Bahm Karl. Berlin 1945: The Final Reckoning
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their village authorities could pay the cash tribute in gold to the chiliarchs, and that
Antigonos obtained large amounts of produce from his royal estate lands for which he
also required a ready market.
[2]
Financial reasons aside, there were political
considerations, in that the major grain exporter of the eastern Mediterranean area
was Egypt, governed by Antigonos's rival Ptolemy, whose economy Antigonos would
not wish to see boosted by the import of Egyptian grain into
[1][2]
― 288 ―
his own empire. Such a political desire for economic self-sufficiency receives some
slight support from a notice in Theophrastos (Hist. plant. IV 8, 4; cf. Pliny NH XIII 73)
concerning the papyrus plant: he reports that besides in Egypt it also grew around a
lake in Syria and that Antigonos thence derived a supply to make cables for his ships.
The reference appears to be in the first instance to Antigonos's naval building
program of 314/13 (Diod. XIX 58, 1–6), thus primarily reflecting Antigonos's military
rather than economic preoccupations. However, papyrus cables were not only used
for naval vessels, and neither was papyrus exclusively used for cables; the
development of an independent source of papyrus seems to be an indication of
Antigonos's desire to make his realm self-sufficient, just as the Attalids later
promoted the development of parchment so that they would not be dependent on
papyrus from Egypt.
[3]
There are other indications that Antigonos was aware of the economic and hence
political importance of trade and sought to encourage, control, and exploit it. Another
passage in Theophrastos (Hist. plant. IX 4, 8) reports that Antigonos was interested in
the trade in frankincense from the Red Sea area, and persuaded the Arab traders who
brought the incense to the Mediterranean to bring him logs of the frankincense tree
(cf. also Pliny NH XII 56). It may be that his attempt to conquer the Nabataians of
Petra, the middlemen in this trade, was in part inspired by an interest in securing
control of the frankincense trade (see Diod. XX 94, 1–98, 1), and that when this failed
he persuaded the traders to bring him frankincense plants in the hope of cultivating
them within his realm. The notion that Antigonos might have gone to war partly from
economic motives should not be dismissed: that such motives had some weight with
him is attested by his attempt to take over bitumen production on the Dead Sea
(Diod. XX 98, 1–100, 2), hoping to find in it a profitable source of revenue (and
perhaps to put pressure on Egypt, the main market for the bitumen).
Further evidence of economic policy comes from the Teos inscription (Welles, RC,
no. 3) at lines 94–101, where Antigonos lays down rules for the export of foodstuffs
from the territory of the proposed synoikism (see also Welles's commentary, RC, p.
30). Antigonos introduced a new provision that farmers wishing to export
[3]
― 289 ―
need not bring their produce to the city agora first in order to pay the duties; instead
they could just declare to the agoranomos their intention to export a stated quantity
of produce, pay the relevant duties, and then export it direct. This was clearly
designed to facilitate exports, which shows Antigonos's interest in promoting a surplus
of exports over imports in his empire. Again certain aspects of the hostilities between
Antigonos and Rhodes in 306–304 were probably connected with trade. Rostovtzeff
has noted (SEHHW, 3:1354 n. 42) that Antigonos's rivalry with Ptolemy of Egypt as a
grain exporter (Asia Minor, Syria, and Cyprus producing surpluses of grain for export)
may have been in part responsible for their rivalry to secure paramount influence with
Rhodes, which was playing an increasingly important role in the grain trade. This idea
is supported by the fact that when in 306 Antigonos decided on hostilities with Egypt,
he sent a naval flotilla to disrupt trade between Egypt and Rhodes (Diod. XX 82, 1–2);
and that during the later siege of Rhodes in 305–304, Antigonos attempted to bring
over to his side all Rhodian seamen and traders operating in Syria, Phoenicia, Kilikia,
and Pamphylia by promising them the freedom of the ports in his realm if they would
abstain from aiding Rhodes (Polyainos IV 6, 16).
While it is not possible, then, to describe Antigonos's foreign trade policy in
detail, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he was interested in this matter,
took at least occasional initiatives connected with it, had in general a policy of
promoting a healthy surplus of exports over imports in the foreign trade of his empire,
and sought to promote self-sufficiency within the empire and to set up a government
monopoly in the grain trade.
Turning to his internal economic policy, this was probably primarily fiscal in
nature—that is, concerned with securing as high an income as possible and regulating
his expenditures. That this is how economic policy was regarded in Antigonos's time is
directly attested by Ps.-Aristotle Oikonomikos II, which is of early Hellenistic date (it
mentions in all its examples of economic activity no person or event later than ca.
320).
[4]
It has long been recognized that the description (at sec. 1, 1–4) of the royal
and satrapial economies refers essentially to late Persian times and the period of
Alexander and Antigonos (see, e.g., Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 1:441). The author speaks
of the royal
[4]
― 290 ―
economy being concerned with coinage (i.e., the money supply), with imports and
exports (glossed as taxes on these, sent to the king by the satraps),
[5]
and with
expenses: in other words we are here dealing with income (from taxation), the
production of coinage, and outlays—all strictly fiscal matters. Likewise the section on
the satrapial economy deals exclusively with the governor's finances, deriving from
agricultural tribute, from mining, from harbor, land, sales, and cattle taxes, and from
poll taxes and taxes on manufacture.
The interest of all this is that it provides us with certain insights into the internal
economic organization of Asia in the late fourth century. It appears that the tribute
(phoros or ekphorion ) was at least notionally set at one-tenth of agricultural produce,
though since we read in the Mnesimachos inscription of a fixed cash tribute, this
"tithe" was probably established as a tenth of the average yearly yield, so that the
tribute would not vary with good or bad years. Furthermore, it would seem that most
economic activity was taxed, as were land and agricultural animals, the latter again at
one-tenth. The statement that all products of the earth such as gold, silver, copper,
and so on, formed part of the state revenues indicates that in Asia at this time all
minerals were considered state property and the mining of them was a royal
monopoly. It is not my purpose here to analyze this information in depth and see
exactly how far we may be justified in applying it to Antigonos's rule, for this would
demand too much space.
[6]
It suffices to indicate that in general the late-fourth-
century date of Ps.-Aristotle's work invites its application to Antigonos, and that
nothing obviously rules such an application out. The kinds of taxes and revenues
described therefore form an eloquent commentary on certain anecdotes concerning
Antigonos's financial administration, for he is said (Plut. Mor. 182a = Apophth. Ant. 1)
to have been more exigent in his demands for money than Alexander, and to have
justified this by remarking that whereas Alexander had reaped Asia, he was reduced
to gleaning it.
[5][6]
― 291 ―
This anecdote suggests that in practice there was considerable leeway in the
interpretation and application of the various taxes and tributes imposed on the
peoples of the empire,
[7]
and that Antigonos was relatively strict and rigorous in his
application of taxes. On the other hand, another anecdote (Plut. Phok. 39, 1) records
that under the even harsher regime of Lysimachos, the peasants of Asia Minor
regretted Antigonos's demise, so that in general one might perhaps characterize
Antigonos's taxation policy as strict but fair. That the peasantry of Asia Minor were by
and large quite well off under Antigonos's rule is further suggested by a passage in
Plutarch's Eumenes (8, 4–5) which tells us that in the early winter of 320/19 Eumenes
plundered greater Phrygia to pay his troops,
[8]
that region having been for the
previous thirteen years under Antigonos's governance as satrap. The countryside is
described as being full of people and flocks, indicating that it had prospered under
Antigonos's governance. There is no reason to suppose that Asia Minor and Syria were
less well treated by Antigonos as king than Phrygia had been by Antigonos as satrap.
In short, it may reasonably be claimed that so far as he could, Antigonos promoted
agricultural productivity and rural prosperity. The already-cited regulation in the edict
concerning the Teos/Lebedos synoikism, making it easier for farmers to export
produce by freeing them from the obligation of first bringing their produce to the
agora of the local city or port of exit, will also have aimed at this.
This is about as much as can reasonably be said about Antigonos's economic
policy. To be sure, the establishment of Greco-Macedonian friends and supporters as
proprietors of large estates of royal land (for instance, the frequently adduced
Mnesimachos: Buckler and Robinson, Sardis VII, no. 1), the settling of soldier-
colonists on plots of royal land, and the establishment of new or larger Greek cities
(colonies and synoikisms), may have had as consequences increased agricultural
efficiency and productivity and increased economic activity; and this may well have
been to some extent a planned and
[7][8]
― 292 ―
intended effect. However, the main reason for this activity was probably not economic
but political and military.
What does need to be discussed in connection with Antigonos's economic policy
is the coinage produced in his realm. Antigonos's attitude to coinage and the money
supply is hard to determine, because he struck no coins in his own name; instead
throughout his reign the mints of Asia continued to produce Alexander coinage,
whether due to deliberate policy of Antigonos or on their own initiative. Consequently
any attempt at an in-depth investigation of Antigonos's coining would involve a study
of the posthumous Alexander coinage, which is beyond the scope of this work. The
failure of Antigonos to put his name on the coinage in his realm is the more surprising
in that his satrap of Susiane felt at liberty to put his name (Aspeisas) on the
Alexander coins minted at Susa (see app. 3, no. 21). The facts that Tyre after 307
became an important mint site for Alexander coinage and that Demetrios
subsequently produced his own coinage with his own name, suggest that the
continuation of the popular Alexander coinage under Antigonos was a deliberate
policy, whether from economic or propagandist motives one cannot say. At any rate a
number of important mints within Antigonos's realm kept the empire supplied with
coinage of Alexander's type throughout this period: mints at Susa, Babylon, Sidon,
and Ake may be mentioned, for example.
[9]
In the absence of any evidence as to why
Antigonos elected, unlike his rivals and his own son, to continue to mint Alexander
coinage exclusively, any further discussion of Antigonos's coining policy would be the
merest speculation, which is better avoided.
Settlement Policy: Urbanization and Colonization
As foreign conquerors the Macedonian rulers of Asia—Alexander no less than
Antigonos and the Seleukids—found it necessary to promote the establishment in Asia
of large numbers of Greco-Macedonian settlers to act as a kind of permanent garrison
of the conquered lands and to provide a continuous supply of manpower for the army
[9]
― 293 ―
and the bureaucracy of the new empire. Although Alexander seems to have sought to
coopt the Iranian ruling class as partners in the running of the empire,
[10]
and
although we shall see in the section on Antigonos's cultural policy below that
Antigonos to a certain extent followed this policy, it is obvious that the Macedonian
rulers of Asia had in the first place to rely on Greco-Macedonian helpers and soldiers,
the only people whose most vital interests as inhabitants of Asia required them to
support the Macedonian rulers. Handsome tribute is regularly paid to Alexander's
pioneering work as a founder of Greco-Macedonian colonies in Asia (already briefly
discussed in chapter 1 above), and every work discussing the Greco-Macedonian
colonization of Asia recognizes the major contributions of Seleukos and his son
Antiochos in this respect (see now, e.g., Cohen, Seleucid Colonies, pp. 1–14).
Between these, however, the colonizing activity of Antigonos is too often passed over
with only a brief acknowledgement that he, too, made a contribution.
[11]
Several modern scholars have, in fact, recognized that Antigonos's settlement of
Greeks and Macedonians in Asia must have been of fundamental importance. In Die
hellenistischen Städtegründungen, for example, Tscherikower remarks (at pp. 154–
55): "Dass Antigonos der bedeutendste unter den unmittelbaren Nachfolgern
Alexanders gewesen ist [i.e., as a founder of cities], wird man trotz der mangelhaften
Überlieferung zugeben müssen" and "Dass Antigonos als grosser Städtegründer von
seinem Nachfolger gepriesen worden wäre wenn er einen Nachfolger gehabt hätte,
steht ausser Zweifel." More recently Goukowsky has pointed out that a simple
calculation of the potential provenance of Greco-Macedonian colonists in Asia shows
that Antigonos must have anticipated much of Seleukos's work.
[12]
For Seleukos was
never in a position to draw recruits for his colonies from Macedon, and neither could
he draw upon Greek manpower with anything like the ease Antigonos could.
[10][11][12]
― 294 ―
By and large Seleukos must have worked mostly with Greeks and Macedonians
already in Asia, which is to say the soldiers and settlers of Antigonos. Indeed, in the
case of Antioch and Apamea-on-the-Orontes we are explicitly told by sources that
Seleukos founded the cities with settlers who were already present.
[13]
Since most of Antigonos's colonizing activity is not recorded in the sources, any
full treatment of it must be largely speculative. However, sufficient evidence does
survive to show that he was a large-scale colonizer by any reckoning. Moreover, since
the cities he is directly recorded as having founded, such as Antigoneia Troas,
Antigoneia in Bithynia, and Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, are reported to have been
refounded under new names after his death (as Alexandria Troas, Nikaia, and Antioch
respectively), there is every reason to suppose that original foundations of
Antigonos's may have been behind many colonies of the Seleukids, and that many of
the Macedonian settlements in Asia whose founders are not known may go back to
him. Antigonos's settlement policy will be reviewed under five basic headings: care for
Greek cities already existing in Asia; Hellenizing of native Asian cities; foundation of
entirely new Greek cities; establishment of military colonies which lacked city status;
and settling of individual colonists, whether as large estate holders or as soldier-
settlers.
As ruler of Asia Minor and Syria/Palestine, Antigonos was fortunate in already
having within his realm a considerable Greek element in the form of the old Greek
cities established along the coasts of these territories; from Amisos on the Black Sea
all the way round the Anatolian coast down to Poseideion in Syria, there were a host
of Greek cities of varying sizes and antiquity. A large number of men from these cities
are attested in Antigonos's service (see app. 3 for details), and they formed a natural
source of supply for officials and officers, mercenary soldiers, and drafts of settlers. It
was Antigonos's policy to foster and strengthen this existing Greek element as much
as possible. It is clear from the evidence on his relations with the Greek cities that he
treated them well and respected their autonomy as far as was consonant with his own
security needs as ruler of Asia. What calls for special attention here is his synoikizing
activity, which led to the foundation of Antigoneia Troas, the reestablishment of the
city of
[13]
― 295 ―
Smyrna, and the reintegration of Kolophon and its port town of Notion, and which
envisioned the synoikism of Teos and Lebedos.
Antigonos's synoikizing was intended to strengthen the Greek cities involved by
making them more viable economic and political units. In this he was spectacularly
successful in the cases of Antigoneia Troas and Smyrna, which were in Hellenistic and
Roman times two of the most flourishing cities of western Asia Minor. Only Strabo
reports Antigonos's synoikizing of these cities, stating that he founded Antigoneia
Troas (later Alexandria Troas after Lysimachos changed its name) from a number of
mostly utterly insignificant Aiolic communities in the Troad: Hamaxitos, Kebrene,
Chrysa, Larissa, Kolonai, Neandria, Sigia (on the old site of which Antigoneia was
actually founded), and Skepsis—a more important city, which was later given back its
independent status by Lysimachos (Strabo XIII 593, 597, and 604).
[14]
Smyrna had
been sacked and razed by the Lydians in the seventh century and had broken up into
a number of small villages, and it was on Antigonos's initiative that these were
abandoned and the people came back together into a single city, though the process
of synoikizing was apparently completed only after Antigonos's death by Lysimachos
(Strabo XIV 646). The extension of the city of Kolophon is epigraphically attested, and
though Antigonos is explicitly mentioned only as having guaranteed the city's
autonomy, it is commonly hypothesized (and surely rightly) that Antigonos was in fact
behind the extension of the city.
[15]
The projected synoikism of Teos and Lebedos,
finally, is attested by the famous inscription, which contains portions of two letters by
Antigonos setting out arrangements and regulations for the synoikism (see Syll., no.
344; Welles, RC, nos. 3 and 4).
Besides fostering and strengthening the Greek cities of the coast, it is highly
probable that Antigonos strengthened the native cities in the interior and in particular
sought to introduce a Greco-Macedonian population element and turn them into
Hellenic poleis . Three examples of this may be adduced, unfortunately none of them
absolutely secure. In the first place there is the case of Karrhai (= the ancient
Mesopotamian city of Harran), where Seleukos, in the winter of
[14][15]
― 296 ―
312/11, came upon a colony of Macedonians, some of whom he compelled to join his
small army for the attack on Babylonia (Diod. XIX 91, 1); the Macedonian colony at
Karrhai is also attested by Dio Cassius (XXXVII 5, 5), speaking of the time of Pompey.
When we wonder who could have established a colony of Macedonians at Karrhai
before 312, and consider that the colonists were still of an age for active campaigning
in 312/11, the obvious answer is that Antigonos most probably founded the colony
around 315/14. It is also probable that Antigonos considerably Hellenized the ancient
Phrygian city of Kelainai, which was his satrapial seat and his residence as ruler from
333 to 306. There is no direct evidence of this other than Antigonos's well-attested
sojourns at Kelainai, but since Antiochos I founded the Greek city of Apamea Kibotos
close by the site of Kelainai, using the population of Kelainai as settlers (Strabo XII
577–78), it may be regarded as almost certain that the population of Kelainai already
contained a large Greco-Macedonian element and that this was due to Antigonos (see
in this sense, e.g., Tscherikower, Städtegründungen, pp. 155–56). The third example
is Synnada, which is known to have had a Macedonian colony probably dating from
the late fourth century (Tscherikower, Städtegründungen, p. 35). This city, near the
modern Afyonkarahisar, is first mentioned in the sources as a center of Antigonos's
power and seat of his strategos Dokimos in 302 (Diod. XX 107, 3–4). Besides
Macedonians, Ionian and Dorian settlers are attested by the city's coinage (see Ruge,
RE, s.v. Synnada). The colony was most probably founded by Antigonos, perhaps on
the site of an earlier Phrygian community.
[16]
Several new cities are attested as having been founded by Antigonos, and more
can be plausibly conjectured. The sources directly attest to three cities named
Antigoneia after himself: near Bithynia (later renamed Nikaia by Lysimachos), at the
site of Daskyleion in Hellespontine Phrygia, and on the river Orontes in upper Syria
(near the later site of Antioch). The first of these, Antigoneia/Nikaia, was
[16]
― 297 ―
founded on the eastern shore of Lake Ascania at the site of modern Iznik, in a position
where it could watch over Bithynia and the cities of the Propontis, as well as the
north-south routes from Europe into Asia Minor via the Bosporos (Strabo XII 565;
Steph. Byz. s.v. Nikaia). Antigoneia by Daskyleion is mentioned only by Stephanos of
Byzantion (s. v. Antigoneia); Daskyleion was the seat of the Persian satraps of
Hellespontine Phrygia and hence an important place, though it does not seem to have
been a city (see the description of it in Xenophon Hellenika IV 1, 15–16). Recent
exploratory excavations have established its site as being on the southeastern shore
of Lake Manyas and have shown the presence of Persian and early Hellenistic
remains.
[17]
However, the place does not seem ever to have grown into an important
city, though having a strategic location for overseeing Hellespontine Phrygia.
The most important of the three was undoubtedly Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes,
which was Antigonos's residence from 306 to 302. It is the only one of Antigonos's
foundations for which we have relatively full and accurate information on the date of
foundation, the number and provenance of the colonists, and the size of the city; this
is due to the face that Diodoros reports its foundation in 306 (Diod. XX 47, 5) and
that later writers interested in the great and famous city of Antioch were necessarily
interested in Antigoneia, because Antioch was basically a re-foundation of Antigoneia
at an adjacent site and using the population of Antigoneia.
[18]
The site of this
Antigoneia seems to have been inland somewhat from Antioch, near the point where
the tributary from the lake north-east of Antioch (the modern Lake Amik) joins the
Orontes; ancient ruins have been found there and the identification of these with
Antigoneia, already made in Kiepert's atlas of the ancient world (Atlas antiquus V map
1), is accepted by Downey in his monographs on Antioch.
[19]
Despite the destruction
of Antigoneia by Seleukos in 301, the place is mentioned as still existing in 53 B.C. by
Dio Cassius XL 39, 1–2; presumably it continued to be inhabited by a remnant of its
former population and became a kome of Antioch, as Tscherikower conjectures
(Städtegründungen, p. 61).
[17][18][19]
― 298 ―
Besides these three clearly attested new cities, several other cities may be
conjectured to have been founded by Antigonos. On the Gulf of Issos the modern city
of Iskenderun occupies the site of an early Hellenistic foundation usually called
Alexandria-by-Issos, though the city was actually many miles south of the town of
Issos. In spite of a late tradition that the city was founded by Alexander himself—
obviously simply deduced from the name Alexandria—it is clear that it was in fact
founded by one of the successors, the obvious candidates being Antigonos and
Seleukos (see in this sense, e.g., Tscherikower Städtegründungen, pp. 58–59). Of the
two, the former is the more likely candidate. Strabo tells us that the successors of
Alexander considered it an act of piety to name a city after Alexander and that
Lysimachos renamed Antigoneia Troas after Alexander (Strabo XIII 593). Ptolemy
similarly put his energy into building up the famous Alexandria in Egypt. Appian tells
us that Seleukos named some cities in honor of Alexander, and mentions
Alexandropolis in India and Alexandreschata in Scythia (Appian Syr. 57). If, as seems
implied by Strabo, Antigonos also followed this practice, Alexandria-by-Issos is an
obvious place to have been founded by him, for as a port it was clearly intended to
serve as the end-point of the great trade route from inner Asia through upper
Mesopotamia, and, just as it now is the port of Antakya, to serve as the port of upper
Syria.
[20]
Seleukos built Seleukia-in-Pieria to fulfill this function, so we should most
probably link the building of Alexandria with the foundation of Antigoneia-on-the-
Orontes, with which it would have been connected by the excellent route still used.
A large number of military colonies (katoikiai ) that probably did not, in origin at
least, possess the status of poleis are known to have been founded in Asia Minor,
Syria/Palestine, and Media, and it is commonly supposed that Antigonos was
responsible for some.
[21]
Again, a few can be singled out as being particularly
plausible, while for the rest it can only be said that one should not automatically
assume a Seleukid founder for any of these katoikiai . Stephanos mentions a
phrourion called Antigoneia in the Kyzikene some fifty stades west of Kyzikos on the
coast (Steph. Byz. s.v. Antigoneia).
[20][21]
― 299 ―
Approximately at the right distance from Kyzikos on the coast of the Kyzikene (i.e.,
the large peninsula jutting out into the Sea of Marmara by Kyzikos) lay the ancient
town or village of Artake, at the site of modern Erdek (on this place, see Hirschfeld,
RE, s.v. Artake no. 1). Possibly the fort called Antigoneia was the base of a
garrison/colony settled near Artake by Antigonos to secure the Kyzikene against
possible attacks by Lysimachos. In Phrygia a little to the north of Synnada there was
a small town called Dokimeion, obviously founded by Antigonos's strategos Dokimos.
The place is called a kome (village) of Synnada by Strabo (XII 577) and Stephanos
(Steph. Byz. s.v. Synnada), though its coinage seems to indicate that it later became
a polis .
[22]
Its coins proclaim Macedonian origin, and it is probable that the place was
originally a settlement of veterans who had served under Dokimos as garrison troops
in Phrygia.
Concerning the great city of Apameia-on-the-Orentes, the military headquarters
of the Seleukid empire, Strabo informs us (XVI 752) that the "first Macedonians" who
settled there called the place Pella before it was named Apameia by Seleukos after his
wife. Again the obvious inference is that Antigonos (who may well have been a native
of Pella—see pp. 17–18 above) founded a colony of Macedonian katoikoi on this site
with the name Pella, which Seleukos later refounded as a city and named Apameia
(thus, e.g., Tscherikower, Städtegründungen, pp. 158–59). The same may have been
the case with Seleukia-in-Pieria: Strabo informs us (XVI 2, 8) that Seleukia was
originally called Hydatos Potamoi; Diodoros knows of a town in upper Syria in 312
named Potamoi Karon (XIX 79, 6), near Poseideion at the mouth of the Orontes.
These towns, named Potamoi from their location at the Orontes Delta, are presumably
in fact one and the same place—to judge by the name Diodoros gives, perhaps a
settlement of Karian veterans. Such a settlement, existing already in 312, can only
have been founded by Antigonos; like Pella it was evidently resettled, expanded, and
renamed by Seleukos.
The region of Rhagai in Media was settled by Greco-Macedonian colonists in the
early Hellenistic period, and Tscherikower conjectured (Stadtegründungen, p. 159)
that this might have been in part the work of Antigonos, citing in support of this
hypothesis Diod. XIX 44, 4, where the prominent mention of Rhagai as a site where
Antigonos quartered soldiers in 316/15 may be the remnant of a longer notice in
Hieronymos describing the settlement of soldiers there as
[22]
― 300 ―
garrison/colonists. In favor of this hypothesis, I would also adduce Polyainos IV 6, 15
where we learn that of the 3,000 Macedonian argyraspides, a third were sent to
Sibyrtios in Arachosia in 315, and the remaining 2,000 were stationed in various
"secure and out-of-the-way sites" (cwria. . .ecurakaidusbata ) as garrisons. The
description "secure and out-of-the-way" fits the region of Rhagai, in the northeastern
corner of Media, very well, and it may be that the settling of these 2,000 Macedonian
troublemakers as soldier-colonists in the Rhagai area is cryptically referred to by both
Diodoros and Polyainos.
Other significant areas of Greco-Macedonian settlement were the so-called
Dekapolis in Palestine, the region of Kilikia in southern Asia Minor, and Lydia in
western Asia Minor, where a host of small towns boasted in Roman times of
Macedonian origins: for example, Nakrasa, Thyateira, Mostene, and Hyrkanis (see
Tscherikower, Städtegründungen, pp. 21–24). Again, it is possible that Antigonos had
a hand in founding some of these settlements, though this cannot be proved.
[23]
There
are, however, indications of Antigonos settling individual colonists on estates or farm
plots in Lydia, in the already often cited Mnesimachos inscription. This records the
granting by Antigonos of a large estate in the Sardian plain to Mnesimachos and of
kleroi (lots) within it, mentioning two individuals named Pytheos and Adrastos as
holders of part of the estate (perhaps the two kleroi, in which case these men would
probably be soldier-settlers).
[24]
We can be sure that the facts we learn from the
Mnesimachos inscription do not form an isolated case: note for example that Diodoros
XIX 25, 2 reports that in seeking to bring over to himself the army of Eumenes in
316, Antigonos promised to give them large gifts of land. Clearly, what Antigonos
promised to deserters from Eumenes he must also have granted his own officers and
soldiers. We may be sure that he gave many estates such as that of Mnesimachos to
prominent supporters, and settled many soldiers as klerouchoi (allotment holders) on
royal and other lands in Asia. An indication of this seems to be
[23][24]
― 301 ―
provided by an inscription from Iasos in Karia recording that soldiers established in
nearby forts by Antigonos's general Polemaios held parcels of land in the region and
were hence intended to remain settled there.
[25]
Though I have broken down Antigonos's settlement activity into the above five
types, this is simply a convenient way of arranging the evidence for analysis. There is
no reason to suppose that Antigonos himself distinguished the categories I have
identified above, and in fact there was clearly some overlap between the various
types of settlement activity. For example, since Antigoneia Troas was an entirely new
city, it had in some ways more in common with such new foundations as Antigoneia-
on-the-Orontes than with synoikisms like those at Smyrna and Kolophon. Again it is
not clear whether Synnada was a new foundation or an old Phrygian town now
Hellenized, and similarly it is not certain to what extent there was already existing
indigenous settlement at the sites of Antigoneia/Nikaia (previously called Ankore
according to Steph. Byz. s.v. Nikaia) and Antigoneia/Daskyleion. Furthermore the
distinction between individual settlers and soldiers settled together in katoikiai is not a
clear one. Though the Mnesimachos inscription, if rightly interpreted, indicates that
some soldiers were settled on individual lots or estates, it seems likely that it was
more common for soldiers to be settled in groups according more or less to their
military units, and as such they would also have received kleroi to farm. The colony at
Karrhai appears to have been of this sort, and an inscription from Thyateira shows
that in Seleukid times, at least, soldiers were sometimes settled as a unit, complete
with officers.
[26]
The findings of this review of settlement activity by Antigonos are
shown here in figure 6.
The fact that eighteen foundations or areas of colonization can be attributed to
Antigonos with at least a fair degree of probability notwithstanding the extremely
defective evidence shows that he certainly deserves to be considered the forerunner
of the Seleukids in this respect. As mentioned above, the major reason for supposing
even where evidence is lacking that Antigonos is nevertheless likely to have laid the
foundation for the subsequent work of Seleukos is that Antigonos had greater access
to Macedonian and Greek manpower
[25][26]
― 302 ―
1. ?Alexandria-by-Issos
2. Antigoneia-by-Daskyleion
3. Antigoneia Kyzikena
4. Antigoneia Bithyniake (Nikaia)
5. Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes (Antioch)
6. Antigoneia Troas (Alexandria)
7. Dokimeion
8. Iasos
9. ? Karrhai
10. ? Kelainai (Apameia Kibotos)
11. ? Kolophon
12. Lydia—settlers in plain of Sardis: Mnesimachos et al.
13. ? Pella (Apameia-on-the-Orontes)
14. ? Potamoi Karon/Hydatos (Seleukia-in-Pieria)
15. ? Rhagai in Media
16. Smyrna
17. ? Synnada
18. Teos/Lebedos
(Question mark indicates that colonizing by Antigonos is not certain; additional
names in parentheses show later name changes by action of Lysimachos or the
Seleukids.)
Figure 6. Cities or Regions Colonized by Antigonos
than was ever the case for Seleukos and his successors. In 320 Antigonos
received 8,500 Macedonian infantrymen from Antipatros, and despite losses in battle
between 319 and 315, the number of Macedonian troops in Antigonos's service would
have risen considerably due to his incorporation of the armies of defeated rivals: the
army of Eumenes in 319, that of Alketas and Attalos in the same year, the troops of
Arrhidaios and Kleitos in 318/17, and the second army of Eumenes at the beginning of
315. All of these armies had Macedonian elements in them, sometimes substantial
ones (see app. 2 below for details). Consequently Antigonos may conservatively be
estimated to have had somewhere around 20,000 Macedonians (infantry and cavalry)
in 315 to draw on for settlers.
― 303 ―
Since Kassandros secured control of Macedon in 315, and at the end of that year
became an enemy of Antigonos, no further drafts of Macedonian soldiers could be
expected, and to maintain his Macedonian infantry and cavalry (and officer corps)
Antigonos could henceforth only resort to the expedient of settling his own troops in
Asia and drafting their sons into his army. As most of Antigonos's Macedonians were
already veterans in 315, it must be assumed that he began to settle them in colonies
long before his end in 301, and this is shown to be so by the evidence concerning
Karrhai, Rhagai, Pella/Apameia, Potamoi/Seleukia, and so on. Seleukos cannot have
had more than a handful of Macedonians in his service before 301, and though he
would then have inherited part of Antigonos's army (which probably included 6,000
new Macedonians brought from Europe by Demetrios in 302: see Plut. Dem. 23, 1),
after the division with Lysimachos he would scarcely have received a sufficient
number of Macedonians to carry out the extensive colonization attributed to him.
Much of it must simply have been a completion/reorganization of colonization begun
by Antigonos.
Of course, one should not suppose that those places attested as Macedonian
foundations, or katoikiai, were peopled exclusively with Macedonians. There were
never enough Macedonians in Asia to people the large number of cities and colonies
attested to have had Macedonian settlers. In 316 a substantial element in Antigonos's
army was formed by people of various (Asian?) origins (pantodapoi ) armed in
Macedonian fashion: it seems very likely that these men were settled together with
Macedonians in the katoikiai, both by Antigonos and by the Seleukids. Their
descendants would doubtless simply be considered "Macedonians." In addition a large
number of the settlers in Asia were certainly Greeks. Undoubtedly many Greek
mercenary soldiers received kleroi and were settled in katoikiai along with the
Macedonians, the more so as the difference between Macedonians and Greeks rapidly
became of little importance in Asia, particularly in late Hellenistic times. However, in
the time of Antigonos the difference between Greek and Macedonian was still fresh,
and probably most of the Greeks who settled in Asia preferred to do so as members of
the new Greek poleis founded by Antigonos and the Seleukids.
The major source of settlers for the new poleis, however, was drafts of colonists
from old Greek cities—those in Asia Minor certainly, and, under Antigonos at least,
also the cities of mainland Greece. Again, since Antigonos had great influence in
Greece from
― 304 ―
314 on and essentially controlled the Greek cities of Asia Minor from 317 on, whereas
Seleukos conquered Asia Minor only just before his death and had no particular
influence in mainland Greece at any time, it may justly be assumed that many of
Seleukos's new poleis built on foundations already laid by Antigonos. A case in point is
the great Antioch-on-the-Orontes, which was peopled with the settlers of the nearby
Antigoneia: 5,300 men, we are told, of Athenian and Macedonian origin.
[27]
Whereas
Antigonos was in a position in 306 to obtain a large draft of colonists from Athens,
such was never the case for Seleukos, who obtained his manpower simply from
Antigonos's existing foundation. The mix of a large number of Greeks with some
Macedonians appears to have been typical for Antigonos's foundations: Dio
Chrysostom of Nikaia (formerly Antigoneia) tells us that the original settlers of this
city were "Macedonians and the first of the Greeks" (Dio Chrys. Orat. XXXIX 1). His
meaning is that the Greeks settled there were not drifting riffraff but proper colonists
drawn from reputable Greek cities.
There were two relatively distinct strands to Antigonos's settlement policy. One
was colonization, which refers to the policy of settling soldiers with kleroi in return for
military service. This policy aimed to secure the military viability of the realm by
arranging for a continuous supply of recruits for the army: in the first place,
trustworthy Greeks and Macedonians, but also doubtless soldiers of other races.
[28]
The other strand was urbanization: the synoikism of small Greek poleis, the
Hellenization and expansion of native cities, and the foundation of new poleis . This
policy of building up an infrastructure of urban centers within the realm must partly
have served a cultural purpose (Hellenization), partly a political function (as self-
governing entities, the cities would not require constant administrative supervision,
but would administer and watch over large areas of Asian territory), and partly an
economic function (the cities could be expected to exploit their lands efficiently and to
become centers of trade and manufacture). In some cases a further, distinct policy is
discernible, as for example with the four Antigoneias (Troas, Kyzikena, Daskyleion,
Nikaia) founded in the Hellespontine
[27][28]
― 305 ―
region between 310 and 307.
[29]
These foundations must have been intended to help
settle the region after the rebellion of Phoinix in 310, and perhaps also to serve as
outposts against the power of Lysimachos, who in 309 built Lysimacheia on the
European side of the Hellespont (Diod. XX 29, 1).
A final point that may be made concerns the success of Antigonos's foundations
and synoikisms. Though some of these (such as Antigoneia-by-Daskyleion and
Teos/Lebedos) never really got off the ground, many of the others had a lasting
impact. Under their new names Alexandria Troas, Nikaia, and Antioch, three of
Antigonos's foundations became cities of major importance in the Hellenistic world
and later in the Roman Empire. Synnada grew to be the metropolis of northen Phrygia
and one of the most flourishing cities in Asia Minor (see Ruge, RE, s.v.); and, as
Apameia Kibotos and Apameia-on-the-Orontes respectively, the towns of Kelainai and
Pella were also important urban centers. It is clear that Antigonos and his advisers
made excellent choices in selecting locations for colonization and city foundation.
There was nothing mean about Antigonos's settlement policy: for example,
Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes is said to have been founded with a circuit of seventy
stades (ca. seven and a half miles: Diod. XX 47,5); and with 5,300 adult male Greek
and Macedonian settlers, its Greco-Macedonian population must have been about
20,000 including women and children—no doubt considerably larger still counting
slaves and Asians. All in all then, Antigonos's settlement activity clearly played a
considerable part in creating the Hellenistic world.
Cultural Policy
Under the heading of cultural policy, two aspects of Antigonos's rule need to be
discussed. In the first place, there is the question of what his attitude was to the
native Asian peoples of his empire, and, connected with this, the matter of whether
he consciously pursued a
[29]
― 306 ―
policy of hellenization. Secondly, one should consider whether Antigonos—like the
Ptolemies and Attalids, for example—encouraged or patronized letters and arts, or
whether he was indifferent to cultural matters of this kind. The evidence on both of
these questions is fragmentary and it is certainly the case that we can only seek to
infer Antigonos's policy from the little that is known of his acts in regard to these
matters; but enough is known for at least an outline of Antigonos's policy to be
reconstructed.
Much has been made by the more encomiastic modern biographers of Alexander
the Great—such as W. W. Tarn—of his plans to associate at least the Iranian upper
class in the ruling of his empire, and it is usually supposed that when Alexander died
the notion of allowing anyone other than Greeks and Macedonians a share in the
running of the empire died with him.
[30]
In his article on the ruling class in the
Hellenistic monarchies, Christian Habicht fleshes out this supposition somewhat by