
564
Metaphysics
definition
of
the first principle
of
all
things as non aliud, the Not-Other. The
second
part
discusses the contributions made to this idea by Aristotle,
represented by Ferdinand, Proclus, represented by Pietro, and Plato
himself, represented by Giovanni Andrea.
Nicholas'
account of Aristotle's contribution amounted to a very severe
criticism of the Philosopher's metaphysics, but one much more profound
than
those we have encountered
thus
far. In the De non aliud he concerns
himself
less with questions like the eternity of the world and the
immortality of the soul
than
with the roots of Aristotle's errors. Although
Nicholas
had, in fact, taken over from Aristotle theories such as those of
universal ideas,
matter
and form and substance and accident, he rejects
Aristotelian metaphysics.
Like
many
of
the Byzantines, he limits Aristotle's
merits to the areas
of
natural
and moral philosophy. Aristotle failed in first
or 'mental' philosophy, because he was never able to define clearly the
subject of the science, the 'being' or 'substance' which is the same
—
Not-
Other
—
in different things. The deepest reason for his failure is to be found
in the fact
that
he never ascended beyond sense and reason to the certitude of
intellectual vision. Reason is able only to approach certitude; it can never
attain
it. The way to the absolute vision
of
the intellect is opened only by the
realisation
that
the Not-Other and the Other are beyond contradiction.
41
Nicholas
did not, however, limit his criticism to Aristotle's philosophy.
He also regarded the Platonic definition of the first principle of things as
inadequate and deficient. In the De non aliudhe rejects the idea
of
calling
the
One
of
the Parmenides the first principle
of
things because the first principle
cannot be other
than
the things which derive from it.
42
Whereas Plato had
spoken of the One and the Indefinite Dyad as first principles, the
Neoplatonists preferred the expression 'the Other' to 'the Indefinite Dyad',
and thought
of
unity as original and otherness as somehow derived from it.
Christian readers of these
authors
identified, accordingly, God with the
One and creation with the Other or Not-One. It was in this context
that
Nicholas
came to his definition of the first principle as the Not-Other.
Because
the first principle cannot be opposed to anything, he proposed the
substitution of the name 'Not-Other' for the 'One'.
The
question was not simply one of extrinsic denomination. Nicholas
makes it clear
that
his Not-Other should not be understood as the first
principle itself, but
rather
as the concept of the first principle. In
contradistinction to the notion of the One, to which in Proclus even
41.
Nicholas
of
Cusa
1932-,
xm, pp. 44-7 (De non aliud
18-19).
42. Ibid., xm, pp. 52-4 (De non aliud 22).
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