Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)

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Ammianus’ description of an unusually large army, accompanied by

an important non-combatant (the boy-Augustus, Gratian, presum-

ably with numerous attendants), marching cautiously for a few days,

and then at an even gentler pace, before engaging the enemy at

Solicinium. The latest estimate of the rate of march of a late-imperial

army is c. 20 km (12 statute miles) per day;134 but this is an average

Wgure, and Ammianus’ account provides grounds for assuming that

Valentinian’s force moved at a slower speed, perhaps only half

this rate.135 Rottenburg, c. 170 km (100 statute miles) from Mainz

as the crow Xies, is therefore out of the question as the location of

Solicinium. Having crossed the Rhine, Valentinian probably

struck north, as Julian had done in 359,136 reaching Solicinium, like

Ladenburg in the following year, not far from the river. There is

nothing to substantiate the long-standing conjecture that identiWes

Solicinium with Heidelberg.137

In Solicinium, Ammianus could be describing a ‘Ho

hensiedlung’,

large enough to accommodate a major battle.138 The mass of rocks

seized by the Wrst wave of Roman troops in their attack might,

therefore, have incorporated a drystone wall.139 There is no refer-

ence to the conXict’s being hampered by any internal buildings,

which would suggest that, if the place was a hill-site, it functioned

as an emergency redoubt rather than as a ‘Herrschaftszentrum’.140

However, if it was a refuge it is odd that there is no hint of any

defence works protecting its open northern neck. As far as the

Wghting is concerned, it is signiWcant that Gratian was removed

from harm and that Valentinian early went out of his way to

demonstrate his personal courage, in a no doubt much-bruited ven-

ture that Ammianus may have picked up from the oYcial record,

possibly even from paintings. Again, the emperor needed to project

134 Elton (1996a: 245).

135 The 25 km per day of Lorenz, S. (1997: 102 n.200) is certainly excessive.

At 25.1.10, Ammianus appears to report that in the Wnal stage of the Persian

campaign Julian’s army advanced only 70 stades (c.13 km) in a day. I doubt whether

Valentinian’s formation was able to maintain even this speed.

136 Above 249.

137 Lorenz, S. (1997: 108 and n.243).

138 Above 96.

139 AM 27.10.12.

140 Above 95–6; cf. AM 27.10.9.

288 ConXict 365–94

himself as an active soldier.141 There is no need to judge the campaign

a relative failure.142

Ammianus’ treatment of the following year, 369, is uneven, con-

sisting of a general notice of Valentinian’s building activities,

together w ith two examples of these. However, it can be better

understood by taking into account Symmachus’ oration in honour

of Valentinian’s third consulship, delivered at the beginning of

370.143 Symmachus, a rising star of the Roman senate, had been on

oYcial business at the western court from the winter of 368/9.144

An eye-witness,145 he, like Ammianus, describes the commencement

of Valentinian’s great military building programme in 369 and

gives examples.146 However, he also recalls an expedition of the

emperor over the Rhine in the same year, against a place called

Alta Ripa—‘High Bank’.147 Though Symmachus’ Alta Ripa lay on

the right side of the Rhine, its name seems also to have been applied

to a new Valentinianic fort sited on the left bank—identiWed as

modern Altrip, south-east of Ludwigshafen (Fig. 23). Valentinian

issued a law from Alta Ripa on 19 June 369, having remained in Trier

until at least mid-May. He was still on the Rhine on 30 August, at

Breisach (opposite the site of the Za

hringer Burgberg), but had

returned to Trier by 14 October. His 369 campaign must therefore

have taken place in early summer, probably in June.148 According to

Symmachus, after careful preparation, a small force was sent over by

boat (perhaps the type of large, shallow barge found in Xanten in

1993149). Once a landing had been made and the position secured, a

pontoon bridge was built to bring over a larger force. Roman

troops scaled the lofty bank that gave the place its name and then

141 Cf. Mause (1994: 197) on the need for an emperor to be seen as an active

soldier.

142 Contra Lorenz, S. (1997: 116–17). Cf. Raimondi (2001: 168–9): the Solicinium

campaign as the most important militar y expedition of Valentinian’s reign, and the

last great victorious military sortie of a Roman emperor over the Rhine.

143 Symmachus, Orat. 2 (Pabst (1989: 66–91)). Later, of course, than Orat.1:

above n. 49.

144 Matthews (1975: 32); Quellen 2, 28.

145 Symmachus, Orat. 2.3, 22.

146 Symmachus, Orat. 2.1, 28.

147 Symmachus, Orat. 2.4.

148 Seeck (1919: 236–8); Pabst (1989: 306).

149 Bridger (2003: 24).

ConXict 365–94 289

advanced on an Alamannic settlement. This they took, and forced its

inhabitants to take Xight.150

There is much of interest in Symmachus’ account, beginning

with the nature and location of the Alamannic settlement. To a

Roman it will have seemed a very poor place, made up of thatched

wooden huts.151 However, it must have been large, to justify the

size of the force directed against it; and it comprised women and

children and men bearing arms. All this suggests that it was more

than a ‘village’,152 and that in Symmachus’ description we have a

lowland ‘Herrschaftszentrum’.153 The settlement also lay close to the

Rhine, very possibly east-north-east of the fort at Alta Ripa, where

raised ground (Symmachus’ transrhenish ‘high bank’) aVorded

protection from the Rhine and the Neckar.154 Such proximity

implies that its inhabitants, like those of Mengen and the Za

hringer

Burgberg,155 usually co-existed peacefully with the Empire. Its

leader must have been a compliant king, from its location perhaps

150 Symmachus, Orat. 2.4–10, 26.

151 Symmachus, Orat. 2.10, 14.

152 Or, as Lorenz, S. (1997: 121), ‘villages’.

153 Above 98.

154 Pabst (1989: 376 Fig. 2).

155 Above 89.

Fig. 23 Alta Ripa, Mannheim-Neckarau and Ladenburg [from Pabst

(1989: 376 Fig. 2); ß Frau Prof. Angela Pabst].

290 ConXict 365–94

Hortarius or his successor.156 The impression of cooperation is

strengthened by what we are told about the Roman attack. If this

settlement really was hostile, it is surprising that it was not earlier

abandoned by its inhabitants in the face of what, despite Valentinian’s

alleged eVorts at secrecy,157 must have been an evident concentration

of Roman forces over the Rhine. Equally odd is that the Alamanni did

not keep a close watch on the river bank and that the Roman assault

was apparently unopposed.158 However, most astonishing is what

happened when the Romans entered the settlement. Symmachus

tells us that its occupants were not killed in their beds, nor driven

from their huts by Wre. They had already risen and had prepared

themselves for the day, and they departed unmolested—according to

the latest translation of the text—even being permitted to keep their

weapons.159 There is every reason to suspect that the whole thing was

devised to impress visiting civilian dignitaries, and was not an

authentic assault.160 Again, a signiWcant indicator of Valentinian’s likely

caution in all this is Gratian’s presence in the imperial train.161 The

oddly secretive way in which Valentinian made his preparations was

unlikely to have been a real precaution, generated by his fear of

indiscretion, or worse, by Germanic oY cers,162 but rather a reXection

of Symmachus’ ignorance of what was to happen, as the military

establishment kept him and his fellows out of the ‘information

loop’. The subsequent building of the pontoon bridge looks very

much like a peacetime exercise. It took only a day, and troops on

both sides of the river competed cheerfully with each other in its

construction. That it was covered with earth hints at some degree of

overengineering, and further suggests that it was more for show than

for use.163

What follows is more diYcult to interpret, but it appears that the

Roman force advanced to a former imperial town (as Symmachus

156 Above 243, 249; cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 121 and n.340).

157 Symmachus, Orat. 2.5–6.

158 Symmachus, Orat. 2.4, 6–9.

159 Symmachus, Orat. 2.10; Pabst (1989: 75, 143 n.42). See Sogno (forthcoming)

for Symmachus’ treatment of their Xight as circus spectacle.

160 Matthews (1975: 32–3), with Drinkwater (1996: 28 and n.33).

161 Symmachus, Orat. 2.31.

162 Contra Pabst (1989: 309).

163 Symmachus, Orat. 2.26. Contra Pabst (1989: 150 n.118).

ConXict 365–94 291

puts it, a colonia, still with inscriptions and ruined buildings), and

robbed it of materials in order to build a new fortiWcation at the

conXuence of two rivers. Its construction was designed and super-

vised by Valentinian; and it turns out to have been one of this

emperor’s ‘fortiWed beaching areas’.164 Symmachus’ subsequent

emphasis on Valentinian’s activity on the Neckar165 indicates that

this was the region where the ‘campaign’ took place: the two rivers are

the Rhine and the Neckar, and the new fort is the one found at

Mannheim-Neckarau.166 Ammianus’ reference to the Neckar in his

Wrst example of Valentinian’s fort building tempts one to think that

the structure concerned is also the one at Mannheim-Neckarau.167

From a reference in Ausonius linking Neckar and Lopodunum,168 the

colonia is taken to be the former civitas-capital of Ladenburg—itself

also later developed as a forti W ed beaching area.169 Here, the most

interesting aspect of this is that local Alamanni were recruited to

enter Lopodunum and help strip it of building materials.170 This

suggests that the allied king of the peacefully evacuated ‘Herrschafts-

zentrum’ provided the labour and transport necessary for the oper-

ation as part of general Romano-Alamannic cooperation in the

exploitation of the resources of the area, already discussed.171 Part

of his reward was probably continued permission to occupy his

riverside settlement, albeit still obliged to give hostages.172

Cooperation takes us to Valentinian’s military building at Mons

Piri. What we see is clear Alamannic distress at Roman disregard of a

peace agreement, perhaps made with Valentinian. If, as seems

164 Symmachus, Orat. 2.15–16, 18–20. Below 295, 296–7.

165 Symmachus, Orat. 2.24.

166 Scho

nberger (1969: 185); Petrikovits (1971: 186); Pabst (1989: 145 n.67).

167 So, Wrmly, Lorenz, S. (1997: 124–5, 130), though Matthews (1989: 285) has

reservations.

168 Below 293.

169 Pabst (1989: 145–6 n.68); below 295. I see no reason to accept the assertion of

Lorenz, S. (1997: 124–5 and n.358, 128) that Ladenburg was built before Mannheim-

Neckarau.

170 Symmachus, Orat. 2.15–16.

171 Above 133–5; cf. Pabst (1989: 309).

172 Asche (1983: 88); Lorenz, S. (1997: 121) from Symmachus, Orat. 2.23. See also

below concerning Mons Piri. Contra Lorenz, S. (1997: 122), that Valentinian was

engaged in creating an ‘Alamanni-free’ zone. This would surely have been too large

and diYcult to maintain.

292 ConXict 365–94

likely, the work aVected only a single pagus, Ammianus’ ‘optimates’is

a collective term for its chief and leading men.173 Roman aggression

now provoked unexpected reaction. Presumably the imperial author-

ities, assuming that the threat to the hostages was suYcient to keep

these people submissive, had not bothered to consult them in

advance about the fort. Again, as in 366, the Alamanni played into

Valentinian’s hands by conWrming the Roman image of them as

untrustworthy and dangerous foes who deserved Wrm treatment.

The loss of Roman troops, though shaming, was no major defeat,174

and must have been avenged.175 However, the most important con-

clusion to be drawn from the incident is that communities living

close to the frontier, in line with previous agreements, did not expect

Roman harassment: the normal condition was peace. Mons Piri is

generally located in the vicinity of Heidelberg, at no great distance

from Mannheim-Neckarau and possibly in the same pagus.176 This

would explain the dismay of the optimates: having cooperated closely

over the establishment of one fort in their territory, they were not

expecting a second.177 It may also be noted that, in the absence of the

emperor, Alamanni were expected to deal w ith a senior army oYcer,

as already proposed for the Iller-limes.178

A Wnal question concerning 368 and 369 is whether Valentinian

and Gratian travelled any distance beyond the Rhine. In his poem

celebrating the Moselle, Ausonius declares that the river has seen

the ‘united triumphs of father and son’ (that is Valentinian I and

Gratian), which they have won by defeating enemies beyond the river

Neckar and ‘Lupodunum’ (that is Lopodunum) and the source of the

Danube.179 Mention of the Neckar and Lopodunum Wts what we

know of Valentinian’s activities for 368 and, especially, 369, but the

Danube is more of a problem.

173 Cf. above 118, 120.

174 Lorenz, S. (1997: 142).

175 Above 277.

176 Cf. Gutmann (1991: 32); Lorenz, S. (1997: 142).

177 Lorenz, S. (1997: 122, 124 and n.359, 141).

178 Above 99, 157, 212.

179 Ausonius, Mosella 422–4: Nicrum super et Lupodunum/et fontem Latiis ignotum

annalibus Histri.

ConXict 365–94 293

The imperial visit to its source appears to have been made much of

in oYcial circles.180 It seems unlikely that, as commonly assumed,

this had taken place by the end of 369, as a result of campaigning in

368 or 369.181 We must not assume from the stray references in

Ausonius and Symmachus that the years 368 and 369 were the only

ones in which Valentinian and Gratian went into the Weld together. It

is more probable that, like the sons of Constantine I, the boy was

prepared for an imperial career by frequent association with the

army.182 Much will have been made of Gratian’s Wrst campaign as

Augustus, and it is this that was picked up by Ammianus;183 but there

will have been later expeditions. However, as in 368 and 369, none of

these will have been deep into Alamannic territory: Valentinian liked

to stay close to home.184 A likely date for the Danube visit is 370.185 A

sortie from, say, Windisch (only 60 km or so from the union of the

headstreams of the Danube at Donaueschingen, along the old Roman

road to Rottweil) would have been another grand but localized aVair,

polishing the image of Valentinian as the great explorer, introduced

in 369 on his advance to the Neckar186 (Fig. 4). Seeck’s reconstruc-

tion of Valentinian’s movements allows plenty of time for such an

imperial expedition in the second half of 370.187 The expedition need

not have been aggressive in nature, but the attention given to it will

have served to divert attention from Valentinian’s failed attempt early

in the year, probably in July and August,188 to use the Burgundians

against Macrianus.189

180 Above 280.

181 e.g. Evelyn-White (1919: xvi–xviii, 258); Nagl (1948: 2173–4); Piganiol (1972:

196 and n.7); Green (1978: 92); Heinen (1985: 245); Pabst (1989: 306–7); Sivan

(1990: 383–4 and n.1); Green (1991: 379, 456, 507); Heinen (1995: 81–2); Lorenz, S.

(1997: 102–8) with full bibliography and Wrmly for 368.

182 Cf. above 197–8. Note AM 27.6.8: Valentinian, while presenting Gratian to the

troops in 367, admits the need for him to be hardened in war. Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997:

101 and n.194).

183 Cf. Nagl (1948: 2174).

184 Cf. Seeck (1921: 5.24).

185 Drinkwater (1999b: 449–50).

186 Windisch: cf. Nagl (1948: 2173) citing Maurer, for 368.

187 Seeck (1919: 238–40).

188 Lorenz, S. (1997: 150).

189 Below 305–6.

294 ConXict 365–94

Ammianus famously praises Valentinian for his work in fortifying

the length of the Rhine, ‘from the beginning of Raetia as far as the

strait of the Ocean’.190 These words are conWrmed by what he says

elsewhere, by the earlier eyewitness account of Symmachus, and by

archaeological discoveries. Valentinian built or restored forts and

established lines of watchtowers (burgi) along the Rhine and

the Danube. Along the Upper and High Rhine and the Danube–

Iller–Rhine limes he was responsible for a number of major left-bank

structures. Directly on the Upper Rhine, upstream from Mainz, we

Wnd for ts at Speyer, Altrip, and Breisach. On the High Rhine, from

Basel east to Lake Constance, and from Lake Constance up the Iller to

the Danube, there is a line of burgi. Behind the actual line of

the frontier, there were more forts and burgi. Near the Rhine, these

are known at Alzey, Altinum, Horbourg, Kreuznach, Eisenburg,

Irgenhausen, Schaan, Zurich, and along the Aare. Near the Danube

are Wilten and Isny. All these structures were located on imperial

territory, on the left bank of the Rhine and the rig ht banks of the Iller

and Danube. They were complemented by a number of constructions

on the right bank of the Rhine. On the Upper and High Rhine there

were bridgehead forts at Mainz, Jechtingen-Sponeck, Basel (possibly

Ammianus’ Robur) and Wyhlen.191 In addition, on the right bank,

there were specialized burgi, categorized by Schleiermacher as ‘befes-

tigte SchiVsla

nden’—‘fortiWed beaching areas for ships’. Along

the Upper Rhine, remains of these have been found at Wiesbaden-

Biebrich, Mannheim-Neckarau and Ladenburg.192 Valentinian’s

western building programme (which appears to have been mirrored

by one directed by Valens, but ordered by Valentinian) was, to judge

from literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence, concentrated

in the late 360s and early 370s.193

Why did Valentinian do what he did in the west, and how did

his actions aVect the Alamanni? Current opinion remains that

Valentinian correctly perceived a renascent Germanic threat along

190 AM 28.2.1: a Raetiarum exordio ad usque fretalem Oceanum.

191 Maps: Scho

nberger (1969: Fig. 23); Petrikovits (1971: Fig. 32); Johnson (1983:

Figs 51, 62).

192 Ho

ckmann (1986: 400); cf. above 292.

193 Lenski (2002: 376); cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 132–3).

ConXict 365–94 295

the whole line of the western frontier and successfully countered it.194

He must initially have believed in a ‘threat’: as both a product of

Greco-Roman society and (as a soldier and emperor) a beneWciary of

‘the politics of fear’, he was bound to do so. However, his lack of haste

in reaching the Rhine indicates that from the start he recognized there

was no immediate danger; and his subsequent activities there suggest

that he appreciated fairly quickly that neighbouring Alamannic com-

munities were no major problem. He maintained the idea of a ‘threat’

because it enabled him to follow his own agenda: to avoid helping

Valens; to conWrm his position and that of his heir; to distance him, as

a ‘rough’ provincial, from the sophisticated civilian society of Italy.195

His new defence works may therefore be interpreted as defensive

rather than aggressive, aimed at preventing sporadic raiding, not

massive attack and, again following his own agenda, permitting him

to indulge his passion for architecture and gadgetry.196

Valentinian’s work was, in essence, not new. It followed an estab-

lished pattern of linear defence which went back to Diocletian and

even earlier, Wrst and second-century, models. As Petrikovits says, on

the Rhine and Danube the emperor ‘found a defensive network

already established; the need was to supplement it and make it

more dense’.197 ( The idea that the Late Empire saw the development

of an integrated strategy of ‘defence-in-depth’, popular after the

publication of Luttwak’s Grand Strategy, is now out of favour.198)

What was original was Valentinian’s building of right-bank ‘SchiV-

sla

nden’.199 These are also found on the left bank of the Danube, in

Pannonia,200 but here, in concentrating on the Alamanni, I restrict

myself to the Rhine. Symmachus’ description and archaeological

194 Above 270. See also Alfo

ldi (1946: 15). Scho

nberger (1969: 186); Matthews

(1975: 33); Stroheker (1975: 38–9); Asche (1983: 42, 49, 53, 56, 98); Pabst (1989: 304);

Lorenz, S. (1997: 183); Raimondi (2001: 94).

195 AM 30.8.10. Nagl (1948: 2191).

196 Symmachus, Orat. 2.18–20; AM 30.9.4; Epitome 45.6. Nagl (1948: 2203);

Matthews (1975: 49); Wiedemann (1979: 143–5); Pabst (1989: 147–8, 329–38);

Lorenz, S. (1997: 131).

197 Petrikovits (1971: 184).

198 Luttwak (1976: ch. 3). See, e.g. Brulet (1993: 135); Elton (1996a: 157);

Mackensen (1999: 239): Raetia.

199 Lorenz, S. (1997: 138 n.455).

200 Lander (1984: 288).

296 ConXict 365–94

excavation show them to be towers defended by close curtain walls,

two of which are extended to run in parallel down into a nearby

river201 (Fig . 24). The enclosure thus created was used for the beach-

ing of naval vessels (by this time the versatile light lusoriae, in service

since the third century).202 We cannot be sure if Valentinian invented

the concept of the ‘SchiVsla

nde’:203 one may even have been deployed

by Julian.204 However, it certainly captured his interest. Symmachus

records his close involvement, as an ‘imperial builder’, in the con-

struction of such structures.205 But it is the ships, not the buildings,

that best indicate Valentinian’s ‘big idea’ here: the use of naval power.

Regular Roman naval activity on the Rhine began in the reign of

Augustus.206 It was disrupted by internal troubles, and no more so than

by those of the 350s. Barbatio had to bring his own boats in 357.207 The

situationwas restored by Julian,but not completely: in 359, hehad only

40 lusoriae available to him for his expedition over the Rhine.208 To

judge from his actions, Valentinian was aware of the deWciency, and

sought to remedy it. He may have been alerted to the value of naval

power when he served on the Rhine in 357. Thoug h he was dismissed

before the debacle of Barbatio’s bridge and the full assembling of

Alamannic forces before Strasbourg, both of which had lessons to

teach about the controlling of rivers, he will have heard of these events.

And he may earlier have witnessed Alamannic use of river craft—the

crucial link between Alamannic settlements on opposite banks of the

Rhine—and realized its dangers. He must also have been aware

of the way in which Julian had used waterways.209 More recently,

Valentinian may have concluded that the Alamannic raids of 365

and 366 could have been prevented by naval power; and the

initial assault of the expedition of 369 was launched by ship. Later,

201 Symmachus, Orat. 2.20. Ho

ckmann (1986: 399–400). Plans and reconstruc-

tions: Johnson (1983: Fig. 54); Ho

ckmann (1986: Fig. 14); Pabst (1989: Figs 4–6).

202 Ho

ckmann (1986: 381, 392–3, 396–7 and Fig. 13).

203 Lander (1984: 288).

204 Above 241. Cf. Ho

ckmann (1986: 414) on Julian’s appreciation of naval power.

205 Symmachus, Orat. 2.18–19: artifex purpuratus.

206 Ho

ckmann (1986: 379).

207 AM 16.11.8. Above 233.

208 AM 18.2.12. Ho

ckmann (1986: 406); above 247.

209 Ho

ckmann (1986: 414).

ConXict 365–94 297