McBride W.M. Technological change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945
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Permitted by the Washington and London Naval Treaties,” 72nd Congress, 1st Ses-
sion (1932), cited in Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battle-
ship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 291.
7. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979), 152. Battleship numbers from Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms
Control, 1921–1937 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), table 1.1, 13.
8. The Five-Power Treaty did not limit aircraft. A committee of aviation experts
from Britain, Japan, Italy, France, and the United States deferred discussion of the
aircraft question, believing “that it is not practicable to impose any effective limi-
tations upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or mili-
tary, except in the single case of lighter-than-air craft. The committee is of the opin-
ion that the use of aircraft in warfare should be governed by the rules of warfare as
adapted to aircraft by a further conference which should be held at a later date”;
Report of Special Committee on Limitation of Aircraft in Warfare, cited in Tenth
Annual Report of the N.A.C.A. in Aviation, 22 December 1924, reprinted in USNIP
51 (1925): 495.
9. Or, as Billy Mitchell put it: “more than 1000 airplanes can be built and main-
tained for the outlay required for a single [$10 million] battleship”; see William
Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power
Economic and Military (New York: Dover, 1988; reprint of the 1925 edition pub-
lished by G. P. Putnam’s Sons), 120.
10. The older battleships that were expended in these tests had been designed
to fight at relatively shorter ranges than contemporary battleships, for example,
those of the U.S. 1916 Program. At shorter ranges more vertical armor was installed
as the trajectory of incoming shells was relatively flat. Long-range naval guns de-
livered their shells at a steeper angle and as a result the later battleship designs in-
stalled heavier horizontal armor that resisted aerial bombs as well.
11. Report of the Special Board on Policy with Reference to the Upkeep of the Navy
in its Various Branches, 17 January 1925, in General Board Hearings (hereafter 1925
Special Board Report), 23.
12. For the aviation side of the bombing trials, see Mitchell, Winged Defense,
chap. 3.
13. Rear Admiral Moffett’s statement before the Joint Military and Naval Affairs
Committee of the House of Representatives printed in full in Aviation and
reprinted in USNIP 50 (1924): 1364–70.
14. Ibid. Army flyers had recently flown across the northern Pacific from Dutch
Harbor, Alaska, to Japan in April–May 1924; see “Professional Notes,” USNIP 50
(1924): 1370.
Notes to Pages 140–143
284
15. The naval officer corps deeply resented the intrusion of New Era efficiency
experts, led by the administration’s budget office, into naval affairs. As Admiral
Rodgers told the General Board: “We are continually confronted by Treasury
people who want a change, and reformers who are constantly making the point
in which their business training causes them to follow a line of thought which is
not in accordance with [naval] necessity.... [The New Era] Congress, taking
over from civil life its business ideas, looks to the great corporations which have
grown up by consolidation to become trusts, and says, ‘Let us consolidate every-
thing that looks alike and put them together.’ They say, ‘We will take those things
that look alike and consolidate them in the interests of efficiency’”; Rodgers’s 26
June 1922 statement to the General Board, General Board Hearings. For many
naval officers, Republican Party New Era efficiency threatened the U.S. Navy
with extinction.
16. Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur to General Board, 23 September
1924, reprinted in General Board Hearings.
17. See Army and Navy Register,“The Naval Budget,” 25 October 1924, reprinted
in USNIP 51 (1925): 127–28.
18. 1925 Special Board Report, 1–3.
19. Ibid., 11.
20. Ibid. As yet, the navy had no aircraft carriers save the converted collier
Langley.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 43.
25. Ibid., 70.
26. Ibid., 70–71.
27. Ibid., 20.
28. Ibid. 28.
29. For accounts of Sims’s experience in revamping U.S. naval gunnery prac-
tices, see Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1966), chap. 2.
30. 1925 Special Board Report, 20.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. For a critical assessment of the battleship, see Rodrigo Garcia y Robert-
son, “The Failure of the Heavy Gun at Sea, 1898–1922,” Technology and Culture
28 (1987): 539–57.
33. 1925 Special Board Report, 20.
Notes to Pages 143–146
285
34. Testimony of Admiral Strauss, Hearings Before the Special Board, contained
in General Board Hearings (hereafter Special Board Hearings), 132.
35. See testimony of Rear Admiral Moffett and Captains Johnson and Land of the
Bureau of Aeronautics, 30 September and 1–3 October 1924, Special Board Hearings.
36. Navy Secretary Curtis D. Wilbur in [Washington] Star, “Naval Engineers
Have in View Vastly Improved Battleships,” 15 January 1925, reprinted in USNIP
51 (1925): 501.
37. 1925 Special Board Report, 27.
38. Ibid.
39. Combat experience in World War II forced the navy to take waterborne
shock from nearby explosions more seriously than before the war. See Francis Dun-
can, “Hyman G. Rickover: Technology and Naval Tradition,” in Quarterdeck and
Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders, ed. James C. Bradford (An-
napolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 398.
40. Testimony of Rear Admiral Moffett, 30 September 1924, Special Board Hear-
ings.
41. Moffett had entered his “largest gun” battleship essay for the Naval Institute’s
Lippincott Prize. See Commander William A. Moffett, USN, to Captain William
S. Sims, USN, 12 June 1916; Sims to Moffett, 16 June 1916; and Moffett to Sims, 27
June 1916, in the Papers of William S. Sims, Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Sims Papers), Box 47.
42. Testimony of Rear Admiral Moffett, Special Board Hearings, 170. For Mof-
fett’s medal-winning in Mexico, see William F. Trimble, Admiral William A. Mof-
fett: Architect of Naval Aviation (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1994), chap. 3. Moffett was an astute politician and his use of the gun metaphor
may have been to placate the battleship hierarchy. At this stage in his career at the
Bureau of Aeronautics, Moffett is most likely speaking sincerely as a member of
the battleship thought collective. The developments in aviation technology in the
late 1920s and introduction of the large carriers Lexington and Saratoga provided
the framework which allowed him to move away from this “normal” view of naval
aviation.
43. Testimony of Lieutenant Commander Mitscher, Special Board Hearings,
42 and 39.
44. Testimony of Rear Admiral M. M. Taylor, Special Board Hearings, 310. Tay-
lor was basing his estimate on a carrier costing $16 million; the carrier Saratoga,
still under construction, actually cost $45 million, which would have enhanced his
argument on behalf of the submarine.
45. For an overview of the U.S. Navy’s War Plan Orange against Japan, see Rus-
Notes to Pages 146–149
286
sell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strat-
egy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), chap. 12.
46. Testimony of Rear Admiral Magruder, 10 October 1924, Special Board Hear-
ings.
47. Ibid.
48. The Board heard testimony regarding the potential use of poison-gas aerial
bombs against ships. See the testimony of Rear Admiral Moffett and Lieutenant
McMurrain, 30 September[?] 1924, Special Board Hearings.
49. 1925 Special Board Report, 75–77.
50. Testimony of Admiral William F. Fullam, USN (Ret.), Special Board Hear-
ings, 716.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 719.
54. Ibid., 723.
55. Coontz was a part of the what Rear Admiral Sims condemned as the reac-
tionary “Daniels Cabinet”; see Sims to John Callan O’Laughlin, 23 September
1925, Sims Papers, Box 46. Sims characterized the appointment of these admirals
of the Old School as “a crime against the people of the United States”; Sims to
Lieutenant Commander Dinger, 14 February 1925, Sims Papers, Box 54. For Ad-
miral Coontz and the submarine program, see the testimony of Admiral Fullam,
Special Board Hearings, 723.
56. Testimony of Admiral Fullam, Special Board Hearings, 717.
57. Ibid.
58. The General Board, fearing a foreign shift in naval competition from the
battleship to the air, was particularly interested in British efforts in naval aviation.
Lieutenant Colonel Porte, of the Royal Flying Corps, was questioned vigorously in
1918 in order to ascertain whether the British were considering any radical em-
ployment of aircraft at sea. See the testimony of Porte in General Board Hearings,
18 June 1918.
59. For the Morrow Board, see Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, His-
tory of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1949), 249–58.
60. The Morrow Board Report was reprinted in USNIP 52 (1926): 196–225.
61. See Michael A. West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval
Affairs Committee and the Construction of the Treaty Navy, 1926–1934” (Ph.D.
diss., The Ohio State University, 1980), 44–47; and Turnbull and Lord, Naval Avi-
ation, 257 and chap. 24.
Notes to Pages 149–152
287
62. Admiral Samuel S. Robinson, commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, to Captain
Emory S. Land, (CC), USN, Bureau of Aeronautics, 17 May 1926, Emory S. Land
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 5.
63. Captain Yates Stirling, USN, “The Place for Aviation in the Organization
for War,” USNIP 52 (1926): 1103–4.
64. Captain Yates Stirling, USN, “Some Fundamentals of Sea Power,” USNIP
51 (1925): 913–14. Stirling extended his gun metaphor to include the submarine, a
projectile that plunges beneath the sea, but one, like the airplane, which must re-
turn to the surface; ibid., 915.
65. Ibid., 917. Stirling’s description of future aerial warfare typified the naval
hierarchy’s extension of its battleship worldview to this alternate technology: “[We
may imagine] an air fleet . . . the great bombing planes and torpedo planes repre-
senting capital ships; scouting planes and spotting planes being the light cruisers
and fighting planes the swift, agile destroyers of the air; fighting planes on each side
concentrating to bring a superior force upon the enemy air fleet at a superior mo-
ment.” See Stirling, “Aviation in Organization for War,” 1105.
66. Statement of Rear Admiral Williams, Special Board Hearings, 122.
67. The first purpose-built aircraft carrier, Ranger, did not enter service until
1934. Early fleet exercises tended to pit Lexington against Saratoga. On the avia-
tion lessons of the exercises, see Thomas Wildenberg, Destined for Glory: Dive
Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower (Annapolis: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1998), chap. 7.
68. Tactical Orders and Doctrine for the U.S. Fleet, 1941 quoted in Wildenberg,
Destined for Glory, v.
69. Rear Admiral M. M. Taylor, commander of the Control Force, Special
Board Hearings, 263.
70. Ibid. Other relevant articles include Hector C. Bywater, “The Battleship
and Its Uses,” USNIP 52 (1926): 407–25; Lieutenant Commander C. A. Pownall,
USN, “The Airphobia of 1925,” USNIP 52 (1926): 459–63; Lieutenant Comman-
der O. C. Badger, USN, “History Repeats or The Application of Lessons of History
on a National Problem of Today,” USNIP 51 (1925): 707–21.
71. For a contemporary account of the navy’s Naval Aircraft Factory, see Lieu-
tenant Commander S. J. Ziegler (CC), USN, “The Naval Aircraft Factory,”
USNIP 52 (1926): 83–94.
72. Rear Admiral W. A. Moffett, USN, “Recent Technical Development of
Naval Aviation,” USNIP 57 (1931): 1182–83.
73. Ibid., 1185. For the development of aviation technology during Moffett’s
tenure as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, see Trimble, Admiral Moffett, passim.
Notes to Pages 152–154
288
74. Admiral W. T. Mayo, USN, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to General
Board, 5 May 1919, a copy of which is contained in General Board Hearings, 660–
71; quote on 660.
75. Testimony of Rear Admiral Moffett, 30 September 1924, Special Board Hear-
ings. At the time of his testimony, the navy had only one carrier, the converted col-
lier Langley; the converted battlecruisers Lexington and Saratoga would not be
ready until 1927. The effect that New Era efficiency exerted on the navy can be
seen in the naval budgets from 1922 through 1932. During this period, the naval ap-
propriations averaged $359 million per year and totaled almost $4 billion. The to-
tal naval appropriations for the dreadnought navy (1906 through 1916) was less (al-
most $2 billion), but on average, 27 percent of each year’s appropriation went to
naval expansion, that is, new ship construction and alterations to existing vessels,
as opposed to an average of 15 percent ($54 million) per year during the New Era.
Data drawn from West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation,” table 3, 38.
76. See, for example, Naval War College Staff Lectures: “The Employment of
Aviation in Naval Warfare,” serial 3429–1487/9-9-37, September 1937; “Tactical
Employment of the Fleet,” 29 October 1937; and “The Employment of Sub-
marines,” 3 October 1938, in Record Group 14, Staff Presentations and Lectures,
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
77. New York Times, 26 February 1931, reprinted in USNIP 57 (1931): 538.
78. Ibid. Also see Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air
Navy (Huntington, N.Y.: Robert E. Krieger, 1978), chap. 1, especially 14–21.
79. Wildenberg, Destined for Glory, 156–57.
80. Ibid., 156.
81. Ibid.
82. See ibid., chaps. 18 and 19; speed data on 193.
83. Wildenberg places the initial squadron employment of the SBD-2 in De-
cember 1940 (ibid., 161). TBD squadron data from Roy A. Grossnick, United States
Naval Aviation, 1910–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1996),
appendix 6, “Combat Aircraft Procured,” 494.
Chapter 7. Disarmament, Depression, and Politics
1. Commager and Morris, editors’ introduction, in William E. Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940 (New York: Harper & Row,
1963), ix.
2. Only two (Alaska and Guam) of the six expensive, lightly armored, and rela-
tively slow Alaska-class battlecruisers were completed. Work on the third, Hawaii,
was suspended in December 1943. The remaining three were not laid down, and
Notes to Pages 154–158
289
their allocations were shifted to aircraft carrier production. Although the navy des-
ignated the Alaskas as large cruisers (CB), they were, in fact, battlecruisers. See
Robert O. Dulin and William H. Garzke Jr., Battleships: U.S. Battleships in World
War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), chap. 6.
3. Selig Adler, “Hoover’s Foreign Policy and the New Left,” in The Hoover Pres-
idency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1974), 153–54; Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert
Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After,” in Hoover and the His-
torians (West Branch, Iowa: Hoover Presidential Library Association, 1989), 5. A
useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner,
“Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese,” in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-Amer-
ican Relations 1931–1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1973), 25–52. Also see Alexander DeConde, “Herbert
Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment,” in Herbert Hoover Re-
assessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of
Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96–63, 96th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 313–34; and
Joan Hoff Wilson, “A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover’s Foreign Policy,” in Fausold
and Mazuzan, 164–86 (quote on 171).
4. The one exception to Hoover’s general policy was his grudging permission
for the navy to transfer funding allocated for shore establishments, under the July
1932 Emergency Relief and Construction Act, to the construction of three new de-
stroyers. See Robert H. Levine, The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930–
1938 (New York: Garland, 1988), 41–61. Roosevelt in 1932 proposed a $100 million
reduction in the annual naval budget and a $30 million cap on annual naval con-
struction funding over the next five years. See Michael A. West, “Laying the Leg-
islative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs Committee and the Construction of
the Treaty Navy” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1980), 275–77.
5. Arthur M. Schlesinger does not mention naval construction as part of the $3.3
billion NIRA public works package in his The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the
New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); see chap. 6. Nor is there any mention
in Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt; see chap. 3, especially 55–61. Frank Freidel mentions
NIRA naval construction in passing, characterizing it as “palatable” to Roosevelt; see
Frank Freidel Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973), 432. Freidel observed that Hoover allocated $15 million in relief
funds for ships and shore bases (although he did not point out that the funds were for
operation and maintenance and not for new construction); ibid. See William H.
McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force in European Society
Notes to Page 158
290
since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), chap. 8, especially 270.
On Cleveland and the navy, see Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 160 and 173–75.
6. Frank Freidel Jr., “Hoover and Roosevelt and Historical Continuity,” in
Hoover Reassessed, 288. Admiral Land to Secretary Swanson, 13 June 1933, Record
Group 19, Records of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 19); and Swanson to Roosevelt, 15 June 1933,
Record Group 80, Records of the Secretary of the Navy, National Archives, Wash-
ington, D.C. (hereafter RG 80), cited in West, “Legislative Foundation,” 329. See
also Waldo H. Heinrichs Jr., “The Role of the United States Navy,” in Pearl Har-
bor as History, 197–224.
7. The “Basic Naval Policy” may be found in General Board to Secretary of the
Navy, G.Bd.#438, Serial 1347, 21 April 1927, in Foreign Affairs—Disarmament File,
Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West
Branch, Iowa. Trade data from Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The
United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1963), 190. The disagreement between Hoover and the General Board over
the worldwide strategy and large navy inherent in the “Basic Naval Policy” was par-
alleled by late cold war tensions among national strategy, developed by the Presi-
dent/National Security Council; Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/commander-in-chiefs’
strategies formulated by the JCS; defense strategy developed within the Depart-
ment of Defense; and service strategies created within each of the armed services
and used for “setting their own institutional agendas, rationalizing their require-
ments, and arguing for a larger or protected slice of the budget.” Carl H. Builder,
The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), chap. 5, quote on 57–58.
8. [Washington] Star, “Navy Up to Par, Coolidge Believes,” 10 January 1925,
reprinted in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP) 51 (1925): 481–82.
Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), “New Naval Limitation Conference Pre-
dicted,” The Sun [Baltimore], 7 January 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498–
500. For cruiser funding, see Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Con-
trol: 1921–1937 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 39–40.
9. See Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, chap. 6; and Hall, Arms Control, 58.
See Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise
of the U.S. Navy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 292. Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot, December 1928, quoted in Raymond G. O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium:
The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (New York: Green-
wood, 1969), 20.
Notes to Pages 158–160
291
10. See Wilson, “Reevaluation.” As William Appleman Williams observed,
Hoover believed that “[t]he armed forces of the United States had the one purpose
of guaranteeing ‘That no foreign soldier will land on American soil. To maintain
forces less than that strength is to destroy national safety, to maintain greater forces
is not only economic injury to our people but a threat against our neighbors and
would be a righteous cause for ill will among them.’” William Appleman Williams,
“What This Country Needs . . . The Shattered Dream: Herbert Hoover and the
Great Depression,” in Hoover Reassessed, 445.
11. Hoover in a statement to his cabinet, reprinted in Ray L. Wilbur and Arthur
M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937), 601.
Hoover published J. Reuben Clark’s memorandum, suppressed by Coolidge,
which invalidated use of the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for U.S. interven-
tion in Latin America; Williams, “What This Country Needs,” 444.
12. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the
New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941,
Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best are portrayed as misguided
in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy’s interwar
court historian, characterized treaty limitations as “disappointing” and the reason
for the “defeat” of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would
have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the “strong naval policies” of
Theodore Roosevelt or followed “the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after
1916, to create a preeminent American Navy”; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the
United States Navy (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1948), 431. Also see Philip T.
Rosen, “The Treaty Navy, 1919–1937,” in In Peace and War: Interpretations of Amer-
ican Naval History, 1775–1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood, 1984), 221–36. More recently, Robert W. Love Jr. claimed Hoover had a
“crabbed view of the utility of naval power” and characterized his defense policies
as “eccentric” and Hoover as a “pacifist”; History of the U.S. Navy, 1775–1941 (Har-
risburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1992), 558–59. Stephen E. Pelz, in his Race to Pearl Har-
bor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World
War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), simply wrote off
Hoover and attributed “a fateful delay in American naval building” not to the New
Era Republicans but to Roosevelt’s difficulties with Congress. For a more balanced,
recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, “Naval Rearmament, 1930–1941: An Amer-
ican Perspective,” Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35–54.
13. Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and Pres-
idency, 1920–1933, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 340. In the fall of 1929, the
navy had 331 ships in commission: 16 battleships, 15 cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 8
Notes to Page 161
292
minelayers, 103 destroyers, 82 submarines, 29 patrol ships, and 75 noncombatant
service ships; Report of the Chief of Naval Operations in Annual Reports of the Navy
Department for the Fiscal Year 1929 (Including Operations to November 15, 1929)
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 79–80.
14. Sperry pointed out to Hoover that measuring naval strength by tonnage alone
was inaccurate; telephone message from Sperry to Hoover, December 12, 1921,
Limitation of Armaments Conference File, Commerce Papers, Hoover Papers,
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Hoover was serving as a
member of the Executive Committee of the U.S. Advisory Committee to the Amer-
ican Delegation.
15. General Board to Secretary of the Navy, G.B. No. 438–1, Serial 1427, 10 June
1929, Foreign Affairs—Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers,
Hoover Library. For the genesis of U.S. naval war gaming, see Ronald H. Spector,
Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Pro-
fession (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977), chap. 6, especially 74–82.
16. See the detailed formulas contained in General Board to Secretary of
the Navy, G.B. No. 438–1, Serial 1430 (Secret), 1 August 1929, Foreign Affairs—
Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library.
17. For an overview of the London Naval Conference, see Wheeler, Prelude to
Pearl Harbor, chap. 7; and O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium. No notes were taken
during the Hoover–MacDonald meeting; Hall, Arms Control, 78–79.
18. For a view of the London conference from the Japanese side, see Kobiyashi
Tatsuo, “The London Naval Treaty, 1930,” in Japan Erupts: The London Naval
Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932, ed. James William Morley
(New York: Columbia University Press , 1984), 11–117. The Japanese government
of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi saw Japan’s future in a reordering of the do-
mestic economy and expansion of foreign trade. Naval agreement at London was
viewed as essential to buy Western support for a solution to Japan’s economic prob-
lems; Arthur E. Tiedemann, “Introduction,” Japan Erupts, 4–11; 9. Hall, Arms Con-
trol, 80.
19. Hoover to Secretary of the Navy, 2 November 1929, Foreign Affairs—Disar-
mament File, Disarmament Conference 1929, November 1–10 Folder, Presiden-
tial Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library.
20. See Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, chap. 7; and William F. Trimble, “Ad-
miral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference,” Military Affairs 43
(1979): 1–4. For Pratt, see Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S.
Navy: A Sailor’s Life (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Division, Department
of the Navy, 1974); and the useful contextual essay by Craig L. Symonds, “William
Notes to Pages 161–163
293