Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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FREE WILL DEFENSE

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free will theism. The form they embrace, corre-

lated to the Greek word kenosis, entails that God is

self-emptied of some power in order for creatures

to possess power for freedom. This self-limitation

occurs because God lovingly desires others with

which to relate and create. Some forms of acci-

dental free will theism suppose that God’s loving

nature drives the divine desire for others to ex-

press freedom, even when the expression of crea-

turely freedom occasionally results in pain and

suffering.

Critics of accidental free will theism argue that

if God is omnipotent in every possible world, the

best possible world that God would create would

be one in which people invariably choose rightly.

Other critics acknowledge that it may be logically

possible that a perfectly loving and all-powerful

God exists despite the occurrence of genuine evil,

but the amount of evil makes the existence of such

a God evidentially implausible. Perhaps the most

severe criticism of accidental free will theism is that

it does not explain why God does not prevent gen-

uine evils. A God who is voluntarily self-limited

ought to become un-self-limited occasionally, in

the name of love, to veto the freedom expressed

by perpetrators of genuine evil.

Essential free will theism. Essential free will

theism, also known as the free process defense,

views divine omnipotence as meaning that God is

the most powerful being in existence, rather than

possessing all power in the universe. This form of

the free will defense speculates that all individuals

necessarily posses some power that cannot be

completely overridden, withdrawn, or vetoed by

anyone, including God. Advocates of this position

claim that culpability for genuine evil rests upon

the shoulders of creatures that use their own

power wrongly.

Process theist David Ray Griffin (1939– ) posits

a form of essential free will theism that entails that

God is metaphysically unable to determine crea-

turely decisions unilaterally. Creatures possess self-

determinative power that cannot be withdrawn or

overridden by God, and the fact that individuals

possess power for freedom is an eternal meta-

physical law. God cannot circumvent these meta-

physical laws of freedom, partly because God did

not create them. God is not indictable for failing to

prevent genuinely evil events from occurring be-

cause these metaphysical laws prevent God from

removing power and freedom away from creatures

who misuse freedom. Griffin’s free will defense

solves the problem of evil by denying that God is

able to prevent genuinely evil occurrences result-

ing from free creaturely decisions.

The recurring criticism of Griffin’s hypothesis

ultimately derives from the claim that God did not

create the metaphysical laws that govern actual ex-

istence. Most theists have assumed that part of

what it means for God to be the creator is that God

created the metaphysical laws that govern what it

means for all things to exist. Griffin’s process free

will defense also envisions God as always relating

to and creating from some realm of nondivine en-

tities. This hypothesis undermines the classic

Church doctrine of God’s capacity voluntarily to

create the world out of absolute nothingness (cre-

atio ex nihilo).

Dialogue with science. Both the accidental and

essential forms of the free will defense posit a

theodicy that reinterprets the concept of divine

omnipotence in light of creaturely freedom. Cul-

pability of genuine evils is removed from a per-

fectly loving God and is placed upon creatures that

have the ability to exert freely a degree of control

over their circumstances. This reinterpretation of

divine power and creaturely responsibility is

profoundly important for the science and religion

dialogue, partly because many atheists have cho-

sen not to believe in the existence of God due to

the problem of evil. If convinced by the free will

defense that God can be considered perfectly lov-

ing despite the occurrence of evil, a platform may

be secured for discussing other dialogue issues.

See also EVIL AND SUFFERING; FREEDOM; FREE PROCESS

DEFENSE; KENOSIS; THEODICY

Bibliography

Davis, Stephen T., ed. Encountering Evil: Live Options in

Theodicy: A New Edition. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster

John Knox, 2001.

Griffin, David Ray. God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theod-

icy. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976.

Griffin, David Ray. Religion and Scientific Naturalism:

Overcoming the Conflicts. Albany: State University of

New York Press, 1999.

Haught, John. God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000.

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FREUD,SIGMUND

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Inbody, Tyron. The Transforming God: An Interpretation

of Suffering and Evil. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster

John Knox, 1997.

Moltmann, Jürgen. The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ

as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theol-

ogy. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993.

Peacocke, Arthur. Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and

Becoming—Natural, Divine, and Human. Minneapo-

lis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993.

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids,

Mich.: Eerdmans, 1983.

Polkinghorne, John. The Faith of a Physicist. Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Polkinghorne, John. Belief in God in an Age of Science.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998.

Polkinghorne, John., ed. The Work of Love: Creation as

Kenosis. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001.

THOMAS JAY OORD

MATTHEW HENRY

FREUD,SIGMUND

Sigmund Freud, well known as the founder of psy-

choanalysis, was born in 1856 in Freiberg, Moravia.

He moved with his family to Vienna, Austria, at the

age of four. Freud received a thorough scientific

training in his early years and went on to a distin-

guished career in scientific research, establishing

himself as a leading neuropathologist. He made

important contributions to the study of the neuron

(nerve cell) and wrote influential treatises on apha-

sia and cerebral palsy. In his later career, Freud

labored to establish psychoanalysis as a form of

natural science. As a late representative of Enlight-

enment thinking, Freud joined the issue of the re-

lation between science and religion most directly

in his long drawn out debate with Oskar Pfister

(1873–1956), a Swiss Lutheran pastor and his de-

voted friend of many years.

Debate with Pfister

The debate came to a head in Freud’s writing of

The Future of an Illusion (1927). Pfister took up

the challenge and responded in a lengthy article,

“The Illusion of the Future” (1928). The inter-

change was, in fact, the high point of a dialogue

contained in letters exchanged over more than

thirty years. The two men differed radically in their

assessment of and attitudes toward religious expe-

rience and belief. Freud viewed religious beliefs as

forms of illusion (if not delusion) and religious ex-

perience and practice as universal forms of obses-

sional neurosis. Freud continually presented him-

self to Pfister as an unbeliever, a “godless Jew”

(1928, p. 170).

The analytic insistence on the resolution of

transference, rather than the dependence (as he

saw it) of religion on transference in the sense of

emptional attachment and dependence, was cen-

tral in Freud’s assessment of religion. In 1928,

Freud wrote to Pfister:

The rift, not in analytic, but in scientific

thinking which one comes on when the

subject of God and Christ is touched on I

accept as one of the logically untenable

but psychologically only too intelligible ir-

rationalities of life. . . . In contrast to utter-

ances as psychologically profound as “Thy

sins are forgiven thee; arise and walk,” . . .

if the sick man had asked: “How knowest

thou that my sins are forgiven?” the answer

could only have been: “I, the Son of God,

forgive thee.” In other words, a call for un-

limited transference. And now, just sup-

pose I said to a patient: “I, Professor Sig-

mund Freud, forgive thee thy sins.” What a

fool I should make of myself. To the for-

mer case, the principle applies that analy-

sis is not satisfied with success produced

by suggestion, but investigates the origin

of and justification for the transference.

(Meng and Freud, pp. 125–126)

Yet, Freud clearly envied the power of religion:

“As for the possibility of sublimation to religion,

therapeutically I can only envy you. But the beauty

of religion certainly does not belong to psycho-

analysis. It is natural that at this point in therapy

our ways should part, and so it can remain” (Meng

and Freud, p. 63).

Freud’s argument in The Future of an Illusion

was fairly straightforward. In opposition to nature,

civilization exacts a heavy price in the form of in-

stinctual renunciation. In addition to prohibitions

and privations, imposed externally or internally by

the superego, culture proposes certain ideals as its

highest achievements. The satisfaction associated

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with such ideals is basically narcissistic. In this un-

ending struggle between civilization and the forces

of nature, religion serves to defend civilization

against nature. Thus, “Man’s self-regard, seriously

menaced, calls for consolation; life and the uni-

verse must be robbed of their terrors; moreover his

curiosity, moved, it is true, by the strongest practi-

cal interest, demands an answer” (1927, p. 16). In

their hopelessness, mankind turn the forces of na-

ture into gods with whom they can associate on

relatively human terms. But this transformation fol-

lows the prototype of the original infantile state of

helplessness in relation to one’s parents. The gods

thus are transformed fathers, who could be both

feared and looked to as sources of protection

against unknown dangers.

Religious ideas, therefore, are in essence illu-

sions. They are enunciated as dogmatic teachings

rather than as the product of experience or of ar-

gument and proof. As Freud proclaimed: “They are

illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and

most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their

strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we

already know, the terrifying impression of help-

lessness in childhood aroused the need for protec-

tion—for protection through love—which was

provided by the father; and the recognition that

this helplessness lasts throughout life made it nec-

essary to cling to the existence of a father, but this

time a more powerful one” (1927, p. 30). Religion,

like obsessional neurosis in childhood, becomes a

universal obsessional neurosis of humanity, arising

out of the Oedipus complex, specifically out of the

relationship to the father.

Science and religion

Freud’s polemic against religion was cast in the

form of a radical opposition between natural sci-

ence and religion. Religion had failed in making

the majority of people happy or, for that matter, in

bringing them to a more moral condition of life.

Rather it achieved little more than keeping them

submissive to religious beliefs and practices. Freud

attributed the decline of religion to the rise of nat-

ural science. He observed:

We have heard the admission that religion

no longer has the same influence on peo-

ple that it used to. . . . And this is not be-

cause its promises have grown less, but

because people find them less credible. Let

us admit that the reason—though perhaps

not the only reason—for this change is the

increase of the scientific spirit in the higher

strata of human society. Criticism has whit-

tled away the evidential value of religious

documents, natural science has shown up

the errors in them, and comparative re-

search has been struck by the fatal resem-

blance between the religious ideas which

we revere and the mental products of

primitive peoples and times. (1927, p. 38)

Anticipating the grim vision later enunciated in

Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud

painted a dire picture of the weakening of the in-

fluence of religion on the mass of people. He ar-

gued that incestuous and murderous passions

would surge to the surface without the suppressive

force of religious convictions—“If the sole reason

why you must not kill your neighbor is because

God has forbidden it and will severely punish you

for it in this or the next life—then, when you learn

that there is no God and that you need not fear His

punishment, you will certainly kill your neighbor

without hesitation, and you can only be prevented

from doing so by mundane force” (1927, p. 39).

Freud’s answer, of course, is to replace reli-

gion with science. Since religion has proven so de-

ceitful, misguided, untrustworthy, and oppressive,

humankind is obviously better off without it. More-

over, people can do without illusions, and the

sooner they abandon their dependence on such

infantile illusions, the better off they will be. More-

over, those who abandon such illusions are not

without resources or assistance. Their scientific

knowledge, which is increasing every day, gives

them power to deal with and control their envi-

ronment, to face the demands of harsh reality more

effectively. And, Freud says, “as for the great ne-

cessities of Fate, against which there is no help,

they will learn to endure them with resignation.”

(1927, p. 50)

Freud’s reply to this imagined argument seems

to lack conviction. Certainly, he says, no one has to

tell him about the difficulty of avoiding illusions,

and perhaps his own hopes, rooted in scientific

methodology, are illusory too. But at least his illu-

sions are not, like religious ones, incapable of cor-

rection. To that extent, they are not delusions, as

religious convictions would be. Finally, he holds

out some optimism that people can overcome and

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free themselves from their neurotic entanglements

in virtue of better scientific knowledge, specifically

psychoanalysis.

Freud stakes his modest claim for the superi-

ority of the human intellect to religious beliefs:

We may insist as often as we like that

man’s intellect is powerless in comparison

with his instinctual life, and we may be

right in this. Nevertheless, there is some-

thing peculiar about this weakness. The

voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it

does not rest until it has gained a hearing.

Finally, after a countless succession of re-

buffs, it succeeds. . . . It will presumably

set itself the same aims as those whose re-

alization you expect from your God (of

course within human limits—so far as ex-

ternal reality, “Ananke,” allows it), namely

the love of man and the decrease of suf-

fering. (1927, p. 53)

In “The Illusion of the Future,” Pfister summa-

rized the Freudian viewpoint in one trenchant sen-

tence: “The God, Logos, hurls the God of religion

from the throne and reigns in the realm of neces-

sity, about whose meaning we, in the meantime,

do not know the least.” (p. 172)

See also PSYCHOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Bibliography

Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion (1927). In Stan-

dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of

Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol.

21. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.

Freud, Sigmund. “A Religious Experience” (1928). In Stan-

dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of

Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, Vol.

21. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).

In Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological

Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Stra-

chey, Vol. 21. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.

Gay, Peter. Freud: A Life for Our Time. New York: Nor-

ton, 1988.

Irwin, J. E. G. “Pfister and Freud: The Rediscovery of a Di-

alogue.” Journal of Religion and Health 12 (1973):

315–327.

Meissner, W.W. Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984.

Meng, Heinrich, and Freud, Ernst L., eds. Psychoanalysis

and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar

Pfister, trans. Eric Mosbacher. New York: Basic

Books, 1963.

Pfister, Oskar. “Die Illusion einer Zukunft” (“The Illusion

of the Future”). Imago 14 (1928): 149–184; Available

in English in International Journal of Psychoanalysis

74 (1993): 557–579.

WILLIAM. W. MEISSNER, S.J.

FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism is a schema of explanation: All parts

of a system fulfil a necessary, latent function for

the system as a whole, its stable equilibrium (prin-

ciple of homeostasis), or its survival. Functional-

ism, thus, is a descendant of earlier teleological or

finalistic conceptions. It can be applied to nearly

all complex systems, but functional explanations

are not a unitary phenomenon across disciplines.

Functionalism in sociology

Stimulated by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Herbert

Spencer (1820–1903), and especially Emile

Durkheim (1858–1917), and encouraged through

the anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–

1942) and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), func-

tionalism became important in sociology. Specific

structural-functional macro-theories, such as that

proposed by Talcott Parsons, describe religious in-

stitutions, norms, and symbols with respect to their

output on integration, legitimization, compensa-

tion, and socialization for the society as a whole,

its equilibrium, or its survival. The function of reli-

gion is destined for its power of integration (e.g.,

Durkheim), its role to institutionalize cultural-social

norms (Parsons), or its ability to cope with experi-

ences of contingency and reducing complexity

(Nikklas Luhman).

This functional conception of religion has been

criticized with respect to the epistemological and

cognitive status of religious notions, regardless of

the contribution of religion to the survival of

human cultures. In addition, though the notion of

stable equilibrium in functional analysis enables

one to define what is dysfunctional and allows the

search for functional equivalents, it needs to be

defined in its temporal context and can hardly

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cover social change; in other words, it was accused

of being conservative. However, functionalists can

easily dismiss this criticism: Contributing to an op-

timum is adaptive, not legitimate. Some functional

theories do not even have a static or equilibrium

bias (Luhmann). Modern (neo)functionalism

(which takes cybernetic concepts into account),

theories about the evolution of religion proposed

by Robert Bellah (which mediate the structural-

functional model and historic-genetic model of so-

cial evolution), and autopoietic systems theories

like that of Luhmann all try to avoid this and other

criticism mentioned below.

Functionalism in biology

The form of a functional explanation in biology is

the same as in sociology: It explains the presence

of a trait as solution to a hypothetical design prob-

lem to assure that the needs of the individual or

group are satisfied. Functional explanations for the

needs of the genes are especially popular in socio-

biology. Intentions are not involved.

Controversies in sociology and biology roughly

concern (1) evidence, (2) explanation, and (3) the

selection question. First, opponents like Richard

Lewontin argue that stories are being told in socio-

biology that have little statistical evidence, are

incomplete, and are not empirically testable. Func-

tionalism is accused of “adaptive failure”: Adap-

tiveness does not assure presence of a trait, and it

does not give criteria for normality and empirical

measures for survival. In the same vein, function-

alism is accused of eliminating the truth-question:

The issue is not whether the propositions are true

or whether there is evidence for believing them to

be true, but how holding beliefs is functional. Sec-

ond, the issue of different levels of explanation is

controversial: Is the gene level sufficient for socio-

biological explanations? Or do also the individual

or the group level have to be considered? Also, the

relation of functional explanations to mere func-

tional descriptions and to chemical, causal expla-

nations is controversial. Third, functional explana-

tions in biology do better than those in sociology,

it is argued, because they offer an answer to the

selection question, natural selection, whereas

mechanisms for cultural selection have not been

satisfactorily developed. Nevertheless, as Wolfgang

Stegmüller posits, functional analysis can be logi-

cally correct, empirically substantial, and highly

valuable as a heuristic research program. Despite

these controversies, (neo)functionalism dominated

mainstream sociological and anthropological theo-

ries for most of the twentieth century. Functional-

ist approaches are also prominent in biology.

Functionalism in philosophy of mind

In contemporary philosophy of mind, functional-

ism is one of the most important theories. Devel-

oped in the 1960s by Hilary Putnam and Jerry

Fodor, a wide range of different versions has been

developed since. The basic thesis is: Mental states

are functional states caused by external sensory in-

puts, causing external behavioral outputs, and

causally related to other functional states. One

function may be realized in different ways in dif-

ferent cases (multiple realizability). One can

roughly distinguish between common-sense or an-

alytic functionalism, which deals with meanings of

mental vocabulary; scientific, empirical, or psycho-

functionalism, in which neurobiology lays down

the characteristics of functional roles of mental

states; and machine- or computer-functionalism,

where the relation of mind to brain is thought to

be equivalent to the relation of software to hard-

ware, usually excluding intentionality and teleol-

ogy. This computer functionalism, supported by

fruitful research on artificial intelligence, has been

investigated by Putnam, as well as others, as a

worthwhile reaction to a materialistic or physicalis-

tic view of mind because it does not attribute men-

tal states only to humans or living organisms with

a similar central nervous system. Like functionalism

in general, it hardly gives sufficient justice to qual-

itative phenomena.

Functionalism in science and religion

Functional approaches are also highly relevant to

the science and religion dialogue, mainly in inter-

pretations of ideas about nature and God. An ap-

proach that historians of science and religion like

John H. Brooke have found useful is to ask what

function theology plays within the sciences and

vice versa. Religious belief can function as a pre-

supposition of, or sanction for, science. Religious

belief could even provide a motivation for science

if one happened to believe that the more one un-

covered of the intricacies of nature the greater the

evidence of divine intelligence. Robert John Russell

has even suggested that scientific research pro-

grams such as Big Bang Theory and Steady State

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Theory have been motivated by religious respec-

tively atheistic worldviews. Religion may also have

reinforced aesthetic criteria, such as ideas of sim-

plicity, elegance, and harmony in theory selection.

The aim of a functional analysis is to uncover the

uses to which natural theology was put, even in

the fields of politics.

Ralph Wendell Burhoe’s scientific theology is a

functional approach to religion. Based upon writ-

ings of the sociologist Donald T. Campbell, Burhoe

argues for a positively selected role for religion in

the survival of cultures: Only religions can enable

the shift from selfishness to altruistic behavior. He

even argues for a continuing role for religion or a

functional equivalent in the development and sur-

vival of human culture, proposing his scientific

theology, which incorporates the scientific world-

view. Critical reactions to this approach show that

a functional approach to religion within a scientific

framework has to be complemented by a func-

tional approach to science within a religious or

theological framework. This has been done by

Philip Hefner from the point of view of a distinct

theological anthropology. The integration of both

concepts could have an even more liberating effect

on the science and religion dialogue.

See also ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; MIND-BODY

THEORIES; MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION;

EUROSCIENCES; TELEOLOGY

Bibliography

Abrahamson, Mark. Functionalism. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice-Hall, 1978.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. Neofunctionalism and After. Malden,

Mass., and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998.

Block, Ned. “Art. Functionalism (2).” In A Companion to

the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan. Cam-

bridge, Mass., and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994.

Braddon-Mitchell, David, and Jackson, Frank. Philosophy

of Mind and Cognition. Oxford, UK, and Cambridge,

Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.

Brooke, John, and Cantor, Geoffrey. Reconstructing Na-

ture: The Engagement of Science and Religion. Edin-

burgh, UK: T&T Clark, 1998.

Burhoe, Ralph Wendell. Toward a Scientific Theology.

Belfast, Northern Ireland: Christian Journals Limited,

1981.

Hefner, Philip. The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and

Religion. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993.

Kincaid, Harold. “Functionalism Defended.” In Philosophi-

cal Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing

Controversies in Social Research. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Lycan, William G. “Art: Functionalism (1).” In A Compan-

ion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan.

Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994.

Meisinger, Hubert. “Christian Love and Biological Altru-

ism.” Zygon 35 (2000) 745–782.

Putnam, Hilary. Representation and Reality. Boston: MIT

Press, 1988.

Root, Michael. Philosophy of Social Science: The Methods,

Ideals, and Politics of Social Inquiry. Oxford, UK, and

Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993.

Richardson, W. Mark, and Russell, Robert John. Science

and the Spiritual Quest: New Essays by Leading

Scientists. London and New York: Routledge,

2002.

Sober, Elliott, and Wilson, David Sloan. Unto Others: The

Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Stegmüller, Wolfgang. Probleme und Resultate der Wis-

senschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie.

Vol. 1: Erklärung, Begründung, Kausalität, 2nd

edition. New York, Heidelberg, and Berlin: Springer,

1993.

Turner, Jonathan H., and Maryanski, Alexandra. Function-

alism. Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin Cummings, 1979.

HUBERT MEISINGER

FUNDAMENTALISM

Two sets of complex ways by which contemporary

people look at reality coexist and often clash. The

code word most frequently used for one set of

views is fundamentalism. The other is referred to

as science, as in “the scientific worldview.” Science

has developed over many centuries and has taken

different forms since at least ancient Egypt, Greece,

and Rome. At its heart are notions such as these:

Scientists must be able to observe cause and effect,

and they must be able to replicate experiments to

test their validity. Such notions have to do with

methods and serve mainly practical purposes.

It happens, however, that many scientists and

science theorists become so engrossed in the

method and its many positive results that they see

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it as an all-purpose explanation of the world. Any-

thing that cannot be subjected to the cause-and-

effect approach is suspect. Almost inevitably, habits

of attention to science become preoccupying. More

than a few devotees of the scientific worldview

come to regard it as exclusive. Any alternatives that

challenge it have to be refuted or repudiated.

The term fundamentalism was first applied to

Protestants in the United States in the 1920s, but it

now represents a set of phenomena that can be

observed in most cultures where religion has in-

fluence and especially in cultures where religion

dominates. Fundamentalism is almost always asso-

ciated with religion, but some scholars also see it

as an outlook on life that can characterize the non-

religious as well. In fact, some theological scholars

claim that those who are devoted without question

to the scientific worldview sometimes approach it

as uncritically as most scientists see religious fun-

damentalists defending their worldviews.

If the word fundamentalism was coined in the

twentieth century, it must have been needed to de-

scribe a new reality. By common consent, the

word points to phenomena different from what is

suggested by the related words conservatism, tra-

ditionalism, or orthodoxy. The difference lies

chiefly in the fact that fundamentalism is reactive.

Its defenders “fight back” against what they feel

might undercut or assault what they believe. Such

fundamentalism is especially present in the “reli-

gions of the book”: Christianity, Islam, and, to a

lesser extent, Judaism. Fundamentalism is present

in other forms in Buddhism and Hinduism, but the

lines between religion and science are drawn dif-

ferently in these traditions.

Religions of the book also speak of cause and

effect. In their case, the cause is philosophy’s “First

Cause,” which translates into “God.” The means of

producing effect is the revelation of God through

prophets, events, and a sacred book. It is difficult

for devotees of the book to subject it to experi-

ment. How does one “replicate” the creation of the

world or the presence of prophets who profess to

speak about realities that are not testable in the

laboratory? How does one “repeat” events that be-

long to faith, such as the resurrection of a God-

Man or a journey into the heavens by a prophet

Muhammad on his horse?

Ordinarily people can live with the two world-

views, which do not always have to be seen as

competing. Religion can address some aspects of

life and science can address others. But funda-

mentalists have great difficulty picturing how the

two worldviews can coexist in the same mind and

the same culture. To fundamentalists, one world-

view must be right and the other wrong. One is of

God and the other is anti-God, perhaps of Satan.

Fundamentalists react or fight back against

threats to their communities, traditions, and ways

of life. Usually the term for what they attack is

modernization and all that goes with it. Funda-

mentalism took shape in countering the assaults of

what modernity brings. Not to fight back is to play

into the hands of God’s enemy and to see the pos-

sible destruction of all that one believes.

Technology provides the most profound im-

pact of modernization among citizens around the

globe and in all the religions. Technology might in-

clude mass communication, rapid means of travel,

highly developed weaponry, and the like. With it

may come social arrangements that disrupt com-

munity. In the modern world, guided by technol-

ogy, people migrate and spread alien ideas in

traditional cultures. While many adapt, fundamen-

talists say their adherents dare not.

Paradoxically, however, most fundamentalists

are very comfortable with technology. Jewish fun-

damentalists in Gush Emunim in Israel have highly

proficient weapons and systems of communica-

tion. The modern revolutionary Islamic move-

ments, from that of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran

in the 1970s to the al-Qaeda terrorists in Wahhabi

Islam at the beginning of the twenty-first century,

have exploited technologies from tape recordings

to the Internet. In the United States, Christian fun-

damentalist broadcasters are much more effective

in the use of technical media than are their non-

fundamentalist competitors.

What has happened? Is there, in fact, compati-

bility between two worldviews that were opposed

root and branch? As one studies Islamic and Chris-

tian fundamentalisms, it becomes clear that the

leaders are able to separate the practical instru-

ments of technology from the scientific theories

and experiments that made them possible.

This does not mean that all fundamentalists

oppose all science. Many are, in fact, experts in

hard sciences. The largely fundamentalist Ameri-

can movement called creation science includes

people with Doctor of Philosophy degrees, often

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FUNDAMENTALISM

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in the hard sciences where “facts” are determina-

tive. They might accept but one miracle: That their

book is the utterance of God. From there on, they

will draw “facts” from the sacred book and ap-

proach those facts the way they would approach

species in biology.

Islamic and other non-Western fundamental-

ists aim their reactionary efforts against the West,

which is the source of so much science and the

philosophy of science. The West is seen as the in-

trusive agent that has exported science and made

the non-West dependent upon its hated alterna-

tive. And the science that comes from the West

tends to arrive with trappings, which may include

scientists and technicians who ignore or have dis-

dain for religion. In a world that is gradually being

dominated by technology, whether in medicine,

opinion formation, or weaponry, the fundamental-

ist rejection of science is seen as dangerous

among moderate coreligionists or people of secu-

lar mentality.

Cultures dominated by fundamentalism may

eventually be able to overcome suspicion and re-

trieve from their heritage the variety of approaches

that helped them lead in science, as was the case

with medieval Islam. Until then, it will remain nec-

essary for regimes dominated by fundamentalists

to borrow some coveted features of scientific de-

velopment, such as modern medicine. Whether

such regimes can remain players on the global

scene and serve their constituents without devel-

oping their own scientific research traditions is a

fateful question both for fundamentalist-ruled na-

tions and those who experience the dangerous ex-

pressions of their reaction.

See also CHRISTIANITY, EVANGELICAL, ISSUES IN SCIENCE

AND

RELIGION; CREATIONISM; CREATION SCIENCE

Bibliography

Antoun, Richard T. Understanding Fundamentalism:

Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements. Walnut

Creek, Calif.: Altamira, 2001.

Bassam Tibi. “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamental-

ists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technol-

ogy.” In Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming

the Sciences, the Family, and Education, ed. Martin E.

Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1993.

Farhang Rajaee. “Islam and Modernity: The Reconstruction

of an Alternativbe Shi’ite Islamic Worldview in Iran.”

In Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sci-

ences, the Family, and Education, ed. Martin E. Marty

and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1993.

James Moore. “The Creationist Cosmos of Protestant Fun-

damentalism.” In Fundamentalisms and Society: Re-

claiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education, ed.

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1993.

Lindberg, David C., and Numbers, Ronald L., eds. God

and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter be-

tween Christianity and Science. Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1986.

Mendelsohn, Everett. “Religious Fundamentalism and the

Sciences.” In Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaim-

ing the Sciences, the Family, and Education, ed. Mar-

tin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1993.

Moore, James. The Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study

of the Protestant Struggle to Come to Terms with Dar-

win in Great Britain and America, 1870-1900. Cam-

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

MARTIN E. MARTY

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GAIA HYPOTHESIS

Gaia is the name of the Greek goddess of the Earth.

The Gaia hypothesis is that the Earth is more wor-

thy of the respect and reverence once shown to

Gaia than modern people have supposed. Accord-

ing to this hypothesis, the Earth is a self-regulating

system, of which humans are an unruly part. In

particular, the organisms on the Earth’s surface play

a major role in determining the composition of the

atmosphere to ensure that it is favorable to life.

Some proponents judge from the scientific evi-

dence that the Earth has its own intelligence and

depict it in almost personal, quasi-divine, terms.

This provides religious support for concern about

particular features of the global ecosystem.

See also ANIMAL RIGHTS; BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; DEEP

ECOLOGY; ECOFEMINISM; ECOLOGY; ECOLOGY,

THICS OF; ECOLOGY, RELIGIOUS AND

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS; ECOLOGY, SCIENCE OF;

COTHEOLOGY; SACRAMENTAL UNIVERSE

Bibliography

Lovelock, James E. Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Ox-

ford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

JOHN COBB

GALILEO GALILEI

The condemantion of Galileo by the Roman

Catholic Church in 1633 is one of the most dramatic

incidents in the long history of the relations

between science and religion. Galileo claimed in

his Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, pub-

lished the year before, that the sun-centered system

of Copernicus was not only a convenient mathe-

matical device for calculating the position of the

planets but that it was the physical truth. This ap-

peared to many Christians to run counter to state-

ments in the Bible where the sun is described as

mobile and the earth as stationary.

The clash between scientific truth and biblical

revelation could have been avoided if Galileo, who

had no decisive proof that the earth moves, had

been more cautious and if theologians, who

tended to be dogmatic, had not assumed that the

Bible was to be interpreted literally whenever it

mentioned natural events.

Early life

Galileo Galilei was an Italian astronomer, physi-

cist, and natural philosopher. He was born in Pisa

on February 15, 1564, and died in Arcetri on Janu-

ary 8, 1642. Galileo studied at the University of

Pisa where he became Professor of Mathematics in

1589. Three years later he moved to the University

of Padua where he taught elementary astronomy,

mathematics, and physics. Medical students made

up the majority of his audience, and he also lec-

tured on fortification and military engineering to

young noblemen.

Copernicanism

The first indication of Galileo’s commitment to the

Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543)

appeared in a letter that Galileo wrote to his former

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GALILEO GALILEI

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colleague at Pisa, Jacopo Mazzoni, in 1597. In

August of that year he received a copy of Johannes

Kepler’s Mysterium Cosmographicum, in which the

heliocentric theory of the solar system was vindi-

cated on mathematical and symbolic grounds. After

reading the preface, Galileo wrote to Kepler

(1571–1630) to voice his approval of the view that

the earth is in motion, but also to express his fear of

making his position known to the public at large.

Around 1602, Galileo began making experi-

ments with falling bodies in conjunction with his

study of the motion of pendulums. He first ex-

pressed the law of freely falling bodies, namely the

fact that speed increases as the time squared, in

1604, but claimed to have derived it from the as-

sumption that speed is proportional to distance

(whereas, as he later realised, speed is propor-

tional to the square root of the distance). In the au-

tumn of 1604, the appearance of a supernova gave

him the opportunity to argue that heavenly matter

is not unchangeable.

In July 1609, after hearing that a Dutchman

had invented a device to make distant objects ap-

pear nearer, Galileo built one himself and gave a

demonstration of his telescope from the top of the

Campanile of San Marco in Venice. The practical

value for sighting ships at a distance impressed the

Venetian authorities who confirmed Galileo’s ap-

pointment for life and raised his salary from 520 to

1,000 florins, an unprecedented sum for a profes-

sor of mathematics. Galileo never quite mastered

the optics of his combination of a plano-convex

objective and a plano-concave eyepiece (an opera

glass), but he succeeded in producing a twenty-

power telescope, which he turned to the sky in

1610. What he saw is reported in the Sidereus

Nuncius (The Starry messenger), which appeared

in March 1610. The work was to revolutionize as-

tronomy. The moon was revealed as covered with

mountains, new stars appeared as out of nowhere,

the Milky Way dissolved into a multitude of starlets

and, more spectacular still, four satellites were

found orbiting around Jupiter. This was particu-

larly important since, if Jupiter was revolving

around a central body with four attendant planets,

it could no longer be objected that the earth could

not carry the moon around the sun. Jupiter’s satel-

lites were not a decisive argument for Copernican-

ism, but they removed a major obstacle to having

it seriously entertained by astronomers.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand, died in

January 1609 and was succeeded by his son, Cosimo

II. Galileo had wanted to return to Florence for

some time and he realised that his newly-won fame

might assist him in effecting a change of residence.

He christened the satellites of Jupiter Medicean stars

in honour of Cosimo and, in July 1610, he was ap-

pointed Mathematician and Philosopher of the

Grand Duke of Tuscany. Soon thereafter he discov-

ered that Venus has phases like the moon, and that

sunspots move across the surface of the sun.

Theological objections

In December 1613, theological objections were

raised at a dinner at the court of the Grand Duke in

Pisa. Galileo was absent but his disciple Benedetto

Castelli defended his views when questioned by

Christina of Lorraine, the Grand Duchess of Tus-

cany and the mother of the Grand Duke. Galileo

felt that the matter was important enough to write

a long letter to Castelli, dated December 21, 1613,

in which he argued that the heliocentric system

was not at variance with the Christian faith. On the

fourth Sunday of Advent 1614, a Dominican friar,

Tommaso Caccini, inveighed against the Coperni-

can system from the pulpit of the church of Santa

Maria Novella in Florence. Another Dominican, Ni-

colo Lorini, denounced Galileo to the Inquisition.

Galileo then wrote a long letter to Christina of Lor-

raine, where he developed the view that God

speaks through the book of nature as well as

through the book of Scripture, and that the Bible

teaches people how to go to heaven, not how the

heavens go. In 1615, Cardinal Robert Bellarmine

wrote a letter stating that in the absence of a con-

clusive proof for the motion of the earth, Galileo

and astronomers should content themselves with

speaking hypothetically. The Cardinal added that

should such a proof become available then the

passages in the Bible that seem to say that the earth

is at rest would have to be reinterpreted. In 1616,

Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Heavenly

Spheres was placed on the list of proscribed books

and Galileo was privately, but nonetheless offi-

cially, warned not to teach orally or in writing that

the earth revolves around the sun.

The debate on the comets and Galileo’s trial

In 1618 great excitement was generated over the

appearance, in rapid succession, of three comets.

Galileo thought that they were merely optical

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