Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)

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arrest.257 Macrianus’ possible illness hints that by 371/2 he was,

through age, disease or inclination, no doughty warrior, on the

model of Chnodomarius. The loyalty of his attendants, and his

later return to prominence, speak volumes for his powers of leader-

ship. The use of a carriage also says much about the passability of

local roads. But this raises further questions. With Macrianus living

close to Wiesbaden and frequently visiting the place, why did it take

an expedition to seize him? Why not, as Julian had done in the case of

Vadomarius, wait until he was on Roman territory and then simply

detain him? Probably Macrianus was wise enough not to cross over

to the left bank, and on the right bank he went nowhere without a

signiWcant entourage: much more than the handful of comites who

had accompanied Vadomarius, perhaps even a small army. This

would explain Severus’ loss of nerve and the consequent prolonga-

tion of the enterprise. Given the short distance involved, Roman

forces should easily have reached Macrianus in a day.258 A night

attack was not planned: Ammianus states that Roman troops had

not been equipped to sleep in the open. It became necessary only

after Severus had fallen back to wait for Valentinian, presumably in

Wiesbaden.

Related to the diYculties the Romans faced in apprehending

Macrianus, it is likely that Macrianus’ residence was more than a

house or mansion. Given the king’s status and Ammianus’ report

that, when Roman forces found themselves close to him, they fell to

looting, this residence is unlikely to have been a simple aVair but

rather, I would suggest, a lowland ‘Herrschaftszentrum’.259

The raid failed. Valentinian always underestimated Macrianus’

support. The more he pressed him, the more powerful he became.260

However, for the moment, Macrianus had Xed and Valentinian used

the opportunit y to terrorize his subjects. Ammianus’ ‘Wfty miles’ is

probably a round number expressing the distance from Mainz up the

257 AM 29.4.2. Schoppa (1974: 101 and 142 at n.143) while himself rejecting

‘Macrianus’ illness’, discusses its historiography, attributing the original idea to

Reuter, in an article published in 1871.

258 Schoppa (1974: 101).

259 Cf. above 98.

260 AM 29.4.2.

308 ConXict 365–94

Main valley to the old limes and the border with the Burgundians.261

However, given the lack of preparation for the initial attack, this

harrying must have been short-term and sketchy, and unlikely to

inXict much lasting damage. It was not a major expedition, and

was therefore probably delegated to Valentinian’s subordinates.

Valentinian’s major Rhenish campaign remained that of 368. He

then installed Fraomarius in place of Macrianus. This also failed.

The speedy fall of Fraomarius reXects continuing support for

Macrianus, even among high-ranking Alamanni in Roman service.262

The ‘recent invasion’ that precipitated Fraomarius’ removal can be

interpreted as Macrianus and his supporters returning to claim

power.263 In the end, as Valentinian may have sensed (his decisive

removal of Fraomarius from local politics is signiWcant264), he had to

deal with Macrianus; and the settlement of 374 is as illuminating as

the snatch raid of 371.

Ammianus’ dramatic details (with the imperial party aXoat,

Macrianus and his Alamanni on land, at the margin of the Rhine,

presumably in the vicinity of Mainz) indicate negotiations between

two powers.265 Valentinian apparently gave up right-bank territory

north of the Main (and any remaining Roman occupants) to

Macrianus, with the exception, presumably, of riverine strongpoints

such as Kastel and Wiesbaden-Biebrich.266 This explains the

non-completion of Wiesbaden’s ‘Heidenmauer’. Macrianus had

every reason to be puVed up with pride, but the policy worked

because of his basic loyalty. It is to be noted that when Valentinian

really wanted to move, from Rhine to Danube, he was able to strike

an eVective deal with Macrianus. Overall, what we see again is

previous Roman exaggeration of the Alamannic ‘threat’.

Valentinian died suddenly in 375. He had fought barbarians

because he was obliged to: like all Roman emperors, he must conWrm

his credentials as a military leader. Thanks to Julian, his enemy of

261 From Mainz: Demandt (1972: 93).

262 Cf. above 151.

263 Gutmann (1991: 38); Sabbah (1999: 187–8 at n.109).

264 Cf. Gutmann (1991: 38).

265 Whittaker (1994: 241): ‘a symbolic but artiWcial compromise between two

powers with conXicting territorial claims’.

266 Cf. Gutmann (1991: 248).

ConXict 365–94 309

choice were Alamanni. However, by the end of his reign things had

settled. Valentinian had moved his centre of operations down the

Danube, and, despite occasional local diYculties, he appears to have

restored a positive working relationship with border Alamanni. His

fortiWcations on the Upper Rhine were designed for frontier policing,

not long-distance aggression. The case of Macrianus had demon-

strated the danger of close reliance on border kings: it allowed them

to develop local power bases. On the other hand, it also showed that

the mightiest king could be checked by Rome and that, left to

themselves, Alamannic leaders were not inimical. Alamanni would

be attacked again by Gratian, but not because they posed a major

threat. Generally, by the end of the century they appear passive, and it

is not surprising that on the Rhine Roman animosity began again to

be directed towards Franks.

Valentinian’s death caused great political uncertainty on the

Danube. To secure the situation the leaders of the imperial court

there proclaimed his younger son, and half-brother of Gratian, Valen-

tinian II (born 371), Augustus in his place. This, done without the

permission or even the knowledge of Gratian or Valens, was, strictly

speaking, usurpation. However, the two senior emperors accepted the

expedient and continued in their roles as rulers of the west and east

respectively. Valentinian II was controlled by Gratian.267 Then, in 376,

the east was destabilized by the arrival of large numbers of Goths over

the Danube. The immigration had been sanctioned by Valens, but

Roman mismanagement provoked Gothic resistance and then

outright rebellion in Thrace. During 377, the situation became so

serious that Valens decided to confront the Goths in person, and

asked Gratian to come in support with western troops.

It is at this point that Ammianus refers again to Alamanni as

causing trouble. The Lentienses broke a long-standing treaty

and raided into the Empire.268 They had been encouraged by the

loose talk of one of their countrymen, an imperial guardsman, who

while home on leave revealed that Gratian would soon be leaving

the west to help Valens.269 They formed raiding-parties which, in

267 Lenski (2002: 357–61).

268 AM 31.10.1–2.

269 AM 31.10.3.

310 ConXict 365–94

February, attempted to cross the frozen Rhine, but were thrown

back.270 Undaunted, and still mindful that Roman attention was

being diverted eastwards, they concentrated their forces, amounting

to some 40,000 men (or 70,000: Ammianus gives both Wgures but

prefers the former), and entered Roman territory.271 Gratian recalled

the units he had already sent ahead into Pannonia, combined these

with forces he had held back in Gaul, put the army under the generals

Nannienus and Mallobaudes and sent it against the enemy.272 Battle

was joined at Argentaria. It was hard fought, but eventually the

Romans won. No more than 5,000 Alamanni escaped and among

the dead was king Priarius, ‘the inciter of the deadly battles’.273

Gratian, already moving eastwards, heard of the victory and

‘secretly’ swung northwards over the Rhine aiming to repay the

Lentienses for their perWdy by destroying them.274 Stunned and

unable to resist, they Xed to the hills where, ‘taking their place

round about on the sheer rocks’, they sought to save themselves,

their property and their families.275 The Romans set up a crack

squad to overcome ‘obstacles like those of city walls’. These men,

spurred on by the emperor’s presence, tried to storm the heights;

but the Wghting lasted into the night, with heavy losses on

both sides.276 Gratian then resolved to star ve out the enemy. The

Lentienses, however, broke out and made for other heights, with

Gratian in hot pursuit. Recognizing that the emperor would not

give up, they surrendered. Under the terms of an agreement, they

gave young men for distribution through the Roman army; the

rest were allowed to depart unmolested.277 Ammianus’ comment

on these events runs: ‘Incredibly great energy and conspicuous

rapidity were shown by Gratian, while he was hastening in another

direction, when through the favour of the eternal deity he won this

victory, which was at once seasonable and proWtable, since it

270 AM 31.10.4.

271 AM 31.10.5.

272 AM 31.10.6.

273 AM 31.10.8–10: exitialium conc itator pugnarum.

274 AM 31.10.11: latenter.

275 AM 31.10.12: abruptisque per ambitum rupibus insistentes.

276 AM 31.10.13–14: velut murorum obicibus.

277 AM 31.10.15–17.

ConXict 365–94 311

tamed the western nations.’278 Having set matters right in Gaul,

and having punished the treacherous guardsman who started the

trouble, he set o V east, making for Sirmium on the Danube.279 He

was too late to be of any use to Valens who was defeated and killed

by the Goths at the great battle of Adrianople, on 9 August 378.

All these conXicts occurred in 378. Gratian’s crossing of the Rhine

must have occurred between 20 April, when he was still in Trier, and

mid-August, when he is reckoned to have been in residence in

Sirmium.280 Ammianus’ ‘Argentaria’ is generally held to be the

Argentovaria of Ptolemy, the Peutinger Table and the Antonine

Itinerary, traditionally identiWed as Horbourg, near Colmar on the

Upper Rhine.281 On the other hand, a strong claim has recently been

made for Biesheim-Kunheim, also near Colmar but to the east of

Horbourg—in fact, just west of Breisach282 (Fig. 17).

However, the Wrst part of the story is diYcult to make sense of. The

Lentienses, of whom nothing has been heard since Constantius II’s

clash with them in 355 when they oVered little real resistance,283 are

now suddenly able to deploy an enormous army and make massive

trouble for the Roman Empire. It took a pitched battle to destroy their

main force which had managed to travel from its home territory and

penetrate Roman defences on the Upper Rhine, an area of particular

imperial interest at a timeof intense military activity. There is toomuch

vagueness. On the other hand, w ith regard to the loose talk of Gratian’s

guardsman,and to his fate, thetale is suspiciouslydetailed and glib.In a

section that is almost pure panegyric of Gratian, 284 the whole thing

crackles with the electricity of political ‘spin’, but, apart from remark-

ing that Ammianus’ numbers are probably exaggerated,285 most have

been content to accept his account more or less as it stands.

278 AM 31.10.18: Hanc victoriam, opportunam et fructuosam, quae gentes hebetavit

occiduas, sempiterni numinis nutu, Gratianus incredibile dictu est, quo quantoque

vigore exserta celeritate aliorsum properans expedivit.

279 AM 31.10.20, 11.6.

280 Seeck (1919: 250); Lorenz, S. (1997: 172–3).

281 Moreau (1983: 129).

282 Talbert (2000: Map 11 Gazetteer), from Petit and Mangin (1994: 160).

283 Above 211.

284 Sabbah (1999: 272 n.486).

285 e.g. Sabbah (1999: 272 n.479). Zotz (1998: 399) enthusiastically accepts

Ammianus’ Wgures, and so the impressive size of the venture.

312 ConXict 365–94

The simplest solution would be to break the link between

Argentaria and Argentovaria, putting Argentaria closer to Lake

Constance, and having the Lentienses cross the High Rhine.286

However, this is made impossible by a small but signiWcant group

of sources, probably derived from Jerome and possibly related to

Ammianus, which locate Argentaria in Gaul and so support the

identiWcation Argentaria/Argentovaria.287 Progress may be made by

putting this problem to one side and considering what Gratian made

of the incident. Why did he turn aside to wage war on the Lentienses?

Ammianus presents Gratian’s Lentiensian campaign as a major factor

in Valens’ defeat, to the detriment of the senior emperor. Gratian did

what a good emperor was supposed to do, destroy barbarians.288

Valens, brimming with envy at his nephew’s success, refused to wait

for his arrival, forced battle against the Goths, and lost.289 But it is

possible to see events the other way round. Gratian, unwilling to

travel as far as Thrace and expecting that Valens would be victorious

against the Goths, required an activity that would detain him in the

west and give him a military reputation to match that of his uncle.290

(Gratian’s despatch to Valens announced his latest victory, his

personal achievement, not the earlier one won by Nannienus and

Mallobaudes.291) But against whom might he gain this, and where?

This returns us to the question of Argentaria. I propose that there

was trouble with Elbgermanic/Alamannic raiders that resulted in

Wghting near Colmar, but that this may be attributed to other than

a major Lentiensian push. Alamannia and neighbouring imperial

territories are likely to have been subject to long-distance raiding,292

and in the late 370s such raiding may have been encouraged by

contemporary problems with the Goths. It was dealt with by the

286 Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 170).

287 Jerome (Eusebius), Chron. 248, 14–16; Orosius, Hist. 33.8; Epitome 47.2;

Jordanes, Rom. 312. See Festy (1999: 221–2 n.2, 224 n.2).

288 Cf. Sabbah (1999: 272 n.483).

289 AM 31.12.1, 4–7.

290 Cf. Lenski (2002: 357–8, 361–2, 366–7) on the generally poor relations between

nephew and uncle.

291 AM 31.11.6. Cf. the fuss made of Gratian’s recent victory by Ausonius (Grat.

Act. 2.8–9): Sivan (1993: 122).

292 Above 261–2, 276.

ConXict 365–94 313

system.293 If the war-bands crossed the Rhine at Breisach,294 they did

not get far. Their numbers were probably fairly small. However, and

the more so given the possibility of recent unrest in the area,295 they

may have been joined by some Lentienses, including king Priarius. In

other words, Priarius was not the main instigator but a local ruler

swept up by the tide. His death on Roman soil, however, provided

Gratian with the opportunity to exploit the situation. Making the

most of this and Lentiensian ‘treachery’ (the tale of the garrulous

guardsman), he picked a Wght with Lentienses. The venture, now

regularly bruited as the last great imperial campaign over the

Rhine296 and clearly made much of at the time (note Ammianus’

suggestion that the emperor and his guard were in the thick of

the Wghting297), was ill-timed, unnecessary and basically unsuccessful

in that Gratian won no great victory in the Weld. And in the long

term it seriously damaged the Empire by contributing to defeat at

Adrianople.298

These events also reveal two aspects of Alamannic society, already

touched upon. The Wrst, from the case of the gossiping guardsman

(where what might be believed of him is more important than

what—if he ever existed—he actually did), is the routine nature of

Alamannic service in the Roman army and continuing contact with

home.299 The second, from the means by which the Lentiensians

evaded full defeat, is Alamannic use of defensive hill-sites—not just

one, but a chain.300 The most likely locations of this chain are north

of Lake Constance, along the Danube or even along the Swabian

Alp.301 Gratian therefore probably crossed the Rhine at Zurzach, and

struck into the modern Linzgau.302 ‘His’ Lentienses were thus not

293 Cf. above 277.

294 Damage to Breisach’s ‘bridgehead fort’ at Jechtingen-Sponeck has been attrib-

uted to the 378 troubles: Fingerlin (1997a: 105), though this may be a garbling of

Fingerlin (1990: 101), referring to those of 383.

295 Above 304.

296 Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 174–5).

297 AM 31.10.13–14.

298 Cf. Seeck (1921: 5.112); Lenski (2002: 365–6).

299 Above 155, 176.

300 Above 311.

301 Above 97.

302 Lorenz, S. (1997: 172); Sabbah (1999: 272–3 n.484).

314 ConXict 365–94

those of Constantius II, encountered more to the east: a further

indication that the name should be interpreted as a loose label

attached by Roman authorities to a regional grouping of pagi , not

as a ‘people’.303

Ammianus terminated his ‘History’ with Adrianople and its

immediate consequences. References to Alamanni in our sources

now become scattered, thin, and varied in nature and quality.304

I shall summarize what these say, and then consider the signiWcance

of what happened down to Theodosius’ taking over the west in 394.

Gratian never moved beyond Sirmium, but he eventually solved the

Gothic crisis by appointing Theodosius, son of count Theodosius, as

eastern emperor (19 January 379). Then, according to Socrates and

Sozomen, he left to deal with Alamannic raids on Gaul.305 In 383

the general Magnus Maximus revolted in Britain and crossed the

Channel. Gratian attempted to confront him in Gaul, but Xed and

was captured and killed at Lyon (25 August 383). Again according to

Socrates and Sozomen, at the time of Magnus Maximus’ departure

from Britain, Gratian was heavily engaged in W ghting Alamanni.306

At Wrst Magnus Maximus ruled the west from Trier. Italy was

governed by Valentinian II and his advisers. Ambrose tells us that

following the murder of Gratian, Iuthungi raided into Raetia but

were repulsed by Valentinian II’s general, Bauto, using Huns and

Alans as allies. These were so successful that they threatened Gaul

and, at Magnus Maximus’ request, Valentinian paid them to leave.307

In 387, Maximus moved into Italy, forcing Valentinian to Xee to

Theodosius. In 388, Theodosius came west, defeated and killed

Maximus and restored Valentinian.

Valentinian was sent into Gaul under the direction of the Frankish

general, Arbogast. Relations between the two deteriorated, and

Valentinian was found dead in mysterious circumstances at Vienne

(15 May 392). Arbogast then set up his own emperor, Eugenius

(22 August), and early in the following year the two left Gaul for

303 Above 123, 172.

304 See the handy compilations of Stroheker (1975: 40–2); KuhoV (1984: 110–13);

Runde (1998: 672–4).

305 Socrates 5.6.2; Sozomen 7.2.1, 4.1–2.

306 Socrates 5.11.2; Sozomen 7.13.1.

307 Ambrose, Ep. 18.21, 24.8.

ConXict 365–94 315

Italy. Before leaving they renewed old treaties with the kings of the

Alamanni and Franks.308 They confronted Theodosius at the great

battle of the Frigidus, on 5–6 September 394, and were defeated.

Events down to the 380s may be interpreted as following the

standard pattern of Romano-Alamannic relations, that is Roman

superiority and exploitation, unchanged by what had happened at

Adrianople. Thus, it is likely that in 379 Gratian made much of the

‘Alamannic threat’ for his own ends. He was not back in Gaul until,

at the earliest, high summer, which suggests that he was kept busy

elsewhere. Indeed, Ausonius had to deliver his speech of thanks for

his consulship in Gratian’s absence.309 However, in an earlier poem,

written late in 378 on the eve of his inauguration as consul,

Ausonius was already looking forward to Gratian’s imminent

reappearance;310 and in the Wnal section of the speech of thanks,

where he describes Gratian’s return to Gaul, he makes no mention

of what the emperor had been engaged in for most of 379 nor gives

any hint of trouble with Alamanni or any other Germani.311 This

last is particularly remarkable since, if there had been Wghting,

Ausonius would have used it to praise Gratian’s martial skills.

(Even though, in the speech of thanks, Ausonius undertakes to

deal with Gratian’s military achievements in a separate work,312

he expresses himself weakly and never fulWlled his promise.313)

We can conclude that Gratian dawdled back to Gaul in 378/9,

uninvolved in any major warfare. This is conWrmed by an itinerary

that took him directly from Sirmium to Milan.314 If he fought

Alamanni in 379, this could only have been while en route for Trier,

and so not part of any speciWc campaign. Overall, Gratian was

not catapulted into going west by a military emergency involving

Alamanni. The Alamannic ‘threat’ was, as ever, a means of distancing

himself from a diYcult situation—military and political—on the

Danube. (A mention in the Theodosian Code, of late 379, concerning

308 Gregory of Tours, Dec. Lib. Hist. 2.9.55.

309 Green (1991: 537).

310 Ausonius, 20 (Precationes).2 [Green], 34; Green (1991: 537).

311 Ausonius, Grat. Act. 18.82.

312 Ausonius, Grat. Act. 2.9.

313 Sivan (1993: 122).

314 Seeck (1919: 250–2).

316 ConXict 365–94

disruption of judicial procedure by enemy action, need not neces-

sarily refer to Gaul.315)

Four years later Gratian was in great need of military glory because

of Theodosius’ success and his own growing reputation for idleness

and declining popularity among his troops.316 His 383 campaign

against Alamanni gave him a means of acquiring such a reputation,

and so could have been contrived. It should not be seen as necessarily

reXecting Alamannic aggression. Indeed, the fact that Gratian’s cam-

paign fell just before Magnus Maximus’ usurpation perhaps indicates

just how bad his political situation had become: sensing political

danger he decided to show his military mettle, but too late. The

trouble just after his death is therefore explicable as the aftermath of

this venture. Gratian’s unnecessary and abortive expedition may have

stirred up unrest among Alamanni/Iuthungi which needed to be

quieted.317 And again, such trouble could have been exaggerated

for political ends: Bauto may have made more of the war than was

necessary to undermine Magnus Maximus.318

Then there is quiet. That this is not just an artefact of the poor

sources is demonstrated by reports of more trouble with Franks.319

The usual explanation for this is that the ‘terrifying’ Alamanni were

Wnally broken.320 Better is that this happened because, as in the days

before Julian and Valentinian I, the Alamanni were left in peace; and

this occurred because Adrianople had changed the imperial situ-

ation. Straws in the wind had been Valentinian’s sharing of the

Empire with Valens in 364, and the failure of Valentinian and Gratian

to come to Valens’ help in 365 and 378. However, it is only after 378

that we can clearly see the Roman Empire, still nominally a single

entity, evolving into two states, usually allied but increasingly

inclined to pursue their own interests. This forced the rulers of

each to keep a closer watch on each other; and in the west it resulted

in a diversion of interest and, eventually, the transfer of the imperial

315 CT 11.31.7.

316 Epitome 47.4–6.

317 For the confusion of the name see above 62.

318 Cf. Matthews (1975: 177); Lotter, Bratoz

, and Castritius (2003: 83).

319 Below 318.

320 e.g. Lorenz, S. (1997: 174–5); Pohl (2002a: 170).

ConXict 365–94 317