The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
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ASPECTS OF THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM 241
for more than a generation or two before being replaced by other families.
Even in the single lineage dominated villages of south-east China, wealthy
households of
a
given surname were eventually replaced by other families
with the same surname. Evidence to support this assertion of
a
revolving
elite is scanty, but it does exist. For example, when 37 Manchurian villages
are ranked by period of settlement, and the households within each of
these ranks are compared in terms of their social and land tenure status
at the time of their arrival in the village and then in 1934-6, the results
are as follows: for the oldest villages the data clearly show that by 1934-6,
the total percentage of landlords had declined, that of owner-cultivators
had risen, and that of tenants had declined.
35
Only a few families residing in rural communities ever accumulated
considerable land; the remainder either rented land from them or worked
their lands as hired labourers. Eventually, of
course,
land changed hands,
new families accumulated land, but the same renting and labouring, only
by different households, continued. How was it possible for some families
to accumulate land, only to lose it later?
A large family - ten to twelve persons - could reclaim land and farm
a large tract of 40 to 60 mou (nearly 3-4 hectares). But landholdings
exceeding several hundred
mou
(about 15 ha.) or even larger, could only
be acquired by families of great wealth. The few facts available about these
families indicate that most became wealthy originally through trade,
moneylending, or as officials. They then purchased land, developed new
lands,
or acquired land from families who had pledged or mortgaged it
to acquire credit. The records of
13
5
former landlords in Shantung during
the nineteenth century, collected and analysed by two Marxist Chinese
historians, show that nearly 60 per cent of this sample had formerly been
officials or urban merchants.
36
These landlord households, located in the
main commercial centres near the Grand Canal, accumulated their wealth
in the cities and then purchased rural land. Some of it they leased to
families of the same village; the remainder they farmed with teams of
hired labour from surrounding households. This example is probably
representative of other provinces during the same period.
Wealthy urban families also purchased tracts of land, hired labourers
to develop it, and then invited families to settle and farm it as tenants.
In Mi-chih county of northern Shensi, 8 km south-east of the county seat
and 16 km south of Sui-te county, six hamlets of 271 households were
35
Ramon
H.
Myers,
'
Socioeconomic change
in
villages
of
Manchuria during
the
Ch'ing
and
Republican periods: some preliminary findings', Modern Asian Studies, 10.4 (1976) 591-620,
see
pp.
614-15.
36
Ching
Su and Lo Lun,
Cb'ing-tai Sban-tung cbing-jing ti-cbu
ti
sbt-bui bsing-cbib (Landlord
and
labour
in late Imperial China: case studies from Shantung), see Appendix.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM
located on the Yang-chia-kou Canal, which flowed off the Wu-ting River.
Fifty-one of these families leased land and belonged to the Ma lineage.
They resided together behind large walls near a mountain.
37
The lineage
founder, Ma Chia-lo, first managed a shop in Sui-te county seat in the
late 1820s. Ma saved his money and opened his own shop in
18
3 3
in Mi-chih
county seat. His four sons helped him, and a fifth son became an official
and remitted his money home. Ma used these savings to lend, buy land,
and speculate in the grain market. He finally invested a large sum to buy
land near Yang-chia-kou, hired workers to clear it, and invited families
to settle and farm the land as tenants. The Ma lineage then sold its shops
and moved to live in Yang-chia-kou. For the next seventy years, the third
and fourth generation sons of the Ma lineage loaned money, collected rents
from their land, and speculated in the grain market. From the account
books of Ma Wei-hsin, a fourth-generation landlord, we know that the
Ma households collected grain rents and loan repayments that annually
far exceeded the grain used for their households. They stored surplus grain
and later sold it when market prices had reached their zenith. After 1910,
the landholdings of the lineage remained stable in size until the late 1930s
when many households began to sell their land in fear it would be
expropriated.
In other instances, wealthy individuals joined together to develop land.
Near Hsiang-yin, a city south of Lake Tung-ting in Hunan, ten persons
in 1917 formed a company, hired
8,000
workers to build dikes, and invited
families to rent the land and farm.
38
An even more common procedure
was for city people to acquire land through moneylending and then lease
the land, preferring to remain absentee landlords. Farmers were introduced
to wealthy families from which they borrowed by pledging or mortgaging
their land. If they were unable to repay, their land became the property
of their creditors. Yuan Shih-k'ai, to judge from the following account
by Japanese researchers, practised this type of moneylending on a large
scale in 1909-11 to become one of Honan's largest landlords.
Yuan Shih-k'ai acquired his land during the period when he retired to Honan
after his fall from power. The method he used to acquire large tracts of cultivated
land was not to purchase it from various sellers at a fair price but to take land
offered as collateral for securing a loan
(Ju-tieri).
In the tenth section of P'eng-te
county he amassed most of his land that way. His relatives and agents, too, are
known to have acquired land
by
the same methods. The land mortgaged to Yuan
(ch'u-tieri)
represented the receipt of both immediate cash and a signed contract
37
Kawachi Juzo, 'Chugoku
no
jinushi keizai' (The landlord economy
of
China), Kei\ai tumpo,
18
(1965)48-124-
38
Hsin Hu-nan
pao,
Hu-nan mmg-ts'm cb'ing-k'uang tiao-ch'a
(A
survey
of
village conditions
in
Hunan), 48.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ASPECTS
OF THE
AGRARIAN SYSTEM
243
by peasants
who had
encountered troubles
and
needed money.
The
period
of
time
for
which land
was
mortgaged
to
Yuan
was
three years, which
was
later
extended
to
eight years. During the eight-year period, many areas suffered floods
and droughts,
and as a
result
few
peasants could repay their loan
and
recoup
their mortgaged land. When relatives
and
agents
of
Yuan Shih-k'ai accepted
mortgages
the
warlord-landlord Yuan used cash loans
and
contracts
as
bait.
He
then allowed postponement
of
the loan until expiration
of
the agreed period
of
land mortgage, when
the
borrower usually could
not
repay.
By
acquiring those
mortgaged lands,
he
amassed huge tracts
of
cultivated land.
39
In order
to
keep their lands intact
and
collect
a
dependable land rent from
them, wealthy families, especially within lineages, would often form
an
association
and
place some
of
their land
at its
disposal
for
lease.
The
association would then
use the
revenue
to
organize
a
village school,
a
temple,
or
other public facility. Sometimes these landlord-type associations
held more land
in an
area than
did any
individual landlord,
as
this report
from 1933-4 testifies:
In Kwangtung
the
power
of
private landlords
is
simply
not as
great
as
that
of
the landlord associations.
If
we exclude
the
public property owned
by the
many
county offices
and the
numerous philanthropic agencies,
the
land area owned
by
the landlord associations occupies
a
very great share
of the
cultivated land
of
Kwangtung province. These associations' land consists
of
schools
(hsiieh-tieri),
temples
(miao-tieri),
various private associations
(hui-tieri),
and
lineages (ta-kung-
tien).*
0
In other areas, urban families that had acquired considerable land through
moneylending or other activities assigned the management of their land
to bursaries. These in turn leased the land to families of different villages,
collected rents, paid taxes to the state, remitted part of the rental income
to the urban landlords, and retained a fee for their services.
41
Partible
inheritance
This powerful landlord class, the dominant influence in so many rural
communities, rarely kept its land intact for more than one or two
generations unless the land was assigned to a lineage association. The
reason for this was the custom of partible inheritance, which divided the
land and household property among the sons, while providing some
39
SMR, Research Section, Hoku-sbt nosongaikjocbosa hokoku: Keimin ken dai-icbiku, Wabeikyo, Sonkabyo
(Research report on village conditions in North China: Sun-chia-miao village, Ho-p'ing township,
in district one
of
Hui-min county), 62-3.
40
Ch'en Han-seng,
'
Kanto noson
no
seisan kankei
to
seisanryoku' (Production relationships
and
production power
in
Kwangtung villages), Mantetsu
cbosa
gtppo, 15.6 (June 1935)
175.
41
Muramatsu Yuji, Kindai Konan no sosan (Bursaries
in
the
Lower Yangtze area
in
modern times);
see ch.
5.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
244
THE
AGRARIAN SYSTEM
security for the aged parents. This custom was practised by all households,
large or small, wealthy or poor, located either north or. south.
42
It
guaranteed the ultimate demise of the large, extended family of great
wealth, and the creation in its place of new households with the same
surname but weaker kinship ties. A Japanese scholar who analysed village
studies of North China for information about partible inheritance had this
to say about it:
the Chinese household
{chia)
economically,
socially,
and even spiritually rests upon
weak foundations
—
foundations that seem gradually to be disintegrating. Here
the underlying reason appears to be the numerous cases of family disharmony
and the impoverished living conditions that typically cause household partition
(Jen-chid).
Yet ... family disharmony and impoverished living conditions are
actually used as opportunities to partition the household the principle of equal
household division is so powerful that it can promote and create disagreement
between brothers and sisters-in-law, which then causes household partition.
43
If farmers and landlords firmly believed in the principle of equal property
division, together with other values emphasizing ancestor worship and
filial piety, what then? Obviously, as this quotation suggests, the
sanctioned right or norm justifying the partition of household wealth must
have provided many family members with a rationale for creating family
cleavages. And these must invariably have brought about household
partition. But even if partible inheritance provided a rationale for conflict
within families, why so much conflict to start with? Although this issue
has not received the scholarly attention it deserves, one of several possible
explanations, based upon a recent illuminating study of rural women in
Taiwan, points to a powerful source of conflict. The author, Margery
Wolf,
argues that Taiwan girls, when they enter the household of their
husband, are driven by emotional need to establish their own uterine
family. In essence, this uterine family will be 'her own children and
grandchildren'. Cut off" as she is from those she loves and feels most
attached to, the young bride must struggle for survival in a new family
that is frequently dominated and even controlled by a new mother-in-law.
Wolf further asserts: ' In most cases, by the time she, the young bride,
adds grandchildren, the uterine family and the household will almost
completely overlap, and there will be another daughter-in-law struggling
with loneliness and beginning a new uterine family'.
44
As the young bride struggles to establish her position in a household
dominated by the mother-in-law, her only effective weapon is to rely upon
42
SMR, Cbu-sbi
ni
oktru noson no sbakaijijo, 17-21.
43
Uchida Totnoo, Cbugoku
noson no
btmke
seido
(The system
of
family division in rural China), 413-14.
44
Margery
Wolf,
Women and the family
in
rural Taiwan,
36.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ASPECTS OF THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM 245
her husband to establish a closely knit family of her own. In families of
two or more brothers, the efforts by their wives to establish their
respective uterine families within the large, patrilineal household will
invariably lead to conflict between brothers. Ultimately, one or more of
the brothers will insist upon division of land and property.
Whatever the reasons for
fen-chia,
this widespread, long-practised
custom served to fragment large and even small landholdings. Some
examples will show why downward social mobility was always occurring
and eventually overcame the rich. In
1930,
a wealthy rural family in Sui-hua
county in Manchuria divided its 1,000 odd
shang
(667 hectares) estate
between eleven sons.
45
Seven years later, these eleven families had already
sold 45
sbang,
which meant a
5
per cent reduction in the land transferred
from parents to their male children. In Hsu-hsiu county of Hopei, a
landowner with 210
mou (15
ha.) in 1882 divided it among his three sons,
who in turn divided their property among their progeny.
46
In 1940, a total
of fifteen new families farmed 324 mou (about 21 ha.) between them,
whereas sixty years before a single household had farmed 210
mou
(14 ha.).
The
chia
and its income
Below the landowning elite were other households of varying size and
wealth in which the members also lived together and shared everything
in common.
47
The household, or
chia,
was the smallest, most cohesive
social unit anywhere in rural, or for that matter, urban China. Fei
Hsiao-t'ung has described it vividly:
The basic social group in the village
is
the
chia,
an expanded family. The members
of
this
group possess a common property, keep
a
common budget and cooperate
together to pursue a common living through division of
labour.
It is also in this
group that children are born and brought up and material objects, knowledge,
and social positions are inherited.
48
The
chia
functioned as a corporate unit. Its members performed the tasks
assigned to them, handed over their earnings to the household head
(cbia-chang),
and shared equally in the disposition of rewards. Major
decisions were made only after discussion between the
chia-chang
and other
members. In the following interview, farmers in Sha-ching village of
Hopei describe the functioning of such a household.
45
Iwase Suteichi,' Hoku-Man noson
ni
okem daikazoku bunke
no
ichi jirei' (An example
of
equal
division
of
property
in a
large family farm
of
a north Manchurian village), Mantctsu cbosa geppo,
20.12 (Dec. 1940) 66-95.
46
Kumashiro Yukio, 'Kahoku
ni
okeru noka
no
bunke
to
tochi
no
udoki' (Peasant household
division
of
land and land transfer
in
North China),
in
Noktn bokaku cboben, 167-266.
47
Makino Tatsumi, Sb'ma ka^pku kenkju (Studies
of
the Chinese family), 10-11.
48
Fei
Hsiao-t'ung,
Peasant life
in
China,
27.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
246 THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM
What is the main activity of the family?
Farming.
Is the division of labour different for household head, his wife, the eldest
son, and the next son?
No,
they cooperate.
What is the duty of the household head?
He manages the work of the family members. Men farm, and women do
housework and embroider.
Do all household members perform field work?
No.
For the most part only men do this, but if hands are scarce, women
help.
At such times will the household head also work?
He works like everyone else in the family.
How is the daily work programme decided?
The household head assembles everyone, and they discuss it at
breakfast.
49
Every
chia
was linked to other
chia
before it in an endless chain maintained
by ancestor worship and ceremonial display.
50
Although this chain
sometimes broke when a family line ended, parents raised their children
to worship certain
chia
ancestors and taught them to work hard, save,
venerate the aged, and assume ancestral obligations. They also encouraged
their children to identify with their parents' and ancestors' goals, and strive
'for more wealth, for larger family honour, for more advantageous
graveyards, for bigger clan temples, for costlier ceremonials, and for
a
host
of other measures which [were] calculated to increase the welfare and
prestige of the living and of the dead'.
51
When the
chia-chang
transferred
property to his sons, they were obliged to honour him and his ancestors
with appropriate rites. The accumulation of wealth, especially property,
ensured that these rites could be performed. It also guaranteed that they,
too,
would be venerated by their children after they had passed property
on to them.
In many ways, then, this corporate unit, the
chia,
was strongly motivated
to accumulate wealth. It is not surprising that good household manage-
ment, hard work, frugality and diligence were attributes all farming
families tried to acquire. Every
chia
and its
chia-chang
aspired to become
wealthy and achieve extended family form, though few in fact ever realized
4
° Chugoku noson kanko chosa kankokai, comp. Cbugoku noson kanko cbosa
(A
survey
of
traditional
customs
in
Chinese villages),
1.236.
50
Francis
L. K. Hsu,
Under the ancestors' shadow: kinship, personality and
social
mobility
in
village China,
see chs. 9-10.
51
Ibid.
249.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ASPECTS OF THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM 247
these goals. These values, held by all farmers, were the bedrock upon
which this rural society was founded. The similarity between rural families,
regardless of size and wealth, has been emphasized
—
not without irony
—
by Niida Noboru:
To sum up, the conditions which have given rise to the small family in China
have existed from earliest times ... In recent years, people who have travelled
in China, especially in areas where the small family predominated, have observed
that most rural families in China are small, and the large family which people
had presumed to exist was very rare. For some time there have been attempts
to explain the decline of
the
large family system in China. But such theories have
ignored the continued existence of the small family and have failed to note that
both small and large families have essentially the same characteristics. Thus, if
we can say that today's small family is the result of
the
decline of
a
family system
of long ago, we can say that the Chinese family system has been on the decline
for over two thousand years.
52
For this corporate unit to earn income the
chia
used its resources in many
different ways, and farming was only one of many possibilities.
There were many different combinations of income-earning sources for
the
chia.
At one end of the continuum were day-labouring jobs of low
status,
performed away from the family and even the village, dirty and
inconvenient. Next came peddling, clerking, and brokerage tasks that
required some skill, carried higher status, and were cleaner to perform.
They were often scarcely more profitable than work as a labourer, but
their higher social status made them more desirable. At the middle of this
continuum came farming, either working one's own land or renting from
another. Toward the other end of the continuum were managing land,
lending money, operating a shop, becoming an official, or serving as a
military officer. Each
chia-cbang
had to choose among the different sources
of income when he allocated household resources. Although some tasks
produced more income than others, the social costs of each task - distance
to and from work, status, cleanliness, extent of drudgery or risk - also
had to be carefully considered.
By the second quarter of the twentieth century, farm families seem to
have had a clear order of preference in choosing occupations for their
children. At the top were official and even military careers; next were
entrepreneurial pursuits; then farming, followed by labouring tasks that
ranged from monthly or day-by-day farm work to working as a household
servant. Fei Hsiao-t'ung reports that the
chia-chang
usually tried to educate
at least one son to become an official or military officer.
53
Lin Yueh-hwa's
study of two Fukienese families recounts how Huang Tung-lin wanted
52
Niida Noboru, Cbugoku no
noson
ka^pku (The Chinese rural family), i j i.
51
Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China'sgentry: essays on rural-urban relations; see chs. 4—5.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
24
8
THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM
to cooperate with his brother-in-law to start a store rather than help on
the farm. The store eventually prospered, so that he was able to build
a new home for his family.
54
After families had accumulated considerable
land, they began to lease part of
it,
lend money, and engage in commercial
activities.
55
If we rank rural families according to their assets, we find
that the poorer, smaller families invariably earned a high percentage of
their income from low-prestige, high-risk, and low-return income sources
that were either wholly outside farming or supplemented their very small
farm earnings.
56
Families with more than enough land to support
themselves devoted more of their resources to farming, while the very
wealthy frequently engaged in mercantile activities instead of farming their
land.
57
Only if it could acquire certain scarce resources from another household
could the individual household allocate its resources as it wished. This
required inter-family arrangements, usually on a kinship basis. We have
already seen how such arrangements were concluded by means of informal
or formal agreements, written as contracts or orally understood, that
pertained to leasing and renting land and farm capital, lending and
borrowing money, and hiring or supplying labour for different periods
of
time.
On first consideration, the contracts between families in Taiwan
and those used on the mainland to pledge and mortgage land, lease and
rent land during the late Ch'ing and early Republican periods appear to
be quite similar.
58
Families were constantly breaking old contracts and
making new ones with different families. In short, private contractual
agreements between rural families were the preferred way of obtaining
a scarce resource.
Forms of
chia
cooperation
The rural families struggling to make a living in their villages did not
depend solely upon contracts; they also cooperated with each other. Such
cooperation was referred to by various terms, and was prevalent in some
communities but not in others. It took two different forms.
59
The first
54
T.in
Yueh-hwa, The golden wing:
a
sociological
study ofChinese familistn, 2j—35.
55
Fei
Hsiao-t'ung
and
Chang
Chih-1,
Eartbbound China:
a
study
of
rural economy
in
Yunnan;
see ch.
56
Myers, Peasant economy,
1
j
3—8;
see below, ch.
5.
57
Chang Yu-i, comp. Cbung-kuo cbin-tai nung-yeb sbib tyu-liao (Historical materials
on
modern China's
agriculture), 2.319—32, 333-6, 343-67.
58
Fu-mei Chang Chen
and
Ramon H. Myers, ' Customary law
and
the economic growth
of
China
during
the
Ch'ing period',
CSV/1 3.5
(Nov. 1976) 1—32.
59
Ramon
H.
Myers,
'
Cooperation
in
traditional agriculture
and its
implications
for
team fanning
in
the
People's Republic
of
China',
in
Dwight Perkins,
ed.
China's modern economy
in
historical
perspective, 261-78.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ASPECTS OF THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM 249
involved only a few households, which shared their land, labour, or farm
capital for short periods when seasonal demand was greatest. This form
of cooperation occurred among friends or kin, lasted for short periods,
and was terminated by mutual agreement; it existed everywhere in the
countryside. The second form involved many households in a village -
sometimes, in several villages - grouped together and bearing the costs
of undertaking a certain enterprise. Some examples would be crop-
watching, widespread in North China, or forming a village defence corps,
an activity common to all villages when law and order broke down. There
was also cooperative processing of crops, such as sugar-cane, especially
in Kwangtung and southern Taiwan. But the most important activity
requiring large-scale cooperation was probably water control to counter
drought, including water storage to prevent flooding and irrigation.
Village organizations for water control were of two
types.
Some of them
were integrated into large-scale systems; they were managed by the public
officials who maintained dikes along large rivers. The second type
consisted of one or more village organizations that serviced only the
households in their own communities. The two types of organization had
some common features. Their participants were landowning households;
their rules for allocating costs and benefits were based on the amount of
land each household owned (families with less land contributed and
received
less);
and they were run by a hierarchy of water-control managers
consisting of experienced farmers who rotated the discharge of their
duties.
60
Morita Akira, in his definitive study of water control during the
Ch'ing period, summarizes the experiences of more than half a dozen
provinces which carried over into the Republican period as well.
In Hsing-t'ai county of Hopei there were two organizations for water control
established in areas to utilize
rivers.
These organizations designated the Watergate
(cha)
as the standard unit for water control. The personnel for each Watergate
were peasant households who owned land; they were called
lien-hu.
Because these
households paid for the repairs of
the
watergates and the canals furnishing water,
made tax payments, and provided cost-free labour, they participated in water
control management and also acquired the benefits of water
use.
Even in Suiyuan
and Shansi there were water control organizations made up of owners of irrigated
land, and these households, like those mentioned above, were also landowners.
These landowning households supplied the labour required for construction and
repair of water control facilities. The amount of water they used to irrigate their
fields was apportioned according to the different amount of land owned by each
household
(an-ti-mou
chiao-shui).
The basic principles governing these water
control organizations, such as the personnel being landowning households who
60
Ramon H.Myers, 'Economic organization and cooperation in modern China: irrigation
management in Hsing-t'ai county, Hopei province', in the late Professor Yflji Muramatsu
commemoration volume,
Tbe polity and economy
of
China,
189-212.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
25°
THE
AGRARIAN SYSTEM
shared costs and received benefits according to the amount
of
land they owned,
were the same
for
water control organizations in Central and South China.
61
Of course, before farmers could
be
induced
to
commit their resources
to
such undertakings, they
had to
perceive that
the
benefits would exceed
the costs. Outsiders might evaluate
the
potential benefits from village
cooperation quite differently from
the
inhabitants,
who
habitually
disregarded certain costs.
But in any
case, cooperation played
a
very
important role in village life because it permitted households to share scarce
resources.
In
this respect,
it
performed
the
same function
as
private
contracts between families, namely,
it
enabled them
to
earn
a
higher
income with their resources than they would have earned otherwise.
COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE
By the early 1900s railways were built and the city-ports expanded. These
developments meant new opportunities for farmers. But in the early 1920s,
just
as a new
supply
of
farm capital (American cotton-seed, chemical
fertilizer, etc.),
was
being generated,
and
farmer beliefs were beginning
to alter, agriculture encountered
its
first major crisis.
As a
result, these
new inputs, still weak
and
scarcely perceptible
in the
hinterland, never
really affected
the
majority
of
villages.
Nevertheless, the growth
of
trade and crop specialization were respon-
sible
for a
rise
in the
marketed surplus from agriculture during this brief
period. Both were made possible
by the
dramatic improvement
in
transportation. Between 1894
and
1911, there
was a
26-fold increase
in
railway track.
In
contrast, the increase between 1911
and
1927 was
a
mere
35
per
cent.
62
Railways speeded
up
long-distance deliveries, encroached
upon traffic moving
on
waterways
and
roads,
and in
certain locales
eliminated many periodic markets.
63
Not only did they redirect trade from
traditional transportation routes
to
the city-ports; they also brought new
goods into
the
hinterland
and
collected agricultural products
for
shipment.
The first
new
demand
for a
marketed surplus from agriculture came
from foreign trade. Exports
of
farm products expanded more rapidly
between the 1890s and
1910
than at any other time. Between
1876
and 1890
the value
of
food
and
industrial crops exported increased respectively
by
only 26 and
38
per cent.
64
But for the 1890-1905 period, the corresponding
61
Morita Akira, Sbindai suirisbi kenkyu (Studies in the history of water management during the Ch'ing
period), 399.
62
Yen
Chung-p'ing et
al.
190.
63
Skinner, 'Marketing
and
social structure
in
rural China, Part II', 211-28.
64
Huang Yen-p'ei and P'ang Sung, comps. Cbung-hio sbang-cbangsbib-paishib (The history of China's
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