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the code of laïcité in state education. Although
the event was often presented in the media as a
struggle between the fundamentalist obscurant-
ism of a foreign-based Islam and the modern,
secular and enlightened French nation-state, the
issues were far more complex (see Gaspard and
Khosrow-Khavar 1995).
Unlike Christianity and Judaism, which (in
their different ways and over the years) have
reached compromises with the Republican
secular tradition and have an institutional
presence recognized by the state, Islam has
never been granted the same opportunity to
find a similar space of its own. Hence, the
common perception that Islam functions as a
fifth column in France, manipulated by for-
eign regimes and outside influences (for ex-
ample, the grand mosque in Paris is under
Algerian control), is largely due to the inabil-
ity of the French state to establish the ground
rules for a French Islam.
However, just as Jews are not simply the
product of anti-semitism, so too Muslims are
not simply the product of anti-Muslim racism.
Today, more than ever, Islam in France is far
from an unproblematic faith, reducible to ex-
tremist fundamentalist politics or the product
of negative images. Kepel (1987) and Étienne
(1989) have revealed the diversity of practices
which go under the name of Islam, and the
heterogeneous nature of the so-called ‘Mus-
lim community’. Less than 5 per cent of the
2.5–3 million Muslims in France actually pray
in a mosque or other place of worship, and
most of them are of the older generation. For
many young Muslims (for the most part born
in France with French nationality, or eventu-
ally to acquire it at the age of 18), Islam has
been either rejected or reinterpreted in a vari-
ety of ways. A number of young people have
used Islam strategically, for the purposes of
socialization and identity construction. For
most, a Muslim heritage today is only one part
of the wider process of socialization and iden-
tification; in conjunction with other forms of
cultural and social identification, Islam con-
tributes towards a hybrid sense of identity
which challenges all-embracing religious/cul-
tural stereotypes.
The so-called ‘second’ or beur generation
has not only participated in political struggles
to redefine rights and identities (for example,
through anti-racist organizations like SOS
Racisme and France Plus, and movements for
new citizenship), but has also produced a vi-
brant cultural output, frequently born from
the clash or mixing of traditions and identifi-
cations. In literature (Hargreaves 1991), mu-
sic, theatre and the other arts, the new voices
in the 1980s and 1990s of the beur generation
have presented a challenge to the frequently
ethnocentric nature of French cultural pro-
duction and cultural theory, and rendered
problematic some of the unquestioned as-
sumptions underlying concepts of the French
nation and national identity. The writers
Mehdi Charef and Azouz Begag, the pop
group Carte de séjour and the popular music
known as raï have all, in their different ways,
refashioned the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘France’
to counter the notion of their mutual incom-
patibility.
Institutional rigidity and negative histori-
cal images are therefore being challenged by
two processes: the breakdown of the divisions
between the political and the sociocultural
spheres, and the everyday construction by
young French Muslims and cultural practi-
tioners of a hybridized form of identification.
Pluralism from above and below might yet
lead to the erosion of monolithic stereotypes
of Frenchness and Islam.
MAX SlLVERMAN
See also: beurs; Désir, Harlem, and SOS
Racisme; education, the state and the church;
postmodernism; racism/anti-semitism
Further reading
Cesari, J. (1994) Être musulman en France:
associations, militants et mosquées, Paris:
Karthala/IREMAM (comprehensive over-
view of Muslims in France).
Étienne, B. (1989) La France et l’Islam, Paris:
Hachette (historical account).
Gaspard, F. and Khosrow-Khavar, F. (1995)
Islam