Martel Gordon. A Companion to Europe 1900-1945
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178 peter waldron
tsar, this meant a return to firm government, after the hiccup of the 1905 revolution.
In Britain it included a program of social reform, but in Germany produced only
stalemate between government and opposition. The coming of war in 1914 and the
mass displays of national unity that it provoked across the continent suggested that
the appeal of patriotism was sufficient to seal up the political cracks in each of the
great powers. But such unity proved to be short-lived. The failure of European politi-
cal regimes to meet the aspirations of their peoples before the war, and the catastro-
phe of World War I itself, meant that the seeds of postwar politics had already been
sown by 1914. Disillusion with the venerable old order that had dominated Europe
for centuries meant that people turned to political movements at the extremes.
Revolutionary socialism proved to be the victor on the left, while the soft-edged
conservatism of the pre-1914 world was supplanted by the harshness of fascism on
the right. Political failure before 1914 was to give Europe a bleak future after the
end of World War I.
NOTES
1 See E. J. Hobsbawm,
Echoes of the Marseillaise: Two Centuries Look Back on the French
Revolution (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), esp. chs 2 and 3.
2 Dominic Lieven,
Nicholas II: Emperor of all the Russias (London: John Murray, 1993),
p. 71.
3 See Peter Waldron,
Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in Russia
(London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 175–7.
4 Robert B. McKean,
St Petersburg Between the Revolutions: Workers and Revolutionaries
June 1907–February 1917 (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 495–6.
5 “The General Political Situation and the Octobrist Party,”
Russian Review 3/1 (1914):
152.
6 Walter Bagehot,
The English Constitution (London: Kegan Paul, 1892), p. 75.
7 See Neal Blewett, “The Franchise in the United Kingdom, 1885–1918,”
Past and Present
32 (1965): 31.
8 See Roy Jenkins,
Mr Balfour’s Poodle: An Account of the Struggle between the House of
Lords and the Government of Mr Asquith (London: Heinemann, 1954), p. 67.
9 See A. T. Q. Stewart,
The Ulster Crisis (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 62–7.
10 See I. F. W. Beckett, ed.,
The Army and the Curragh Incident 1914 (London: Bodley
Head, 1986), p. 14.
11 See June Purvis,
Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 67.
12 See J. C. G. Röhl, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: A Character Sketch of Kaiser Wilhelm
II,” in Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations, J. C. G. Röhl and N. Sombart, eds
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 23–61
13 Immanuel Geiss, “Origins of the First World War,” in
The Origins of the First World War,
Hans W. Koch, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 40.
14 C. Gauss,
The German Kaiser as Shown in His Public Utterances (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1915), p. 181.
15 Volker R. Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1993), p. 43.
16 See Alan Sked,
The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918 (London:
Longman, 1989), p. 278.
17 See Lázló Péter, “Montesquieu’s Paradox on Freedom and Hungary’s Constitutions
1790–1990,” History of Political Thought 16 (1995): 86–7.
politics: the past and the future 179
18 See Steven Beller, Francis Joseph (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 168–9.
19 Horace Rumbold,
The Austrian Court in the Nineteenth Century (London: Methuen,
1909), p. 330.
20 See Gerald Stourzh, “The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial
Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 23 (1992): 1–22.
21 See S. Konirsch, “Constitutional Struggles between Czechs and Germans in the Habsburg
Monarchy,” Journal of Modern History, 27 (1955): 231–61.
22 See Theodore Zeldin,
France 1848–1945: Politics and Anger (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 1979, p. 223.
23 See Martin P. Johnson,
The Dreyfus Affair (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 150–5.
24 See Maurice Larkin,
Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair: The Separation Issue in
France (London: Macmillan, 1974).
25 See James Joll,
The Second International 1889–1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1974), pp. 102–8.
26 A. J. Balfour,
Essays Speculative and Political (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930),
p. 153.
27 Julius Braunthal,
History of the International, vol. 1 (London: Thomas Nelson, 1966),
p. 351.
GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, 2 vols (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1988
and 1992). This ranges much more widely than its title suggests and gives a broad picture
of Russian politics in the first years of the twentieth century.
Steven Beller, Francis Joseph (London: Longman, 1996). A very good introduction to the
Habsburg monarchy.
Chris M. Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II (London: Longman, 2000). A good modern biography of
the Kaiser.
George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England 1910–1914 (London: Constable,
1936 and many later editions). A classic view of British politics before World War I.
H. V. Emy, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics, 1892–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973). A discussion of key issues in British political life.
Robert Gildea, France 1870–1914 (London: Longman, 1994). A short introduction to the
Third Republic.
Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of all the Russias (London: John Murray, 1993). The
best biography of the last tsar, placing him in a comparative context.
Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867–1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an
Authoritarian State (London: Arnold, 1995). A wide-ranging introduction to Germany
under Bismarck and Wilhelm II.
Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918 (London: Longman,
1989). A controversial view of the end of Austria-Hungary.
Theodore Zeldin, France 1848–1945: Politics and Anger (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979). The outstanding work on French political culture, showing it in all its complexity.
Chapter Twelve
The Coming of War, 1914
Annika Mombauer
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility
of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and
Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. (Treaty of
Versailles, Article 231)
Few historiographical debates have been as heated and as long-lived as the contro-
versy over the origins of World War I. The literature on the events that led to war
in 1914 is now so vast that it is almost impossible to grapple with. The following
account will provide a brief introduction to the subject through an overview of the
events prior to 1914 and a summary of the controversy that followed. In three parts,
it will first of all look at the long-term and short-term causes of the war, summarizing
the development of the alliance system, imperial rivalries and the arms race, and
focusing on some of the major prewar crises from which a major war could easily
have resulted. To what extent can such international developments really be seen to
have caused war? Why, it will be asked, was war averted on so many occasions but
not in July 1914?
This “July crisis” will be the subject of the second part of this chapter, in which
the events following the assassination of the Austrian archduke, Franz Ferdinand, will
be examined. Did this act of terrorism necessarily lead to the outbreak of war in the
Balkans? What were the chances of such a war being “localized” (as contemporaries
put it) and what were the motivations behind the decisions made in Europe’s capitals
during these final days of peace?
Finally, the concluding part will briefly summarize the long debate on the origins
of the war. So many years after its outbreak, is there any agreement on its causes
among historians? Has the once-heated debate on the question of war guilt finally
been resolved?
Long-Term and Short-Term Causes of World War I
In order to set the scene and explain the diplomatic background to World War I,
most investigations into the origins of the war begin with the wars of German unifi-
cation (1864, 1866, and 1870–1).
1
Following the defeat of France in 1871 and the
annexation of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, the German Empire was
founded, with a new emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm I, at the helm. The powerful country
at the heart of Europe which had been united through a series of successful wars
seemed a threat to the other great powers, although initially the chancellor, Otto von
Bismarck, aimed to avoid further conflict and consolidate the gains the country had
made.
2
His complicated alliance system served to ensure that what he considered a
“nightmare of coalitions” against Germany could not threaten the new status quo.
He declared that Germany was “satiated” following its recent unification and that it
sought no further conflict with its neighbors. During his time in office, the alliance
system that he created preserved peace and prevented Germany’s neighbors from
uniting against it. Germany was allied to Austria-Hungary in the Dual Alliance of
1879, which became de facto a Triple Alliance when Italy joined in 1882. A few years
later, in 1887, Germany also concluded the secret “Reinsurance Treaty” with Russia,
guaranteeing neutrality in the event of a future war (in contradiction with the alliance
agreement with Austria-Hungary). Britain and France remained diplomatically iso-
lated during this time (the former largely by choice, pursuing a policy of “splendid
isolation” and reaping the benefits of being the world’s largest imperial power), and
there seemed little chance of either of them settling their imperial differences with
each other. With the accession to the throne of Kaiser Wilhelm II in Germany in
1888, however, and particularly following Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, this carefully
constructed system of alliances began to be dismantled. Bismarck’s successors were
less concerned to preserve the status quo in Europe and envisaged a much more
powerful role for the new German Empire, both on the continent and worldwide.
As a result, German foreign policy under Wilhelm II became more erratic and began
to threaten the European balance of power that had kept Europe relatively peaceful
since 1871.
3
In this age of imperialism, Britain – with its enormous global empire on which
the sun never set – was the main imperial power, although new international players
were emerging, such as the USA and Japan. France, too, was a great power with
considerable imperial clout, while Russia’s drive to expand to the east ensured its
share of the imperial stakes. It is not surprising that Germany, now a large and eco-
nomically successful country at the heart of Europe, was eager to make its presence
felt. More populous than either France or Britain, it had even begun to overtake
Britain as the foremost economic power in Europe.
Under Wilhelm II’s erratic leadership and in pursuit of the goal of becoming a
Weltmacht (world power) and gaining a “place in the sun,” the powerful new
Germany soon began to challenge its neighbors, who were quick to react to its pos-
turing by forming defensive alliances. Republican France (which still begrudged
Germany the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871) and autocratic Russia overcame
their substantial differences in negotiations between 1892 and 1894 which led to the
conclusion of a military alliance against Germany and Austria-Hungary which, in
turn, gave rise to a feeling of “encirclement” in Germany. Given its geographic
the coming of war, 1914 181
182 annika mombauer
situation, Germany, though allied to Austria-Hungary and Italy, now faced potential
enemies both in the west and the east, and felt encircled by envious and potentially
dangerous neighbors who were forming alliances against it.
At the same time, Germany had stirred Britain into a position of antagonism by
deliberately and openly challenging its supremacy at sea with Admiral von Tirpitz’s
program to build a great navy which would, in time, be able to hold its own against
the British. Germany began to construct a high-seas fleet to rival that of Britain in
1897–8. Britain took up the challenge and responded in 1906 with the construction
of the first Dreadnought. The introduction of this new “all gun ship” leveled the
playing field and ruined Tirpitz’s grand design. The main result of this Anglo-German
naval race was enmity and suspicion in the government and people of both countries,
made worse by some ill-advised meddling in South African affairs by the Kaiser, for
example during the Jameson Raid in 1895.
4
In Britain, Germany’s expanding navy
was regarded as one of the ways in which Germany was attempting to improve its
international position and challenge its rivals, while in Germany it was felt that the
country deserved to play a greater international role and to occupy a more
prominent place in the sun, for which a powerful navy was portrayed as an essential
prerequisite.
The worsening of Anglo-German relations has often been stressed as playing a
major part in leading to a general deterioration of the relations between the great
powers, and thus contributing to an increasingly warlike mood before 1914. Although
there were some attempts to come to amicable agreements between Berlin and
London (for example, the 1912 “Haldane mission”), none came to fruition.
5
Among
the reasons for this failure were German insistence on a formal alliance with Britain
(which had become impossible once Britain had allied itself to France) and Germany’s
unwillingness to cease building a strong navy, as well as the threat that German
foreign policy seemed to pose to the European status quo, and to Britain’s own
foreign policy ambitions. In Britain the government faced crucial decisions: who
would be the more useful future ally and who the more worrying future enemy
among the continental great powers? To British statesmen, the price Germany seemed
to be demanding for an understanding with Britain was British neutrality in case of
a continental war between Germany and either France or Russia – a price that they
believed to be too high to pay, particularly in view of their concerns for the safety of
the British Empire.
It has been argued that in addition to the existing Anglo-German antagonism and
to Britain’s aim of upholding the European balance of power, British policy in the
prewar years and its decision to join the war in August 1914 may have been motivated
by fears of an overly powerful Russia, and the threat that a victorious Russia would
pose for the British Empire, particularly in India. In the British foreign office, some
believed that an unfriendly France and particularly Russia would potentially be a
much greater threat to the empire than a hostile Germany.
6
While such a view remains
contested, it is clear that there were many Francophone voices in the British foreign
office, and that an anti-German mood pertained which made more cordial relations
between the two countries more difficult. As Sir Edward Grey’s private secretary
William Tyrrell noted in 1911: “It is depressing to find that after six years’ experience
of Germany the inclination here is still to believe that she can be placated by small
concessions . . . what she wants is the hegemony of Europe.”
7
the coming of war, 1914 183
Anglo-German enmity was such that Britain preferred to settle its colonial disputes
with its former rival France to escape its previous relative diplomatic isolation.
The conclusion of the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain in 1904 was
initially a loose arrangement of the two powers that was strengthened as a result of
the first Moroccan crisis in 1905–6, during which Germany reacted to French colonial
aspirations in the region by attempting to break up the new allies Britain and France.
Britain had actually given up its position of “splendid isolation” in 1902 when
it had become allied to Japan, but it was the conclusion of the Entente with
France that indicated to Germans that Britain would be found on the side of
Germany’s enemies in any future European conflict. In effect, this Entente also led
to a détente between Britain and Russia via their shared partner France. This
friendship was given a more solid basis with the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian
Convention in 1907. From then on the so-called “Triple Entente” stood in opposi-
tion to the Triple Alliance of the Central Powers and two European alliance blocs
faced each other in a number of international crises. In both alliance systems, the
partners promised to support each other in case one of them faced aggression from
a third power. As a result, a conflict between any state in the Entente with one in
the Triple Alliance would threaten to escalate and potentially embroil all the major
European powers.
The crisis which resulted in the outbreak of war in 1914 was no isolated incident.
In the years preceding the outbreak of war, a number of international crises and
localized wars had threatened to escalate into a European war. The Russo-Japanese
War of 1904–5 involved land battles of almost unprecedented scale, and provided a
taste of things to come. Much to everyone’s surprise, a European “white” country
was defeated by a “non-white” race. The most important result was a significant
change in the balance of power in Europe. Following Russia’s defeat and the revolu-
tion of 1905, Japan emerged as a force to be reckoned with, leading to the renewal
and extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Russia, on the other hand, was for the
time being so weakened that it could almost be discounted as a great power. The
lost war spelt the end of Russia’s imperialist aspirations in the far east for the foresee-
able future. Any future ambitions would have to focus on Europe. A conflict between
Russia and Britain had, however, been avoided and France had been spared the
dilemma of having to take sides.
Nonetheless, France was adversely affected by Russia’s lost war in the far east, for
in the aftermath of its crushing defeat, Russia could be of no support to its French
ally in the Moroccan crisis of 1905. Indeed, it was Russia’s weakened state which
encouraged Germany to challenge France over its Moroccan policy, based on the
assumption that Russia would be unable to come to France’s aid, thus heightening
Germany’s chances at achieving a diplomatic victory. At the same time, Germany’s
military planners developed a new and daring deployment plan (later named the
Schlieffen Plan),
8
based on the assumption that the recently defeated Russia would
not pose a real threat to Germany in the east in the near future. In fact, Germany’s
chief of the general staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, advocated a preventive war
against France at that time because Russia’s weakened position meant it would not
be able to support its ally, France. However, the military’s demand for war found no
favor with the German Kaiser or with the chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow, at that
time. By 1914, following mounting international tensions, Bülow’s successor,
184 annika mombauer
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, would be less inclined to resist the demands for
war by Germany’s military leaders.
While Russia and Japan were fighting in Asia, Germany provoked an international
crisis over the Anglo-French agreement regarding the territory of Morocco. Aside
from the concerns for some German companies established in the region, Germany
felt slighted by not having been consulted by France and Britain, who were increasing
their influence over north Africa, and wanted to demonstrate that a great power such
as Germany could not simply be passed over when important colonial decisions were
made. Friedrich von Holstein, a senior figure in the German foreign office at the
time, feared that if Germany allowed its “toes to be trodden on silently” in Morocco,
this would amount to allowing a “repetition elsewhere.”
9
German policy also aimed
at demonstrating that France could not rely on its new Entente partner, Britain, and
that Russia was too weak to support it in an international crisis. At the heart of the
Moroccan crisis was Germany’s desire to expose the newly formed Entente Cordiale
between Britain and France as useless, to split the Entente partners before they had
a chance to consolidate their bond, and to intimidate the French. However, these
bullying tactics did not succeed. On the contrary, the newly formed Entente between
Britain and France emerged strengthened from the crisis, with both countries realiz-
ing the benefits to be had from such a coalition. The international conference at
Algeciras, which had been convened following German demands to settle the dispute
at the conference table, amounted to a diplomatic defeat for Germany, which found
itself isolated, with support only from its ally, Austria-Hungary.
As far as Berlin was concerned, the crisis provided further evidence of German
encirclement, while for the country’s neighbors it seemed as if Germany was an
aggressive bully. This trend was set to continue in the coming years, in which several
crises in the Balkans threatened to escalate into a European war on several occasions.
It was with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that the status quo in the
Balkans changed fundamentally. The smaller Balkan states were keen to expand their
area of influence into former Turkish territory, and were beginning to pose a direct
threat to Austria-Hungary, whose population was made up of numerous national
minorities, some of which had ambitions for independence. Austria-Hungary had as
much interest in preventing the area from being taken over by Serbs as Russia had
in supporting Serbian ambitions in the region. Serbia, Austria-Hungary’s main
Balkan rival, received moral support from Russia, who considered itself the guardian
of the pan-Slav movement. There were disputes over access to the sea, over control
of the Straits of Constantinople (providing vital access to the Black Sea), and simply
over territorial possessions. For Austria-Hungary, the matter was made worse by the
fact that the Dual Monarchy united 11 disparate nationalities in one empire, some
of which wanted to establish their independence, notably among them many dis-
gruntled Serbs.
The Bosnian annexation crisis was one such serious dispute which threatened to
bring war to Europe as early as 1908. Following the Austro-Russian negotiations of
1897, when the two powers had come to an agreement over the Balkans, relations
between the countries had been amicable. The Balkans only reappeared as a potential
source of friction after Russia’s disastrous experience in the far east, when its interest
in the Balkans was reawakened. Revolution in Turkey by the Young Turks
10
in 1908
led to a change of government and policy, and the previously assumed disintegration
the coming of war, 1914 185
of the Ottoman Empire seemed to be halted – a threatening development for those
European countries that had an interest in Turkey’s decline and had welcomed
|it. The multinational empire of Austria-Hungary faced numerous internal threats
from the nationalist aspirations of its many national minorities, and the policy of
Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister, Count Alois Aehrenthal, aimed at diverting
domestic discontent with the help of an aggressive foreign policy. On the back of the
Young Turk revolution, Aehrenthal decided to annex the provinces of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which Austria had nominally occupied following the Treaty of
Berlin in 1878, but which had formally remained under Turkish suzerainty.
11
Russia, too, hoped to gain from the instability in the Balkans, and the Russian
foreign minister, Alexei Izvolsky, and his Austrian counterpart, Aehrenthal, came to
a secret agreement in 1908. Austria would be allowed to go ahead with the annexa-
tion, and in return was expected to support Russian interests in the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles. However, Aehrenthal proceeded with the annexation on October 5,
1908 before Izvolsky had time to secure diplomatic support from other European
capitals (or indeed from members of his own government). Izvolsky felt betrayed by
Aehrenthal, and denounced the secret agreement. Serbia was ready to go to war over
the annexation, believing the Bosnian Serbs to belong to its own sphere of influence,
but in the event was not supported by Russia, which was still too weak following
the war against Japan. Given the fact that Germany gave unconditional support
to Austria-Hungary over this Balkan matter and put significant pressure on Russia,
it was primarily Russia’s mediating influence on Serbia that prevented a war on this
occasion. However, the previous accord between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the
Balkans had been destroyed, while the German government’s open and unconditional
support of its ally had significantly changed what had so far been a purely defensive
alliance agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. From now on, Austria’s
leaders believed they would be able to count on Germany even if an international
crisis resulted from their own actions. The Bosnian annexation crisis marked an
important juncture in this respect. In the future, Serbia, humiliated in 1909, would
be keen to redress its status in the Balkans, while Russia was now suspicious of
German interests in that region and more determined than ever to regain its military
power. The European armaments race which followed was started by Russia’s desire
to increase its military potential, and soon led to army increases by all major European
powers.
12
Russia and Serbia had been forced to back down on this occasion, but they
were unlikely to do so again.
In 1911 the great powers of Europe again faced each other in a serious diplomatic
crisis that brought the continent to the verge of war. When the French sent troops
to Morocco to suppress a revolt (and thus, by implication, to extend their influence
over that country), Germany considered this to be a move contrary to the interna-
tional agreements which had been concluded following the first Moroccan crisis.
Germany tried again to assert its claim as a great power that could not simply be
ignored in colonial affairs. After failing to find a diplomatic solution, Germany’s
political leaders decided to dispatch the gunboat Panther to the port of Agadir to
intimidate the French. Germany demanded the French Congo as compensation for
the extension of French influence in Morocco. However, as during the first Moroccan
crisis, France received support from Britain, and the links between the two Entente
partners were only further strengthened as a consequence of German intervention.
186 annika mombauer
Britain let Germany know – in no uncertain terms – that it intended to stand by
France, and David Lloyd George’s famous Mansion House Speech of July 21, 1911,
threatening to fight on France’s side against Germany if the need arose, caused great
indignation in Germany. Although the crisis was resolved peacefully, and Germany
was indeed given a small part of the French Congo as compensation, the affair was
in fact another diplomatic defeat for Germany, whose leaders were becoming increas-
ingly worried that their foreign policy adventures were not leading to the break-up
of hostile alliances or to proper recognition of the country’s great power status.
Moreover, Austria-Hungary’s lukewarm support suggested that the ally could only
be counted on definitely if an international crisis directly affected the Dual Monarchy’s
own interests. Germany’s decision makers arrived at the crucial realization that
only a crisis in the Balkans would guarantee the all-important Austro-Hungarian
support.
Soon after the Agadir crisis, the Balkans once again demanded the attention of
Europe’s statesmen. Following the humiliation of 1909, Russia had encouraged the
creation of a coalition of Balkan states, and in 1912 Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro,
and Serbia formed the Balkan League. In October 1912 the League declared war on
Turkey, and the First Balkan War threatened to embroil Europe’s major powers in
an armed conflict, too. Against this background, Germany’s Kaiser convened an
infamous “war council” in which he and his chief of staff demanded war. In the event,
that decision was postponed, but the meeting provides evidence for the way inter-
national crises such as the Balkan war impacted upon decisions made in Europe’s
capitals and could easily have led to a European war.
13
In the First Balkan War, Turkey was quickly defeated and driven out of most of
the Balkans, but in the aftermath of the war, the victors fell out over the spoils, and
ended up fighting each other in the Second Balkan War of 1913. As a result of the
wars, Serbia doubled its territory, and now posed an even greater threat to Austria-
Hungary, both externally, and by encouraging the sizable Serbian minority within
the Dual Monarchy to demand its independence. This is essential background for
understanding Austria’s reaction to the Serbian-supported assassination of the heir
to the Austro-Hungarian throne on June 28, 1914. Given the longstanding Balkan
instability, and Serbia’s many provocations, this was a threat to the Empire’s inter-
national reputation that Vienna’s statesmen felt they could not ignore. With the
moral right seemingly on their side, the assassination seemed to provide an oppor-
tunity to dispose of the Serbian threat once and for all.
The July Crisis and the Outbreak of War
In view of these tensions and underlying hostilities of the prewar years, and given
that few contemporaries thought of war as a catastrophe that they should strive to
prevent at all cost, it is perhaps not surprising that war resulted from such interna-
tional rivalries. However, that is not to say that such a turn of events was inevitable,
given, for example, the existence of an increasingly vociferous peace movement in
Europe, and the prewar attempts at curbing the armaments race, for example during
the Hague peace conferences. However, as there had been a general expectation that
war would come at some point in the not-too-distant future (and given that war
was, after all, still a legitimate way of conducting foreign policy when diplomacy had
the coming of war, 1914 187
failed), it is not surprising that all that was needed was the proverbial spark that would
set light to the powder keg of Europe.
That spark was provided by the murder of the Austrian heir to the throne,
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on June
28, 1914. That act of terrorism committed by Bosnian Serbs against the Austro-
Hungarian state would lead to the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia that
quickly escalated into a European war, and ultimately became World War I. With
hindsight, it appears almost as if that war could not have been avoided. However,
even in July 1914 a European war was not inevitable. Right until the last moment,
some decision makers were desperately trying to avoid the outbreak of war and to
resolve the crisis at the conference table, while others did everything in their power
to ensure an armed conflict would result from the assassination. That war finally broke
out was less the product of fate or bad fortune than the result of intention. In order
to understand why the crisis escalated into full-scale war, we must look particularly
at Vienna and Berlin; for it was here that war (at least a war between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia) was consciously risked and planned. France, Russia, and Britain entered
the stage much later in July 1914, when the most fateful decisions had already
been taken.
14
In Vienna, the reaction to the assassination was officially one of outrage, although
behind the scenes many were secretly pleased because Franz Ferdinand had not been
universally popular. It is ironic that the archduke’s assassination should have provided
the reason for a declaration of war on Serbia, given that Franz Ferdinand had been
opposed to war during his lifetime, and had been a powerful opponent to the belli-
cose demands of the chief of the Austrian general staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf,
for a war against Serbia. Conrad welcomed an excuse for a war with Serbia. He still
regretted what he (as well as his German counterpart Helmuth von Moltke) had
considered the “missed opportunity” for a “reckoning with Serbia” in 1909.
15
In
Berlin, the possibility of a Balkan crisis was greeted favorably, for such a crisis would
ensure that Austria would definitely be committed to fighting if a war resulted. Most
historians would also agree that Berlin encouraged Vienna to demand retribution
from Serbia, and was happy to take the risk that an Austro-Serbian conflict might
escalate into a European war. When the Austrian envoy Count Hoyos traveled to
Berlin in order to ascertain the powerful ally’s position in case Austria demanded
recompense from Serbia, he was assured that Germany would support Austria all the
way, even if it chose to go to war over the assassination, and even if such a war were
to turn into a European war. This was Wilhelm II’s so-called “blank check” to Vienna.
In a strictly confidential telegram of July 5 to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister,
Count Berchtold, the Austrian ambassador to Berlin, Count Szögyény, reported the
following account of his meeting with the German Kaiser:
The Kaiser authorized me to inform our Gracious Majesty that we might in this case,
as in all others, rely upon Germany’s full support . . . He did not doubt in the least
that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg [the German chancellor] would agree with him.
Especially as far as our action against Serbia was concerned. But it was his [Kaiser
Wilhelm’s] opinion that this action must not be delayed. Russia’s attitude will no doubt
be hostile, but for this he had for years prepared, and should a war between Austria-
Hungary and Russia be unavoidable, we might be convinced that Germany, our old