Dignas B., Winter E. Rome and Persia in late Antiquity. Neighbours and Rivals

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27 Protection of the frontier 193

the fact that the Romans had failed to comply with the Persian request to

contribute to the protection of the Caucasus.

An account given by Priscus from Thracian Panion (c. 420 to after 474)

regarding a Persian embassy to the Byzantine emperor Leo I (457–74) nicely

illustrates the concerns. Priscus is the author of a lost Byzantine history,

which covered the events between 434 and 474; the work primarily yields

information on the confrontations between Byzantium and the Huns but

also gives us insight into the balance of power between Romans, Persians,

Huns, Hephthalites and the Lazes. The surviving fragments are assembled

in the Excerpta de legationibus by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (905–59).

Priscus himself participated in two embassies sent to Attila, the king of the

Huns, in 449 and to Rome in 450 by Theodosius II (408–50) and therefore

must have known the contemporary diplomatic events quite well.

Priscus frg. 41.1 (= FHG

, frg. 31)

There was also an embassy from the Persian king complaining that some of their

people were seeking refuge with the Romans . . . They also requested that the

Romans contributed money for maintaining the fortress Iuroeipaach, which is

situated by the Caspian Gates,

or at least commanded soldiers to its protection

because they would no longer bear the costs and protection of the place by them-

selves. For if they withdrew the attacks of the tribes in the area would bear an

impact not only on the Persians but also on the Romans. They added that it was

also necessary that these supported them with money for the war against the so

called Kidarite Huns; for it would be to their own advantage if they defeated this

people and did not let them enter the Roman Empire. The Romans responded that

they would send someone

who would discuss all these matters with the Parthian

king.

For neither were they receiving refugees nor did they keep the Magians from

practising their religion. With regard to the protection of the fortress Iuroeipaach

and the war against the Huns, they claimed that the Persians had taken these on

in their own accord and did not have a right to request money from the Romans.

The ambassadors referred to the Kidarite Huns, who during the reign of

King P

oz (459–84) represented a serious threat primarily to the Sasani-

ans.

Leo therefore tried to delay the negotiations. According to another

passage in Priscus, in 467 the emperor rejected a new Persian request to

Luther 1997: 106.

Doblhofer 1955: 11–82 and Blockley 1983: 222–377.

Priscus confuses the Caspian Gates at Derbend with the portae Caucasiae.

The Romans sent the patricius Constantius to enter negotiations with P

oz (459–84), which ended

without any actual results; cf. Priscus frg. 41.3 (= FHG iv 106).

Priscus refers to the Sasanian ruler P

oz.

Blockley 1985a: 66 and Luther 1997: 112–16; see also Blockley 1981: 121.

194 6 Shared interests: Continuing conﬂicts

support the fortress Iuroeipaach by sending either money or troops, say-

ing that each side should defend their own country and maintain their

own fortresses.

In contrast, during the ﬁrst half of his reign the Byzan-

tine emperor Zeno (474–5/476–91) did make subsidiary payments to P

oz,

although these should probably not be labelled ‘tribute’, as the Syrian chron-

icler Joshua the Stylite clariﬁes in his detailed account.

Immediately after the death of the Sasanian king (484) the payments

for the fortiﬁcation of the Caucasian passes ceased.

100

This led to new

tensions. When in the year 502 Kav

adh I (488–97/499–531) asked the

emperor Anastasius (491–518) to send him money for his battle against

the Hephthalites,

101

the emperor’s rejection led to the outbreak of the ﬁrst

Byzantine–Sasanian War in the sixth century.

102

Apparently, the Persian

ruler had offered Anastasius one of the Caucasian fortresses in turn; during

the peace negotiations in the spring of 531 Kav

adh I accused Anastasius of

having been the aggressor by saying, among other things, that the emperor

had not been willing to ‘acquire’ the Caspian Gates. If he had done so, he

would have had to maintain an army there for all times and bear a great

ﬁnancial burden in order to fend off the barbarians.

103

Both the question of how the costs for maintaining the Caucasian

fortresses would be met and the cessation of the annual payments triggered

many new conﬂicts way into the sixth century.

104

It is thus not surpris-

ing that when Justinian I (527–79) and Xusr

oI(531–79) tried to put an

end to the second Roman–Persian War in the sixth century in 562 (20)

the diplomatic efforts towards a comprehensive agreement also focused on

the protection of the shared border and its defence against the bellicose

nomadic peoples attacking from the north. According to Menander the

Guardsman the Persians agreed to march against invasions of the Huns,

the Alans and other barbarians in the Caucasus region whereas the Romans

promised not to send troops into the area and thus to give up any inﬂuence

in the region.

105

This means that the Persians, who had ﬁrmly established

their military presence in the Caucasus by the sixth century,

106

were now

willing to defend this insecure border by themselves without insisting on

Priscus frg. 47 (= FHG iv 107).

Ios. Styl. 8; see the detailed commentary in Luther 1997: 101–8; also Blockley 1985a: 66–7, ‘The

insistence of Joshua that the payments made by Zeno were no tribute suggests that some thought

they were, perhaps because the Persians had attempted to convert an occasional payment into a

regular.’

100

Ios. Styl. 18.

101

Proc. BP i.7.1–4 and Ios. Styl. 20 and 23;onKav

adh’s requests see Blockley 1985a: 68.

102

Greatrex 1998: 73–119.

103

Proc. BP i.16.4.

104

Blockley 1985a: 68–74.

105

Menander Protector, frg. 11.

106

Kramers 1935–7: 613–18.

28 Economy and trade 195

compensation from Byzantium. This agreement stayed in place until the

end of the relations.

107

28: Economy and trade

Although the numerous military conﬂicts between Rome and the Sasanian

Empire impeded uninterrupted trade, both sides showed a strong interest

in close economic relations. Primarily in order to secure the revenues from

customs duties they designed a diplomatic framework which established

the conditions for a regulated exchange of goods. Numerous treaties that

were concluded between the empires and their details on economic and

trade related issues attest to this.

When relations between Rome and the Parthian kingdom intensiﬁed it

was above all luxury goods from the Far East, in particular silk and silk

products, which were traded at great proﬁt and therefore important goods

of trade in East and West.

108

The ancient sources reveal the wide range of

goods that were imported from the East and had to be declared, for example

spices, incense, gems or even wild beasts and enslaved Indian eunuchs.

109

They also attest to the wider circulation of these goods.

110

The fourth-century Latin work of an anonymous author, the so called

Expositio totius mundi et gentium, gives a description of all territories of the

ancient world and their populations, including trade and its products.

111

Expositio totius mundi et gentium 19 (pp. 153–4, ed. Roug

After these there are the Persians, who are the neighbours of the Romans. The

history books say that they are particularly bad and brave in war. . . in all other

respects, however, they are said to have everything in abundance; for the nations

neighbouring their territory are given the opportunity to engage in trade and

therefore they themselves also seem to have plenty of everything.

In this passage the anonymous author, who draws on an unknown Greek

source,

112

emphasises the Sasanian trade policy. For rather selﬁsh reasons

they permitted the neighbouring peoples to engage in trade as they pleased.

The Sasanians made good proﬁt from the exchange of luxury goods, not

only silk but also precious stones, spices, incense and ivory. The traditional

trade route was the famous Silk Road (map 13),

113

which went from China

107

Blockley 1985a: 72.

108

Cf. Young 2001.

109

Dig. xxxix.4.16 (7); cf. also Pigulevskaja 1969: 78–9.

110

On the wide range of goods that entered the Roman Empire see Miller 1969: 34–109; in general on

the Roman eastern trade see Raschke 1978: 604–1378; Loewe 1971: 166–79.

111

Roug

e 1966 and Drexhage 1983.

112

On the author see Pigulevskaja 1969: 46–50.

113

Haussig 1983 and Klimkeit 1990.

196 6 Shared interests: Continuing conﬂicts

via Central Asia, Hor

an and Northern Persia to Mesopotamia from where

the goods could then be shipped to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

114

Trade relations between the Graeco-Roman world and the Far East and

India existed already during the early Principate. In late antiquity these

contacts intensiﬁed.

Until late in the third century the most important trade route from the

Persian Gulf to the centres of the Roman province of Syria and the Mediter-

ranean ports followed the river Euphrates.

115

There are early attestations to

the transport of goods to Nik

ephorion-Kallinikos via the Euphrates, and

from there to the markets in Edessa, Batnai or Harran, from where the

merchants transported their merchandise to the Mediterranean centres.

116

Isidorus of Charax, who was a geographer of the Augustan period, gives

us a detailed description of the major trade routes and bases for supplies.

According to the author the trafﬁc of goods went from the Parthian capital

Seleucia on the Tigris/Kt

esiph

on to the Roman Empire via the trading

centres along the Euphrates, namely Neapolis, Anath,

117

elesi Biblada,

118

Phaliga, Nik

ephorion, to Zeugma.

119

The intense trade between the Far East, India and the Persian Gulf did

not cease after the fall of Hatra (22) and Palmyra (23); Persian traders

themselves participated in the lucrative trade with India.

120

After 273 at the

latest, possibly already after the fall of Hatra, the trafﬁc of goods may have

shifted towards the Tigris river, and as a result this waterway, which so far

had been rather insigniﬁcant for trade purposes, became much more attrac-

tive.

121

This view is supported by the decision of 298 to make Nisibis the

only centre for an exchange of goods.

122

Because of a lack of archaeological

investigation along the Tigris we do not have any immediate testimonies

for such a ‘shift’ of trade but new studies show that there were signiﬁcant

demographic movements from the Hatrene towards the Tigris.

123

Inten-

siﬁed settlement patterns throughout late antiquity can be observed also

114

Bivar 1970: 1–11.

115

See Young 2001: 188–90.

116

Chaumont 1984: 63–107.

117

Kennedy 1986: 103–4 and Kennedy and Northedge 1988: 6–8.

118

Kennedy and Riley 1990: 224–5.

119

Isid. of Charax Mansiones Parthicae 1; on this source see Chaumont 1984: 63–107 and Luther 1997:

237–42.

120

Williams 1972: 97–109; Whitehouse and Williamson 1973: 29–49; Whitehouse 1996: 339–49 and

Morony 2004: 184–8.

121

This development also affected strategic considerations; according to Amm. xxiii.3.1 before embark-

ing on his Persian campaign Julian had to decide at Carrhae whether to take the route along the

Tigris or along the Euphrates.

122

See Millar 1996: 483–4, who argues that the peace of 298 indicates a possible shift of trade from the

Euphrates to the Tigris.

123

Hauser 2000: 187–201.

28 Economy and trade 197

for the parts of the Tigris that were under Roman control,

124

and these

must have been a consequence of the increased signiﬁcance of the Tigris

for trade. However, as the ravines created by the course of the river become

very narrow, hardly any transport of goods would have been possible above

the Roman camps Castra Maurorum

125

and Bezabde.

126

Moreover, along

this part of the Tigris the extremely barren mountain ridge of the T

‘Ab d

ın (Mons Masius) to the West must have impeded regular trade so

that goods going upstream must have been taken no further than Bezabde,

most likely only to Castra Maurorum, from where they would have been

transported along the southern edges of the T

ur ëAbd

ın to Nisibis.

In light of these topographical premises Nisibis, which was located

in the northern Mesopotamian plain on the upper reaches of the

Chab

oras/Chab

ur,

127

almost inevitably became the new centre for long

distance trade.

128

There were then several routes on which goods could be

transported from Nisibis to Syria, via Edessa and Zeugma for example.

In contrast to the ‘caravan cities’ Hatra and Palmyra the Roman colonia

Nisibis, which was also the seat of the Roman governor of the province

of Mesopotamia, was no longer the guarantor for an extended network

of trafﬁc but a huge trans-shipment centre. The Expositio totius mundi et

gentium conﬁrms the city’s exceptional role.

Expositio totius mundi et gentium 22 (p. 156, ed. Roug

Mesopotamia, however, has many different cities of which I shall name but the

most exceptional ones. There are, then, Nisibis and Edessa, which possess the best

men in every respect, both clever merchants and good hunters. Above all they are

wealthy as well as equipped with all sorts of goods. For they acquire their goods

directly from the Persians, sell them throughout the entire Roman Empire and then

engage in trade with the goods they purchase there, except for bronze and iron

because it is not permitted to sell bronze and iron to enemies.

129

These cities, which

will always remain standing through the wisdom of the gods and the emperor and

124

On the location of Castra Maurorum see Ball 1989: 7–18 and 2003: 18–19.

125

Ball 2003: 80–1.

126

For a long time it has been suggested that Bezabde was located in the Turkish–Syrian border area

close to Cizre; see Lightfoot 1983: 189–204; for new surveys locating Bezabde 13km further north

see Algaze 1989: 248–52 and 1991: 191–2.

127

On the course and navigability of the Chab

oras/Chab

ur see Tardieu 1990: 103–35.

128

Also important because of its geographic location was Singara, a point of intersection between the

course of the upper Chab

oras/Chab

ur towards the Tigris and along the route from Hatra to Nisibis;

on Singara see Oates 1968: 97–106 and Kessler 1980.

129

For the export embargo on aeramentum et ferrum see also Herodian iv.18; Dig. xxxix.4.11; Cod. Iust.

iv.53.1 (4); on further export embargos ibid. iv.41.1–2 and iv.63.2.

198 6 Shared interests: Continuing conﬂicts

BASTARNAE

ALANI

Caspian Sea

Byzantium

Alexandria

Gaza

Antakya (Antioch)

Palm

yra

Halebie-Ze

nobia

Dura-Europa

Hamadan

(Ecoatana

Aman)

Damghan

(Hacatomphylos)

Ho-tu)

Damghan

(Hacatomphylos)

Ho-tu)

Sama

rkand

(Maracanda)

(Pei-t'ien )

Balkh

(Bactra)

(Pu-tiao)

BACTIRIA

(TA HSIA)

Begram

Ta xila

Mathura

(T'IEN

Barygaza

Barbaric

Indus

FARGHANA

(IAYUAN)

KUSHAN

ITAYUEH CHIH

Tigris

Damascus

PART H

NHS

Myos-Hormos

EGYPT

Red Sea

ARABIA

Arabian

Sea

(Ethryaean Sea)

Ty re

(TACHIN)

Mediterianean

Sea

Panticapaeum

Aral

Sea

L. Balkhash

Issyk-kul

WU-SUN

Tashkent

SOGDIANA

(K'ANG CHU)

Oxus

Jax

arles

R. Iii

SYEBI

(CHIEN-K'UN)

ALANORSI

(TING-LING)

Black Sea

60 °E30 °E

60 °E

20°

10°N

(

)

Marv

(Antiokia Margiana)

(Mu-lu)

Kashgar

(Su-to)

Yarkand

(Su-chil)

T Ten

Map 13: The Silk Road from China to the Roman Orient

which have famous walls,

130

in war always thwart the bravery of the Persians;

131

they are enthusiastic about their business and well engaged in trade with the entire

province.

130

In late antiquity city walls were considered as sanctum and could not be mended or changed without

explicit permission by the emperor; cf. Dig. i.8.9.4, i.8.8.2 and i.8.11; on this issue see Winter 1996:

205–6.

131

The Sasanians had attacked Nisibis repeatedly during the reign of Constantius II (7).

28 Economy and trade 199

Sayan

Yablonoy

Noin-Ula

L. Balkal

Urga

Lop Nor

Karashar (Yen-chi)

Edsin Gol

Peking

YUEH

TUNG HAI

MIN YUEH

NAN YUEH

T'IEN

Canton

Sites where Han Chinese

silks and/or lacquers

have been found

Land over 2000 m

500

miles

500 km

Yangtze

CHINA

Lo-yang

Ch'ang-an

Lan-chou

Lo-lang

CH'AO HSIEN

MANCHURIA

Chu-yen

An-hsi

Tun-huang

Hami

Lou-tan

Ying-pan

Aksu

(wen-su)

Khotah

Niya

Keriya

Kitai

Urumchi

'zungaria

Shan

Altai

Tu rfari

ANAREI

( HU-CHIEH

)

Lhasa

DIA

CHU)

Bay of

Bengal

TIBET

Koko Nor

90 °E 120 °E

40°E

30°N

20°N

90 °E

MONGOLIA

Map 13:(cont.)

By the fourth century Nisibis was thus a crucial centre of trade and also

played a great strategic role. As the passage suggests, for the purpose of

defending the Roman Eastern frontier the city served as an essential fortress.

Ammianus Marcellinus speculates that had it not been for Nisibis – orientis

ﬁrmissimum claustrum – at this point the Roman East would have been

under Sasanian rule for some time.

132

Quite consistently, the same author

132

Amm. xxv.8.14.

200 6 Shared interests: Continuing conﬂicts

labels the foedus of 363 (18) and the cessation of Nisibis to the Persians as

‘humiliating agreements’ accepted by Jovian.

133

But why did Rome insist in 298 (17) to make it the only place for the

exchange of goods between West and East? There may have been several

reasons. The fact that the treaty of 298 made Nisibis the only place of

trade – in an area where numerous caravan routes and trafﬁc routes existed –

inevitably channelled the Sasanian trade. However, the changes initiated

by Rome with an eye to centralisation did not bear that much impact

on the trade of the sought after luxury goods from the Far East because

these had always been exchanged in the great centres of trade such as

Nisibis. The changes affected above all the local trade in the border areas

and the exchange of goods within Mesopotamia. The individual tradesman,

merchant or peasant who had offered his ware at the nearest market now had

to decide whether to expose himself to the risks of the long and exhausting

journey or not. According to the treaty of 298 merchants had to take their

goods, sometimes covering long distances, all the way to Nisibis where

Roman merchants received them.

When Roman merchants received goods from the Far East and from

India that had travelled through Persian territories into the border regions

along the Euphrates and Tigris,

134

they had to pay customs duties ﬁxed by

the Eastern power. Some scholars believe that the revenues accumulated in

this way allowed the Sasanians to build up their army, to conscribe Arab

mercenaries and ﬁnally to expand westwards.

135

For the Romans the fact

that their only overland trade with China and India was via the Sasanians

entailed high costs in peace time and a cessation of the eastern trade in times

of war.

136

In order to secure its eastern trade the Romans therefore were

primarily interested in breaking the Sasanian monopoly as mediators for

the exchange of goods along the Roman Eastern frontier and in acquiring

trade centres outside the Persian Empire.

Accordingly, the Romans intended to limit the activities of Persian mer-

chants and to control these. Moreover, they were interested in ﬁxed prices

as well as their own revenues from customs duties, which were normally

133

Ibid. xxv.7.13.

134

For some time Sasanian merchants monopolised the trade in the Persian Gulf and the Indian

Ocean so that the Sasanians were able to control the trade with India; cf. Williams 1972: 97–109;

Whitehouse and Williamson 1973: 29–49; Whitehouse 1996: 339–49.

135

Haussig 1959: 138.

136

In late antiquity Roman maritime trade between the Red Sea and India therefore became more and

more important; cf. Sidebotham 1986a: 16–36.

28 Economy and trade 201

raised by cities that had customs ofﬁces.

137

It is thus not surprising that

in 298 the Roman ambassador Sicorius Probus insisted on Nisibis as the

only place of trade in Mesopotamia. Fiscal considerations must have been

responsible for including this clause in the treaty because in consequence

every Sasanian merchant had to pay customs duties if he wanted to sell

his goods in Nisibis, which at the end of the third century was part of the

Roman sphere of inﬂuence.

138

We cannot say with certainty how high these

customs duties were. It is possible that the Sasanians now had to submit

25 per cent instead of the customary 12.5 per cent of the selling price.

139

By imposing high customs duties Diocletian intended to break the Persian

monopoly on the silk trade and to add a counter weight to the prices

dictated by the Persians.

While the Roman line of reasoning seems clear and ﬁnancial advantages

on the Roman side possible, it is difﬁcult to estimate how far the decision

of 298 had an overall effect on the Sasanian state budget.

140

It looks as if

the clause did not diminish the revenues of the Sasanian state because it

did not lose its freedom to impose customs duties from traders either when

they entered the Sasanian Empire or when they sold their goods within

Persian territory.

141

Nisibis was vehemently contested during the fourth century

142

but still

retained its role as a trans-shipment centre after 363 when the city fell

into Sasanian hands.

143

Ammianus Marcellinus’ elaborate description of

the exodus of its inhabitants and the take over by the Persians illustrates

how much the loss of this city shocked contemporaries.

144

Not surprisingly,

when relations once more deteriorated during the sixth century, the Romans

built the city of D

a-Anastasiopolis facing Nisibis and transformed it into

a massive bulwark during the reign of Justinian. This was meant to be the

Western counterpart to Nisibis.

145

137

Manandian 1965: 77; in general on trade related aspects in the diplomatic relations between West

and East see Winter 1987: 46–74.

138

Andreotti 1969: 215–57.

139

Cf. DNP s.v. Zoll: 830 for further references; on late antique taxation in Syria and Mesopotamia

see Pollard 2000: 213–18 and Jones 1964: 824–7.

140

Blockley 1984: 33 emphasises the ﬁnancial advantages for Rome, ‘The result of this was that the

Romans would garner all the income from taxes of the lucrative eastern trade.’

141

In Winter and Dignas 2001: 210 the authors emphasised the ﬁnancial losses for the Sasanians but

have changed their view since; on the Sasanian economy in general see Morony 2004: 166–94.

142

Festus 27.2; on the confrontations during the reign of

ur II see Mar

oth 1979: 239–43 and

Lightfoot 1988: 105–25.

143

Amm. xxv.7.19–14 (18); see also Chrysos 1993: 165–202.

144

Amm. xxv.9.1–12; for context and interpretation see 18.

145

For details, references and a photograph of the modern – still impressive – ruins of D

a see

ﬁgs. 13–14.

202 6 Shared interests: Continuing conﬂicts

The foedus of 298 also forced Nars

e to acknowledge the Roman protec-

torate of Ib

eria (17), an area south of the central Caucasus and north of

Armenia through which the upper and middle Kyros was ﬂowing. Diocle-

tian intended to expand the Roman sphere of inﬂuence to the north-east

in order to create new routes for the Eastern trade which would circum-

vent Sasanian territory in the north. The emperor’s ambition to regain

power over Ib

eria was closely linked to the role of this area as a transit area.

Repeatedly the Romans had become painfully aware that the most impor-

tant overland trade routes in the East of the ancient world, by which the

sought after luxury goods from the Far East reached the large Roman cen-

tres along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, went through Sasanian

territory. The Persian supremacy by sea, in particular in the Persian Gulf,

which was the starting point for the lucrative trade with India,

146

must have

further strengthened the key role the Sasanians played with regard to the

Roman eastern trade. The Romans therefore tried to establish ﬁrm bases

along the Black Sea and in the Caucasus in order to create new land routes

for an extended eastern trade, primarily with China.

147

To some extent their

attempts to maintain diplomatic relations with Armenia and the Caucasus

had to do with the hope that the peoples in this region would help them

to obtain important luxury goods, above all silk and silk products. The

signiﬁcance of the areas in the Caucasus and around the Caspian Sea with

regard to trade has been suggested as a motive for the expansion of a Roman

Eastern policy during the Parthian period

148

and has been acknowledged

for some time as a cause for confrontations between Byzantium and the

Sasanian Empire during the ﬁfth and sixth centuries.

149

This signiﬁcance

very much also applies to the situation at the end of the third century.

Until the treaty of 363 (18) when

ur II (309–79) made the emperor

Jovian (363–4) revise the central aspects of the foedus of 298 (17) the agree-

ments of this treaty continued to be legally valid. Ammianus Marcellinus

states, however, that during the reign of Constantius II an annual market

existed in Batnai where Indian and goods from Seran were offered and

the author also praises the magniﬁcent goods of the city of Kallinikos.

150

146

On the Sasanian contacts with India, speciﬁcally by sea via the Persian Gulf see also Wieseh

ofer

1998a: 19–20 and Daryaee 2003: 1–6.

147

On possible trade routes to China which went through the Caucasus and bypassed Sasanian territory

in the north see Herrmann 1966: 18–19 and 26–7; cf. also Thorley 1969: 215 and Wissemann 1984:

166–73; on the Sasanian attempts to stop trade along the northern route of the Silk Road see Haussig

1983: 161–82.

148

Wissemann 1984: 166–73.

149

Pigulevskaja 1969: 155–8; Harmatta 2000: 249–52.

150

Amm. xiv.3.3 and xxiii.3.7; cf. also Kirsten 1959: 558 and Synelli 1986: 89; on Batnai as a centre of

trade see Kissel 1998: 171–2 and De Ligt 1993: 74.