-
sight,
or of
his
extreme
weakness after the battle
of the
20th,
that
Balaklava was
left without
effectual defence.
The
change
of
operations
reminds one
of
Nelson's
manoeuvre
at
the
Nile,
494
HISTORY
OE
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXXYI.
in
attacking
the
enemy
on
the shore
side,
where
the
ships
were
logged
with
lumber
and
unprepared
for
action.
By
this
date,
however,
the allies were
destined to
sustain
a
grave
loss,
in
the
departure
of
marshal
St.
Arnaud.
The
French
commander-in-chief
had succeeded in
three
achieve-
ments,
each one of
which
would
be sufficient to
mark the
great
soldier.
He
had
thrown his
forces
into
the
battle on
the
Alma with
all
the
ardour
of
which his
countrymen
are
capable,
but
with
that
perfect
command
which the
great
general
alone retains.
He had succeeded in
exciting
the
soldierly
fire
of
the
French,
and
yet
in
preserving
the
friend-
liest
feelings
towards
their rivals and
allies,
the
English.
He
had succeeded
in
retaining
his
place
on
horseback,
notwith-
standing
mortal
agonies
that would have subdued the
courage,
or at
least the
physical
endurance,
of
any
other man.
Many
can
meet
death,
numbers can sustain torture
;
but the
power
of
holding
up
in action
against
the
depressing
and
despairing
misgivings
of internal
maladies,
is
a
kind of resolution which
nature confers
upon
very
few
indeed,
and
amongst
those
very
few
marshal St.
Arnaud will be ranked as one
of the
most
distinguished.
He was
succeeded
in the command
of
the French
army
by
general
Canrobert,
and died
at sea
on
the 29th.
By
this event
Lord
Raglan
became commander-
in-chief
of the allied forces
in the Crimea.
Had
marshal
St. Arnaud
lived,
it is
hardly
to be doubted
that
he would have
attempted
to take
Sebastopol
by
the
summary
process
of
breaching
and
storming
instead of the
slower
one of
a
regular
siege.
The
former
plan
might
have
been
successful,
for
it is
now
known,
upon
the
authority
of
the Russians
themselves,
that
when
the allies
first
broke
ground
before
the fortress
its
preparations
for resistance
were
very
incomplete.
On
the other
hand,
events
have
too
painfully
demonstrated
that the force with
which the
siege
was
undei
v
taken was
totally
inadequate,
both
in
numbers
and
weight
of
metal.
It was not sufficient to invest
the
place
on
every
side,
or to hinder the
garrison
of one
of the
strongest
fortresses in
the world
from
receiving
unlimited
reinforcements
and
supplies
of
all
kinds.
Hence,
to use
ge-
neral
Peyronnet
Thompson's
homely
but
very apt
illustra-
tion,
the
operations
before
Sebastopol
have
hitherto
been
A.D.
1854]
SIEGE
LAID TO
SEBASTOPOL.
495
like
the
work
of
drawing
a
badger
out
of
one
end
of a
box,
with
an
interminable
series
of
badgers
entering
at the
other end.
The
position
occupied
by
the
English
before
Sebastopol
was
to
the
right
of
the
French,
at a
distance
of six miles
from
their
ships.
They
held
the
summit
of
a
ridge,
whence
at a
long
range
they
could
fire with some
effect
on
the
Russian
outworks
;
but
as
they
descended
the
slope,
their
force
was
broken
in
two or three
parts,
while
they
were
exposed
to
a fire
like
that which
destroyed
so
many
brave
men
at
the
Alma.
The
French,
on the
left,
rested on
Cape
Chersonese,
and
were
Avithin three miles of
their
ships,
in a
position
where,
though
they
might
suffer from
the fire
of the
garrison,
they
were
protected
from
the
attacks
of
the
Russian
army
in the
field.
The attack on
the
place
by
the
land
batteries
and
by
the
ships
began
on the 17th
of
October.
The Russians
had closed
the entrance
to
the harbour
by
sinking
two
ships
of
the line and
two
frigates (they
subse-
quently
sank
all the rest
of
their
fleet),
and the fire of
the
allied
ships
at
long
range
produced
so
very
little
effect,
whilst
the
casualties
sustained
by
them were so
disproportionate
to
the
damage
they
inflicted,
that the
experiment
was
not
re-
peated.
Eight
days
afterwards
the Russians
in
turn became
the
assailants.
A
large
reinforcement
having
been received
under
Liprandi,
that
general
was detached
to
the
Tchernaya
with
some
30,000
troops
to attack
our rear.
The
peculiarity
of
the
position
of
the
allied army
facilitated
his
efforts.
It
has
already
heen
explained
that
Balaklava
is at some
distance
from
the
lines
of
the
besiegers.
The
road
connecting
the two
runs
through
a
gorge
in the
heights
which
constitute the
rear
of
the
British
position,
and which
overlook
the
small
gcascn
plain
that lies
to the north
of the inlet
of llalaklava.
The
p'
OB
of the
port
and
1
he
connecting
road are
essential
to the
success of the
siege.
To defend
them,
Lord
Raglan
had
placed
a
bodj
of
marines and sailors
with some
heavy
guns
on
the
heights
above
the
village
and
landing-
place
of
Balaklava;
beneath
tihe
heights
he
had
stationed
the
93rd
Highlanders,
under
Sir
Colin
Campbell,
who
barred
the
road
down to
the
village.
The
plain running
northward
to-
wards
the
Tchernaya
is intersected
by
a low
irregular ridge,
496
HISTORY
OP
BUSSIA.
[CH.
LXXVI.
about
two miles
and
a
half from the
village,
and
running
nearly
at
right angles
to the
rear
of the
heights
on
the
north-
western
slopes
of which
lay
the British
army.
This
ridge
in
the
plain
was defended
by
four
redoubts,
intervening
between
the
Tchernaya
and
the
British
cavalry
encamped
on
the
southern
part
of
the
plain
;
and the
rising ground
in
their
rear was held
by
the
Zouaves,
who
had
intrenched
them-
selves
at
right angles
with the redoubts.
The
extreme
right
of
our
position
was
on the road to Kamara
;
the
centre about
Kadakoi,
with
the Turkish
redoubts in
front
;
the left on
the
eastern
slopes
of
the
high
lands
running
up
to the
Inkermann
ravine.
The
object
of
the Russians
was to turn
the
right
and
seize
Balaklava,
burn the
shipping
in
the
port,
and,
cutting
off
our
communication with the
sea,
establish
themselves in our
rear.
To
accomplish
this,
general
Liprandi
gathered
up
his
troops
behind the defiles at
Tchorgun
on the
Tchernaya.
Here,
having
previously
reconnoitred our
position,
he
divided
his forces on the
morning
of the 25th of
October,
direct-
ing
one
body by
the
great
military
road,
the other
by
Kamara,
and
debouching
upon
the
plain
near the Turkish
redoubts. The
redoubts
were armed with two or three
heavy
ship-guns,
and each manned
by
about
250 Turks. The
Russians
coming
on
with
the
dawn,
some
12,000
strong,
with
from
thirty
to
forty field-guns,
attacked the
redoubts
with
horse
artillery,
and
carried
them
in succession
;
the
Turks
firing
a few
shots,
and then
flying
in
disorder under a
fire of
artillery
and
the
swords of
the Cossacks.
Sir
Colin
Campbell,
aroused
by
the
firing,
instantly
drew
up
the
93rd
in
front
of the
village
of Kadakoi
;
and the
affrighted
Turks
rallied
for a moment on the flanks
of
that
"living
wall
of
brass,"
to use
the
language
of a
French
writer,
presented by
the
Highlanders.
But the
redoubts
being
taken,
the
enemy's
artillery
advanced and
opened
fire
;
and the
cavalry
came
rapidly up.
As
the 93rd
was within
range,
Sir Colin
Camp-
bell
drew them
a
little backward
behind the crest
of the hill.
The
British
cavalry lay
to
the left of the
Highlanders,
and
a
large body
of
Russian
cavalry
menaced
both. The
larger
section went
towards the
encampment
of
the British
cavalry,
and
were
met
at once
by
the
heavy brigade,
under
general
Scarlett.
A
brief
but
brilliant
encounter
followed:
for a
A.D.
1854]
BATTLE OF
BALAKLAVA.
497
moment
the
Greys
and
Enniskillens in
the
first
line
seemed
swallowed
up,
in
another
they
reappeared
victorious.
The
long
dense line
of
the
Russian
horse had
lapped
over
their
flanks
;
but
the second
British
line,
consisting
of
the
4th
and
5th
Dragoons,
charging,
the
Eussians
were
broken
and
rapidly
made off. While this was
proceeding,
a
body
of
some
400
cavalry
rode
at the
Highlanders,
who,
not
deigning
to
form
square,
mounted
the
crest
of the
hill,
behind
which
they
had
taken
shelter,
fired
in
line two
deep,
and
sent the
enemy
flying.
But
the
fighting
was
not
yet
over. Seven
guns
taken in
the
redoubts
yet
remained in the
possession
of the
enemy
;
and
Lord
Raglan
sent
an
order to
Lord Lucan to
prevent
the
enemy
from
carrying
off the
guns,
if
possible.
The
order
was
wrongly
interpreted
as
a
peremptory
order to
charge,
and
in
that sense it
was
repeated
by
Lord Lucan
to
Lord
Car-
digan,
who
obeyed
it
and
charged
into the
very
centre
of
the
enemy's position,
with a
desperate
sacrifice of
men,
but
not
without
inflicting
severe blows
upon
the
enemy.
Nor
was
the
loss of life
entirely
a waste. To the
Russians
the
inci-
dent
proved
the
unmeasured
daring
of the
foe
they
had
to
face
;
to the
British
troops
it
showed the
lengths
to
which
discipline
and
fidelity
can be carried. The
light
cavalry
brigade
mustered
607
sabres
that
morning
;
in
the
twenty
minutes
occupied
by
the
charge
and
the
return,
they
lost
335
horses,
and
had
nearly
as
many
officers and men
killed
or
wounded.
The
heavy dragoons
and the
Chasseurs d'
Afrique
covered
the
retreat of the
bleeding
remnant
of this
daring
band. It was
now
nearly
noon :
the
fourth
division,
under
Sir
George
Cathcart,
and the first
division,
under the
Duke
of
Cambridge,
had
come
up
;
and
the Russians
abandoned
all
the
redoubts,
except
the furthest one
to
the
right.
Nothing
more was
done
that
day.
Looking
to the
extent
of the
position
previously occupied,
Lord
Raglan
determined
to
contract his
line
of
defence
to the
immediate
vicinity
of
Balaklava and
the
steeps
in the
right
rear of
the British
army.
Next
day
the
enemy
sallied forth
from
Sebastopol,
7000 or
8000
strong,
and
attacked
the
right
flank
of
the
British
army
;
but,
steadily
met
by
the
second
division
under
Sir
De
Lacy
Evans,
supported
by
the
brigade
of
Guards,
a
regiment
vol. ir.
2
k
498
•
HISTOKY
OF
EUSSIA.
[CH.
LXXVI.
of
Rifles,
two
guns
from
the
light
division,
and
two
French
hattalions,
the
Russians
were
gallantly repelled,
and
then
chased
down
to
the
slope,
with
a
loss
of some 600
killed
and
wounded,
and 80
prisoners.
Another
fierce
engagement,
the most
important
of
all in
which
the
belligerents
have
yet
been
engaged,
took
place
on
the
5th
of
November.
For
some
days
previously,
the Rus-
sians,
who
already possessed
a
large
force in the
prolonged
fortifications,
and others
to
the
rear of the
allies in
the
neigh-
bourhood
of
Balaklava,
had been observed
to receive
large
re-
inforcements,
which,
added to
Liprandi's
corps
on
the
Russian
left,
of
30,000
or
more,
and the
garrison,
would
probably
jus-
tify
Lord
Raglan's
estimate
of
60,000
men
arrayed against
the
allies
on the
memorable
5th of November.
To
augment
the
weight
of
the force
brought
down to
crush the
besiegers,
the now
useless
army
of the Danube
had
been withdrawn
from
Moldavia,
leaving
Bessarabia
still
defended
by
its
special
army,
but
not,
it
is
supposed,
entirely
exhausting
the rein-
forcements
to be
brought
from the interior.
The effort
of
Mentchikof
to throw
his
strength
into a succession
of
power-
ful
and,
if
possible,
decisive
blows,
is
shown
by
the
advance
of
Dannenberg's army
in
the
very
lightest
order,
augmenting
the numbers
about
Sebastopol
without
much
regard
either to
their
equipment
or
provision.
The aim was
to bear
down
by
accumulated
pressure
;
and
it was
with
such
a
view that the
batteries
resumed
the bombardment
of the
allies in
their be-
sieged
camp,
a
strong
force
from
the
garr^on
moved out to
act with
Dannenberg's army,
and
Liprandi
made a
feint,
that
might
have
been,
had
it*
succeeded,
a
penetrating
attack to-
wards
the
rear
;
and
as
it
was,
it did
busy
a
portion
of the
British
and
French forces.
Thus the
allies were to be
occu-
pied
all
round,
while
the
weak, unintrenched,
and unfortified
point
in their
position
towards the
valley
of
the Inkermann
was
to be
penetrated
by
a force
of
great
weight
and mo-
mentum.
The
British
position
extends to
the termination
of
the
north-eastern
heights
overlooking
the
valley
of Inkermann.
and
sloping
on
the
west towards
Sebastopol.
A
road,
cross-
ino-
the Inkermann
valley,
and the stream
by
a
bridge,
runs
up
the
heights
into
the
British
rear.
A
little on
its
right,
a
A.D.
1854]
BATTLE OF
INKERMANN.
499
small redoubt
had
been
constructed
for
two
guns
;
but the
guns
were
not
in
position
on
the 5th.
To
the left
of the
road,
as
far
as the extreme
Lancaster
battery
on our
right
attack,
the
ground
was
broken
with ravines
and covered with
thick brushwood.
The
greater part
of the
hill
below
the
two-gun
battery
was loose
and
stony
;
but
within
about a
hundred
yards
of the redoubt
it becomes
tangled
and
covered
with thick
brushwood.
Facing
the
hill,
and
overtopping
it
on the
north,
is
a
corresponding
headland.
It was
this
hill,
so
steep
that
to take
guns up
seemed
impossible,
which the
Russians
occupied
with
guns.
Across
the
Inkermann
road,
about
a
quarter
of a
mile
from
our
encampment,
and a
mile
from
the
two-gun battery,
runs
a
long
low
stone
wall.
It
was in
this
position,
contracted to
a front
of about
a
mile
and a
half,
that the
battle
of Inkermann was
fought.
It
was
with
the earliest
dawn,
enveloped
in
mist and
rain,
that the
allies,
hearing,
without
seeing,
the movement
of the
enemy,
roused
themselves to
a
comprehension
of that which
they
were
to
expect.
They
were
attacked
in
position by
troops
converging
into a narrow
and
broken ravine
or
meeting
of
ravines
;
and
here,
for all
the
"
solidity"
ascribed to them
by
the
French
commander,
the
English
soldiers
were re-
peatedly
driven back.
At one
time the battle
consisted
in
the
play
of
artillery
upon
the
soldiers of
either
side
;
at
another,
in
sharp
conflicts
of
small
arms;
but
for
the most
part
of the time in
direct
personal
encounters,
where
each
side
tried
against
the other its
weight,
muscular
strength,
nerve,
and
resolve,
perilling
body
and
soid
in the
determina-
tion
to
kill.
The
8000
English,
who
were
repeatedly
brought
forward
to
meet the
attack,
were
the
same,
unrelieved,
throughout
the
day.
The
narrowness of the
channel
through
which
the battle
raged
prevented
the
Russians
from
using
their
nuinl>er>
ai
once,
but those
numbers
gave
a
command
of
freak
forces
in
successive
relays.
So the conflict continued
throughout
the
day;
the
contending
bodies
swayed
back-
wards and
forwards as
reinforcements
or
new
resolution
Ion!
the
greater
weight
to either
side. The
arrival
of the
Erench
first
restored
something
like
aggressive
equality
to
the side
of
the
allies;
and
at
bet,
English solidity
and
Erench
fire
proved
greater
than Russian
ferocity
and numbers.
2 k2
500
HISTORY
OF RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXXVI.
As
the
enemy
seemed
about
to make
a
final
effort,
the
Zouaves
and the 30th
French
Kegiment
came
up
and assailed
the
Eussian left.
"This occurred
at about
eleven
o'clock;
and
from
that
moment
the Russian chance
was
hopeless.
Yet
though
under
the French fire
they
were
literally
falling by
batta-
lions,
they
never
showed
the
least
signs
of
trepidation
or
disorder.
On
the
contrary, they
formed
up
in
the most beau-
tiful
order,
altered
their
front so as to meet
the attack of the
French,
and
extending
their
line to
the
left,
prepared
to
re-
sume
their attack
upon
the
English.
At that
time,
however,
our
men were
well
prepared,
and,
without
any
order
or
arrangement, flung
themselves
headlong
upon
the
enemy,
charging
with
the
bayonet.
The Eussians
boldly
charged
with the
bayonet
also,
and
for the
space
of five minutes the
30th,
41st,
49th,
88th,
and six
or seven
Eussian
regiments
were
stabbing,
beating,
and
firing
at each other
in the
most
fearful manner.
At last the
enemy
gave
way,
and
began
re-
tiring
in
good
order across
the Inkermann
heights.
Until
I
saw
it,
I
never
in
my
life
could
have believed
that
any troops
in the world could
have retired
under such a
murderous
fire
in
such
perfect
order. The
French
and
English,
with a
whole
mass of
artillery,
followed close
upon
the
retreating
battalions,
pouring
in
volley
after
volley
of
grape-shot,
shell,
and
musketry
:
in
fact,
it was a
perfect
carnage.
Yet,
in
spite
of
this,
the
enemy
kept
their
order,
retreating
almost
at
slow
time,
and
every
five
or
ten
minutes
halting
and
charging
desperately
up
the hill
at our
men and
the
French.
In
these
charges
the
Eussians lost
fearfully.
We
received
them
with
volleys
of
musketry,
and then
dashed
at them
with
the
bayonet."
The
battle
lasted
from
dawn
until
past
noon
;
when the
Eussians,
covering
their
retreat
by
a
heavy
fire,
fell
back,
some
to
Sebastopol,
some
across
the
Inkermann,
leaving
be-
hind
them
one of
the bloodiest
fields ever beheld
by
a
soldier.
Its
aspect
has
furnished
matter for much
eloquent
description,
but
none
equals
that
of Lord
Eaglan.
"
I
never
witnessed
such
a
spectacle
before
—
but
on this
I
will not
dwell,"
—
which
implies
more from
his
pen
than
pages
from
others. Still some
phrases
will
assist
the reader.
"
The
A.D.
1854]
BATTLE OE INKERMANN.
501
scene
from the
two-gun battery
was
awful,"
—
for
round
that
spot
on the
night
of the battle
the clear
moonlight
enabled
a
spectator
to see
"
upwards
of five thousand
bodies."
"
Out-
side the
battery,
the Russians
lay
two
and three
deep
:
in-
side,
the
place
was
literally
full with bodies of
Russians,
guardsmen,
the
55th,
and 20th."
"
They lay
in
heaps."
"
This
was not the case in one
spot,
but all
over the
bloody
field."
"
From
the
very
doors
of the
tents of the
second
division over the
hills,
on
the
high
road,
and
along
the
ravine,
down to the
very
valley
below the Inkermann
ruins,
the
earth
is
strewed
with
dead, wounded,
arms and
ammunition,
cloth-
ing,
and
all the
debris of
the
fight."
The ascertained
loss
of
the
English
was
2612,
including
three
generals
killed and five wounded
;
that of the
French
is
stated at
1700
;
and
the
Russian loss
was estimated
at not
less
than
15,000.
The
proportionate
loss of officers in
our
army
was
excessive
;
but
we doubt
whether
it
was due
entirely
to
the
conspicuous
dresses which
they
wore :
their
conspicuous
acts
contributed
much
more
signally
to
point
them
out for
special
attack.
Supposing
the Russian loss
not
to be
over-estimated,
it
would
about
equal
that of the
allies
in
proportion
to the
gross
numbers at
the
command
of
Prince Mentchikof
;
so
that if
the
Russians
were
inferior
soldiers,
their
inferiority
at
all
events exists
in a ratio
barely
exceeding
their
supe-
riority
of
numbers. If
their
bravery
was less
chivalrous,
it
was
not less
stubborn
;
and the battle of Inkermann
has
exploded,
before hundreds
of
competent
witnesses,
the
old
dogma
that
hand-to-hand
conflicts with
the
bayonet
cannot
be.
.Many
linns
the
bayonet
was the
only
weapon
with
which
the
swaying
multitude
was
fighting
man to
man.
In
one resource the
Russians were alone:
blindly
obedient
to
the divine
order
of
their
emperor,
assoilzied
before
the
con-
flict
by
tho
blessing
of their
priests
in
the
churches
of
Sebas-
topol,
they
were
licensed
to
carry
the war
further
than
humanity
warrants,
tor
the wounded were
slaughtered
where
they lay.
Inkermann
showed,
therefore,
that Ave
had
nothing
to
hope
for from
Russian
incompetency
to use;
Russian
re-
sources,
from
flic
wanted of
adapted
skill
on
the
part
of
the
commanders,
of
animal
bravery
in
the
men
;
nothing
to
hope
from Russian
scruples
;
and
that
the
conquest
of
Sebastopol
502
HISTORY
OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXXVII.
could
only
be
effected
by
main
strength
exercised
to over-
come
the
great numbers,
the
strong position,
blind
fidelity,
and absolute
unscrupulousness.
Soon after
the
news
of
the
battle of Inkermann came
that
of
a
truly
untoward
event
on the other side of
the
globe.
In the
last
week
of
August
half a dozen
ships
of
the
allies,
looking
out for
Eussian
vessels at
large
in
the
Pacific,
found
themselves off
the
fortified
port
of
Petropaulofski
;
and with
only
one
steamer
amongst
them entered
upon
a
bombardment
of
a
Kamtchatkan
Algiers,
as if
they
were
fully equipped
and
constituted
for the
purpose.
The
fire of the
ships
kept up
for
some
days,
and a
partial landing
did some
damage
;
but
a
subsequent
attempt
to
storm
the town ended
in
the
repulse
of the
troops
disembarked,
with
much
slaughter
;
and the
fleet
retired with
a
loss
of
many
men and several
officers,
in-
cluding
the
English
admiral,
killed,
it
is
said,
by
the acci-
dental
discharge
of
his
own
pistol.
That a fleet
of
English
and
Erench
ships
should leave their mark is a matter of
course
;
but
never
was a week worse
spent
than
that
off
Petropaulofski.
CHAPTEE
LXXVII.
THE
SIEGE
OF
SEF.ASTOPOL
CONTINUED
—
ACCESSION
OF SAR-
DINIA
TO
THE ANGLO-FRENCH
ALLIANCE
—
DEATH
OF
THE
EMPEROR
NICHOLAS
—
CONFERENCE
AT VIENNA
—
CON-
CLUSION.
Since
the battle of Inkermann
the
fighting
before Sebas-
topol
has consisted
only
of sorties
from
the
place,
and attacks
upon
the
besiegers'
working parties
in
the
trenches,
always
repulsed
with
comparatively
little loss
on
either
side.
Perils
more fatal
than Eussian shot or
steel
began
now to
deal
havoc
among
the
allies,
the
British
troops being
the chief
sufferers.
The
expedition
to
the
Crimea
had been under-
taken
with
most
inadequate
means,
and without
due caution
or
sufficient
inquiry
into
the
nature
and
extent of the
re-
sistance
to be
expected
from the
enemy.
Thus
rashly
begun,
it
was
still
worse conducted
—
by
our
government
at
least.
The hideous
mismanagement
which
prevailed
in
every
de-