Bahm Karl. Berlin 1945: The Final Reckoning
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common enemies, of which an oath of the members to maintain peace among
themselves was merely a necessary corollary. Antigonos seems to have planned to
combine the hegemonic league system with the common peace system into a single
institution that would combine his own interest (leadership of the Greeks) with the
best interests of the Greeks (harmonious self-rule).
It may be thought that I have presented too rosy a picture of Antigonos's policy
and intentions with respect to the Hellenic League, but in truth I have merely
interpreted the evidence of the document recording its institutions. This paints the
picture itself, although naturally one does not know to what extent Antigonos would
have lived up to what seem to have been his intentions in 303/2. Since the Hellenic
League basically died with Antigonos on the field of Ipsos in 301, we shall never know
how well or how badly this league would have fared. Given the arrogant and unstable
character of Demetrios, one suspects that it was doomed from the start.
In any event, Antigonos's relations with the mainland Greeks were always
colored by the presence of Kassandros in Macedon, which made Antigonos's policy of
"freedom for the Greeks" profitable and ensured his popularity among them. Final
evaluation of Antigonos's dealings with the Greeks, then, should be based mostly on
his relations with the Asiatic Greeks, whose overlord he was for more than a decade.
[111]
― 231 ―
Greek Reactions to Antigonos
At the start of this chapter I remarked that the fourth century was a difficult era for
the Greek cities: this is especially true of the last two decades of the century. The
dismemberment of Alexander's empire created a situation in which the Greeks were
torn between their own desire for independence, the determination of Kassandros to
control them as a source of strength to be kept to himself and denied to his rivals,
and the determination of those rivals—Antigonos and Ptolemy—to disrupt
Kassandros's control. The kingdoms that Antigonos and Ptolemy were building
required large numbers of Greeks to help control and run them. Hence the importance
to Antigonos (and Ptolemy) of the Greek cities, both of Asia Minor and of Europe.
Antigonos was clearly determined to bring the largest possible number of Greek
cities under his aegis, and in the face of stiff competition from Ptolemy and
Kassandros he could not afford to leave such cities entirely independent: he could not,
that is, countenance their defection to his rivals. Two paths were open to him. He
could follow the example of Kassandros and try to control the Greek cities by
garrisons and strong-arm tactics, or he could seek to gain the goodwill of the Greeks.
Both policies had drawbacks: the former in the commitment of large numbers of
troops to garrison duty and the certainty of unpopularity; the latter in the uncertainty
of the practical worth of Greek goodwill. To his credit, Antigonos chose the latter path,
which required from him something of a tightrope act in striving to combine the
maximum of autonomy for the cities with the necessary minimum of control by
himself.
It seems that since he had to limit the freedom of the cities somehow, Antigonos
chose the symmachy as his tool to this end. The examples of Rhodes, Samos,
Kalymna, the Skepsis decree, Astakos and Chalkedon, and the League of the
Islanders (not to mention the various mainland Greek alliances) indicate that he most
probably built up a network of alliances that bound all the Greek states within his
sphere of influence to him. The advantages are obvious: in making such an alliance,
Antigonos recognized the Greek city as a sovereign state, but he could limit the
foreign policies of these city-states by the terms of the alliances, binding them to his
cause and giving himself justification for attacking any that defected from him. Thus,
too, he could obtain aid in money and manpower without having to resort to
extortion.
― 232 ―
This policy was pleasing to the Greeks because it recognized their autonomy and
strictly defined and limited their obligations to Antigonos. It also suited Antigonos no
doubt because it limited the amount of time and effort he would have to put into the
governance of the Greeks. For that dealing with the Greek cities could be a very time-
consuming business can be seen at a glance by looking at the complex provisions in
Antigonos's two letters on the synoikism of Teos and Lebedos.
It is doubtless in this context that one should place Antigonos's liking for leagues
of Greek cities. The more cities could be gathered together into such organizations,
the better, for it enormously simplified his diplomacy. Instead of having thirteen
embassies from Ionia to listen to, he might have to hear only one, from the Ionian
League; and if he himself had something to communicate to the Ionians, he could
send an ambassador to a meeting at the Panionion. Significantly, the later leagues
that we hear of—the island and Hellenic leagues—seem to be far more highly
developed than those of Asia Minor. Whether or not Antigonos had anything to do
with the revitalization of the Ionian and Ilian leagues, he evidently found the league
as an institution much to his taste and worth developing.
In general, Antigonos's administrative involvement with the Greek cities was
very slight. Their foreign and defense policies were in his hands, and for purposes
connected with warfare he might require contributions of money, men, or ships from
them, or occasionally even interfere with them in other ways. But on the whole it
seems that he involved himself with the affairs of the Greek cities only when appealed
to, and even then usually preferred (as in the cases of Kyme and Klazomenai) to
request another Greek city to do the work, restricting himself to the sending of a
diagramma giving guidelines for the law tribunal, international arbitration, or
whatever. Moreover, it is evident that Antigonos for the most part used Greeks in his
dealings with the Greek states. Men like Aristodemos of Miletos, Medeios of Larissa,
Nikomedes of Kos, and Adeimantos of Lampsakos, all very well known figures in
Antigonos's diplomatic activities with respect to the Greeks, are only the most
important representatives of a host of Greek collaborators who appear in the Greek
inscriptions as aides of Antigonos and Demetrios in their relations with the Greek
cities. Though Antigonos had many Macedonians and a number of Asians in his
service, it seems that he preferred when practicable to send a Greek to Greeks. The
most notable exceptions, Dioskourides, Telesphoros, and Polemaios, were all three
members of his family (nephews), and are thus to be viewed as particularly personal
representa-
― 233 ―
tives—and no doubt he felt better able to trust them with major independent
commands (wrongly as it turned out).
This scrupulous thoughtfulness probably explains Antigonos's generally excellent
reputation among the Greeks. That the mentions of Antigonos in the contemporary
epigraphic sources should have been highly complimentary was only to be expected:
a Greek state would not normally refer to a ruler in an inscribed document except to
compliment him for some benefaction or other.
[112]
Noteworthy, however, is the fact
that even posthumously Antigonos continued to be highly regarded for his relations
with the Greek cities: recall in this context the third-century inscription from Erythrai
pointing out that Antigonos had given the city its freedom, and the verdict of Plutarch
on Antigonos's efforts on behalf of Greek freedom. The policy which Antigonos
enunciated in his Tyre proclamation and pursued steadfastly throughout the
remainder of his career became the standard policy of virtually all great powers
towards the Greek cities, down to and including Rome in the second century B.C. .
The enthusiasm aroused by Antigonos's espousal of the cause of Greek freedom and
the successes he gained thereby were such as could not be ignored by later
powers.
[113]
The contemporary records attest abundantly to that enthusiasm and success.
The responses of the Greek cities to Antigonos's activities may be roughly divided into
three categories, based on the type of honors accorded by the Greek cities: there
were the standard honors awarded to Antigonos's various officers and aides—
proxenia, citizenship, crowns, statues, preferential access to council and people, and
so on; there were the more or less standard honors awarded to Antigonos himself and
members of his family, such as xenia, crowns, good-news or thanks offerings,
statues, preferential access to council and people; and there were the divine honors
accorded Antigonos and members of his family—cults with altars, sacrifices, festivals,
divine epithets, cult statues, and the like.
There are extant a host of inscriptions from Greek cities all around the Aegean
honoring Antigonos's various friends and subordinates: many of these have been
referred to already (see especially nn. 63, 64, 106, and 107 above), and the evidence
is presented in full in my
[112][113]
― 234 ―
prosopographical appendix (app. 3 below).
[114]
There are, as far as I can tell, more of
such decrees honoring friends of Antigonos than of any other single Hellenistic
monarch, an attestation not only of the influence and authority of Antigonos, but also
of the genuine enthusiasm and popularity he evoked as the first monarch to make
Greek autonomy a firm plank in his general policy. The Greeks could not fail to
perceive the self-interest and cynicism behind the claims and counterclaims of
subsequent monarchs and themselves became cynical in awarding even the highest
honors in order to encourage a friendly interest in them by powerful persons.
However, self-interest and cynicism, even if present (as they probably were to some
degree), were not so evident in the case of Antigonos, the first and most tenacious
proponent of this policy, so that the genuine popularity evoked by Antigonos's policy
need not be doubted. And the mainland Greeks, at least, had a tradition going back to
387 of looking to Asian rulers as potential liberators from oppressors nearer at hand.
The various honors bestowed on Antigonos and his immediate family are a
further attestation of the success of Antigonos's propaganda. Instances of what I have
called the "standard honors" (as opposed to divine or quasi-divine honors) are
numerous, and the evidence has mostly been alluded to already: the states concerned
are Priene, Ephesos, Delos, Ios, Rhodes, and Byzantion. The most significant of these
honors were those involving actual outlays of money: crowns and statues; and of
these the statues were the more important, since they formed a lasting reminder of
the benefactions conferred by Antigonos and so must have spread his repute and
perpetuated his fame. One should not underestimate the significance of the fact that
visitors to the greatest Panhellenic shrines—Olympia, Delphi, and Delos—and the
greatest Greek cities of the Hellenistic age—Athens and Rhodes—would there have
seen statues of Antigonos and his son Demetrios.
[115]
Most important of the honors accorded Antigonos by the Greek cities, however,
were those of a divine nature: cults of Antigonos of one sort or another are definitely
attested at Skepsis, Samos, Athens, and Delos, and less certain evidence may refer to
cults at Kos, Rhodes, and Ios.
[116]
Most likely there were cults in numerous other
[114][115][116]
― 235 ―
cities of which no evidence survives, especially in cities in Asia Minor. There were
Greek precedents for the rendering of divine honors to a mortal, but until Alexander
the Great, at least, they were isolated cases; and if the recent tendency to doubt the
existence of widespread cults of Alexander during his lifetime is correct,
[117]
then
Antigonos would have been the first man to receive divine honors widely in the Greek
world while still alive. Again these cults attest to the enormous impact the career and
policies of Antigonos had on his contemporaries, such that in seeking to praise him
adequately, they felt the need to break down the traditional barriers between the
human and the divine, something that had been done before on a widespread basis, if
ever, only in the case of the superhuman-seeming Alexander.
The location, nature, and meaning of the various cults of Antigonos and his
family around the Greek world have been exhaustively reviewed and analyzed by
Habicht in Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte (see especially pp. 42–79).
Besides cults of Antigonos and Demetrios, we have evidence also for cults of Phila,
the wife of Demetrios, and Stratonike, either the wife of Antigonos or the daughter of
Demetrios.
[118]
What needs to be pointed out is that, though divine honors and a cult
subsequently became a regular and institutionalized feature of Hellenistic
monarchies,
[119]
passing thence to the Roman emperors, and though this was clearly a
development of the cults of Alexander and Antigonos and their contemporaries, it was
in no wise part of Antigonos's policy to seek divine honors as far as we can tell. In
every known case of a cult for Antigonos, the initiative in instituting it seems to have
come entirely from the Greek city concerned, being a way of expressing gratitude for
some benefaction conferred and hope of future benefits.
The raising of Antigonos to "divine" status, with at Athens at least—and perhaps
at Ios—the cult epithet Soter, is a reflection of his
[117][118][119]
― 236 ―
prestige and authority, not of any policy of seeking to elevate himself above mortal
status. It demonstrates again the enthusiasm that his espousal of the principle that
the Greek cities should be free and ungarrisoned aroused. Particularly interesting in
this respect is the fact that at Athens even private citizens were moved to offer
homage of their own to Antigonos and Demetrios as quasi-divine patrons of Greek
liberty.
[120]
One must bear in mind, therefore, that while the various honors accorded
Antigonos by the Greek cities became standard in the Hellenistic period, they were
not so already in Antigonos's own lifetime, being then first evoked by his career and
policies. Habicht (Gottmenschentum, pp. 240–41) rightly points to the contrast with
Kassandros, who was not liked or honored by the Greeks.
Here, indeed, we touch on the central issue in passing judgment on Antigonos's
relations with the Greeks. He was not motivated by a disinterested love of the Greeks,
or of freedom as such; he did limit the freedom of the Greeks; his pronouncements of
Greek autonomy were self-interested. But having decided, as a self-interested act of
statesmanship, on a policy of gaining the goodwill of the Greeks, he applied it with all
the rigor and tenacity that circumstances permitted, and so deserves to be called the
most philhellene of the kings of his time, for he could have acted otherwise. From the
Greek point of view, it would no doubt have been better if there had been no Philip
and Alexander, and no Diadochoi, to disturb their independence; but given the reality,
an Antigonos was clearly preferable to a Kassandros or Lysimachos, or even a
Ptolemy. One wonders, finally, whether the policy Antigonos chose was a wise one
from the point of view of his own interests. I think that on the whole it was. It is
always better to rule through goodwill than through force when possible, and
Antigonos had the power and wealth not to need to keep a tight rein on the Greek
cities. More significantly, as a Macedonian king of Asian "barbarians," he needed to be
able to attract Greeks to his service, and a good reputation among the Greeks would
have been very useful to him in this respect. It is noteworthy that Ptolemy was his
chief rival for Greek goodwill, and that subsequently the Seleukids, Ptolemies, and
Attalids all sought to maintain good repute among the Greeks.
[120]
― 237 ―
7—
Antigonos's Administration of His Asian Realm
The realm under Antigonos's direct or indirect rule in Asia fluctuated considerably
during the years 320–301, starting as just his old satrapy of
Phrygia/Lykaonia/Pisidia/Lykia/Pamphylia; encompassing at its greatest extent
virtually all of Asia Minor west of the rivers Iris and Euphrates, Syria and Palestine,
and the upper satrapies as far as Areia/Drangiane and Arachosia; and in its last and
most stable phase (310–301) comprising essentially Anatolia and Syria/Palestine. It is
the aim of this and the following chapter to give as far as is possible an account of
how Antigonos ruled this realm, what sort of institutions and policies, whether
inherited from predecessors or newly invented, he established, and to what extent he
is therefore to be considered the precursor of the Seleukids, who eventually took over
his realm. The evidence on which this attempt is based is scanty and inadequate: the
literary sources were by and large not interested in social, institutional, and economic
history, so that one must rely on brief scattered references in them and on the
slightly more forthcoming epigraphic source material in trying to reconstruct this
aspect of Antigonos's career. The result is that any such reconstruction must
necessarily be incomplete and to a certain extent hypothetical, but there is enough
source material to justify the attempt, particularly as it seems likely to shed some
very interesting light on the origins of Seleukid institutions and policies.
― 238 ―
The Geography of Antigonos's Asian Realm
The heart of Antigonos's empire, ruled by him virtually uninterruptedly from 317 to
302, was western Asia Minor and Syria/Palestine (though Palestine was conquered by
Antigonos only in 314). Apart from the coast lands, which were subject to occasional
raids by Ptolemaic fleets (though these had no lasting effect), these regions enjoyed
an era of relative peace under Antigonos's rule. Upon Antigonos's return from inner
Asia in 315, it is true, a campaign by his nephew Polemaios was needed to assert his
authority in Kappadokia and to establish it in Paphlagonia and Bithynia. Moreover,
Karia was conquered only in 313–312; the rebellion of Polemaios and Phoinix in 310
briefly interrupted Antigonos's control of the Hellespontine region and necessitated
fighting there; and the battle of Gaza in the winter of 312/11 caused a brief
interruption of Antigonid control over Palestine. But these interruptions of the peace
of the region were brief and local; overall, the region enjoyed fifteen years of peace
under Antigonos as far as we can tell from the sources.
[1]
For though he was
constantly at war, the fighting occurred almost entirely outside his realm.
This period of peace formed a profound contrast to that ushered in by the
invasion of Asia Minor by Lysimachos in 302, which led to extensive and recurrent
campaigning in and around the region that disturbed its peace again and again in the
next century or so. It seems that during the decades after Antigonos's death, his rule
was looked back on as a pleasant period and his demise was regretted: see, for
example, the anecdote of the Phrygian peasant who, when found digging a large hole
and asked what he was doing, responded sadly that he was looking for Antigonos
(recorded by Plutarch Phok. 29, 1–2).
It must be emphasized that statements in some modern works to the effect that
parts of Asia Minor such as Pisidia or Kappadokia and Paphlagonia were never really
under Macedonian control seem to be entirely erroneous as far as the period of
Antigonos's rule is con-
[1]
― 239 ―
cerned.
[2]
Antigonos asserted his authority in Pisidia in 319 in the course of the
campaign against Alketas, and won control of Kappadokia and Paphlagonia by his own
campaigning early in 319 and by the subsequent efforts of his generals Menandros
and Polemaios. There is no evidence of any difficulties or trouble in either of these
regions during the rest of Antigonos's rule. Statements of the sort made, for example,
by Jouguet (Macedonian Imperialism , p. 348) that "even in Asia Minor, certain
regions, such as Pisidia, were not reduced" (sc., by Antigonos) rest on no evidential
basis whatever and in fact ignore the evidence (Diod. XVIII 44,1–47,4) that shows
Antigonos campaigning successfully in Pisidia in 319 and imposing his will on
Termessos.
[3]
It is difficult to say how far east Antigonos's authority extended at any time
during his rule. As to Asia Minor, there is no evidence that Antigonos's rule extended
beyond Kappadokia into Armenia, nor is it particularly likely. Since his territories
certainly extended at least as far east as Amisos in northern Asia Minor (Diod. XIX
57,4; 60,2), and probably as far as the Euphrates in the south (though this is,
admittedly, a conjecture), it seems best to posit an eastern boundary corresponding
roughly to a line between the headwaters of the Eu-
[2][3]
― 240 ―
phrates and the lower course of the river Iris for Antigonos's realm in Asia Minor,
though he no doubt had a certain influence in Armenia (see map 5). East of Syria the
satrapies of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Media, Susiane, and Persia were all conquered
by Antigonos during his eastern anabasis in 317–315. In addition, he was able in
315to place a subordinate of his own in charge of Areia/Drangiane and also received
the submission of Sibyrtios, the satrap of Arachosia. It is hard to believe, however,
that his control of these latter two satrapies was ever much more than nominal, and
the same may be said of the authority he appears to have claimed over Baktria and
Karmania in 315, recognizing the incumbent satraps there (Diod. XIX 48, 1) and
perhaps receiving nominal messages of submission from them.
It is certain that Antigonos genuinely ruled over the five aforementioned
important areas, which he had personally visited with his army in 317–315 and over
which he had placed his own satraps. However, his rule here turned out to be of short
duration, as Seleukos recaptured Babylonia in 311 and thence conquered Susiane,
Media, and Persia, as well as regions further east. What is not clear is the fate of
Mesopotamia after 311: one can only conjecture that Antigonos retained control of
the parts of it adjacent to Syria and Asia Minor, while Seleukos took over those
portions of it situated nearer Babylonia and Media. Effectively, then, Antigonos's
realm was much the same as the territories in Asia later held by the Roman Empire:
Asia Minor as far as the border of Armenia and Syria/Palestine up to the Euphrates,
with some territory in Mesopotamia.
[4]
The available evidence suggests that Antigonos
was at heart not greatly interested in the regions east of the Euphrates: his conquests
there in the first place were only the result of his duel with Eumenes, and he refrained
from establishing control over Baktria and Karmania when he certainly had the power
to do so in 315. His efforts to recover the upper satrapies from Seleukos in 310–308
seem to have been distinctly half-hearted, and were probably due more to a
(justified) fear of Seleukos's new power than to a powerful interest in the upper
satrapies. The removal of the great royal treasures of Ekbatana and Susa to
safekeeping in the western treasuries such as Kyinda in 315 (Diod. XIX 48,7–8; 55, 1)
should probably be understood as indicating that Antigonos had no
[4]
― 241 ―
intention of ever returning to the east and was not too confident of being able to keep
control of the farther east.
Even so, the territories ruled by Antigonos were extensive, wealthy, and
productive of all kinds of resources. In the great river valleys of western Asia Minor,
the valley of the Orontes in Syria, the valley of the middle Euphrates, and the valley
of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan in Palestine, Antigonos held vast and fertile
arable lands. The Troad and the plateau of Phrygia and Kappadokia provided pasture
in abundance for cattle and horses. The forests of the Black Sea coast and of Kilikia
and the Lebanon provided an unfailing supply of timber of all sorts, and a variety of
important minerals were mined or quarried in Anatolia and Syria in ancient times.
[5]
In
addition to these economic resources, moreover, these regions provided manpower.
The evidence of our sources shows that Antigonos made extensive use of the military
peoples of Asia Minor in his armies, and his navies were certainly largely manned by
Phoenicians, Kilikians, and Ionian Greeks—we even hear of Karian crews in one flotilla
(for details on all this, see app. 2 below). The power of Antigonos was certainly
founded upon Greco-Macedonian armies and Persian treasure, both indirectly
inherited from Alexander, but it was maintained by the resources of the territories
Antigonos ruled, which made him the strongest of the dynasts who succeeded
Alexander.
For most of his career the capital of Antigonos's huge realm was the city of
Kelainai in Phrygia, which had been his seat as satrap of Phrygia and Lykaonia during
the reign of Alexander. This fact was long ago recognized by Ulrich Koehler in an
important article on Antigonos's realm,
[6]
and can be documented from the literary
sources, which show Antigonos again and again using Kelainai as his winter quarters
and the starting point for various expeditions (e.g., Diod. XVIII 52, 1: 318 B.C. ; XIX
69,2: 313/12 B.C. ; XIX 93,4and Plut. Dem. 6,3: 312/11 B.C. ). Kelainai was
particularly suitable as a capital for the Anatolian part of the realm, since it was at the
crossroads of the great east-west road running from Ephesos via the Kilikian gates to
Tarsos and on into Syria and the north-south road that led from the Bosporos via
Dorylaion and Synnada (where it crossed the Persian Royal Road) to Kelainai and on
over the Klimax pass in Pisidia to the Pamphylian coast.
[5][6]
― 242 ―
In 306 Antigonos founded a new capital city, Antigoneia, on the river Orontes in Syria,
close to the later site of the Seleukid capital Antioch. The city was a large one, having
a perimeter of seventy stades (about seven and a half miles), Diodoros reports, and
its location was (to quote Diodoros) "naturally well suited to watching over Babylon
and the upper satrapies, as well as lower Syria and the satrapies near Egypt" (Diod.
XX 47,5). It was clearly founded with strategic considerations in mind, controlling the
lower Orontes Valley and thereby upper Syria and the routes into Anatolia, the upper
Orontes Valley and hence Koile Syria and the main north-south route from Syria to
Palestine, and the main routes from Syria into Mesopotamia and so to the upper
satrapies. It should not be supposed, however, that Antigoneia replaced Kelainai as
capital of the Antigonid empire—the very concept of a capital being in any case
anachronistic if understood too institutionally. Most likely Kelainai remained the most
important base and center of Antigonos's power in Asia Minor, while Antigoneia was
his administrative center for Syria and Palestine, so that one should think rather of
two "capitals" (like Antioch-on-the-Orontes and Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris in the
Seleukid empire afterwards).
[7]
Though Antigonos seems to have spent the years
306– 302 at Antigoneia, he no doubt spent the last winter of his life, when he was
back in Phrygia preparing for the campaign of Ipsos, at his old capital of Kelainai.
Antigonos's Kingship and Instruments of Rule
Like the transformation of the Diadochoi themselves from satraps to kings, the
development of administrative institutions and policies in the Diadoch kingdoms was
obviously a gradual, evolutionary process. However, in the case of Antigonos's realm
at least, this evolution can no longer be traced in the surviving sources. We get no
more than occasional glimpses of policies and institutions. The only way any
worthwhile analysis and synthesis can be carried out is to treat the fifteen or so years
of Antigonos's rule as monolithic, interpreting evidence for any part of his reign as
being more or less valid for the whole (though it is possible to trace something of an
evolution from the Argeads and Achaemenids through Antigonos to the Seleukids).
One concomitant of the need to treat the period from
[7]
― 243 ―
roughly 317 to 302 as a monolithic whole is that Antigonos is mostly viewed in this
chapter as a ruler tout court, without regard to his rise from satrap to strategos of
Asia and eventually to king in 306.
Of course, the theoretical basis of Antigonos's power varied greatly within the
period from the conference of Triparadeisos to the proclamation of Tyre, the Peace of
the Dynasts, and ultimately his assumption of royal status at Antigoneia. There was
not, however, a great deal of difference in the actual nature of Antigonos's power and
rule: whether officially the plenipotentiary under some title or other of an absentee
and infant king or holding power suo iure as king, Antigonos (and, as far as we can
tell, the other Diadochoi) acted as ruler and owner of his territories with full authority
to administer them as he saw fit.
[8]
For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, I take
the evolution of the Diadochoi into kings as a given fact, employing the benefits of
hindsight in a fashion that may lead to occasional anachronisms, but that is justified
(I think) by the fragmentary nature of the sources and by the supremely independent
and self-confident rule of Antigonos and the other Diadochoi even in the period when
their power was officially temporary and subordinate to that of the Argead king.
The power of the Argead kings of Macedon was not institutionally limited, and as
commander in chief, administrator, chief judge, and head of religion, the king of
Macedon virtually personified the state. The same seems in essence to have been the
case with the Achaemenid kings of the Persian Empire;
[9]
but in practice both the
Argead and the Achaemenid rulers had their power limited somewhat by the existence
in Macedon and Persia of a hereditary nobility with large estates, roots and influence
among the populace, and a traditional hereditary claim to a certain status (the
hetaireia in Macedon) or certain offices (in the Persian Empire).
[10]
The power of the
Hellenistic kings—at least those in Asia and Egypt—was not
[8][9][10]
― 244 ―
limited in this fashion, since the Greco-Macedonian conquest had greatly diminished
the traditional influence and claims of the native aristocracies, while the Greeks and
Macedonians had no hereditary claims to anything outside their homelands. If the
Argead kingship had survived, it is possible that the Macedonian nobility might have
been able to transfer its traditional privileges and influence to the Asian empire, as
the Persian nobility seems to have done in the Persian Empire, though some modern
scholars have noted an increasingly autocratic disposition to Alexander the Great's
rule as his conquests in Asia proceeded,
[11]
which created friction between Alexander
and some of the Macedonians. But the Macedonian nobility fragmented in the power
struggles consequent upon Alexander's death and the dissolution of the Argead
monarchy, and the influence of individual Macedonians, Greeks, or Asians became
dependent on their personal relationship with those who managed to seize leading
positions in the empire as it broke up.
As a consequence the Hellenistic kings, though their kingship was clearly based
on Argead and Achaemenid kingship, enjoyed a more absolute power than had been
the case even in those earlier, already fairly absolutist, monarchies;
[12]
and this was a
direct outcome of the events of the Diadoch period. As is now generally recognized,
the royal power of the Diadochoi was at least de facto based on personal charisma
and what the Germans call Siegerrecht, the right of the military victor. This finds
expression in the ancient sources in the term "spear-won land" (doikthtoVcwra ),
which appears several times in Diodoros as the basis for the territorial power of the
Diadochoi (see Diod. XVIII 39,5: Ptolemy in 320; XVIII 43, I: Ptolemy in 319; XIX
85,3: Antigonos in 312/11; XIX 105, 5: all of the Diadochoi in 311; XX 76,7: Ptolemy
in 305). The principle of the right of the victor to hold his spear-won land had been
expressed by Alexander when he cast a spear into Asia from his ship while crossing
the Hellespont in 334 (Diod. XVII 17,2), and it was doubtless in imitation of Alexander
that the Diadochoi adopted the principle.13 Hence Antigonos and the other dynasts
actually regarded themselves as the owners of their realms by right of military
conquest, in addition to
[11][12][13]
― 245 ―
holding the traditional royal prerogatives of supreme military command, absolute
control of administration and foreign policy, and supreme judicial authority; and this
set the pattern for Hellenistic kingship in general.
[14]
Despite the lack of institutional or traditional checks on their power, however,
there were, of course, limitations to the power of the Diadochoi even after they had
become kings. As compared with the later Hellenistic Seleukid, Antigonid, or Lagid
monarchs, for example, Antigonos and the Diadochoi were relatively more dependent
on the support of their friends, and especially of the leading Macedonians among
them, because they were first seeking to establish for themselves royal status and
hence superiority over the other Macedonian nobles, whereas the later Hellenistic
kings enjoyed established and undisputed legitimacy as kings. This relative
dependence and a consciousness of the ultimately usurpatory nature of their power,
which carried with it the possibility of others seeking to follow their example or step
into their shoes, was no doubt largely responsible for the occasionally rather harsh
and suspicious attitude of the Diadochoi towards friends and allies.
[15]
Antigonos was
not free of this kind of attitude, which is perhaps behind the implied charge of
Plutarch (Sertorius 1,4) that Antigonos was not as faithful towards his friends as he
should have been; but it is clear nevertheless that Antigonos took seriously the duties
as well as the privileges of power and patronage. Two anecdotes recorded by Plutarch
(Apophth. Ant. 8 and 9 at Moralia 182c) show that Antigonos rejected as fit only for
barbarians the notion that a king could do as he pleased without regard to what is
honorable (takala ) and what is just (tadikaia ), and that he brought this principle into
practice even where his immediate relatives were concerned, insisting on trying a
lawsuit involving his half-brother Marsyas in public so that there could be no suspicion
of favoritism or injustice.
[16]
[14][15][16]
― 246 ―
It is obvious that, however absolute the authority of Hellenistic kingship as an
institution, no king could in fact rule the vast territories won and handed down to their
successors by the Diadochoi without a great deal of help from a host of variously
qualified aides and advisers. The Argead kings had had the synedrion (council) of
their hetairoi to help them run their affairs, and it is amply documented that in the
Hellenistic kingdoms the institution of the synedrion continued in place, with the
difference that its members were called philoi (friends) instead of hetairoi
(companions).
[17]
We are fortunate in having four passages in Diodoros that show this
council of state in action in Antigonos's reign, neatly exemplifying the ruler's reliance
on his synedrion and its wide sphere of competence, encompassing essentially every
aspect of the ruler's activities.
The first of the four Diodoros passages is XVIII 50,5, recording that Antigonos
consulted with his synedrion on the state of the empire and the policy he planned to
pursue after the death of Antipatros in autumn 319. Diod. XIX 46,4 informs us that
Antigonos summoned his synedrion to try Peithon Krateua when the latter was
suspected of treachery early in 315 and easily obtained a guilty verdict; and Diod. XIX
48,1 reports that later in the same year Antigonos's synedrion held a session at
Persepolis to help him decide the administrative arrangements and appointments to
be made in the upper satrapies. The fourth passage—Diod. XIX 57,1—tells us that
when ambassadors from the four allied western dynasts came to Antigonos in early
314 with their ultimatum and threat of war, he called his synedrion into session to
receive them. From these it may be concluded, then, that the synedrion might be
consulted on the general policy to be followed, on important judicial decisions, on
administrative matters, and on foreign policy; and it must be emphasized that in none
of these four instances is there any suggestion or hint that the summoning of a
synedrion was in any way unusual or exceptional. The opposite is rather the case:
when we read at XIX 46,4 that Antigonos accused Peithon before toiVmetecousitousu
nedriou and at XIX 57,1 that ambassadors were eisacqenteVeiV tosunedrion , the
impression is given that the synedrion was an established institution at the court of
Antigonos, and this is without doubt in accordance with the facts.
Though the four passages adduced above are the only ones in which the
synedrion of Antigonos is explicitly attested by name, there are other passages in
Diodoros and also in Plutarch that are most
[17]
― 247 ―
probably to be interpreted as referring to activities of the synedrion . This can be
virtually proved in one instance for both Diodoros and Plutarch, who speak of
Antigonos deliberating what to do with Eumenes after the battle of Gabiene (Diod. XIX
44,2: ebouleueto ; Plut. Eum. 18,3: bouleuo x109;enoV ), while on this same subject
the Latin writer Cornelius Nepos speaks of Antigonos deciding Eumenes' fate at a
consilium with his amicis (Nepos Eum. 12,1–3), and it is clear that this must be a
translation of synedrion and philoi in Nepos's Greek source. Evidently, then, we
should understand Diodoros and Plutarch to mean that Antigonos consulted his
synedrion when they say that he "took counsel" concerning the fate of Eumenes.
Likewise we can reasonably assume meetings of the synedrion to be referred to when
Plutarch speaks of "those present" (tvuV parontaV ) at Antigonos's parley with
Eumenes at Nora in 319 (Plut. Eum. 8,3); when we read that Antigonos viewed the
disposition of Eumenes' army in Paraitakene surrounded by his philoi (Plut. Eum.
15,2); when in 307, apropos of the decision to send a great expedition to Attica, one
of the philoi advised Antigonos to garrison Athens (Plut. Dem. 8,2); and when
Antigonos consulted the leaders of his army as to the best course of action after
Demetrios's fleet had failed to turn Ptolemy's defensive position in Egypt in 306 (Diod.
XX 76,5).
[18]
In each of the above instances, when we try to imagine the circumstances—who
were "those present" at the parley with Eumenes and why were they there; when and
in what circumstances did one of the philoi advise Antigonos what to do with Athens;
and so forth—it is clear enough that the obvious context was a session of the
synedrion to hear what was being planned and offer advice. Other similar instances
could be adduced, but these should suffice to make the point, and they indicate that
in addition to the areas of general policy, judicial matters, administrative affairs, and
foreign policy, the synedrion was regularly consulted on military matters also, and we
may be sure that the advice of the synedrion would likewise be sought in regard to
financial and any other concerns of Antigonos. It is clear from a number of the
passages mentioned above (especially from Diod. XVIII 50,5 and XIX 48,1), as well as
from later Hellenistic practice, that the persons who made up the synedrion were
called the king's philoi, or friends. The change in terminology from hetairoi to
[18]
― 248 ―
philoi seems to originate with the Diadochoi, therefore, and is likely due to their
originally non-royal status, when their entourages consisted not of royal hetaireiai but
of groups of personal friends.
[19]
This can be documented by reference to Diod. XVIII 22,4, which describes how
Antigonos, then merely the satrap of Phrygia and Lykia/Pamphylia, fled from the
wrath of Perdikkas in late 321 taking with him his personal friends (meta
twnidiwnnilwn ), and that it required several ships to transport these people to
Europe. Evidently these philoi who fled with Antigonos in 321 must have formed the
nucleus of the body of philoi who formed his synedrion as ruler and eventually king of
Asia. These early philoi, who were apparently not few in number, had presumably
formed his personal staff as satrap at Kelainai and continued to be part of it after his
rapid rise to greater power. An example appears to be the Macedonian Theotimides,
son of Theophilos (see app. 3, no. 115). From the staff of the satrap, then, must have
grown the staff of the dynast and king, and the activities of the philoi were not, of
course, limited to accompanying Antigonos about his travels and campaigns and
forming the membership of his synedrion . No fewer than 128 persons serving under
Antigonos or his generals can be identified in the surviving sources (see app. 3
below), but unfortunately only 19 of them are specifically called philoi or referred to in
such a way that they can be identified as philoi with near certainty.
[20]
Most of these
19 were clearly officers in Antigonos's armies, but a number of them are recorded to
have fulfilled diplomatic tasks (Aristodemos) or administrative duties (Hieronymos;
Peithon, son of Agenor), to have been financial officials (Xenophilos) or at least to
have given financial advice (Aristodemos), or to have been simply close advisers
(Boiotos) or courtiers/attendants (Mithridates; Thorax).
In short, this small sample of 19 makes it clear that the philoi fulfilled a wide
variety of tasks and duties on Antigonos's behalf: the
[19][20]
― 249 ―
preponderance of military men is without doubt due rather to the predominantly
military interests of the literary sources than to a genuine preponderance of the scale
indicated (11 of the 19 are mentioned only in a military context). Moreover, the title
philos can be ascribed with confidence to a great many of those 109 men for whom it
is not specifically attested (one thinks here especially of such men as Agesilaos,
Aischylos, Demarchos, Dokimos, Euagoras, Hippostratos, Idomeneus, Leonidas,
Nikanor, Nikomedes, Menandros, Peukestas, and Theotimides: see app. 3 sub nom. ),
and it is in fact likely that the great majority of the 128 men were philoi of
Antigonos.
[21]
The philoi provided a pool of available manpower for any important task
Antigonos needed to have done: commanding armies or troops, administering
provinces or districts, guarding fortresses or treasuries, undertaking embassies,
leading fleets or flotillas, conducting inquiries or trials, looking after financial affairs,