Bahm Karl. Berlin 1945: The Final Reckoning

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intelligence of Ptolemy's march, Demetrios recalled his troops from their winter

quarters and concentrated them at Gaza. His army consisted of 11,000 heavy

infantry, some 2,000–3,000 light infantry, 4,400 cavalry, and forty-three elephants,

so the two armies appear to have been fairly evenly matched.

[58]

Demetrios's

advisers, concerned at his inexperience compared to Ptolemy and

[57][58]

― 126 ―

[Full Size]

Figure 5.

The Battle of Gaza

― 127 ―

Seleukos, urged him to send for Antigonos and avoid battle, but Demetrios was

determined to fight (Diod. XIX 81, 1). In his co-commander Peithon and in Nearchos,

at least, he had generals of comparable experience to that of Ptolemy and Seleukos,

while his other important generals, Philippos and Andronikos, were also veterans of

Alexander's campaigns (Diod. XIX 69, 1; cf. app. 3, nos. 9, 77, 88, and 93).

The battle plan evolved by Demetrios and Peithon distinctly resembled that of

Antigonos at Paraitakene and Gabiene. A weak right wing under Andronikos was to

hang back and avoid closing with the enemy, while the infantry were to advance

behind a skirmishing screen of elephants and light infantry, and the battle was to be

decided by a strong left wing of 2,900 cavalry under Demetrios and Peithon, behind a

strong screen of thirty elephants and 1,500 light infantry (see fig. 5). This, if

unoriginal, was a sound battle plan, which had every chance of producing a successful

outcome had it not been for the excessive confidence placed in the elephants—

Ptolemy being without any of these beasts. As a screen from behind which to charge

with one's cavalry, elephants had proved useful at Paraitakene and Gabiene, and

Seleukos was to prove their effectiveness as an anti-cavalry screen at Ipsos in 301;

but as an attacking force in themselves, elephants were effective in ancient warfare

only against enemies who had not encountered them before and were overawed by

their size and strength. Seleukos and Ptolemy had encountered elephants before.

[59]

They prepared a special troop of men equipped with iron spikes linked with chains to

be spread out in the path of the elephants' charge, thus rendering them unable to

proceed because of the tenderness of their feet. Their battle plan was based on

Demetrios's battle array: against Demetrios's strong left wing, they opposed their

right wing consisting of 3,000 heavy cavalry, which they commanded themselves,

with the anti-elephant troop in front together with a large body of archers and javelin

men, who had orders to concentrate their fire on the elephants and their mahouts.

Their phalanx was stationed drawn back, with the remaining 1,000 cavalry withdrawn

on the left (Diod. XIX 83, 1–3).

The fighting essentially consisted of a fierce, but confused and indecisive, cavalry

scrimmage between the heavy cavalry forces of

[59]

― 128 ―

Demetrios's left and Ptolemy's right, and a charge by Demetrios's elephants that was

intended to decide the battle. It did. The spikes arrayed by Ptolemy's anti-elephant

corps stopped the beasts in their tracks, whereupon his archers and javelineers shot

down the mahouts and captured the elephants themselves. This disaster shattered

the morale of Demetrios's cavalry, which turned to panic-stricken flight (Diod. XIX 83,

3–84, 5). Demetrios attempted for a while to rally his cavalry, but when he found that

their flight could not be checked, he too left the field of battle. As far as Gaza the

flight remained reasonably ordered, but there wild confusion resulted as the troops

tried to rescue their baggage, so that Ptolemy's pursuing forces were able to capture

the city with ease. Demetrios himself continued straight on to Azotos, some 35 miles

(270 stades) north of Gaza, which he reached about midnight. From there he sent a

herald to treat concerning the burial of his dead, who numbered about 500, mostly

cavalry (Diod. XIX 84, 5–85, 3).

[60]

Andronikos and the right-wing cavalry escaped,

and Andronikos went to Tyre to hold it against Ptolemy (Diod. XIX 86, 1–2). Since

Diodoros names Peithon and a certain Boiotos, otherwise unknown, as the most

distinguished of Demetrios's dead, Nearchos and Philippos must also have escaped. Of

the phalanx, which never really came to grips with the enemy, some discarded their

heavy equipment and escaped from the field of battle, but about 8,000 surrendered to

Ptolemy. He magnanimously returned Demetrios's personal baggage and attendants

to him (having presumably captured these in Gaza) and permitted him to recover and

bury his dead; his own dead he gave a magnificent funeral; the 8,000 captives he

sent to Egypt to be settled there as colonists (Diod. XIX 85, 2–4).

Demetrios now retreated to Tripolis in northern Phoenicia, where he rallied the

remnants of his army (with 500 dead and rather more than 8,000 captured, some

8,000–9,000 remain unaccounted for) and summoned reinforcements from the

garrisons of upper Syria and from Kilikia; he also wrote to Antigonos reporting what

had happened and urging him to send help. Meanwhile Ptolemy and Seleukos

advanced through southern Palestine, capturing the cities one by one. Ake, Joppa,

Samaria, and Sidon were all captured with ease, but at Tyre they met with

determined resistance from Andronikos (Diod. XIX 84, 4–86, 1, and cf. 94,7). This

was most important,

[60]

― 129 ―

for it gave Demetrios more time to organize the defense of upper Syria. Ptolemy's

blandishments and offers of bribes had no effect on the loyal Andronikos, but

eventually his soldiers mutinied and drove him out, the city and Andronikos thus

falling into Ptolemy's hands (see further app. 3, no. 9). At this time, presumably

about the end of January 311, Seleukos asked Ptolemy to give him a force with which

to attempt to reach Babylonia and recover his satrapy (Diod. XIX 86, 1–5). Ptolemy

agreed, and sent Seleukos off with a force of either 800 foot and 200 horse (Diod. XIX

90, 1), or 1,000 foot and 300 horse (Appian Syr. 54). This appears at first sight a

hare-brained venture, but when one considers that Seleukos was marching in the

dead of winter through regions denuded of their enemy garrisons, against a satrapy

whose satrap (Peithon) was dead, the risk seems a good deal less.

[61]

At any rate, Seleukos marched off with his tiny army, and Ptolemy gave his

attention to further exploiting his victory. While he presumably occupied himself with

organizing his conquests in southern Palestine, he sent his general Killes with a major

portion of the army to drive Demetrios out of northern Phoenicia. Killes, however,

fatally underestimated Demetrios, who had by now built up quite a respectable army

again. When he heard from his scouts that Killes and his army were approaching and

had encamped rather carelessly at a place called Myous, Demetrios made a forced

night march with his army and reached the enemy camp around dawn. His attack

took Killes and his men completely by surprise, so that he was able to capture the

camp and general, and most of his army with hardly a blow being struck (Diod. XIX

93, 1–2; Plut. Dem. 6, 1–2). His prisoners came to some 7,000 men according to

Plutarch, thus making up for most of his losses at Gaza, and after consulting with

Antigonos, he reciprocated Ptolemy's magnanimity after Gaza by sending back to him

Killes and his staff with splendid gifts (Plut. Dem. 6, 2–3). Demetrios then prudently

encamped with his army in a strong position surrounded by marshes, until Antigonos

could join him. The latter came down to Syria with a great army early in 311, as soon

as the Taurus passes were clear of snow (Diod. XIX 93, 3–4).

When Ptolemy heard that Antigonos had joined Demetrios with his army, he

called a synedrion of his friends to discuss their best course

[61]

― 130 ―

of action, and the unanimous advice opposed risking a battle against a general of

Antigonos's caliber with a greatly superior army. Accordingly Ptolemy evacuated

Palestine, destroying the forts at Ake, Samaria, Joppa, and Gaza, and returned to

Egypt determined to conduct his defense, if necessary, from behind the Pelousiac

branch of the Nile (Diod. XIX 93, 5–7). Antigonos was thus able to reoccupy Phoenicia

and Koile Syria in peace, but did not at once venture to attack Ptolemy in Egypt,

being no doubt daunted by the memory of how Perdikkas had fared in 320. Instead,

he began operations against the Nabataian Arabs, whose capital was at Petra in what

is now southwestern Jordan.

[62]

This was presumably intended to prepare for an

invasion of Egypt, for to an army marching across the northern Sinai, the Nabataians

could be either valuable allies and a source of supplies or exceedingly dangerous foes

upon a wide-open flank; but it is possible that an interest in the trade route in incense

from the Red Sea lands also played a part in Antigonos's decision to subjugate the

Nabataians, who were the middlemen in this trade.

[63]

Antigonos selected one of his friends named Athenaios (app. 3, no. 22) and sent

him with 4,000 light infantry and 600 cavalry to make a raid on Petra to carry off

hostages and booty, well knowing that only by holding their families and possessions

hostage could he easily subdue the Nabataians, as they would otherwise simply melt

away into the desert with their families and flocks and lead him a merry dance trying

to deal with them (Diod. XIX 94, 1–95, 1). Athenaios's surprise attack was initially

successful, but subsequent carelessness permitted the Nabataians to take him by

surprise in turn and destroy his force, only about 50 horsemen escaping (Diod. XIX

95, 2–5).

When the Nabataians wrote to Antigonos complaining of this attack, he agreed

with their complaints and criticized Athenaios as having carried out an entirely

unauthorized attack, hoping to lull them thus into a false sense of security. But after

maintaining friendly relations with the Nabataians for a while, he fitted out another

expedition, consisting of 4,000 light infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and sent Demetrios

with it to chastise them. Demetrios, taking supplies

[62][63]

― 131 ―

for many days, marched to Petra through the desert, but the Nabataians were on the

alert, and when he reached Petra he found that they had dispersed with their forces

and flocks, leaving only a sizeable garrison to guard their property in the virtually

unassailable stronghold. After making an unsuccessful attack, Demetrios was

therefore easily persuaded by the Nabataians to discuss terms and, being given

hostages and gifts by them (including 700 camels according to Plutarch, Dem. 7, 1),

he made peace with them and marched away (Diod. XIX 96, 1–98, 1). On his way

back to Antigonos, he marched by the Dead Sea and observed the gathering there of

asphalt, a product much in demand in Egypt for its use in embalming. When

Antigonos heard Demetrios's report, he accepted the treaty with the Nabataians

somewhat grudgingly, but was interested to hear of the asphalt production at the

Dead Sea. Since developments in Europe now demanded his attention, he left

Hieronymos of Kardia in charge of Palestine, with orders to take over the asphalt

sources at the Dead Sea and raise revenue therefrom, and turned to more important

matters (Diod. XIX 100, 1–2).

[64]

In the winter of 312/11 Antigonos's nephew Telesphoros, who had been

subordinated to Antigonos's other nephew Polemaios when the latter was made

commander in chief of all Antigonos's forces in Greece, decided to rebel as a result,

considering this subordination to be insulting. Though he did some initial damage to

Antigonos's position (see app. 3, no. 111), Polemaios soon restored the situation and

persuaded Telesphoros to give up his schemes (Diod. XIX 87, 1–3). Telesphoros was

apparently forgiven by Antigonos, for he went in the entourage of Demetrios to

Athens in 307/6 (Diogenes Laertios V 79).

Polemaios was now in control of all Greece south of Thermopylai except Korinth

and Sikyon (still held by Polyperchon), and Athens (where Kassandros's nominees

were still in power), and was allied with the Aitolians in addition. Kassandros

recognized that he was beaten for the time being and opened negotiations with

Polemaios with a view to establishing a truce and bringing the war to an end.

Antigonos's friend Aristodemos, who was still in Greece as a subordinate of Polemaios,

was sent to Asia about mid 311 to confer with Antigonos on these talks, bringing with

him Kassandros's friend Prepelaos, who was acting as plenipotentiary of both

Kassandros and

[64]

― 132 ―

Lysimachos (OGIS, no. 5, lines 9–29).

[65]

Agreement was speedily reached on the

basis of acceptance of the status quo and an express affirmation of the principle of

autonomy for the Greeks, as enunciated by Antigonos's Tyre proclamation of 314.

Kassandros and Lysimachos thus abandoned their ally Ptolemy, who was naturally

very worried at the prospect of having to fight on against Antigonos alone when he

heard of this peace agreement. He therefore quickly sent envoys to Antigonos seeking

to be included in the peace. Antigonos readily agreed, and sent a diplomatic mission

headed by Aristodemos, with Aischylos and Hegesias as his colleagues, to make peace

with Ptolemy too (OGIS, no. 5, lines 30–53).

Such is Antigonos's own account of how this peace came about, preserved in his

letter circulated to the Greek cities, of which the example sent to Skepsis survives.

Diodoros preserves only a brief account of the terms of the peace as they were finally

settled and agreed upon in the latter half of 311 (XIX 105, 1). It was specified that

until the coming of age of Alexandros IV, the empire was to be ruled by the four

dynasts who were signatories to the peace, the division of powers being the following:

Kassandros was, like his father Antipatros, to be strategos of Europe; Lysimachos was

to rule over Thrace, and Ptolemy over Egypt and the adjacent cities of Libya and

Arabia; and Antigonos was to hold sway over all of Asia. The Greek cities were to be

autonomous. Excluded from direct participation in the peace were Polyperchon and

Seleukos; they were implicitly placed under the authority of Kassandros and

Antigonos respectively, who were evidently given a free hand to deal with them more

or less as they saw fit.

[66]

By this peace treaty Antigonos attained the zenith of his power.

[65][66]

― 133 ―

His strategy of creating trouble for each of the enemy dynasts in his own sphere of

influence had ultimately proved too much for them and had broken their coalition. Of

the demands placed before Antigonos at the beginning of 314, not one was achieved

in the peace that concluded the Third Diadoch War: Antigonos was recognized as ruler

of all Asia and retained possession of the treasures he had accumulated. The claim

Antigonos had made to the regency of the empire was of course given up under the

terms of the peace, which looks at first sight like a setback. This is more apparent

than real, however. The claim was made as part of the proclamation of Tyre, which I

have shown above to have been a propaganda counterblast to the harsh demands of

the allied dynasts. Antigonos had not desired war with them, but had tried to

persuade them to accept his position as ruler of Asia (Diod. XIX 56, 4). This he had

now achieved, and that it had been his real aim throughout the war is indicated by

the peace negotiations he had undertaken in mid 313 with Ptolemy at Ekregma (Diod.

XIX 64, 8), and in early 312 with Kassandros near the Hellespont (Diod. XIX 75, 6;

OGIS, no. 5, lines 1–10). In both cases Antigonos seems to have initiated the talks,

and in both cases they seem to have been broken off due to the demands made by

the other party. Evidently Ptolemy and Kassandros were then not yet willing to break

their coalition and retract the demands of 314; but Antigonos did ultimately force

them to take these steps, and the claim to the regency was promptly dropped when

this happened. This was then, it seems, essentially a concession Antigonos could

make without giving up any of his real war aims.

In several respects, indeed, Antigonos had made substantial gains. He had

conquered Karia and brought the dynasts of the northern Anatolian coast—Dionysios

and Zipoites—into his alliance system, thus rounding off his control of Asia Minor.

Kassandros and Lysimachos had not only been forced to give up their territorial and

monetary demands: they had had to confirm the autonomy of the Greeks proclaimed

by Antigonos at Tyre, while Antigonos's alliances with many of the Greek states (e.g.,

the League of the Islanders, the Aitolians, the Boiotians, and the Euboian cities) gave

him a strong foothold in Greece, which was protected by his commander Polemaios

with his army, though nominal supervision of Greece reverted to Kassandros as

general of Europe. By inducing Kassandros and Lysimachos to make a separate

peace, moreover, Antigonos had forced Ptolemy into a corner where he had little

choice but to accept

― 134 ―

his loss of Syria and Palestine to Antigonos and to throw Seleukos to the wolves. This

peace was, then, a triumph for the now 71-year-old Antigonos.

[67]

Despite the fact that Antigonos's rule over Asia was now recognized by the

western dynasts, however, certain problems remained. Antigonos's power, indeed the

power of all the dynasts, was temporary, exercised during the minority of Alexandros

IV, who was now growing up. It remained to be seen whether and how Antigonos

could free his power from Argead suzerainty and pass it on to his sons. Moreover,

there was one leader, Seleukos, who had not recognized Antigonos's authority over

Asia; and though Seleukos seemed a negligible figure in 311, events were already

occurring in inner Asia that proved he was not.

[67]

― 135 ―

4—

Antigonos's Assumption of the Kingship

The Peace of the Dynasts in late summer of 311 basically parceled out the

Macedonian Empire between the four dynasts who signed it: Antigonos, Kassandros,

Ptolemy, and Lysimachos, with Antigonos getting the lion's share. In spite of its

essential character as a division of the empire, however, it still maintained the idea of

a unified empire ruled by the legitimate Argead king, Alexandros IV, thereby

reminding the world of this youth's existence. He was now twelve years old, and had

for the past five years been living in seclusion at Amphipolis under close guard by

officers of Kassandros, ostensibly for his own protection. He constituted a major

problem for all of the dynasts, who had spent twelve years of toil and danger

establishing themselves in power over various parts of the empire, but were faced

with the likelihood of being required to relinquish their power in a few years when

Alexandros grew up and assumed his prerogatives as ruler. In particular, he was a

problem for Kassandros in Macedon, where voices began to be raised asking when the

young king was to be brought out of seclusion and trained to rule (Diod. XIX 105, 2).

Kassandros faced this problem with typical ruthless realism: he sent orders to his

officer at Amphipolis to kill Alexandros and his mother and bury them secretly. With

the king dead, he and the other dynasts were relieved of anxiety; each of them held

his territory now as "spear-won land," and each began to cherish hopes of royal

status for himself (Diod. XIX 105,2–4).

The dominant feature of the next five years (310–306), then, is a jockeying for

position by the major dynasts with a view to the

― 136 ―

assumption of royal status, in which the surviving women of the Argead clan,

Kleopatra and Thessalonike, assumed considerable importance. In the case of

Antigonos, a prominent feature of these years was his handing over of the direct

conduct of military affairs to his sons, Philippos and, above all, Demetrios, devoting

himself instead to the consolidation of his realm by founding cities, settling troops,

and organizing an efficient administrative system, all of which will be investigated in

part 2 of this work. A result is that Antigonos, now well into his seventies, recedes

into the background in our sources, which from 310 onwards focus more and more on

Demetrios; but that Antigonos continued to keep the direction of affairs firmly under

his control is shown by frequent reports in the sources of Demetrios's receipt of and

obedience to instructions from his father.

The Lead-Up to Royal Status (310–306 B.C.)

The question facing all of the dynasts was whether, when, and how to assume the

kingship, and how widely to interpret the claim to power inherent in such status. In

view of this uncertainty and concomitant competition, it is obvious that the peace of

311 would not long have survived the death of Alexandros IV; but in fact it was

already a dead letter even before the king's death. For in the winter of 311/10 news

arrived in the west of Seleukos's activities in inner Asia, activities which constituted a

major blow to Antigonos's power and at once stirred his former enemies into renewed

warfare against him. By all rational calculation, Seleukos's expedition should have

been a forlorn hope, and it is not surprising therefore that the dynasts should have

bowed to Antigonos's pressure to leave out Seleukos in making peace in the late

summer of 311. Seleukos, however, was the sort of man who makes up by energy,

daring, and sheer talent for what he lacks in resources, and his expedition was as a

result successful beyond the stoutest expectations that could have been entertained

when he set out.

He left the camp of Ptolemy with his small force shortly after Tyre had fallen into

Ptolemy's hands due to the mutiny of Antigonos's garrison against their general,

Andronikos.

[1]

Since the battle of Gaza occured in the winter of 312/11, presumably

not earlier than the middle of December 312, and since the events described by

[1]

― 137 ―

Diodoros as the aftermath of the battle (burial of the dead; despatch of prisoners to

Egypt; operations against Phoenician cities, culminating in the siege of Tyre: XIX

85,1–86,2) clearly occupied a number of weeks, it is unlikely that Seleukos set out

earlier than late January 311.

[2]

His route from Tyre to Babylon was necessarily not

the direct one, for that would have taken him through the Syrian desert, where he

could not have found water and supplies for his force; in fact he followed the course

of the so-called "fertile crescent"—north from Tyre, most probably up the Orontes

Valley (he had to avoid the coast, where Demetrios was gathering a new force at

Tripolis), and then east to the Euphrates. He probably crossed this river near the site

where he later founded a colony with the suggestive name Nikephorion ("bringer of

victory"). From there he marched to Karrhai (Harran) in northern Mesopotamia (now

in southern Turkey). At Karrhai there was a colony of Macedonian veterans, whom

Seleukos recruited into his army by a mixture of force and persuasion (Diod. XIX 91,

1). Then he turned south and eventually marched into Babylonia. His success in

marching safely through northern Syria and Mesopotamia was clearly due in large

part to the facts that it was the middle of winter, that the country had been denuded

of its garrisons by Demetrios's summoning of them to Tripolis to form his new army

(Diod. XIX 85, 5), and that Peithon, the satrap of Babylonia and (probably)

Mesopotamia, had died at Gaza.

Setting out in late January and marching by this long and circuitous route, with a

pause at Karrhai, Seleukos cannot have reached Babylonia before late March. Nor did

he make straight for Babylon: he rounded up support from the inhabitants of the

countryside first, and was further strengthened when one of the Antigonid district

commanders, a certain Polyarchos, came over to him with 1,000 soldiers (Diod. XIX

91, 1–3). Seleukos finally entered Babylon some time after the beginning of April

311,

[3]

there to deal with the last

[2][3]

― 138 ―

Antigonid loyalists in the satrapy, who had taken refuge in the citadel of Babylon led

by its commander, Diphilos. These men held out for a long time against Seleukos's

siege, but were eventually overcome, Seleukos taking the citadel by storm some time

in August (Diod. XIX 91, 3–4; Bab. Chron., rev. lines 5–8). In the citadel Seleukos

found many of his friends and retainers, who had been placed there under guard by

Antigonos after Seleukos's flight in 315; having freed these, he began further

strengthening his forces against the inevitable Antigonid counterattack (Diod. XIX 91,

5).

The first Antigonid response to Seleukos's coup came not from the west, where

Antigonos and Demetrios were occupied with reestablishing control over Palestine,

campaigning against the Nabataians, and then negotiating the Peace of the Dynasts,

but from the east. Antigonos's general of the upper satrapies, Nikanor, was stationed

in Media with a substantial force, and as soon as he heard of Seleukos's activities, he

gathered further troops from the Iranian satrapies. Then he set out against Seleukos

in late summer 311 with an army of over 10,000 foot and 7,000 horse, drawn in large

part from Media and Persia. Against this army Seleukos could muster only 3,000 foot

and 400 horse, being obliged to leave behind a force under the command of his

trusted friend Patrokles to guard Babylonia from possible western attacks (Diod. XIX

92, 1–2; 100, 5; Bab. Chron., rev. lines 9–10).

[4]

Nikanor should have been able to

crush Seleukos with ease, but this did not happen. Seleukos reached and crossed the

Tigris before Nikanor and, learning somehow Nikanor's whereabouts and line of

march, he concealed his small army in ambush in marshes near the river. Nikanor

reached the Tigris and found no troops to oppose him there, hearing reports instead

that Seleukos and his men had fled from his approach.

[5]

Accordingly, he encamped at

a way station, foolishly neglecting to keep a proper watch. Thus Seleukos's attack in

the middle of the night took his men completely by surprise, causing panic and

confusion, in which Nikanor's army quickly surrendered to Seleukos.

[6]

Nikanor himself

escaped with a handful of loyal friends and fled through the desert back towards

[4][5][6]

― 139 ―

Media, while Seleukos, now at the head of a formidable force, had no difficulty in

seizing all of Susiane (Diod. XIX 92, 3–5).

Seleukos placed an officer named Euteles over Susiane (Diod. XIX 100, 5–6),

and moved to eastern Susiane, where in November he negotiated a pact of some sort

with the Kossaioi in the mountains between Susiane and Media (Bab. Chron., rev.

lines 11–12: the Guti = the Kossaioi). He clearly planned to invade Media in the

spring. Meanwhile he wintered in eastern Susiane with his army, sending messengers

to Ptolemy with an account of his successes (Diod. XIX 92, 5). Nikanor likewise sent

urgent messages to Antigonos from Media reporting the disasters incurred at

Seleukos's hands and seeking aid (Diod. XIX 100, 3). The news of Seleukos's victories

came as a surprise in the west and prompted a shake-up of political alignments,

ending the peace. Ptolemy had promised Seleukos further aid when he set off from

Tyre early in 311; he had made peace with Antigonos only because he was afraid to

fight on alone after Kassandros and Lysimachos had made peace, but now Seleukos

emerged as a powerful ally, offering a real hope of cutting down Antigonos's power.

Hence at the beginning of spring 310, scarcely six months or so after concluding

peace with Antigonos, Ptolemy sent an expeditionary force to Kilikia Trachea, an

attack on Antigonos that he justified publicly by the claim that Antigonos was

infringing the Greek autonomy clause of the peace by garrisoning Greek cities (Diod.

XX 19, 3–4). He probably also sent troops to Seleukos across the Arabian desert: the

event is reported in passing and without any indication of date by Arrian (Indika 43,

4–5), but it fits the circumstances of this time.

[7]

At any rate, Ptolemy's aim with his

expedition to Kilikia was obviously to weaken Antigonos further, and by distracting

him to enable Seleukos to do more damage in inner Asia.

Meanwhile others in the west took advantage of the situation to attack

Antigonos, including even his nephew Polemaios. In spite of the advancement

Polemaios had received and the trust placed in him by Antigonos, he felt himself

insufficiently honored and appreciated. The reason may have been the advancement

of Antigonos's sons Demetrios and Philippos; these young men were now grown up

and

[7]

― 140 ―

it was clear that Demetrios would in future be Antigonos's right-hand man, not

Polemaios. He could not accept this and aimed to create an independent realm for

himself in Greece based on Boiotia and Euboia.

[8]

To this end he made an alliance

early in 310 with Kassandros, who thereby also broke the peace with Antigonos.

Polemaios also arranged for the governor of the Hellespontine region in Asia Minor, a

friend of his named Phoinix whom he had himself placed in power there in 314, to

rebel against Antigonos, sending him soldiers and bidding him garrison the cities and

forts and refuse all obedience to Antigonos (Diod. XX 19, 2).

Antigonos reacted to these difficulties with decision. The most important matters

were to regain full control in Asia Minor, to distract Kassandros from active

intervention, and to try to aid Nikanor. Accordingly he sent his younger son Philippos

with an army to fight Phoinix and recover Hellespontine Phrygia, and Demetrios with

another army to drive Ptolemy's force out of Kilikia. Kassandros he seems to have

dealt with indirectly, for the hitherto impotent Polyperchon now tried to regain his

power in Macedon, apparently with Antigonos's support. Polyperchon obtained from

Pergamon a youth named Herakles, reputedly an illegitimate son of Alexander the

Great, whom he proposed to raise to the Macedonian throne, and he could hardly

have got him from Asia Minor without the cooperation of Antigonos.

[9]

It seems very

likely that the whole operation set up by Polyperchon was originally planned by

Antigonos. Whoever Herakles really was, it must have been Antigonos who installed

him at Pergamon and had him brought up there as a son of Alexander, presumably

with a view to eventual use against Kassandros. Moreover Polyperchon had hitherto

been reduced to a position of no importance and almost complete powerlessness in

the Peloponnesos, but now suddenly managed to raise a great army, talk the Aitolians

into joining him, and find the funds to finance a major campaign (Diod. XX 20, 1–4).

The Aitolians were allies of Antigonos, and it

[8][9]

― 141 ―

seems probable that it was he who persuaded them to back Polyperchon and provided

Polyperchon with money as well as a pretender to the throne. At any rate, the whole

operation was a very shrewd blow against Kassandros.

After making very careful preparations, both organizational and propagandistic,

Polyperchon marched in 309 with an army of 20,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to

invade Macedon via the region of Tymphaia, his own homeland.

[10]

Here Kassandros

opposed him with an army, but his Macedonians were disaffected—no doubt because

of the rumors of his having murdered Alexandros—and he greatly feared that they

might go over to the party of Herakles: the traditional loyalty to the Argead house

was evidently still strong (Diod. XX 20, 4 and 28, 1). Kassandros characteristically

resorted to diplomacy, and with typical persuasiveness induced Polyperchon to

murder Herakles by promising to restore to him all his properties and estates in

Macedon, make him general of the Peloponnesos, and give him an army of 4,000

Macedonian infantry and 500 Thessalian cavalry. On this basis the two agreed, and,

Herakles having been killed, Polyperchon marched south with his new army to take up

his position in the Peloponnesos (Diod. XX 28, 1–4). He never again played an

important role, though he seems to have outlived both Antigonos and Kassandros

(Plut. Pyrrhos 8, 3).

[11]

Returning to matters in Asia in 310, Demetrios defeated Ptolemy's army with

ease and recovered control of Kilikia (Diod. XX 19, 5). He was then given the job of

leading a counterattack against Seleukos. At Damascus in Syria he gathered an army

of 15,000 infantry (5,000 of them Macedonians) and 4,000 cavalry and marched

towards Mesopotamia (Diod. XIX 100, 4–5). Seleukos at this time had invaded Media

to deal with the fresh opposition Nikanor was trying to organize there, and in a

second battle defeated Nikanor again, personally killing him according to Appian (Syr.

55).

[12]

While

[10][11][12]

― 142 ―

Seleukos was busy adding Media and Persia to his conquests, his officer in charge of

Babylonia, Patrokles, had to deal with Demetrios's invasion. Since he did not have an

adequate force to meet Demetrios in open battle, he decided to adopt a delaying

strategy. Garrisoning the citadels of Babylon, he sent the civilians to Susiane, or into

the trans-Euphrates regions, and prepared to obstruct Demetrios's operations making

use of the waterworks of the satrapy as defenses (Diod. XIX 100, 5–6). This

campaign seems to have taken a considerable time, with Patrokles moving his troops

about the satrapy to hinder Demetrios as much as possible, while sending urgent calls

for help to Seleukos in Media; the Babylonian Chronicle (rev. lines 15–17) shows that

Demetrios arrived in southern Mesopotamia in August 310 and campaigned there

through the summer and autumn and into the winter. He entered the deserted city of

Babylon and besieged the citadels, capturing and plundering one, but being unable to

storm the other (Diod. XIX 100, 6–7; Plut. Dem. 7, 2; Bab. Chron., rev. lines 24–25).

In February of 309 (Bab. Chron., rev. lines 25–29) he brought most of his troops out

of Babylon and thoroughly plundered the surrounding region and the town of Cuthah

(see also Plut. Dem. 7, 3); he then made ready to return to Syria and Asia Minor,

leaving his general Archelaos with 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry (7,000 men

according to Plutarch) in charge of Babylon with orders to continue the siege of the

second citadel (Diod. XIX 100, 7; Plut. Dem. 7, 2–3; Bab. Chron., rev. lines 30–31).

Demetrios himself with the rest of the army marched down to the sea and into Asia

Minor, arriving in Karia in the summer of 309 just in time to stop Ptolemy capturing

Halikarnassos, which he was then besieging (Plut. Dem. 7, 3).

[13]

Meanwhile Seleukos,

who had refused to be distracted from his operations in Media and Persia by

Demetrios, reentered Babylonia and reconquered it after extensive campaigning

against the force left behind by Demetrios, which seems to have caused widespread

devastation (Bab. Chron., rev. lines 34–41).

In Europe, Kassandros's deal with Polyperchon had eliminated the threat to his

position in Macedon, but presumably at the same time violated his pact with

Polemaios, who can hardly have been

[13]

― 143 ―

happy with the position granted Polyperchon in Greece. Polemaios accordingly turned

away from Kassandros, and sought an accommodation instead with Ptolemy (Diod. XX

27,3). Ptolemy had at this time embarked on very ambitious schemes, stimulated

perhaps by the example of Seleukos. Early in 310 he had had first to deal with

difficulties in Cyprus, where Antigonos, not content with simply defeating Ptolemy's

attack on Kilikia, had persuaded Ptolemy's friend Nikokles to change allegiance.

Ptolemy heard of this in time to prevent a serious situation from arising; he sent

agents who, in cooperation with his brother Menelaos, who was still on Cyprus with an

army, surrounded Nikokles in his palace and forced him to commit suicide (Diod. XX

21, 1–3).

[14]

Having dealt with this situation, Ptolemy was not put off by the defeat

inflicted on his forces in Kilikia, but prepared to set forth himself on a major

expedition.

Ptolemy had accused Antigonos early in 310 of breaking the provision of the

peace of 311 that called for the Greek cities to be autonomous, and in connection with

this he is reported (Diod. XX 19,4) to have solicited the Greek cities in the influence

spheres of Kassandros and Lysimachos to join him in an anti-Antigonos crusade.

Evidently Ptolemy was putting forward very wide claims of leadership, such as were

likely to bring him into conflict with other dynasts besides Antigonos. In the spring of

309 he sailed with a large force from Egypt and attacked Antigonos's positions in

Lykia and Karia, capturing Phaselis, Xanthos, Kaunos, Iasos, and Myndos (Diod. XX

27, 1–2; 37, 1; Blümel, I. Iasos, 1, no. 2), but failing to capture Halikarnassos due to

the timely arrival of Demetrios to succor the city (Plut. Dem. 7,3). These various

sieges must obviously have taken some time and the summer must have been well

advanced by the time Demetrios arrived to put a stop to Ptolemy's successes in Karia.

Ptolemy now withdrew to Kos, where he established his forces for the time being and

prepared to strike further blows against Antigonos by diplomatic means. He was in

contact with Antigonos's nephew Polemaios and with Kleopatra, the sister of

Alexander the Great, who was still residing in Sardis at this time under Antigonos's

supervision.

[15]

[14][15]

― 144 ―

Ptolemy and Polemaios arrived at some sort of agreement for common action, in

pursuance of which Polemaios sailed from Chalkis with a substantial force to join

Ptolemy at Kos. Most likely Ptolemy planned to undertake further operations along the

coast of Asia Minor with the aid of Polemaios, who must have had a certain influence

in the region left over from his campaigns there on Antigonos's behalf in 314–312.

[16]

Kleopatra, whose long residence at Sardis had given her ample opportunity to gain

influence in the region, would also have been a help there. However, Polemaios was

not a man to be used easily; he considered himself Ptolemy's equal and thereby

quickly became suspect to Ptolemy, who arrested him, forced him to take poison, and

took over his troops (Diod. XX 27,3). The murder of Polemaios naturally harmed

Ptolemy's chances of making further progress on the Asia Minor coast, but there was

still the Kleopatra card to be played.

The precise details of Ptolemy's negotiations with Kleopatra are lost, but they

must have occurred during the latter part of 309 and winter 309/8 when Ptolemy was

residing at Kos. Kleopatra was dissatisfied with her life under Antigonos's supervision

at Sardis and was persuaded by Ptolemy to marry him, apparently with a view to

assuming the royal power, possibly on a joint basis.

[17]

Ptolemy was thus playing for

very high stakes at this time. Kleopatra actually set out to join Ptolemy, but failed to

evade the vigilance of Antigonos's governor at Sardis, who prevented her from leaving

and, after due consultation with Antigonos, had her assassinated by some of her

women (Diod. XX 37,3–5). Balked of his prospects in Asia Minor, Ptolemy turned his

attention to Greece, where Polemaios's death had left something of a power vacuum.

In spring of 308 Ptolemy sailed across the Aegean and put in at Korinth. There he

made an agreement with Kratesipolis, the widow of Polyperchon's son Alexandros,

who was still in charge of Korinth and Sikyon; he took over these two cities, and

issued a proclamation announcing the liberation of all the Greek cities and asking

them to send representatives to Korinth to discuss Greek freedom. Evidently he

intended to revive the so-called "League of Korinth" of Philip and Alexander, a further

indication that he was

[16][17]

― 145 ―

aiming at royal status.

[18]

However, though many of the Peloponnesian cities promised

him support, none actually materialized. In his anger Ptolemy established garrisons in

Sikyon and Korinth and, making peace with Kassandros, gave up his plans and sailed

back to Egypt (Diod. XX 37, 1–2).

While these events were taking place, Antigonos seems to have been in Asia

Minor watching the development of the situation. We have seen that he reacted to the

setbacks of 310 by sending Philippos to the Hellespont and Demetrios to Kilikia and

then Babylonia, probably also arranging for Polyperchon to challenge Kassandros with

the pretender herakles, and negotiating with Nikokles of Paphos to bring Cyprus over

to his side. In 309 he apparently followed his younger son Philippos to the

Hellespontine region, to aid in reorganizing that district after the rebellion of Phoinix,

for he founded— evidently in the years 309–307—three cities and a military colony in

Hellespontine Phrygia.

[19]

These foundations—Antigoneia Troas, Antigoneia-by-

Daskylion, Antigoneia Bithyniake, and the fortress of Antigoneia-by-Kyzikos—must

have been part of the settlement of the region in the aftermath of Phoinix's activities,

as well as being outposts against possible trouble from Lysimachos, who was busy at

this very time founding the city of Lysimacheia on the northern side of the Hellespont

(Diod. XX 29, 1). When Kleopatra's attempt to ally herself with Ptolemy was reported