EVOLUTION,BIOCULTURAL
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fashion. Popper was a realist, committed to the
idea of an independent, real world, unlike Kuhn,
for whom reality, inasmuch as it exists, is a func-
tion of human perception. The important question
of progress remains. Is science progressive? Does it
progress toward an understanding of the real
world, or is it simply going nowhere and just sub-
ject to fashion? Popper certainly thought of his
epistemology as progressive. Kuhn, who was more
ambiguous, saw progress in a Darwinian sense, in
which certain ideas are better than rivals, rather
than in an absolute sense, in which some ideas are
better on some independent scale. Dawkins would
probably take an even more relativistic approach
than Kuhn.
With the rise of human sociobiology (or evolu-
tionary psychology) there is an increasing interest
in the Darwinian approach to culture. This interest
results, in part, from dissatisfaction with the alter-
native approach. But if culture is Darwinian, then
how can one explain the fact that biological muta-
tions are random (in the sense of undirected),
whereas cultural mutations are apparently nonran-
dom? The sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, work-
ing with physicist Charles Lumsden, argues that cul-
ture is founded on various rules of thought, which
he calls epigenetic rules, or which might be called
“innate dispositions.” As the philosopher W. V. O.
Quine (1908–2000) argued, mathematical rules or
the laws of logic may be ingrained in human biol-
ogy because protohumans who thought logically
were more likely to survive than those who did
not. So culture, which can then elaborate in ways
unknown to biology, nevertheless has its base in
biology. It is not so much that Einstein’s ideas beat
out Newton’s in a struggle for existence, but that
both theories are based on rules that are rooted in
biology. The success of one over the other is sim-
ply an observation, and not really biological at all.
A number of scholars, including Wilson and
Michael Ruse, have applied this approach to
morality, arguing that supreme imperatives, like
the Christian love commandment, are held because
those human ancestors who took them seriously
were more successful than those who did not.
Such an approach does not preclude cultural de-
velopments alongside those of biology. For exam-
ple, whether it is ever obligatory to tell lies—as to
a child dying of cancer—is not something deter-
mined by natural selection, although the tendency
to be kind to such children certainly is.
What of religion in all of this? Wilson certainly
thinks that religion is promoted by biology inas-
much as it reinforces morality and promotes group
harmony and cohesion. Like Dawkins, however, he
is something of a nonrealist on these matters and
thinks that religious beliefs are not objectively true.
Indeed, he would replace Christianity with a better
myth (his word), namely Darwinian materialism.
Others who take this approach, including the ethol-
ogist Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989), incline to a more
realist approach. Whether or not they themselves
accept religious beliefs as true, they would allow
the possibility that they could be found true.
There are, in fact, scholars who apply biology
to an understanding of religion. They do not treat
religion as culturally autonomous but as a system
of beliefs that can feed back into biology and vice
versa. In other words, they would probably not re-
gard such beliefs as innate but as one of a cluster
of characteristics that have biological, and not just
cultural, adaptive advantage, and hence serve as an
aid to the possessors. Religious beliefs maintain a
kind of halfway position between the two extremes
described above (culture as autonomous and cul-
ture as an epiphenomenon of biology). Primatolo-
gist Vernon Reynolds and R. Tanner, a student of
religion, have argued that different religions speak
to different biologically adaptive needs. Using stan-
dard biological theory, which distinguishes be-
tween adaptations that are needed when resources
are not stable or predictable and adaptations that
are needed when resources are stable and pre-
dictable, they argue that religions reflect these con-
ditions. Their theory predicts that organisms will
tend to have numerous offspring that require min-
imal parental care during periods of instability or
unpredictability, and few offspring requiring much
care during periods of stability. Reynolds and Tan-
ner argue that in a place like Great Britain, which
has stable resources, one finds (expectedly) a reli-
gion like Anglicanism that stresses restraint and
care, whereas in a place like Ireland, where re-
sources fluctuate, one finds Catholicism with its ex-
hortation to have many children. Other practices
discussed by Reynolds and Tanner include food
rules and prohibitions (as in Judaism), attitudes to-
ward women, and much more.
Even though it is now nearly 150 years since
the Origin of Species appeared (and two hundred
since the start of evolutionary thinking), it is prob-
ably too early to say that a generally acceptable