McBride W.M. Technological change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945

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Sims concluded his critique by suggesting that the secretary of the navy

specify a greater role for the line ofﬁcers of the General Board in the de-

sign of new battleships.

He also recommended that the tactical qualities

of the various preliminary designs be subjected to analysis by the line ofﬁ-

cer staff at the Naval War College.

Chief Constructor Bowles had been appreciative of Sims’s suggestions

in the past and had even gone so far as to send him warship plans for com-

ments on a regular basis.

When Bowles received Sims’s magnum opus

calling for the restructuring of the Board on Construction and subordina-

tion of naval constructors to the line, Bowles’s cordiality ended:

As I have written you before I welcome your criticisms of our vessels and receive

them wholly in the spirit in which they are made. I do not always agree in the

matter, nor approve wholly in the matter of making them. I am only led to this

remark from the fact that I feel that your last paper, above referred to, would

injure your usefulness to the service in a valuable capacity, from attempting

to deal in a carping spirit upon matters upon which you may not have the best

information, and which will only result in bad feeling.

Bowles soon found that Sims’s “carping” was quiet compared to the

turmoil generated when the Board on Construction eliminated the torpedo

tubes in the Connecticut-class battleships.

The Torpedo Tube Debate

In November 1902 Lieutenant Commander A. P. Niblack presented a

paper entitled “The Tactics of the Gun” at the 10th General Meeting of the

Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers.

Niblack character-

ized the battleship gun as only one weapon of offense, its mission to neu-

tralize the guns and personnel of an enemy battleship. Complete destruc-

tion could only be wrought underwater: “It is the function of the ram and

the torpedo to penetrate the under-water body of a ship, and breaking down

its water-tight subdivisions, or striking it in a vital point such as a magazine

or boiler, to destroy it . . . it is only by luck or by indirection that a modern

battleship can sink another by gun-ﬁre alone.”

Niblack’s argument for the torpedo came at the same time the Board on

Technological Change and the United States Navy

Construction eliminated torpedoes in the Connecticuts. In an attempt to

“keep the pot boiling,” anonymous line ofﬁcers sent Niblack’s paper to Sec-

retary Long, who inquired why torpedo tubes were no longer being in-

stalled in American battleships. The Board responded that seagoing ofﬁ-

cers preferred the submerged torpedo tube over a trainable, “overwater”

tube. However, the Board went on to characterize the military advantages

of all torpedoes as “remote to say the least.” Underwater tubes were prone

to ﬂooding and their inclusion in a ship called for some serious strategic

and tactical sacriﬁces:

The torpedo outﬁt of the [battleship] MAINE [authorized 1898], which has but

two underwater tubes, weighs 27 tons, about equal to the weight of two 6-inch

guns and mounts, and it is safe to say that most commanding ofﬁcers would

much prefer two such guns to two underwater tubes. The space assigned for the

two underwater tubes of the MAINE is, approximately, 10,000 cubic feet, which

is almost equal to that assigned for [the ship’s total] provisions [food].

The Board on Construction had inferred, from complaints by comman-

ders at sea, that the torpedo was a nuisance and inappropriate.

Apparently, Niblack’s enthusiasm for the torpedo was not held by sev-

eral battleship captains who had applied for the removal of their above-

water torpedo tubes.

Even assuming that the underwater tubes func-

tioned perfectly, the Board felt “it is a grave question whether it is advisable

to sacriﬁce any important feature on a battleship or armored cruiser for the

installation of a secondary weapon of remote value, and which requires tac-

tics differing entirely from those best adapted to the gun, the primary

weapon of such vessels.”

The torpedo, as Roland and O’Connell have

both observed, was a weapon beyond the pale.

The Board on Construction was not unanimous in excluding torpedoes

from the new battleships. Rear Admiral Royal B. Bradford, the line ofﬁcer

chief of the Bureau of Equipment, defended the torpedo. Bradford thought

the torpedo question a tactical one that should be referred to “a consider-

able number of tactical line ofﬁcers.”

Such a dangerous proposal sparked

a pointed response from the technical bureau chiefs:

Who are the tactical line ofﬁcers of the Navy whose opinions would be of greater

value than those of the members of the Board on Construction, whose atten-

Competing for Control

tion is constantly drawn to all matters of pertaining to the designs, military fea-

tures and other details of ships of war? It can be conﬁdently asserted that no

other ofﬁcers of the Navy have a better knowledge of the intricacies of and the

difﬁculties attending the use of torpedo discharge tubes than the members of

this Board.

Secretary Long upheld the Board on Construction majority position abol-

ishing battleship torpedo tubes, but the question was far from settled within

the line.

Commander J. B. Murdock used the torpedo issue to attack the naval

constructors’ control over battleship design in the pages of the U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings.

Murdock argued that only line ofﬁcers, with their

appreciation of tactical requirements, should rule on weapons technolo-

gies like the torpedo. Murdock pointed out that American prejudice against

torpedoes would not make U.S. battleships torpedo-proof:

we have never given as much weight to torpedoes as other nations have done,

and have largely ignored the possible results of their use against us. In short, we

are building battleships with neither torpedo tubes nor [antitorpedo] nets, ap-

parently laying down the law that battleships need not use torpedoes, and have

nothing to fear from those of an enemy.

Murdock elucidated the effect national strategic and tactical policies,

and naval culture, had upon the “normal” reﬁnement and trajectory of the

battleship technological paradigm. The U.S. Navy had always placed em-

phasis upon gun power and structural strength—and in armor as that came

into vogue—in its warships. Murdock appreciated that naval and military

establishments tend to design their weapons systems to defeat ships similar

to their own and to ﬁt their own strategic and tactical thought styles. This

mirror approach dismisses counterweapons: if we have not thought to em-

ploy torpedoes, our enemy will not. This was as true of the battleship gun

as it is of most of today’s weapons.

Murdock’s article resulted in a clamor by prominent line ofﬁcers for tor-

pedo tubes in U.S. battleships.

In July 1903 Lieutenant Frank K. Hill, of

the Bureau of Ordnance, ﬁled a minority opinion with the Board on Con-

struction calling for restoration of the torpedo tubes. Hill cited Niblack’s

paper and Murdock’s article and claimed that foreign battleships were

Technological Change and the United States Navy

equipped with torpedoes with ranges up to 3,000 yards. The chief intelli-

gence ofﬁcer, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee (a line ofﬁcer), had voted with

the majority for removal of the battleship torpedo tubes. He reafﬁrmed, to

the Navy Department, the absence of any intelligence data that could con-

ﬁrm Hill’s claims. The Board on Construction attributed Hill’s enthusiasm

to his work with torpedoes and claimed that his duties did not “extend to

questions of policy or tactics, but to material only”—the same “crime” for

which the technical bureaus were being indicted.

Running into a dead end at the Board on Construction, torpedo sup-

porters appealed to the General Board. Apparently, Captain Sigsbee was

not aware of all the intelligence available on foreign torpedoes. Younger

members of his staff at the Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence informed the Gen-

eral Board that foreign torpedoes had the capability to strike at ranges up

to 3,000 yards. Admiral Dewey warned the secretary of the navy that

Since gun-ﬁre, in order to result in a decisive action, must be delivered at a

range not greatly exceeding 3,000 yards, it follows that the tactics of ﬂeet actions

will hereafter be inﬂuenced by the presence or absence of torpedoes. . . . Tac-

tical war games played at the Naval War College between ﬂeets with and ﬂeets

without torpedoes have been won by the former whenever the result of the game

has been decisive; in all cases, the ﬂeet armed with torpedoes holds the com-

mand of the situation in tactical maneuvers.

Faced with such a strong statement from Dewey and the General Board,

the Board on Construction was forced to reopen the torpedo question. As

a result of further study, and “in view of present foreign practice . . . and re-

cent and prospective improvements in the service torpedo of the U.S. Navy,

the Board recommends for battleships . . . as many torpedo tubes as can be

possibly installed.”

Sigsbee’s ignorance of the current intelligence regarding foreign torpe-

does, along with the Board on Construction’s abrupt course change, de-

creased the credibility of the Board on Construction with the ofﬁce of the

secretary of the navy. Conversely, the General Board’s prestige and ability

to inﬂuence technological decisions increased. The navy retroﬁtted tor-

pedo tubes in the ﬁrst ﬁve Connecticut-class battleships after the circum-

navigating cruise of the “Great White Fleet”

in 1907–8. The sixth ship,

New Hampshire, was delivered with her tubes installed.

Competing for Control

Failed Legalization of the General Board

The Connecticut controversy enhanced the prestige of the General

Board and underscored the line ofﬁcers’ position that they should control

the warship design process. Line ofﬁcer control would ensure technologi-

cal conformity with the strategic paradigm and assure that the navy was on

the proper technological trajectory—a “further articulation” of a techno-

logical paradigm, “partly inﬂuenced by the selection environment.”

In April 1904 Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody called for statu-

tory recognition of the General Board to empower it vis-à-vis the bureaus

and the Board on Construction. The General Board had been created by

an executive order of the secretary of the navy whereas the bureau organi-

zation was ﬁxed by an 1842 law.

Moody told the House Naval Affairs

Committee that statutory recognition of the General Board was a move that

would not “supplant the present organization of the Navy Department . . .

[but was] one which supplements that organization.”

As might be ex-

pected, Moody’s proposal generated almost universal opposition by the bu-

reau chiefs, who foresaw a reduction in their own power and autonomy

should Congress place the General Board on a par with the bureaus.

In a move that struck at the very basis of the technical bureaus’ power,

Secretary Moody also proposed that the General Board be authorized to

determine what types of ships the navy should build. Moody’s statement

that “the technical bureaus should say how those ships should be designed

and built” sounded a great deal like Sims’s proposed reorganization on the

French model. Only the details of the actual technology would be left to

the engineers.

In his testimony in support of his plan, Moody blithely dismissed any

“conﬂict between the General Board and the construction department.”

He did admit that the General Board “could not settle the detailed char-

acteristics of the warship types. They have not sufﬁcient knowledge to do

that.”

According to Admiral Dewey, the clear linkage among technology, strat-

egy, and tactics revealed during the torpedo dispute had expanded the du-

ties of the General Board to include determining “the manner and types of

ships proper to constitute the ﬂeet.”

When pinned down before the

House Naval Affairs Committee on the Board’s responsibilities, Admiral

Dewey stated that the General Board only recommended the “numbers

and types” of ships, implying that the details of battleships, for example,

Technological Change and the United States Navy

were left entirely to the Board on Construction.

But the General Board’s

consideration of the “manner” of ships had grown to include more than

numbers and types. There was little doubt among the bureaus, and their

friends in Congress, that the General Board desired a stronger voice in the

technological policy of the navy.

The chief of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, Rear Admiral Wash-

ington L. Capps, told the House Naval Affairs Committee that he had no

objection to the General Board as long as its duties were “clearly deﬁned

and restricted.” Capps was quite speciﬁc as to where control over naval

technology should be vested: “Deﬁnite responsibility in all matters affect-

ing the design and construction of ships of war, including hull, machinery,

armament, and ﬁttings, should be lodged with those whose technical and

military training, and already legalized ofﬁcial duties, make such respon-

sibility direct and unavoidable. This responsibility is now deﬁnitely as-

sumed by the four technical bureaus of the Navy Department, the chiefs

of which constitute the Board on Construction.” Capps was willing to leave

the “disposition of the completed ship” and “matters affecting the military

efﬁciency of the ﬂeet” to the General Board.

Rear Admiral Charles W. Rae, chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineer-

ing, characterized the General Board as a “wedge” being used to break the

power of the technical bureaus and centralize the control of the navy in a

board of line ofﬁcers. Rae belittled the competence of the General Board,

pointing out its stubborn call for the construction of protected cruisers—a

ship protected solely by an armored deck at the waterline—that the Board

on Construction judged (and was) technically obsolete.

Despite Secretary Moody’s strong support for congressional recognition

of the General Board, the legislation failed to leave the committee, torpe-

doed by Moody’s subordinate, veteran Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Charles H. Darling. Darling testiﬁed forcefully against any increase in the

General Board’s power. In Darling’s opinion, “a vast amount of the work

in connection with the administration of the Navy is civilian work pure and

simple.”

There was no need to expand the General Board’s military in-

ﬂuence in battleship design since “The building of a battleship is purely

civilian work. . . . It is entirely a matter of business administration,” work

that fell under the province of the Washington bureaus.

Although thwarted in its attempt to attain status equal to the bureaus,

the General Board continued to expand its involvement in decisions re-

garding U.S. naval technology. In October 1905, in accordance with its

Competing for Control

charter, the General Board recommended the types of ships to be included

in the building program for Congress. However, the Board also speciﬁed

the number and caliber of main guns, the freeboard (the distance between

waterline and main deck)—something well within the province of naval

architects—and the armor protection for the proposed battleships. The

General Board requested three 18,000-ton battleships (2,000 tons larger

than the Connecticuts). The Board also requested three scout cruisers, four

destroyers, four torpedo boats, four submarines, and four gunboats at a

total cost of $35.96 million.

Sensitive to the General Board’s intrusion into its domain, the Board on

Construction recommended three smaller battleships, three scout cruisers,

and two gunboats for a total of $28.7 million. In case some members of

Congress had not yet comprehended the centrality of the battleship to

American naval power, the Board on Construction recommended that

Congress cut the battleships last as they were the “primary and most im-

portant” type of vessel. The Board on Construction rejected the General

Board’s 18,000-ton battleships since a “most effective vessel of this type can

be provided on a displacement which will not involve excessive cost or

size.”

Angered by the Board on Construction’s opposition to bigger battle-

ships, Dewey proposed replacing the Board on Construction with a per-

manent Board on Designs. Dewey feigned concern that the members of

the Board on Construction were being overworked, as their “responsible

duties of research and administration” as bureau chiefs left them “scant

time” to devote to the Board on Construction. Dewey’s proposed Board on

Designs would include two civilians “having expert knowledge and ex-

perience” and ﬁve ofﬁcers, one of whom should be a naval constructor.

None of the Board members would be chief of a bureau. The sole duties

of this Board on Designs would be “to examine and pass upon all designs

submitted to the Navy Department for vessels to be built.”

Such a line of-

ﬁcer-controlled Board on Design was necessary due to the “glaring faults

that are being repeated, and which lessen in a great measure the ﬁghting

qualities of ships of the battle line.”

Not surprisingly, other line ofﬁcers rallied behind Dewey’s proposal.

Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton, president of the Board of Inspection

and Survey, recommended that the General Board alone generate the

building program sent to Congress. Once Congress had authorized the

numbers of ships, Stockton thought that a Board on Design, consisting of

Technological Change and the United States Navy

This 1895 plan of the midship section of the Kearsarge-class shows a gun of the

secondary battery projecting from the armored casement typical of pre-dreadnought

battleships. An above-water torpedo tube is located on the next deck down. Both

weapons were at the center of the 1901 controversy between the Board on Construc-

tion and the General Board. Placement of the vertical armor belt (shaded) along the

waterline generated subsequent line ofﬁcer attacks on the Bureau of Construction &

Repair. The ships’ thicker vertical armor was intended to defeat ﬂat-trajectory shells

in the close-range battleship duels anticipated prior to the Russo-Japanese War.

(Copied from Naval Construction, R. Robinson, 4th ed., Annapolis, 1917, 160–61.

Naval Historical Center, NH 76632)

Image not available.

the Board on Construction and “other sea ofﬁcers of high rank and expe-

rience,” should put the “technical designers in touch with those who use

and ﬁght the vessels.” Stockton’s rationale was strikingly similar to Dewey’s:

“The fact that our vessels of recent construction and design lack equality

in speed and military qualities with their contemporaries in the British ser-

vice emphasizes the need of such a Board to relieve and assist the mem-

bers of the Board on Construction whose time is mainly absorbed by their

duties as administrative heads of the Bureaus of the Navy Department.”

Unfortunately for Dewey and his line colleagues, the reorganization

they desired could not overcome the strong historical links between the bu-

reaus and Congress. Dewey had grown more vocal in his attacks upon the

Board on Construction and the bureau chiefs, but as the navy’s senior of-

ﬁcer he was well aware of the danger of publicly claiming technical bureau

incompetence so soon after the Bennington disaster and the public furor

over amalgamation. Any expression of doubt over the quality of American

ships would provide wonderful ammunition for congressional opponents

of the Roosevelt naval buildup.

The Situation in 1905

The deadlock in the Board on Construction over the secondary gun bat-

teries in the Connecticuts provided the line, through the increasingly pow-

erful General Board, its ﬁrst opportunity to express opinions at the highest

level on the technological basis of the profession. To forestall this challenge

to their control over the battleship, the exemplar of the profession’s tech-

nological paradigm, the members of the Board on Construction conducted

a survey of “expert” seagoing ofﬁcers (many of dubious technical sophisti-

cation), setting a new precedent for bureau-line cooperation.

The exclusion of torpedo tubes from the Connecticut battleships pro-

vided a second opportunity for critics of the technical bureaus. Faced with

widespread criticism and condemnation by Admiral Dewey, the Board on

Construction changed its position and accepted torpedoes in the Con-

necticut class. The Board on Construction was weakened and the secretary

of the navy convinced of the necessity for high-level line involvement in

the design process.

When Secretary Moody tried to grant the General Board increased

power through a legislative reorganization of the Navy Department, the

Technological Change and the United States Navy

technical bureaus mobilized their allies in Congress to prevent any change

in the institutional status quo. Senior ofﬁcers of the line were unwilling to

force the issue publicly as a new controversy with the technical bureaus

would come too soon after the amalgamation controversy and jeopardize

battleship appropriations. Two events in 1905—the Battle of Tsushima and

construction of the British battleship Dreadnought—provided the line

with new opportunities to charge the technical bureaus with malfeasance

for designing and producing inferior battleships. Line ofﬁcers’ efforts to at-

tain hegemony over the battleship technological paradigm increasingly oc-

curred in an environment in which senior ofﬁcers of the line sided with

the bureaus against younger insurgents advocating ever-larger battleships.

In a Kuhnian sense, both bureau engineers and seagoing line ofﬁcers

accepted the basic strategic paradigm—guerre d’escadre based on a battle-

ship ﬂeet. They differed on who should deﬁne the battleship and control

the trajectory of the battleship technological paradigm. After 1905 there was

a relatively sharp split between advocates of bigger and smaller battleships.

However, this professional division no longer ran along the engineer-line

ofﬁcer fault line.

Competing for Control