Wallenfeldt J. The American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812: People, Politics, and Power
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George realized too late that his
clumsiness had destroyed one political
combination and made any other di-
cult to assemble. He turned to George
Grenville, to his uncle, William Augustus,
duke of Cumberland, to Pitt, and to the
3rd duke of Grafton for help. All failed
him. The first decade of the reign was
one of such ministerial instability that
little was done to solve the basic finan-
cial diculties of the crown, made serious
by the expense of the Seven Years’ War.
Overseas trade expanded, but the riches
of the East India Company made no sig-
nificant contribution to the state. The
attempt to make the American colonists
meet their own administrative costs only
aroused them to resistance. Nor was
there consistency in British colonial
policy. The Stamp Act (1765) passed by
Grenville was repealed by Lord
Rockingham in 1766. Indirect taxes, in
the form of the Townshend Acts (1767),
were imposed without calculation of their
probable yield and then repealed (except
for that on tea) as a maneuver in home
politics.
George III was personally blamed for
this instability. According to the Whig
statesman Edmund Burke and his friends,
the king could not keep a ministry
because he was faithless and intrigued
with friends “behind the curtain.” Burke’s
remedy was to urge that solidity should
be given to a cabinet by the building up
of party loyalty: the king as a binding
agent was to be replaced by the organiza-
tion of groups upon agreed principles.
Thus the early years of George III
to drive as a team. The king’s first respon-
sibility was to hold coalitions of great
peers together. But under Bute’s influ-
ence he imagined that his duty was to
purify public life and to substitute duty
to himself for personal intrigue. The two
great men in oce at the accession were
the elder Pitt and Thomas Pelham-Holles,
duke of Newcastle. Bute and George III
disliked both. Pitt was allowed to resign
(October 1761) over the question of war
against Spain. Newcastle followed into
retirement when his control of treasury
matters seemed to be challenged. The
two former ministers were each danger-
ous as a focal point for criticism of the
new government under the touchy cap-
taincy of Bute. The government had two
principal problems: to make peace and to
restore peacetime finance.
Peace was made but in such a way as
to isolate Britain in Europe, and for
almost 30 years the country suered
from the new alignments of the European
powers. Nor was George III happy in his
attempt to express the agreed purposes
of the country that to Bute had seemed
so clear. George III might “glory in the
name of Briton,” but his attempts to speak
out for his country were ill-received. In
1765 he was being vilified by the gutter
press organized by the parliamentary
radical John Wilkes, while “patriotic”
gentlemen, moved by Pitt or Newcastle,
suspected that the peace had been
botched and that the king was conspir-
ing with Bute against their liberties. For
Bute the way out was easy—he resigned
(April 1763).
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English squires in Parliament agreed
with their king that America must pay
for its own defense and for its share of
the debt remaining from the war that
had given it security. George III’s per-
sonal responsibility for the loss of
America lies not in any assertion of his
royal prerogative. Americans, rather,
were disposed to admit his personal
supremacy. Their quarrel was with the
assertion of the sovereignty of
Parliament, and George III was eventu-
ally hated in America because he insisted
upon linking himself with that Parlia-
ment. North would have had diculty in
ignoring the colonists’ insults in any
case; with the king and the House of
Commons watching to see that he was
not weak, he inevitably took the steps
that led to war in 1775.
By 1779 the typical English squires
in Parliament had sickened of the war,
but the king argued that though the war
was indefensible on economic grounds
it still had to be fought, that if disobedi-
ence were seen to prosper, Ireland would
follow suit. He argued also, after the
French had joined the Americans in
1778, that French finances would col-
lapse before those of Britain. So the king
prolonged the war, possibly by two
years, by his desperate determination.
The period from 1779 to 1782 left a fur-
ther black mark upon the king’s
reputation. By 1780 a majority in
Parliament blamed North’s government
for the calamities that had befallen the
country, yet there was no responsible or
produced, inadvertently, the germ of
modern party politics. In truth, however,
the king was not guilty of causing chaos
by intrigue. He had no political contact
with Bute after 1766; the so-called king’s
friends were not his agents but rather
those who looked to him for leadership
such as his predecessors had given. The
king’s failure lay in his tactlessness and
inexperience, and it was not his fault that
no one group was strong enough to con-
trol the Commons.
By 1770, however, George III had
learned a good deal. He was still as obsti-
nate as ever and still felt an intense duty
to guide the country, but now he reck-
oned with political reality. He no longer
scorned to make use of executive power
for winning elections nor did he withhold
his ocial blessing from those of whose
characters he disapproved.
North’s Ministry, 1770–82
In 1770 the king was lucky in finding a
minister, Lord North, with the power to
cajole the Commons. North’s policy of
letting sleeping dogs lie lulled the suspi-
cions of independent rural members who
were always ready to imagine that the
executive was growing too strong. As a
result, 12 years of stable government fol-
lowed a decade of disturbance.
Unfortunately, issues and prejudices
survived from the earlier period that
North could only mue. America was
the greatest and the fatal issue, and
North could not avoid it because the
George Grenville
(b. Oct. 14, 1712—d. Nov. 13, 1770,
London, Eng.)
While serving as first lord of the treasury
of Britain, George Grenville formulated
the policy of taxing the American colo-
nies, initiated by his Revenue Act of
1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765, thus
starting the train of events leading to
the American Revolution.
He entered Parliament in 1741, one of
the “cousinhood” of men interrelated by
blood or marriage and further united in
their opposition to Sir Robert Walpole,
who held power from 1721 to 1742. After
holding a number of ministerial appoint-
ments, Grenville was recommended to
George III by Lord Bute to be his succes-
sor as first lord of the Treasury (prime
minister). Grenville’s ministry (1763–65)
was unhappy and disastrous, largely
because of his lack of finesse, eloquence,
and imagination and his determination
to control all crown patronage. His rela-
tionship with the king suered from
George III’s habit of continual consulta-
tion with Bute. Apart from American
taxation, other notable incidents during
the Grenville administration included the
prosecution of John Wilkes for seditious
libel and the clumsy handling of the
Regency Act of 1765 that had been intro-
duced as a result of a severe illness the
king had suered. This bumbling finally
alienated the king and led to the fall of
the ministry. In opposition after 1765,
Grenville castigated politicians opposed
acceptable alternative, for the opposi-
tion was reputed to be both unpatriotic
and divided. At the time people believed
that corruption alone supported an
administration that was equally incapable
of waging war or ending it. This sup-
posed increase in corruption was laid
directly at the king’s door, for North
wearily repeated his wish to resign, thus
appearing to be a mere puppet of George
III. When North fell at last in 1782,
George III’s prestige was at a low ebb.
The failure of Shelburne’s ministry
(1782–83) reduced George to the lowest
point of all. North joined with the liberal
Whig Charles James Fox to form a coali-
tion government, and George even
contemplated abdication.
With North, he was blamed for pro-
longing the war and losing the colonies.
He reasserted his power when North
and Charles James Fox planned to take
control of the East India Company; he
forced them to resign and rearmed
his control through a new “patriotic”
prime minister, William Pitt, the
Younger. George supported him until
the war with Revolutionary France
(1793) and fears of related uprisings in
Ireland caused Pitt to propose political
emancipation of the Roman Catholics.
George’s vehement opposition led to
Pitt’s resignation in 1801. In 1811 the
king’s ill health and a return of the mad-
ness that had aicted him for short
periods earlier in his life caused
Parliament to enact the regency of his
son, the future George IV.
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that he had instigated the repugnant
Stamp Act of 1765, a mob sacked his
splendid Boston residence that year,
destroying a number of valuable docu-
ments and manuscripts. Barely escaping
with his life, the embittered Hutchinson
from that time on increasingly distrusted
the “common sort” and secretly advised
Parliament to pass repressive measures
that would emphasize that body’s suprem-
acy over the colonies.
Hutchinson was acting governor at
the time of the Boston Massacre in 1770;
he felt impelled to administer the letter
of the British law and thus became more
and more unpopular. Against the advice
of both houses of the legislature, in 1773
he insisted that a shipment of imported
tea be landed before being given clear-
ance papers; this resulted in the Boston
Tea Party, in which dissidents dumped
the import into the harbour.
As the tension worsened, Hutchinson
was replaced by Gen. Thomas Gage as
military governor (1774). He sailed to
England and acted as an adviser to George
III and to the British ministry on North
American aairs; at that time he coun-
seled moderation. He wrote History of the
Colony and Province of Massachusetts
Bay, 3 vol. (1764–1828).
Alexander McGillivray
(b. c. 1759—d. Feb. 17, 1793,
Pensacola, Fla.)
Of Scots–French–Indian heritage,
Alexander McGillivray became the
to American taxation and helped to bring
about the passage of Townshend’s Rev-
enue Act of 1767, which renewed tension
between Britain and the colonies.
Thomas Hutchinson
(b. Sept. 9, 1711, Boston, Mass.—
d. June 3, 1780, London, Eng.)
As the royal governor of the British North
American Province of Massachusetts Bay
(1771–74), Thomas Hutchinson introduced
stringent measures that helped precipi-
tate colonial unrest and eventually the
American Revolution.
The son of a wealthy merchant,
Hutchinson devoted himself to business
ventures before beginning his public
career (1737) as a member of the Boston
Board of Selectmen and then the General
Court (legislature) of Massachusetts Bay,
where he served almost continuously
until 1749. He continued to rise in politics
by serving as a member of the state
council (1749–66), chief justice of the
Superior Court (1760–69), and lieutenant
governor (1758–71).
Hutchinson was originally in har-
mony with his colleagues, even attending
the Albany Congress of 1754, which pro-
jected a plan of union among the colonies.
But he was deeply loyalist and resisted the
gradual movement toward independence
from the British crown. He was convinced
that the rebellious spirit was only the work
of such patriot hotheads as Samuel Adams,
for whom he developed a deep enmity.
Because many Bostonians considered
the British commissioned him colonel
and Indian agent. During the American
Revolution the Creeks were opportunists.
Some of them fought alongside the
Revolutionaries, while McGillivray con-
tributed toward keeping a larger number
on the loyalist side.
By 1782 British military defeats made
it clear that the Creeks would lose their
British connection. Deeply distrusting
American land speculators and encroach-
ing settlers, McGillivray put out feelers
for Spanish support and suggested a
council at Pensacola, West Florida. There,
on June 1, 1784, he and governors Esteban
Miró and Arturo O’Neill signed a treaty
headed “Articles of Agreement, Trade,
and Peace.” Spain would extend a protec-
torate over the Creeks within Spanish
territorial limits and would supply an
adequate trade. McGillivray’s more
remarkable success was in persuading
the Spanish that the trade should be in
English goods and that a contract for the
purpose should go to a British merchant,
William Panton.
Over the next several years,
McGillivray staunchly resisted overtures
from Georgia and the United States to
concede lands and trading privileges.
On occasion he sent raiding parties to
clear the Indian hunting grounds. Then,
in 1788, Miró gave notice that Spanish
support would be reduced. McGillivray
indicated that in the circumstances he
could not refuse discussions with com-
missioners sent by Georgia and the U.S.
Congress.
principal chief of the Creek Indians in
the years following the American Rev-
olution. During the Revolution, he played
a principal role in keeping most Creeks
on the loyalist side of the conflict. He
was largely responsible for the Creeks’
retention of their tribal identity and the
major part of their homeland for another
generation.
In a letter to the Spanish comman-
dant at Pensacola in 1783, McGillivray
identified himself as “a Native of and a
chief of the Creek Nation.” The penman-
ship and the name made that statement
seem improbable, but it was correct.
McGillivray was, in fact, of mixed Indian
and European blood. His father was
Lachlan McGillivray, a Scottish trader.
His mother was Sehoy Marchand, a
French-Creek woman. By blood
McGillivray was thus only one-quarter
Indian. But the Creeks, with whom
descent was matrilineal, had no diculty
in claiming McGillivray as Creek. As
was the custom, his early upbringing was
primarily by his mother and, though
bilingual, was in the ways of her people.
At 14 McGillivray was sent to
Charleston, S.C., for tutoring and served
a short apprenticeship in a counting-
house in Savannah, Ga. He might have
stayed on, but the American Revolution
intervened. His father was proscribed
as a loyalist, and his properties were
confiscated. Father and son decided to
go home, Lachlan to Scotland and
Alexander to the Creek Nation, where he
was given status as a chief and where
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the Spanish urged that the Americans be
driven back, McGillivray wisely pursued
a much less aggressive course.
En route home, McGillivray contracted
a violent fever that immobilized him for
months. He had never been robust and
was sickly, plagued by severe headaches
and aicted by gout, rheumatism, and
the symptoms of venereal disease. He
died at Pensacola in his 34th year. Panton,
in whose garden he was buried, attributed
his death to “gout of the stomach” and
“perepneumonia.” Neither Panton nor the
Spaniards found a suitable replacement
for him, nor did his tribesmen the Creeks,
though the policies he had put into
eect carried on and served the Creek
nation well.
Frederick North,
Lord North (of Kirtling)
(b. April 13, 1732, London, Eng.—
d. Aug. 5, 1792, London)
Lord North served as the prime minister
of Great Britain from 1770 to 1782, and his
vacillating leadership contributed to
Britain’s loss of its American colonies in
the Revolution.
The son of a Tory nobleman, the 1st
earl of Guilford, Lord North was educated
at Eton and Trinity College, Oxford.
Elected member of Parliament for
Banbury at the age of 22, he represented
the town (of which his father was high
steward) for nearly 40 years. The Duke of
Newcastle, when prime minister, made
him a lord of the treasury in 1759, and
In 1789 Pres. George Washington
sent distinguished commissioners to
negotiate with the Creeks. The commis-
sioners proposed a boundary well into
the Creek hunting lands and recognition
of U.S. sovereignty over the entire Creek
area. Bolstered by reactivated Spanish
support, McGillivray objected. Obtaining
no concession, he and his companions
decamped. Washington then sent another
commissioner to invite McGillivray and
a delegation of chiefs to come to New
York City to make a treaty “as strong as
the hills and as lasting as the rivers.”
With the commissioner, the delega-
tion members traveled overland to New
York City, where they were welcomed by
the newly formed political Society of St.
Tammany. Secretary of War Henry Knox
and McGillivray worked out the terms of
a treaty specifying American sovereignty
over Creek lands within the limits of
United States territory and setting a line
near the Altamaha River separating
Georgian and Creek lands. McGillivray
accepted a U.S. Army commission as a
brigadier general and a salary of $100
a month, but he did not promise U.S. trade
except in the event of war between Britain
and Spain, at the time a possibility.
In 1792 McGillivray went to New
Orleans, La., to establish a better under-
standing with the Spanish. The new treaty
specified that the Creeks would order
Americans o their lands and that Spain
would guarantee territorial integrity
within Spanish limits and provide su-
cient arms and ammunition. Although
the colonists’ powers of resistance, he
attempted to combine severity and con-
ciliation. He faced war haleartedly and
was easily depressed by reverses; after
1777 it was only George III’s repeated
entreaties not to abandon his sovereign
to the mercy of the Rockingham Whigs
that induced North to defend a war that
at times he felt to be hopeless and impoli-
tic. In March 1782 he insisted on resigning,
after the news of Cornwallis’ surrender at
Yorktown made defeat in the House of
Commons imminent.
North had been rewarded for his
assistance to the king by honours for
himself and sinecures for his relatives,
but in April 1783 he formed a famous
coalition with the prominent Whig Fox
(much to George III’s disgust) and
became secretary of state with Fox under
the nominal premiership of the duke of
Portland. The coalition went out of oce
on Fox’s India bill in December 1783. For
about three years North continued to act
with Fox in opposition, but failing eye-
sight then caused his retirement from
politics. He succeeded to the earldom of
Guilford on his father’s death in 1790.
Charles Townshend
(b. Aug. 27, 1725—d. Sept. 4, 1767,
London, Eng.)
As the British chancellor of the Exchequer,
Charles Townshend introduced measures
for the taxation of the American colonies
that intensified the hostilities that even-
tually led to the American Revolution.
North held this oce under the succeed-
ing prime ministers, the earl of Bute and
George Grenville, until 1765. On the fall
of the Marquess of Rockingham’s first
ministry in 1766, North was sworn a
member of the Privy Council and made
paymaster general by the next prime
minister, the Duke of Grafton. On the
death of Charles Townshend in September
1767 North became chancellor of the
exchequer.
North succeeded Grafton as prime
minister in February 1770 and continued
in oce for 12 of the most eventful years
in English history. George III had at last
clinched the defeat of the Whiggish
Newcastle-Rockingham connection and
found in North a congenial Tory and chief
minister. The path of the minister in
Parliament was a hard one; he was popu-
lar and an able debater, but at times he
had to defend measures which he had
not designed and of which he had not
approved, and this too in the House of
Commons in which the oratorical ability
of Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox
was ranged against him.
During peacetime North’s financial
administration was sound, but he lacked
the initiative to introduce radical fiscal
reforms. The most important events of
his ministry were those concerned with
the American Revolution. He cannot be
accused of causing it, but one of the first
acts of his ministry was the retention of
the tea duty, and his ministry responded
to the Boston Tea Party with the
Coercive Acts of 1774. Underestimating
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172 | The American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812: People, Politics, and Power
He was the second son of the 3rd
Viscount Townshend. As a member of
the Board of Trade from 1749 to 1754, he
showed an interest in increasing British
powers of taxation and control over the
colonies. In 1754 and 1755 he served on
the Board of Admiralty. He was secretary
at war in 1761–62 and paymaster general
from May 1765 to July 1766, when he
became chancellor of the Exchequer in
the ministry of William Pitt, the Elder.
Soon Pitt became severely ill, and
Townshend assumed eective control of
the administration.
Townshend proved to be financially
brilliant and determined but devoid of
sound political judgment. In his last o-
cial act before his death, he obtained
passage (June–July 1767) of four resolu-
tions that threatened American colonial
traditions of self-government and imposed
revenue duties on a number of items nec-
essary to the colonies. The provision that
customs revenue would be used to pay
ocials caused concern among the colo-
nists because it reduced the dependence
of such ocials on the colonial assemblies.
Townshend estimated that the acts would
produce the insignificant sum of £40,000
($66,104) for the British Treasury; shrewder
observers correctly prophesied that they
would lead to the loss of the colonies.
AFTERMATh
The Peace of Paris (Sept. 3, 1783) ended
the American Revolution. Great Britain
recognized the independence of the
United States (with western boundaries
to the Mississippi River) and ceded
Florida to Spain. Other provisions called
for payment of U.S. private debts to
British citizens, American use of the
Newfoundland fisheries, and fair treat-
ment for American colonials loyal to
Britain.
In explaining the outcome of the war,
scholars have pointed out that the British
never contrived an overall general strat-
egy for winning it. Also, even if the war
could have been terminated by British
power in the early stages, the generals
during that period, notably Howe,
declined to make a prompt, vigorous,
intelligent application of that power.
They acted, to be sure, within the conven-
tions of their age, but in choosing to take
minimal risks (for example, Carleton at
Ticonderoga and Howe at Brooklyn
Heights and later in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania) they lost the opportunity
to deal potentially mortal blows to the
rebellion. There was also a grave lack of
understanding and cooperation at crucial
moments (as with Burgoyne and Howe in
1777). Finally, the British counted too
strongly on loyalist support they did not
receive.
But British mistakes alone could not
account for the success of the United
States. Feeble as their war eort occa-
sionally became, the Americans were
able generally to take advantage of their
enemies’ mistakes. The Continental
Army, moreover, was by no means an
inept force even before Steuben’s reforms.
The militias, while usually unreli-
able, could perform admirably
under the leadership of men who
understood them, and often rein-
forced the Continentals in crises.
The militias also drew upon
an American tradition of guerrilla
warfare that been pioneered by
Robert Rogers’ Rangers during
the French and Indian War.
Rogers’ Rangers had conducted
scouting, reconnaissance, and
screening missions that made it
possible for the British army to
know what was happening in vast
ranges of American territory with-
out having to occupy that territory
with regular soldiers. The Rangers
thus allowed the British to mass
their regular forces on critical
objectives and use minimal forces
in areas of secondary importance.
And the techniques and methods
Rogers’ Rangers learned from
fi ghting with and against Indians
in the rugged virgin forest of the
New World were further devel-
oped during the Revolution.
Col. Daniel Morgan organized
a ranger unit known as Morgan’s
Rifl emen. Using highly accurate rifl es
instead of the smoothbore musket
employed by regular infantry, Morgan’s
men could engage targets accurately
from safe distances while remaining hid-
den. This capability allowed the
Americans to wear down British forces
on the march. Morgan’s Rifl emen fought
The Treaty of Paris, signed on Sept. 3, 1783, formally
ended the American Revolutionary War. National
Archives and Records Administration
in the Battle of Freeman’s Farm in the
Saratoga Campaign, in the Battle of
Cowpens, and in numerous other
engagements.
In the southern states, ranger-type
units were organized by Francis
(“Swamp Fox”) Marion. Based in the
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174 | The American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812: People, Politics, and Power
Furthermore, Washington himself
was a rock in adversity, who learned
slowly but reasonably well the art of
generalship. The supplies and funds fur-
nished by France from 1776 to 1778 were
invaluable, while French military and
naval support after 1778 was essential.
The outcome, therefore, resulted from a
combination of British blunders, Amer-
ican e orts, and French assistance.
swamps of South Carolina (which were
impassable to British regulars and thus
o ered security), Marion’s units oper-
ated in the rear of British forces,
conducting raids, ambushes, and harass-
ment. They also fought as part of
Washington’s army, taking part in the
capture of Fort Johnson and Fort Watson,
the Battle of Eutaw, and numerous other
engagements.
The Peace of Paris was actually a collection of treaties signed by representatives of Great Britain
on one side and the United States, France, and Spain on the other. Preliminary articles (often called
the Preliminary Treaty of Paris) were signed at Paris between Britain and the United States on
Nov. 30, 1782. On Sept. 3, 1783, three defi nitive treaties were signed—between Britain and the United
States in Paris (the Treaty of Paris) and between Britain and France and Spain, respectively, at
Versailles. The Netherlands and Britain also signed a preliminary treaty on Sept. 2, 1783, and a
fi nal separate peace on May 20, 1784.
By the terms of the U.S.-Britain treaty, Britain recognized the independence of the United
States with generous boundaries to the Mississippi River but retained Canada. Access to the
Newfoundland fi sheries was guaranteed to Americans, and navigation of the Mississippi was to be
open to both Great Britain and the United States. Creditors of neither country were to be impeded
in the collection of their debts, and Congress was to recommend to the states that American loyal-
ists be treated fairly and their confi scated property restored. (Some of these provisions were to
cause later di culties and disputes.)
To France, Britain surrendered Tobago and Senegal. Spain retained Minorca and East and
West Florida. The Netherlands came off poorly, ceding the port city of Nagappattinam in India to
Britain and allowing the British free navigation rights in the Dutch-held Moluccas.
In Focus: The Peace of Paris