Martel Gordon. A Companion to Europe 1900-1945
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When Hitler came to power in January 1933, the aims of the Nazi Party were
well known, even if most European statesmen chose to believe that a distinction could
be drawn between statements made for propaganda reasons and the way the new
government would proceed once in power. Nevertheless, Hitler had already signaled
in Mein Kampf that reversing the decisions of the Paris peace conference was not his
main objective.
3
He linked the issue of control of territories to that of his racial
theories.
Nazi Foreign Policy
In 1933 it was still impossible to judge whether the loose and rambling pronounce-
ments made in Mein Kampf were likely to be pursued in practice. Nor was it clear
whether Hitler’s ambition to restore the German frontiers of 1914 could be restrained
by governments opposed to such changes. These were dilemmas that confused con-
temporary politicians and have provoked extensive controversy ever since. Was Hitler
driven by a vision, which he was determined to implement by any means possible?
Or was he an opportunist who merely exploited situations as they arose?
4
While his-
torians will continue to dispute this point, there can be little doubt that when Hitler
came to power in March 1933 his stated aim of reversing the territorial decisions
made at Versailles and flouting restrictions imposed on German military potential
were supported by most political parties and individual German citizens. During the
years that followed, Germany not merely embarked on a full program of remilitariza-
tion but successfully challenged the ban on union with Austria, destroyed
Czechoslovakia, and attacked and defeated Poland. In the process the authority of
the League of Nations was thoroughly undermined and France’s system of continen-
tal alliances was ripped up. At the end of September 1939 European states were not
able to prevent Hitler from pursuing further territorial conquests in Europe.
In 1933 Germany’s economic plight preoccupied Hitler as much as his desire to
see Germany powerful again. Thus, rearmament was not only a means of reaffirming
Germany’s position in Europe but also of revitalizing the economy and providing
employment. Both would enable the Nazi Party to consolidate its authority and to
extend its control over the state and the army. Conservative and nationalist elements
in German political life supported Hitler because they were more anxious to destroy
the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions than to uphold the democratic
system. Further, they concurred in Hitler’s objectives of challenging the European
powers and reaffirming Germany’s role in European politics. Since Hitler’s expan-
sionist plans focused on eastern Europe, neither the Nazis’ political allies nor the
army disagreed. Eastern Europe, the Baltic coast, and even the Balkans were tradi-
tionally seen as Germany’s natural areas of economic development and within her
sphere of influence. Nor did Hitler’s racist policy of subjugating those peoples he
believed to be racially inferior lead to disagreements. Racist theories were freely dis-
cussed – and not merely by German nationalists: they were common in France and
Britain, in spite of their democratic traditions. Hitler’s antisemitism may have been
particularly virulent, but various forms of it had become the norm in Europe after
World War I.
Hitler’s role in the creation of the Nazi regime and in steering it towards a per-
petually radical program is an issue which has preoccupied historians. Ian Kershaw
hitler and the origins of world war ii 409
and Wolfgang Mommsen have debated this point extensively, as have other eminent
historians. There is no consensus as to whether Hitler played a critical role in defining
the Nazi regime’s character, or whether he was merely a catalyst, bringing together
preexisting political ideas. Any attempt to understand the course of German foreign
policy on the eve of World War II inevitably will include a debate on the role of the
Nazi leadership, the army, and a number of ministries. Hitler’s foreign policy initia-
tives and plans for war were pursued with the complicity of these powerful groups
and, as they proved to be successful, they strengthened the Nazi Party’s grip on
power and enhanced his authority.
Hitler’s first foreign policy initiatives were conventional rather than radical. The
signing of a non-aggression pact with Poland followed Germany’s withdrawal from
the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. These decisions met with
the approval of the German ministry for foreign affairs and the war ministry. In France
and Britain, these moves elicited only muted responses, even when followed by the
reoccupation of the Saarland and news of Hitler’s rearmament program. The British
government hoped that Germany would, once its main grievances had been dealt
with, become a partner in the endeavors of the great powers to maintain stability in
Europe. Even the surprising break with the earlier policy of isolating Poland was
viewed merely as Germany’s attempt to break with the post-Versailles order.
The period 1935–7 marked a new stage in Hitler’s policy of probing the western
democracies for signs of willingness to accept Germany’s bid to dominate Europe.
On the one hand, the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement on June 17,
1935 indicated his willingness to conclude bilateral agreements with Britain.
Nevertheless, when in February 1936 Hitler made an official claim for the restoration
of German colonies taken away in 1919, this looked like a policy of confrontation.
In reality, these apparently contradictory strands of German policy indicated divisions
within the ruling elites. On the one hand, Schacht, minister for economics, in
common with the conservatives and nationalists, thought of reclaiming the colonies
and the development of foreign trade. Hitler, on the other hand, focused on Europe
and merely used the colonial issue to test British willingness to compromise. In both
cases, Britain’s attitude was of critical importance. What Hitler ultimately sought was
for Britain to turn a blind eye to Germany pursuing territorial conquests in eastern
Europe. In return, he was willing to renounce Germany’s colonial claims.
5
By 1936
Hitler decided that Germany could proceed without prior agreements with Britain:
the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March, which elicited no military response
from either France or Britain, increased Hitler’s standing in Germany and whetted
his appetite for more.
At the same time, Hitler was preparing extensive plans for the future. When Italy
was condemned for launching a war in Abyssinia, Hitler was able to draw Italy into
German plans, while at the same time seeking anti-Soviet unity with Japan. These
moves culminated in the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact in November 1936,
which suggested not merely that the three were united on ideological lines, but that
a division of spoils would follow. Still, neither Britain nor France took action, which
would have signaled to Germany their determination to put a stop to plans for a
future redistribution of spheres of influence.
In 1936 the outbreak of a civil war in Spain gave Hitler a unique opportunity.
During that year he had more openly asserted his control over the economy and
410 anita j. prazmowska
foreign policy. The Four Year Program, announced in September 1936, focused on
rearmament and heavy industry. State control over economic and financial activities
was also increased. The Nazi leadership became bolder in its pursuit of foreign policy
objectives, abandoning its earlier commitment to revision of the 1919 treaty settle-
ment, and instead taking initiatives that were clearly aimed at France and Britain.
After earlier hesitation, Hitler assisted the nationalist forces in Spain. This led to
increased German and Italian influence in the region, while British and French influ-
ence in Iberia and the western Mediterranean was reduced.
Internally, the Nazi regime increased its authority. The staging of the Olympics in
Berlin gave the party propagandists an opportunity to use the event as a platform for
the glorification of racial ideas. The economy had benefited from the rearmament
programs and, with the reduction of unemployment, support for the party increased.
An eminent historian has stated that “at the beginning of 1937 Germany was unques-
tionably the most powerful country in Europe.”
6
The pursuit of an ideologically motivated policy of expansion was made possible
by the gradual sidelining and removal of those very conservatives and nationalists
who earlier supported Hitler on the assumption that the reversal of the Versailles
decision was the aim of his policies. They had been willing to consider extending
Germany’s influence in the east, even by means of military conquest, though were
not so comfortable about the possibility of a conflict with Britain and France. But
by the beginning of 1938 Hitler no longer needed their support. The ministry for
foreign affairs was purged and Joachim Ribbentrop was appointed to head it. Reliable
party members replaced career diplomats, most notably, in London, Tokyo, and
Rome. At the same time the foreign department of the Nazi Party became more
active in pursuing what it considered to be true Nazi foreign policy. The proliferation
of organizations with the authority to make decisions that affected relations with
other states did not disguise the fact that Hitler had the ultimate authority in the
Nazi state.
7
The power of the military leadership was likewise destroyed. Blomberg,
minister of war, and Fritsch, commander-in-chief of the army, were both dismissed
after being personally discredited. Hitler took over as head of the war ministry. The
response of the officer ranks was muted.
The destruction of Czechoslovakia had been high on the list of Hitler’s priorities.
He saw the state, which enjoyed close political and economic ties with France, as the
lynchpin of France’s eastern policy. Furthermore, the fact that Czechoslovakia had
in 1935 signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union increased Hitler’s
determination to destroy it. Nevertheless, at the end of 1937 events in Austria
allowed Hitler to address that issue first.
When Hitler decided to take action to subjugate Austria, he was confident that
Britain and France would do nothing in its defense and that Italy would acquiesce
in his decisions. On November 19, 1937, only a few days after he had delivered a
wide-ranging exposition to his party and military leaders in which he signaled his
determination to pursue an aggressive policy towards eastern Europe irrespective of
Britain’s attitude, he met with Lord Halifax. Hitler’s disdain for Britain was confirmed
when Halifax indicated that as long as territorial revision was pursued by peaceful
means Britain would not interfere. France, too, appeared no longer concerned with
the fate of Austria. Italy, the only state that had shown a determination to uphold
Austrian independence, had by 1937 become economically dependent on Germany.
hitler and the origins of world war ii 411
When Mussolini visited Germany in September 1937 he was no longer able or willing
to make Austrian independence a condition of good relations. On the contrary, Italy
was by then only too happy to enter into close relations with Germany.
8
Thus
Austria’s fate was left in Hitler’s hands.
Austrian–German unity was an issue which in any case was unlikely to cause the
western democracies to take action against Germany. Even though the Treaty of
Versailles forbade unity between the two, European statesmen and public opinion
were ambivalent. At the end of 1937 Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor,
unhappy about the activities of the Austrian Nazis, sought to clarify relations with
Germany. Hitler clarified by demanding, in February 1938, that the foreign policies
of the two countries be coordinated and that the Austrian National Socialists be given
a larger say in state matters. Schuschnigg’s attempt to parry Hitler’s demands by
calling a referendum that was to exclude young Nazi supporters backfired, as did his
belated request for British support. The British government refused to become
involved, while the French government was in a crisis. The Italian government
advised Schuschnigg not to provoke Hitler, and he was forced to accept the growing
role of the National Socialist Party, which in turn was guided by Berlin. Hitler, who
had planned to install Arthur Seyss-Inquart as his puppet in Austria, changed his
mind and German troops marched into Austria in March. Western responses were
muted, and the absence of military retaliation strengthened Hitler’s arguments against
his military leaders who had advised against sending troops into Austria. Britain and
France were uneasy about the turn of events, but comforted themselves by choosing
to view the event as an internal German matter. Absence of visible Austrian opposi-
tion to the Anschluss further validated their lack of action.
European statesmen immediately considered the implications of Germany’s action.
Few had doubts that Czechoslovakia was now more vulnerable to Hitler’s ambitions.
But it was a sovereign state on which Germany had no obvious territorial claim.
Furthermore, its security was guaranteed by at least two important international
treaties: the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance signed in 1924 and the more recent
Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1935, which was meant to
complement the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance signed a week earlier. In
all cases it was assumed that Germany was likely to be the aggressor. The Little
Entente, which brought together Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania and
which had France’s full support, completed the appearance of perfect security. The
reality was far from perfect. The French attitude towards the eastern allies was always
ambivalent, as they regarded them as a poor substitute for the old alliance with Russia;
thus, continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union indicated to Czechoslovakia and
Poland a potential conflict of interest. The French agreements of 1935 were an illu-
sion, as they lacked precision and even though many politicians and military leaders
would have wanted to see the Soviet Union as France’s ally, they worried about the
impact of more binding agreements on France’s internal conflicts. Poland, France’s
key eastern partner, pursued its own anti-Czechoslovak campaign, in the process
allying itself more closely with Germany. The Little Entente had been formed from
anxieties about Hungary and could not be converted into an anti-German pact.
9
Czechoslovakia, the only politically stable and economically successful state in
that region, had an Achilles heel in the form of 3 million Germans in the Sudetenland.
Although German nationals constituted over 22 percent of Czechoslovakia’s
412 anita j. prazmowska
population, the Czechs were determined to prevent them from claiming autonomy
within regions where they formed a majority. Both during the Weimar period and
after Hitler came to power, a number of German organizations sought to maintain
the national identity of the German community in Czechoslovakia, even though these
were Germans from within the old Habsburg Empire. Hitler claimed the right to act
as champion of German minorities, which was popular in Germany and justified
interference in the internal affairs of states where there were German minorities: in
Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states. German borderland communi-
ties in Czechoslovakia and Poland had found themselves incorporated into the new
states against their wishes. At times of crisis and economic difficulties the latter were
only too willing for Germany to take up their grievances, and the local Nazi Party
began to play an increasingly important role. When, in November 1937, Hitler
decided to destroy Czechoslovakia by military means, the Sudeten Germans were
instructed to put forward demands they knew the Czechs would not concede and
foment a state of tension.
10
Unlike the Austrian crisis, the simmering German–Czechoslovak crisis faced the
European states with a profound dilemma. To ignore it would be tantamount to
giving Hitler the green light. That course of action was difficult to justify, as
Czechoslovakia was a sovereign state and an attack on it, even if provoked by alleged
mistreatment of a minority, could precipitate a wider conflict. On the other hand, to
take military action in defense of Czechoslovakia did not seem possible. Britain had
signaled to Hitler that it considered his grievances justified. To Britain, the real issue
was whether France and Russia would honor their commitments to Czechoslovakia
and thus draw Britain into a war which it had no wish to fight. While the Nazi
propaganda machine inflamed the situation by instructing the Sudeten Germans to
increase their demands, the British and French governments sought to prevent the
situation from escalating into an international crisis. On the personal initiative of
Prime Minister Chamberlain, a minor politician, Lord Runciman, was dispatched
to investigate, while the French government made it clear that it would welcome a
diplomatic solution as it did not want to honor its commitment to defend
Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 Chamberlain made two fateful visits to Germany
to meet Hitler. This intervention allowed Hitler to present himself as the defender
of a mistreated German minority. Chamberlain naively undertook to find a solution
by arranging a conference that convened in Munich on September 30.
11
Germany
and Italy saw the meeting as an opportunity to break up Czechoslovakia. The
Czechoslovak government was not invited to make its case and under the threat of
being left to face Germany alone, was forced to accept the Munich conference deci-
sions. Germany was given the freedom to decide which areas of Czechoslovakia were
to be incorporated into the Third Reich. The Soviet Union was kept out of the
picture. At the same time, Polish and Hungarian claims to Czechoslovak territories,
presented by Germany, were upheld in principle and Czechoslovakia ultimately lost
areas to Germany, Poland, and Hungary.
Germany’s political role among the east European states was henceforth enhanced.
Hungary and Romania now looked to Berlin to resolve local conflicts. Poland, a
state that since 1934 had enjoyed good relations with Germany, was likely to be the
next victim of Hitler’s desire to settle scores predating World War I. In the meantime,
France appeared to abandon the idea of an eastern bloc against Germany, while
hitler and the origins of world war ii 413
Britain reversed its traditional lack of interest in eastern Europe to become mediator
of German grievances there.
Poland’s relations with Germany during the interwar period had undergone a
number of changes. Territorial decisions made after the war created problems not
only between the Polish and German states but also had an impact on international
relations. From the outset Germany resented the emergence of an independent
Poland. The Versailles decision to award Poland access to the seacoast was seen by
most Germans as unjust. The French desire to have a strong ally on Germany’s
eastern border exacerbated British distrust of France’s European policy. The result
was that while Poland’s claim to part of Silesia, the Poznan district, and a strip of
land which gave it direct access to the Baltic was upheld at Versailles, Poland was not
given the port of Danzig. Its “Free City” status, guaranteed by the League of
Nations, satisfied neither Poland nor Germany. During the 1920s Poland ostensibly
remained in the French camp, benefiting from close political and military contacts.
Nevertheless, the Poles distrusted the French. They were anxious that France might
still ally itself with the Soviet Union, Poland’s enemy. France’s close relations with
Czechoslovakia irritated the Poles to the same extent, as did France’s willingness to
go along with British security plans which aimed at drawing Germany into close
cooperation with both European powers. In 1934 Poland appeared to score a diplo-
matic victory when it signed an agreement with Germany. The contentious issue of
the Free City of Danzig was, by common agreement, excluded from the list of issues
to be discussed by both sides. To the Poles, their newfound intimacy with Germany
offered a way out of political dependence on France and increased the likelihood of
foreign investment, earlier deterred by fear of a Polish–German conflict. There were,
of course, more tangible advantages in developing better relations with Germany in
the long term: Czechoslovak influence in the region might be reduced; Poland might
succeed in reclaiming the coal-rich Teschen region grabbed by Czechoslovakia in
1919; they might even join Germany in a war against the Soviet Union in the fore-
seeable future. The Munich conference threw some of these plans into disarray.
Poland’s exclusion from it signaled the possibility that Germany would not treat
Poland as a partner, but as a satellite. With that came the ominous prospect of
Germany returning Danzig onto the agenda of issues to be resolved. In October
1938, while the Poles still thought they might persuade Germany not to raise this
contentious issue, the international community generally perceived that Poland would
be Germany’s next victim.
The sense of anticipation and anxiety which characterized the last months of 1938
and the first months of 1939 was, by March 1939, made worse by rumors which
were impossible to verify, but which, if true, would have required Britain and France
to react. For the Chamberlain government, indications that Germany might strike
west, possibly to extend its control over the Belgian coast and the Low Countries,
were most worrying. French policy was in disarray: Mussolini, emboldened by
Germany’s victories and increasingly confident that Britain would not back France,
laid claims to Nice and Corsica; Colonel Josef Beck, the Polish minister for foreign
affairs, rejected French and British counsel during the Czechoslovak crisis; the Soviet
Union remained an unknown dimension in the evolving European crisis.
12
At the beginning of March two new potential flashpoints overwhelmed the British
and French governments. The British government took the lead in trying to deal
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with them. Since this was done without being able to verify the facts, the response
was muddled. The first was news that Germany had put pressure on Romania to
coordinate its foreign and economic policies with Germany. This would have resulted
in Romania’s oil deposits being at Germany’s disposal, a situation which would have
made Germany immune to any attempts to reduce her preparations for war by means
of an economic blockade. At the same time, British newspapers reported that Germany
had presented Poland with an ultimatum, demanding the return of Danzig. Since
neither the Romanian nor the Polish governments were willing to be absolutely
truthful with the British, Chamberlain chose to believe the worst. As if to underline
the need for the democracies to be seen to be responding to these rumors, Germany
blatantly contravened the agreements made at Munich. On March 15 German troops
occupied Prague. For the first time, German policies were not justified by any claim
to revision of old borders, mistreatment of the German minority, or even provoca-
tion. Nazi Germany now began to appear simply as an aggressor.
The British and French leaders had hoped that the Munich agreement would, at
worst, postpone the European conflict; at best, that it might persuade Hitler that
cooperation rather than conflict would better serve Germany’s interests. Hitler viewed
the matter in an entirely different light. The conference had robbed him of an oppor-
tunity to wage a minor, local war, one that would have restored the pride of the
German army. He therefore wanted to complete the destruction of the hated Czech
state. His second objective was the defeat of France and Britain – in spite of their
complicity during the Czechoslovak crisis. Ultimately, Hitler planned a war against
the Soviet Union and the attainment of world domination.
13
But first Poland, a state
that had refused to accept a subordinate role in Germany’s plans, needed to be
destroyed.
14
The continuing British attempts to stave off the European conflict through nego-
tiations were undoubtedly made more difficult by the conviction on the part of the
Poles and Romanians that they were well placed to deal directly with Germany. Both
states welcomed British concern about their security, though neither was willing to
subordinate itself to British plans, which appeared vague. During the second half of
March 1939 Chamberlain sought to forestall further German aggression by encour-
aging the east European states to form a diplomatic bloc. He hoped this would signal
to Hitler their determination to stand united. All those approached knew that to go
along with the British proposal risked provoking Germany – not least because in its
first draft the plan was supposed to include the Soviet Union. The Poles noted that
this broadly defined security bloc would not assure them of military assistance. Beck
therefore put forward a counter-proposal for a bilateral agreement, which he believed
would be less provocative to the Germans.
15
When, on March 31, Chamberlain
announced to the House of Commons that Britain had undertaken to defend Polish
security and the status of the Free City of Danzig, both sides knew the guarantee
was a diplomatic gesture to forewarn Germany, as distinct from a statement to fight
jointly. In fact, talks after March revealed that neither Britain nor France could
provide military assistance to Poland in the event of a German attack.
Since the end of World War I France and Poland had maintained close relations,
beginning with French military assistance to the Poles in their battles with the Red
Army in 1919–21. France had since come to regard Poland as the lynchpin of its
eastern policy, although this was tempered by the realization that Poland, on its own,
hitler and the origins of world war ii 415
could not stand up to Germany.
16
The alternative ally was the Soviet Union but, since
Poland viewed its powerful neighbor with implacable hostility, the two options were
mutually exclusive. Poland, lacking an absolute commitment of support from France,
sought an alternative – signing a Declaration of Non-aggression with Germany in
1934 and cooperating closely with Germany during the Czechoslovak crisis. Poland
had also claimed territories from Czechoslovakia in the wake of the Munich agree-
ment. Thus in 1939, when it was generally perceived that Germany would lay claim
to Danzig and a territorial link with eastern Prussia, it was unclear how the military
regime in Warsaw would respond. The lingering suspicion that the Poles might
choose to subordinate themselves to the Germans, though wholly unfounded, was
anxiously considered in London and Paris. The Poles, though they welcomed British
interest, which they hoped to convert into loans, credits, and military supplies, reso-
lutely refused to allow France and Britain to negotiate on their behalf with Germany.
They made it clear that if attacked or provoked by Germany they would fight. They
also let it be known that any attempt to change the status of the Free City of Danzig
would be seen as a provocation calling for a military response.
17
It was questionable
though whether they had the military capacity to do so. Thus, in the months follow-
ing the March crisis, as anticipation of a Polish–German conflict grew, France held
back from confirming and strengthening its commitment to Poland, while Britain
uneasily looked first to the other east European countries, then to France and, finally,
to the Soviet Union, to ascertain whether anyone would do anything in the event of
a German attack on Poland. When Germany did attack on the morning of September
1, these dilemmas were far from resolved. Poland was rich in paper commitments
but lacked military support against Germany.
18
During the months that followed the announcement that they would defend
Poland, the British and the French failed to provide the concept of an eastern front
with any substance. Neither was willing to fight in eastern Europe, nor were their
military leaders willing to plan an attack on Germany. Meanwhile, Hitler decided to
call Britain’s bluff and denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement. The initiative
was henceforth in Hitler’s hands, with France and Britain trying to decide whether,
and how, they could stop Germany. This raises the critical question of why did the
British and French governments pursue such inept policies and whether, as asserted
by the British historian A. J. P. Taylor, they might have encouraged German
aggression.
Appeasement
It is debatable whether the policy of appeasement was one of ineptitude or of prag-
matism. During the interwar period British military commitments were extensive,
and continental policy was determined by what seemed to be rational considerations
– in which financial concerns loomed large. Britain considered the extent of any
commitment to the continental against the background of imperial priorities, which
continued to be seen as the backbone of British economic wellbeing.
19
In 1919
financial restrictions based on the assumption that Britain and the empire were
unlikely to be at war during the forthcoming years (the “Ten Year Rule”) led to
dramatic reductions in military expenditure. When, in 1932, these guidelines were
set aside this was done as a result of growing anxiety about Japan. Cuts in funds for
416 anita j. prazmowska
equipping infantry units designated for action in Europe continued to be made and,
in 1935, the chancellor of the exchequer – Neville Chamberlain – confirmed this
policy. In 1937, when he became prime minister, he continued reducing expenditure
on units for continental action.
20
The neglect of the army’s continental role was only
reversed at the beginning of 1939. There was a rationale in Chamberlain’s approach.
In the first place, unemployment was viewed by the government as a priority, and
the way to tackling it was seen through balanced budgets. It was believed that military
expenditure would destroy that precarious economic recovery. The other factor
determining Chamberlain’s policies, one with which military leaders fully concurred,
was a desire to learn lessons from World War I. Thus the general conviction was that
any future war would once more be a long war of attrition in which economic
strength would be as important as military power; hence the need to maintain eco-
nomic links with the empire. The infantry’s role in fighting in Europe was assigned
a lower priority than the navy’s in safeguarding sea routes to the empire. The highest
priority was given to diplomacy, which was to defuse sources of tension in Europe
and either avoid or postpone conflict there.
Chamberlain’s limited political experience of foreign relations undoubtedly con-
tributed to his conviction that personal diplomacy was the best way of resolving dif-
ficulties; hence his penchant for arranging meetings with Hitler. He rarely listened
to the advice of those with whom he disagreed. A blinkered attitude towards Europe
drove British policy towards Germany. Distrust of the French in general and of their
policy towards the successor states in particular was a factor in Chamberlain’s seeking
an accommodation with Hitler. Finally, he intensely disliked the Soviets and felt there
was no need to cooperate with them. In the circumstances it is possible to see how
a well-intentioned desire to accommodate Germany’s just grievances gave Hitler the
impression of weakness.
21
After March 1939 neither Chamberlain’s ministers nor the military leaders were
ever entirely sure that they were right in taking the initiative in relation to Germany.
The need to conserve financial resources and to make supplies available only to those
allies whose contribution to the war would count in the long term, clashed with
attempts to do something about the imminence of the German attack on Poland.
Thus, credits intended for the purchase of military equipment were not given to
Poland, deemed unlikely to withstand a German attack for long. At the same time,
supplies were offered to Iraq, whose oil supplies were vital if Britain were to fight a
long war. Similarly, jointly with France, inconsistent efforts were made to retain Soviet
good will. This nevertheless fell short of a full alliance, which is what the Soviet
Union sought.
While the British government took the initiative during the closing months of
1938 and before September 1939, French policies have been unfairly characterized
as falling in line with British actions. The image of France abdicating its European
role is not correct. The French government did indeed scale down its commitment
to the concept of an eastern front, but not because it was prepared to subordinate
itself to Britain, but because French political and military leaders considered the
immediate defense of French territory to be an absolute priority.
22
Critical to under-
standing France’s response to Germany’s belligerence is the role played by internal
factors. In 1938 France was deeply polarized. The right wing, supported by the
banks, proprietors of the most important daily newspapers, the Catholic church, and
hitler and the origins of world war ii 417
some military and political leaders, came to view the growing strength of the trade
unions, the socialists, and the communists as the major threat to the French regime.
The left wing, earlier strongly pacifist, had eventually mobilized around the call to
fight the Nazis, and the right-wing Leagues in France, and to support the Spanish
republican government. Military and political leaders were also divided on the ques-
tion of which was France’s major enemy: Italy or Germany. Those who supported
an accommodation with Germany refer to the fact that Hitler made no reference to
reclaiming Alsace and Lorraine, whereas Italy had decided to challenge France’s
Mediterranean position. Thus in 1938 the question of whether to support
Czechoslovakia and, in 1939, what role to assume in relation to the Polish–German
crisis, concerned both the advisability of seeking an accommodation with Germany
in order to focus on the Italian threat, and the state of the French economy and the
cost of remilitarization programs.
During the second half of the 1930s French military thinking had changed. In
the 1920s France conceived of a security system that would constrain Germany’s
ability to attack either in the east or the west. Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia, as well
as economic difficulties and the falling French birth rate, influenced a change in
strategy. Even then it was not entirely clear how a new strategy would work: would
it defend only French territories, or would it include forward positions? Nowhere
was this dilemma more obvious than in the building of the Maginot Line of fortifica-
tions on the Franco-German border, which left the Belgian–German border unpro-
tected. Nothing could be done about the Belgian conviction that by assuming a
non-belligerent status, they would be avoiding a German invasion. At the time of
the German attack on Poland, General Gamelin had few illusions about the inade-
quacy of French defenses.
23
Nevertheless, since Munich, efforts had been made to
improve France’s military capability, with increased expenditure on armaments.
Poland was once more elevated to the role of the key element in France’s eastern
front strategy. This dubious policy, which credited Poland with the capacity to with-
stand a German attack, suggests that the French military leadership, most notably
Gamelin, were willfully avoiding the truth. The pretence of France and Poland united
in planning for joint military action could not disguise the fact that all French military
plans were confined to the defense of the French borders to the exclusion of any
offensive action against Germany. Were the French to be more realistic they would
have to reassess not only their eastern front strategy, but also possibly their main
military doctrines. Thus the French pretended that they would assist Poland, and the
Poles in turn pretended that they would be in a position to defend their own terri-
tory. Neither was the case.
Crucial to all considerations in the months preceding the outbreak of the war was
the issue of the Soviet Union. British and French leaders would have preferred to
leave Stalin out of the picture. This turned out not to be possible. Public opinion,
as much as Soviet foreign policy initiatives, made it difficult to maintain that policy,
without being accused of neglect. At the same time, Nazi Germany responded to
Soviet feelers. Neither the democracies nor Germany knew what to expect from the
Soviet Union. Both sides were unsure of the extent to which revolutionary ideals still
determined the Soviet government’s policies. At the same, in a war that was likely to
be long and economically devastating, the economic wealth the Soviet Union might
offer could not be overlooked.