Drinkwater J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496 (Caracalla to Clovis)
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(perhaps because, being from the interior, unknown70) Alamannic
rex and his companions were killed out of hand.71
One piece of evidence adduced in support of the claim that the
battle of Cha
ˆ
lons-sur-Marne was as signiWcant as Strasbourg is a law
of Valentinian I, dated 20 (or 15) June 366 and issued in Reims,
concerning postliminium: the rights of citizens detained against their
will during barbarian invasion and now returned to the Empire.72
Lorenz argues that its very existence is a direct measure of the
importance of Jovinus’ v ictory.73 However, it is often diYcult to
relate a law in the Codex Theodosianus to a particular historical
event. In this case, the situation that the rescript attempts to
redress—the restitution of property (land and slaves) that, as a result
of the prolonged absence of its rightful owners, had already passed to
third parties—hardly suggests a very recent, or especially localized
problem. And, even if the law does relate to Jovinus’ liberating large
numbers of Alamannic captives, Valentinian’s interest in these people
may be interpreted less positively. Since there is no mention of
Jovinus pursuing the enemy back over the Rhine after Cha
ˆ
lons,
such captives would have been held and freed on Roman soil.74
This implies that the Alamanni were allowed a great deal of free
rein, which in turn suggests that the imperial policy of ‘wait-and-see’
was not in the best interests of the local population. Some of
Ammianus’ numerous ‘trivial’ wars of this period may have resulted
from this: not further major campaigns,75 but the suppression of civil
disorder caused by general disruption, the precursor of the ‘savage
frenzy for brigandage in Gaul’ which Ammianus records for 369.76
(Another law, concerning the provision of services of the public post,
addressed to Jovinus early in 367, indicates orderly and extensive
70 Contra Gutmann (1991: 17).
71 As Gutmann (1991: 19) observes, all involved would normally have been spared
and recruited into the imperial army.
72 CT 5.7.1. I take 20 June from Pharr (1952: 108); 15 June comes from Seeck
(1919: 228), XVII Kal. Iul., following Mommsen.
73 Lorenz, S. (1997: 84).
74 Cf. above 140.
75 Cf. Demandt (1972: 85); Lorenz, S. (1997: 91); below 279.
76 AM 28.2.10: latrociniorum rabies saeva. Cf. Drinkwater (1989: 194) on the
possible link between this and the Bagaudae.
278 ConXict 365–94
negotiations with barbarian leaders.77 If these were Alamanni, the
law suggests a speedy restoration of peaceful relations after a period
of unrest.78)
In 364–6, Valentinian simply consolidated his position. In summer
367 he faced the problem of his own serious illness (ominously, the
second since his accession) and consequent political uncertainty
at court, which forced him to appoint Gratian as fellow Augustus
(24 August).79 This happened at Amiens, which the court then left,
heading for Trier. However, en route arrived news of trouble: the
infamous ‘Barbarian Conspiracy’ of Picts, Attacotti and Scots in
Britain, and Frankish and Saxon attacks along the northern coast of
Gaul. Valentinian delegated these matters to his generals, and order
was eventually restored by count Theodosius in 368.80 This meant
that by the end of 367 Valentinian, unlike Valens, still had personally
to prove his military mettle. There are hints that in the latter months
of both 366 and 367 there was successful Wghting against the
Franks, but this appears to have been restricted and did not involve
Valentinian’s personal participation.81 The Alamanni remained the
preferred game, and it is possible that Valentinian’s move from Reims
via Amiens to Trier in 367 was the next step in the preparation of a
major campaign against them, interrupted by other concerns.82 It
comes as no surprise that the emperor renewed conXict with the
Alamanni in 368.
Most of what we know about this and events down to Valentinian’s
death in 375 comes, as before, from Ammianus Marcellinus, but
there is an important diVerence. As he did in the case of Constantius
II and Julian, Ammianus appears to mention all Valentinian’s
77 CT 7.1.9.
78 Cf. Gutmann (1991: 22).
79 AM 26.4.4; 27.6.1–16. On this generally, see now Raimondi (2001: 131–69,
esp. 163–4: the election of Gratian conWrmed the western army’s support of
Valentinian).
80 AM 27.8.1–10; 28.3.1–8. Demandt (1972: 84–91); Matthews (1989: 207);
Drinkwater (1999a: 133–4).
81 Demandt (1972: 82–4); Nixon and Rodgers (1994: 517–19); Lorenz, S. (1997:
83, 91). Gutmann (1991: 47 and n.26) relates this rather to count Theodosius’
suppression of the Barbarian Conspiracy.
82 Gutmann (1991: 23); Drinkwater (1999a: 133). Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 92), for
possible preparations by Valentinian for a major Alamannic campaign while he was
still resident in Reims.
ConXict 365–94 279
military activities; however, contrary to what is often assumed, this
should never be taken for granted.83 There are three indications of
omissions. First, Valentinian’s campaign on the Rhine and Neckar in
369 is described in some detail by our second important source, the
Roman senator Symmachus, but not by Ammianus. Second, we know
from the writings of the high-ranking western courtier, Ausonius,
that at some time during his sojourn on the Rhine Valentinian
travelled to the source of the Danube. Much must have been
made of this exploit. Symmachus lavishes praise on Valentinian’s
Alexander-like advance into ‘unknown’ territory beyond the Rhine
and on the emperor’s ‘discovery’ of the Neckar.84 The reappearance
of Roman arms at the Danube source must have been seen as a
considerably more memorable event. It can be no accident that we
Wnd mention of it in Ausonius’ Mosella and in two further poems by
him, speciWcally commemorating the achievement.85 If the Danube
expedition caused oYcial excitement in Trier, it is justiWable to
assume that it was also celebrated in Rome, and was recorded and
remembered there in close detail. However, when Ammianus, now
researching and writing in the city,86 came to construct his account of
Valentinian’s military exploits he ignored the incident.
From around 367 Ammianus gives us no more than a series of
impressions of Valentinian’s activities. His treatment has, indeed,
been characterized as episodic and ‘imprecise, eclectic and anec-
dotal’.87 It probably suited him to pick up enoug h from imperial
propaganda to intimate that Valentinian had much to do on
the Rhine because Valentinian’s barbarian enemies were those of
Julian. Otherwise, however, Ammianus was not concerned to present
a complete or balanced account of an emperor in whom he was
interested only as the bane of the Roman e
´
lite, the employer of the
‘good’ count Theodosius, and the brother of Valens.88 Finally, the
Alamannic massacre of Roman troops at Mons Piri in 369 must have
83 Thus contra, e.g. Sivan (1990: 384).
84 Symmachus, Orat. 2.24, 30. Pabst (1989: 336).
85 Ausonius, Mosella 424; Epig. 28, 31 [Peiper] (3, 4 [Green]).
86 Matthews (1989: 20–1).
87 Pabst (1989: 307): Ammianus’ ‘wenig pra
¨
zise, eklektisch-anekdotische Erza
¨
h-
lung’.
88 On this see further Drinkwater (1999a: 131–2).
280 ConXict 365–94
been followed by reprisals which went beyond the execution of
hostages, but of these Ammianus makes no mention.89 In short, we
have to accept that it is now impossible to reconstruct anything like a
full narrative of events on the Rhine and the upper Danube under
Valentinian from 367.90 I will therefore Wrst summarize what
Ammianus says of Valentinian’s dealings w ith Alamanni down to
the end of his reign, establish a basic chronology, and Wnally assess
the signiWcance of what occurred by year rather than by campaign.
Having reported trouble in the east, in Isauria, Ammianus
continues that around this time, when Valentinian had already
cautiously begun his campaign, an Alamannic prince (regalis),
Rando, slipped into Mainz with a light raiding-party and took
many captives and much booty. Rando was helped in his enterprise
by his long preparation and by the fact that the city had been left
unguarded and was celebrating a Christian holiday at the time.91
Shortly afterwards there was better news. King Vithicabius, son and
successor of Vadomarius, who had often fanned the Xames of war
against the Empire, was dead, slain by a personal attendant, suborned
by Rome. This was the culmination of various Roman attempts to
kill him, and led to some reduction in Alamannic raiding.92
After this, Valentinian launched a major campaign against the
Alamanni, involving numerous troops assembled from all sides and
carefully armed and provisioned. The reason for this was that the
treacherous and irreducible nature of the foe posed a grave danger to
public safety. At the beginning of the warm season, Valentinian,
accompanied by Gratian, led his men over the Rhine.93 Meeting no
immediate resistance, the emperor advanced carefully and slowly,
guided by scouts. After a few days, still having made no contact with
the enemy, he ordered the burning of neig hbouring Welds and
dwellings, and proceeded more slowly to Solicinium. Here he
stopped, having been warned that the enemy was ahead. He was
told that they, having decided to stand and Wght, ‘. . . had stationed
89 Contra Lorenz, S. (1997: 144), I cannot believe that Valentinian let this incident
pass without retaliatory action.
90 Cf. Raimondi (2001: 92).
91 AM 27.10.1–2.
92 AM 27.10.3–4; 30.7.7.
93 AM 27.10.5–6. For Rhine rather than Main see below 287.
ConXict 365–94 281
themselves on a lofty mountain, surrounded on all sides by rocky
and precipitous heights and inaccessible except on the northern side
where it has an easy and gentle slope’.94 Valentinian hastily devised a
battle plan. This involved stationing one of his generals, Sebastianus,
on the northern slope, to attack the Alamanni as they Xed. The rest of
his army was to attack up the rocky heights, where scouts had found
a path. Gratian was not to participate in the Wghting. As this was
being put into action, Valentinian dashed oV with a small force to
inspect the heights, believing that he could Wnd a better way up.95
However, he was ambushed and only just managed to escape
alive. Battle was joined as originally planned, and Roman forces
stormed the summit. There was heavy Wghting. The Alamanni were
surrounded and eventually Xed. As planned, they were cut to pieces
by Sebastianus.96 Roman forces then went into winter quarters, w ith
Valentinian and Gratian returning to Trier.97
Ammianus then tells us that Valentinian fortiWed the entire Rhine,
from Raetia to the North Sea, in some places building on the river’s
right bank, in barbarian territor y.98 The emperor gave particular
attention to a for t on the river Neckar, which he had had built, but
which was in danger of being washed away. Valentinian came up with
a plan to divert the current away from the structure which, under his
direct super vision, was successfully executed.99 Valentinian then
decided to build another fortiWcation over the Rhine, on M ons Piri. He
entrusted the scheme to a dux, Arator, and, given the lateness of the
season, ordered him to press ahead ‘while deep silence reigned
everywhere’. As work began, Arator and his successor, Hermogenes
(who had, apparently, already been appointed), were approached by
a delegation of leading men (optimates) of the Alamanni, claiming
that what they were doing ran contrary to what had been agreed with
them and begging them to stop. When the Romans refused they
withdrew, sorrowing for sons of theirs who had been handed over
to Rome as hostages under the terms of a treaty. A waiting war-party
94 AM 27.10.6–9.
95 AM 27.10.9–10.
96 AM 27.10.12–15.
97 AM 27.10.16.
98 AM 28.2.1.
99 AM 28.2.2–4.
282 ConXict 365–94
then cut down the Roman troops engaged in building the fort, leaving
only one survivor.100 In the meantime, Gaul was aZicted by a ‘savage
frenzy for brigandage’. One of its victims was Constantianus,
Valentinian’s own brother-in-law and tribunus stabuli.101
Under the third consulship of Valentinian and Valens, Ammianus
describes a Saxon attack on northern Gaul and its destruction by
Roman forces.102 After this, Valentinian concerned himself with
‘how to break the arrogance of the Alamanni and their king
Macrianus, who without limit or measure was confusing the
Roman state by his restless disturbances’. He decided to use
Burgundians as allies, and arranged with their leaders that while
they attacked the Alamanni from one direction he would strike
them from the other.103 The Burgundians agreed, but arrived before
Valentinian (still busy with his building) was ready for them. They
reached the Rhine and ‘caused the very greatest alarm to our
people’.104 When the emperor did not appear as arranged, the
Burgundians sought his support to prevent their being attacked
in the rear during their withdrawal. However, feeling that their
demands were being ignored, their envoys left upset and angry.
Their leaders were furious at their treatment, killed their prisoners
and returned home.105 In the meantime, count Theodosius, seeing
that the Alamanni had been panicked by the Burgundian incursion,
attacked them from Raetia, killed many and sent his prisoners to
Italy, where they were settled on the Po.106
A little later, Ammianus returns to the story of Valentinian and
Macrianus, leading into it from a discussion of the emperor’s temper
and cruelty and, yet, his work for the good of the state. He says that it
was Valentinian’s main concern to take the king alive, by whatever
possible means, as Julian had taken Vadomarius. This was because
Macrianus, ‘amid the frequent changes in policy towards him, had
100 AM 28.2.5–9: dum undique altum esset silentium.
101 AM 28.2.10: latrociniorum rabies saeva.
102 AM 28.5.1–7.
103 AM 28.5.8–10.
104 AM 28.5.11: terrori nostris fuere vel maximo. On the causes of Burgundian
hostility to the Alamanni see above 109.
105 AM 28.5.12–13.
106 AM 28.5.15. Above 167.
ConXict 365–94 283
increased in power and was now rising against our countrymen with
full-grown strength’.107 Having discovered from deserters where
Macrianus was likely to be, and knowing that he expected no trouble,
Valentinian threw a pontoon bridge over the Rhine and sent a small
force, under his magister peditum, another Severus, to Wiesbaden.
Severus at Wrst advanced as ordered, then, worried by the small size of
his force, halted. More troops arrived with Valentinian, also lightly
equipped, and, as dawn approached, the Romans pressed forward,
led by cavalry under count Theodosius.108 There was, apparently
(here there is a short lacuna in the text), a night raid on Macrianus’
residence. The narrative continues with an account of Roman troops
getting out of hand, and looting and burning. The noise woke
Macrianus’ attendants, who promptly moved him to a place of safety
in the hills. Robbed of his prey, Valentinian laid waste enemy terri-
tory ‘as far as the Wftieth milestone’, then returned to Trier.109 With
Macrianus gone, he appointed Fraomarius king of the Bucinobantes.
However, ‘since a recent invasion had utterly devastated that canton’,
he soon transferred him to Britain with the rank of tribune. He also
appointed the Alamannic chiefs Bitheridus and Hortarius to army
commands, but later had Hortarius executed for having treasonably
communicated with Macrianus and other barbarian leaders.110
Valentinian then fought a major war against the Quadi. In the
following year, in the consulship of himself and Aequitius, having
devastated several Alamannic pagi, he was building a fortiWcation
near Basel, ‘which those living nearby called Robur’, when he learned
of further trouble on the Danube. Inclined to move there at once, he
was, we are told, dissuaded by his counsellors on the grounds of the
closeness of w inter and the fact that he Wrst needed to settle matters
on the Rhine: ‘They set before him the alleged savagery of the kings
bordering on Gaul, and most of all of Macrianus, who was formid-
able and (as was well known) had been left unsubdued and would
107 AM 29.4.1–2: auctum inter mutationes crebras sententiarum iamque in nostros
adultis viribus exsurgentem.
108 AM 29.4.2–5. Sabbah (1999: 27) has the Roman advance beginning with
moonrise.
109 AM 29.4.5–6: ad usque quinquagesimum lapidem.
110 AM 29.4.7: quoniam recens excursus eundem penitus vastaverat pagum.
284 ConXict 365–94
actually attack fortiWed cities.’111 Valentinian immediately invited
Macrianus to a meeting near Mainz. The king arrived on the bank
of the Rhine ‘while the clashing shields of his countrymen thundered
all about him’. From the Roman side, Valentinian and his staV took to
boats and drew near him. There were speeches on both sides, and an
alliance was concluded with an oath. Valentinian then withdrew to
Trier for the winter. Macrianus proved to be a steadfast ally, until his
death while raiding into Frankish territory.112 The following year,
Valentinian moved to Illyricum to Wght the Quadi. Here he died of
apoplexy.113
The basic chronology of these events is fairly straightforward. The
campaign which led to victory at Solicinium must have been in 368,
the year after Gratian’s proclamation as Augustus and the Barbarian
Conspiracy. Valentinian’s work on the Neckar and at Mons Piri must
therefore have fallen in 369, as conWrmed by Symmachus’ second
panegyric.114 Ammianus’ consular dating puts the Saxon attack and
the alliance with Burgundians in 370.115 Valentinian’s attempt to
capture Macrianus probably took place in 371, although some
would put it in 372.116 The year in which Valentinian built Robur
and reached agreement with Macrianus preceded the year in which
he died on campaign against the Quadi, and is anyway consular
dated: it has to be 374. By this time Macrianus was clearly back
in full command of the Bucinobantes. He must have driven out
Fraomarius in 372 or 373.117
Valentinian was resident in Trier to the end of July 368, when he
moved to the Rhine. He had returned to Trier and its region by
111 AM 30.3.1–3: quod appellant accolae Robur. . . vicinorum Galliis regum imma-
nitatem, maxime omnium Macriani, ut formidati, tunc praetendentes, quem constabat
impacatum relictum etiam ipsa urbium moenia temptaturum.
112 AM 30.3.4–7: sonitu scutorum intonante gentilium.
113 AM 30.6.3.
114 Below 289.
115 Seeck (1919: 238–40): Valentinian was still in Trier on 1 June. By 31 July he
could have been at Worms (though this is also attributable to 368—cf. below 287—or
373). He was back in Trier by 1 December.
116 Seeck (1919: 242, 371); Demandt (1972: 92); Lorenz, S. (1997: 144, 152, 154
and nn.575–6).
117 Seeck (1919: 244–6): Valentinian was in Trier to 20 June 374; he was at Robur
on 10 July and appears to have been at Mainz on 7 September. He had returned to
Trier by 3 December. Cf. below 309.
ConXict 365–94 285
6 November at the latest (there is the possibility that he was back by
the end of September).118 His main campaign probably took place in
August/September.119 This was after Rando’s raid and if, as generally
accepted, the Christian festival that helped Rando in his enterprise
was Easter, well after it.120 However, the raid still fell too late to have
occasioned Valentinian’s large expedition. Indeed, Ammianus seems
to say that it cut across preparations for war that were already well
under way.121
Therefore what did Rando’s raid amount to and what was its
signiWcance? Ammianus’ account provides more questions than
answers. Rando ’s light forc e is hardly lik ely to ha ve captured Mainz, still
one of the main military complexes of the Empire, consisting of the
Kastel bridgehead, the city, and the legionary base.122 What hap-
pened was probably not a major attack but a daring sortie by a
princeling aware of a temporary dislocation in the garrisoning of
the place (perhaps resulting from Valentinian’s military build-up)
and acting w ithout the knowledge or, at least, the oYcial permission
of his king.123 Rando may have come from a distance but, given his
knowledge of Mainz and its inhabitants, it is more likely that he was
from the territory around Wiesbaden.124 Ammianus mentions no
Roman reprisals for the action. This could well be another of his
omissions, but it may signify that punishment was left to others:
speciWcally, to king Macrianus or one of his dependants. If the
regiment of ‘Bucinobantes’ was recruited in the period 365–8,125
Macrianus must still have been regarded as friendly and dependable
and capable of performing imperial police work. On the other hand,
it may have been this incident that extended his sphere of inXuence
118 Seeck (1919: 230–4); Demandt (1972: 83–4).
119 Lorenz, S. (1997: 100): from early August.
120 Seeck (1919: 232): in 368, Easter Sunday fell on 20 April. Lorenz, S. (1997: 98)
prefers Whit Sunday, 8 June. Gutmann (1991: 24 n.105) puts Easter Sunday on 25
March.
121 As Lorenz, S. (1997: 113–15).
122 Ho
¨
ckmann (1986: 370); Lorenz, S. (1997: 97–8); Witschel (1999: 354); Carroll
(2001: Fig. 16).
123 Above 122.
124 So Lorenz, S. (1997: 113).
125 Above 170.
286 ConXict 365–94
to the Rhine, and reminded Valentinian of the vulnerability of the
Main valley and the Mainz bridgehead.126
Likewise, the assassination of Vithicabius is unlikely to have had
a direct connection with Rando—too far to the north—or the
368 campaign. The most likely reason for Vithicabius’ death is asso-
ciation with the raiding of 365/6.127 Rome must have ensured that, as
Vithicabius had replaced Vadomarius, he was replaced by another
ruler, very likely from another family which was subsequently
rewarded with the building of the Za
¨
hringer Burgberg. (Valentinian
was in the immediate vicinity of this site in mid-June 369.128)
Valentinian had gone out of his way to remove Vithicabius without
military action. While the change of re
´
gime in his former kingdom
was being managed, it would have made no sense to attack it.129
So where did Valentinian lead his troops? Modern historians have
found it diYcult to decide whether the Roman attack was north or
south of the Main. However, proponents of both views have sug-
gested that, wherever he was, Valentinian advanced relatively far: for
example, if north of the Main, to Glauberg, in Oberhessen; if south,
to Rottenburg-am-Neckar.130 A crossing of the Rhenum (Rhine) is
more easily read in the manuscript’s inhenum than one of the
Moenum (Main).131 It also suits Valentinian’s attitude towards
Macrianus, whom he never faced head-on in his own territory and
who was currently still well-regarded. From the distribution of hill-
sites,132 it seems likely that Valentinian crossed into or beyond the
Odenwald. His justiWcation is again likely to have been reprisals
against communities involved in the raiding of 365/6. He may have
crossed from Worms.133 A long-distance strike hardly squares with
126 Cf. above 115, 174, 190.
127 Above 273–6. Cf. Lorenz, S. (1997: 114) on Vithicabius as a driving force in
these attacks.
128 Above 102, below 289.
129 Contra Lorenz, S. (1997: 99, 111–12, 113–15).
130 Glauberg: Demandt (1989: 112 and n.14). Rottenburg: Nagl (1948: 2173);
Matthews (1989: 311); Gutmann (1991: 26–7). For discussion of these and other
identiWcations, based for the most part on supposing a long-distance campaign, see
Lorenz, S. (1997: 102, 108–10).
131 Lorenz, S. (1997: 99, 182).
132 Above 97.
133 As Lorenz, S. (1997: 100 n.184), though arguing against such a route.
ConXict 365–94 287