
market in rental accommodation is often characterized by the charging of “key
money.” Prospective tenants are often forced to bribe a landlord or a subletting ten-
ant to acquire a particular rental unit. The acceptance of key money is illegal in most
jurisdictions with rent controls, but the practice is difficult to stamp out because it is
to the advantage of both parties. Those desperate for rental accommodation will have
to pay the black market rate of as much as R
1
, shown in Figure 6-8(b).
Another problem that results from controls is the emergence of a dual rental mar-
ket if new buildings are exempt from controls. Apartment units whose rents are
below market levels are almost always rented informally or with some form of key
money attached. The units that have recently come on the market will be offered at
rents above the levels that would exist without controls as landlords attempt to
compensate for future restrictions on rent increases. Because of discrimination by
landlords and the ability to pay key money, middle-class tenants will find it easier
to secure units in the controlled market, while the poor will be forced to seek units
in the uncontrolled market. Perversely, tenants with higher incomes can be the
major beneficiaries of the program.
Rent controls distort market signals and misallocate resources. Too few resources
are allocated to rental housing, too many to alternative uses. Ironically, although
rent controls are often legislated to lessen the effects of perceived housing shortages,
controls are a primary cause of such shortages.
CREDIT CARD INTEREST CEILINGS
Over the years there have been many calls for interest-rate ceilings on credit card
accounts. The usual rationale for interest-rate ceilings is that the banks and retail
stores issuing such cards are presumably taking unfair advantage of users and, in par-
ticular, lower-income users by charging interest rates that average about 18 percent.
What might be the responses to government imposing a below-equilibrium interest
rate on credit cards? The lower interest income associated with a legal interest ceiling
would require the issuers of cards to reduce their costs or enhance their revenues:
● Card issuers might tighten credit standards to reduce losses due to non-
payment and collection costs. Then, low-income people and young people
who have not yet established their creditworthiness would find it more diffi-
cult to obtain credit cards.
● The annual fee charged to cardholders might be increased, as might the fee
charged to merchants for processing credit card sales. Similarly, card users
might be charged a fee for every transaction.
● Card users now have a post-purchase grace period during which the credit
provided is interest-free. That period might be shortened or eliminated.
● Certain “enhancements” that accompany some credit cards (for example,
extended warranties on products bought with a card) might be eliminated.
● Retail stores that issue their own cards might increase their prices to help off-
set the decline of interest income; customers who pay cash would in effect be
subsidizing customers who use credit cards.
Price Floors and Surpluses
Price floors are minimum prices fixed by the government. A price at or above the
price floor is legal; a price below it is not. Price floors above equilibrium prices are
usually invoked when society believes that the free functioning of the market
148 Part Two • Microeconomics of Product Markets
price
floors
Legally
determined prices
above equilibrium
prices.