JUDAISM,CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION
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The structure of Jewish ethics and Halachah
Jewish ethical norms are established via a legal sys-
tem called Halachah. (The root of this word in
Hebrew is related to the word “to walk”; the same
root is also found in Islamic law or sharia.)
Bounded by this system of religio-legal behavior,
the individual Jew, once past the age of thirteen
(twelve for women), is responsible for the per-
formance of mitzvot or divine commandments of
activity and response to God and to the commu-
nity. There are 613 such commandments in the tra-
ditional reckoning, a metaphorical number that
stands for the completeness of obligation. Many
commandments are concerned with the daily de-
tails of ritual and familial life, many are employed
in the service of civil codes, and others set the
perimeters of response to newly arising dilemmas,
such as how to regard cloning, nuclear fission, and
space travel. At stake in the system is not only
whether the intended act is regarded as a prohib-
ited, permissible, or exemplary activity, but how
the activity ought to be carried out, using what cri-
teria for assessment. Jewish ethics is a complex ne-
gotiation with procedural questions and substan-
tive ones.
The first procedural question that the system of
Jewish ethics addresses is the problem of how to
achieve good ends in a nonteleological system. Ju-
daism answers this in a way that is the unique hall-
mark of the method; it is a method that, while
based in law, draws on a variety of sources both to
create the cases for the law and to resist and query
its assumptions. The basic procedure for the eval-
uation of norms is the mode of argumentation—
commentary, debate, and discussion. Essentially
casuistic, the halachic system uses the encounter
with the Torah text, and the encounter with the
other’s encounter with the text, to create a contin-
uous discursive community. Cases are raised to il-
lustrate points of law and then to illustrate alternate
interpretations of the law. Narrative, in a variety of
literary forms (metaphor, allegory, historical refer-
ence, intertextual mirroring) called aggadah, are
embedded in the text. While the details of the ag-
gadah did not create binding laws, the form was
used to grapple with and embellish the discussion
of the details of the Halachah. The casuistic ac-
count attempts to decipher the particular and spe-
cific human ways the principle has been, or theo-
retically could be, applied. In fact, it is essential to
remember that much of the case law turns on
elaborate constructs that never happened, or could
never be expected to happen, as well as actual
cases that arose in community practice.
Judaism is both a deontological and a casuis-
tic system, rooted in rules, duties, and normative
conduct and concerned with motive and process.
But it is unlike a purely deontological system be-
cause the real world, and the context and out-
come of each case, count in their assessment. Ju-
daism is a modified casuistic deontology.
Consequences, once enacted, are reexamined and
debated. The real world matters: knowledge of
precedence, historicity, the tactile, and the theo-
retical all count in this system. Human reason is
needed both to negotiate the system and to inter-
pret intelligently the sensory natural world. Tal-
mudic methodology was argument structured by
text, history, and community. These three ele-
ments, and the use of reason to decipher them,
modify the deontological method of Jewish ethics.
It was deontological because it assumed Torah law
as motivational, commanded, central, and binding;
it was casuistic because it was also inductive and
case (context) modified.
The central claim of Jewish ethics is that truth
is found in the house of discursive study—the bet
midrash. Such a public discourse is created when
Jews argue, face to face, about the meaning and
relevance of the narrative, symbols, and referents.
Embedded in the problem are issues of context,
causation, agency, norm, and assessment. Each of
these issues must be addressed by whomever is
describing whatever methodology of ethics they
use, with the assumption that methodology in
ethics involves not only a general theory of moral-
ity, authority, and value, but also “middle axioms,”
or the middle ground between general principles
and the details of policy. James Childress and John
Macquarrie, however, consider this a “misleading
term” in the Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics (1967). Perhaps a better description would
be a coinage: “middle processes.” Methodology in
any integral ethical system must address both the
why and the how of a “right act” if it is to have co-
herency and if it can be used in the human hands
and heart of the world, and Jewish ethics is no ex-
ception. Jewish ethics presumes public choices; it
assumes community, human sociability, and em-
bodied dailiness, and that ordinary human acts
have a weight and meaning that ought to be the
subject of urgent discourse.