Encyclopedia of Russian History

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In 1868, two years before Bismarck completed

the unification of Germany through a war with

France, he ensured himself of Russian support.

Specifically, Alexander II promised that if Prussia

and France went to war, he would mobilize 100,000

men on the Austrian border to ensure that Vienna

could not intervene on the side of France. Thus Rus-

sia played an important role in the Prussian-led

unification of Germany. And Russia would pay a

high price for this in 1914–1918.

See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; GREAT NORTHERN

WAR; POLAND; SEVEN YEARS’ WAR; VIENNA, CON-

GRESS OF; WORLD WAR I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. (1958). A Diplomatic History of Eu-

rope since the Congress of Vienna. New York: Harper.

Bridge, F. R., and Bullen, Roger. (1980). The Great Pow-

ers and the European States System: 1815–1914. New

York: Longman.

Fay, Sidney. (1937). The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to

1786. New York: Holt.

Florinsky, Michael. (1953–55). Russia: A History and an

Interpretation. 2 Vols. New York: Macmillan.

Pflanze, Otto. (1990). Bismarck and the Development of

Germany, Vol. 1: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schroeder, Paul. (1994). The Transformation of European

Politics, 1763–1848. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Taylor, A. J. P. (1971). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,

1848–1918. New York: Oxford University Press.

UGH

HILLIPS

PRUTH RIVER, CAMPAIGN AND

TREATY OF

The Campaign of Pruth River was the Russian re-

sponse to a declaration of war by the Ottoman Em-

pire in November 1710. By June 1711, the Russian

army under the command of Field Marshal Count

Boris Sheremetev and Tsar Peter the Great arrived

at the Pruth River in Ottoman territory. The Rus-

sians had about 38,000 infantry and 14,000 cav-

alry. The Ottoman forces, led by Grand Vizier

Baltadji Mehmed Pasha, numbered about 120,000

infantry and 80,000 cavalry. Peter was counting

heavily on an uprising of the Balkan Christians in

Wallachia and Moldavia to redress the numerical

imbalance. However, Wallachian support did not

materialize, leaving the Russian armies without

crucial supplies and reinforcements.

The fighting raged from July 9–11. The Russ-

ian situation quickly became critical because Peter

had earlier sent the Russian cavalry to the Ottoman

rear for the purpose of capturing or destroying Ot-

toman supplies. The outnumbered Russian infantry

made a stand at Stanelishte on the banks of the

Pruth without cavalry support. The Russians were

completely surrounded by the larger Turkish force.

Short of food and water, and with no possibility

of breaking through the encircling Ottoman forces,

the Russians opened negotiations.

The Treaty of Pruth was signed July 12, 1711,

between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The

treaty dictated that Russia give up the fortresses of

Azov and Tagonrog, lose its permanent ambassador

in the Ottoman Empire, and dismantle both its forts

on the lower Dnieper and its Black Sea fleet. In ad-

dition, Russian troops were to leave Poland and

King Charles XII of Sweden would be permitted to

return to Sweden without Russian interference. In

return, the defeated Russian army received the right

to retreat unhindered to Russian territory. The ef-

fect of this treaty was to nullify the military gains

Peter had accrued against the Ottoman Empire

throughout his reign.

See also: PETER I; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Massie, Robert K. (1980). Peter the Great His Life and

World. New York: Ballantine.

EAN

K. B

ERGER

PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER

The Pskov Judicial Charter consists of 120 ar-

ticles. The preamble states that the Charter was

copied from charters of Grand Prince Alexander

and Prince Constantine. Most scholars believe the

Charter dates back to Alexander Mikhailovich of

Tver’ (prince of Pskov between 1327 and 1337).

Later additions were made by Alexander of Rostov

(governed sporadically between 1410 and 1434)

and Constantine Dmitrievich (served three times as

PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER

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prince between 1407 and 1414) with further redac-

tions made in 1462 and 1474–1475. The Charter

notes that the provisions were blessed by the priests

of the five cathedrals in a meeting of the assembly

(veche) in 1397, but the fifth cathedral was not

founded until 1462. In 1397 Novgorod and Pskov

concluded an “eternal peace,” and it is possible that

a redaction was made to formalize Pskov’s inde-

pendence, which existed de facto since 1348. Arti-

cle 108 stipulates that only the veche may make

changes in the Charter.

Princes played important roles in judicial pro-

ceedings, particularly for theft, and received judi-

cial fines for such crimes as murder. The prince,

mayor (posadnik), and Novgorodian archbishop all

had independent courts. The prince and the mayor

had to hold joint courts in the prince’s quarters and

not in the veche. The Charter consistently admon-

ishes the courts to kiss the cross, judge justly, pro-

tect the innocent, and condemn the guilty. Mayors,

before leaving office, must conclude all litigation

on their docket.

The Charter provides for the death penalty for

robbery within the central fortress, stealing horses,

treason, or arson. Execution is also mandated for

the third offense of theft within the posad, the area

outside the fortress. The Council of Lords (gospoda),

the highest administrative and judicial body, de-

cided conflicts over land and forests, and could di-

rect litigants to settle their dispute by duel (trial by

combat). Duels were utilized for a wide variety of

cases and could end in the death of one of the par-

ties. The old and the weak, the clergy, and women

could hire substitutes to fight a man, but duels

were permitted between women. Duels were also

common in later Muscovite law, despite the oppo-

sition of the Church to such practice.

Written and physical evidence and eyewitness

testimony were important, as was the kissing of

the cross and the giving of oaths, which carried

great weight in judicial proceedings. In property

disputes, four or five witnesses might be called to

testify, but absent such corroborating witnesses,

the taking of an oath was sufficient to exonerate a

defendant.

The Charter offered certain protections to

craftsmen, the poor, and women. A master crafts-

man had the right to sue for unpaid wages. Even

indentured laborers (singular, zakupen) and herds-

men could sue for their property or grain before

the Council of Lords. A widow whose husband died

without leaving a last will had the usufruct of the

property, unless she remarried. Women could in-

herit property and leave behind their own wills.

The Charter enjoined children to feed their parents,

or forfeit their rights to an inheritance.

The Charter gives particular attention to ten-

ant farmers (izorniki), who could contest the claims

of their lords over loans. Lords were required to

produce as many as four or five witnesses to sup-

port their claims. Tenant farmers, gardeners, and

fishermen could not leave their villages except on

St. Philip’s Fast (November 14), a provision that

anticipated the limitations imposed on peasant

movement in the Muscovite Law Code (sudebnik) of

1497. Conflicts over tenant farmers who left their

villages legally, or lords who terminated their con-

tracts with a farmer, were resolved by each re-

ceiving one-half of the harvest. Lords could recover

their loans by seizing the property of tenant farm-

ers who fled illegally. The Charter also provided for

inheritance rights of tenant farmers, while it pro-

tected a lord’s right to recover his loans.

The Charter outlines the duties of bailiffs and

their fee schedules. Court procedure required only

the two litigants to appear in court to speak for

themselves. Women and children, along with

monks, nuns, the elderly, and the deaf could have

spokesmen. Mayors in particular were forbidden

from supporting claimants in court.

The Charter also carefully delineates procedures

concerning suits over loans, collateral guarantees,

and interest payments, all of which reflect the com-

mercial character of the city. It allowed master

craftsmen to sue their apprentices over the cost of

their training. Creditors and debtors retained their

rights to sue one another over their agreements.

Many of these cases would appear before the Coun-

cil of Lords. There are also provisions regulating

brawls that broke out at feasts. Each fraternity

(bratchina), an association perhaps of craftsmen,

had jurisdiction over its own members.

See also: NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER; NOVGOROD THE

GREAT; POSADNIK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kaiser, Daniel, tr. and ed. (1992). The Laws of Russia, Se-

ries 1, Vol. 1: The Laws of Rus’, Tenth to Fifteenth Cen-

turies. Salt Lake City, UT: Charles Schlacks, Jr.

Vernadsky, George. (1969). Medieval Russian Laws. New

York: Norton.

AWRENCE

N. L

ANGER

PSKOV JUDICIAL CHARTER

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PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES

Public opinion research had a long and checkered

career in Soviet times, alternately encouraged then

frowned upon from the 1950s through the 1980s.

After the fall of the Communist Party and disso-

lution of the Soviet Union, attitudinal research be-

gan to play a much more important role in public

life in Russia (as elsewhere in the former USSR).

The Moscow-based All-Union Center for the Study

of Public Opinion (VTsIOM)—renamed the All-

Russian Center under the same acronym—continued

its existence, now as a quasi-state body. But the

monopoly held mostly by VTsIOM and sociologists

working at the Academy of Sciences (AN) had al-

ready been broken in the late 1980s with the es-

tablishment of new, private polling firms.

Among the first of these independent compa-

nies was Vox Populi (headed by Boris Grushin, for-

merly at VTsIOM); ROMIR (directed by Yelena

Bashkirova, formerly a researcher at the AN’s In-

stitute of Sociology [ISAN]); and CESSI (directed by

Vladimir Andreyenkov, former chief of methodol-

ogy at ISAN). The Center for Human Values—also

staffed by former ISAN researchers—and Moscow

State University also conduct public opinion re-

search.

As public opinion studies became more impor-

tant in the political and social life of the country,

these companies had to evolve as well. Their prac-

tices changed to meet world standards. Sampling

methodology, interviewing techniques, and data

workup all rose in quality to satisfy the demands of

both domestic and, increasingly, foreign clients. The

number of primary and secondary sampling units,

and sampling points, often tripled or quadrupled

in order to provide greater variance. Interviewing

through self-administered questionnaires—standard

in Soviet times—gave way to face-to-face interviews

in the homes or workplaces of respondents. Data en-

try and weighting improved substantially also.

Other offshoots of ISAN or VTsIOM, such as

INDEM, headed by Georgy Satarov, and the Public

Opinion Foundation (FOM), with Alexander Oslon

in charge, played a second role. As Russian presi-

dents Boris Yeltsin and especially Vladimir Putin

increasingly took public opinion into account in de-

ciding domestic policy, they turned to experts like

Satarov, Grushin, and Oslon for counsel.

Public opinion research in Russia today takes

many forms. Most common is the nationwide sur-

vey of adult Russians chosen by random sampling.

A typical sample size is 1,500 to 2,000 adults, but

some samples are larger. Other polls are of elites

only, with much smaller samples drawn from po-

litical leaders (in the government or in parties) at

the central and local level; state economic managers

and private entrepreneurs; military officers; media

figures; and members of the cultural and scientific

intelligentsia. A third form of research involves

(typically) 8 to 10 focus groups, in 3 to 5 cities;

these small groups (usually of 8 to 12 people) of

predetermined composition discuss in depth one or

two important issues in an agenda set by the re-

search firm and its client.

Many research firms disseminate their poll re-

sults widely—in newspapers or their own publica-

tions, through news agencies, and on television.

Even more important, several have their own Web

sites and put up current (and archived) poll results.

Unfortunately, much information about sample

sizes, dates of interviewing, and margins of sam-

pling error are not usually given in popular citations

of the research, severely limiting the usefulness of

the findings.

See also: DEMOCRATIZATION; ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET;

GLASNOST

TEVEN

A. G

RANT

PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH

(c. 1742–1775), Russian cossack rebel and imper-

ial impostor, leader of the Pugachevshchina.

Emelian Pugachev headed the mass uprising of

1773–1774 known as Pugachevshchina (loosely

translated as “Pugachev’s Dark Deeds”). The blood-

iest rebellion against central state authority and

serfdom between 1618 and the Revolutions of 1905

and 1917, it disrupted an immense territory and

momentarily threatened the Muscovite heartland.

Thousands of individuals from disparate social

groups and ethnicities challenged Catherine II’s

legitimacy and aggravated international tension

from prolonged Russo-Turkish hostilities. Many

suspected upper-class, religious, or foreign inspira-

tion behind the upheaval, widely reported by the

European press. Particularly provocative was Pu-

gachev’s impersonation of Peter III (1728–1762),

which recalled Catherine’s usurpation of power.

The revolt originated among the Yaik (Ural)

cossacks, a frontier “warrior democracy” that re-

PUGACHEV, EMELIAN IVANOVICH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

sisted pressure from state expansion. Disputes over

the elected leadership led to government suppres-

sion of a cossack mutiny in January 1772, which

left the community divided and resentful. Pu-

gachev, a Don cossack fugitive, visited the area in

late 1772. A typical primitive rebel, Pugachev was

illiterate and his biography obscure. His imposture

was not original; he was one of some seven pre-

tenders since 1764. Shrewd, energetic, and experi-

enced in military affairs, he was also charismatic.

It is unclear whether he initiated renewed revolt or

was persuaded to lead it by the cossacks.

About sixty rebels issued a first manifesto in

late September 1773, presumably dictated by Pu-

gachev or cossack scribes, calling on cossacks,

Kalmyks, and Tatars to serve Peter III in pursuit of

glory, land, and material reward. The rebels focused

on frontier freedom or autonomy, but Peter III’s

name lent national stature to the burgeoning

movement. Within weeks their forces exceeded two

thousand besieging the fortress of Orenburg and

spreading the revolt into the Ural Mountains with

specific appeals to diverse social and ethnic groups.

Turkic Bashkirs joined in force as the regional re-

bellion evolved into three chronological-territorial

phases.

The Orenburg-Yaitsk phase lasted from Octo-

ber 1773 until April 1774, when the rebel sieges of

Orenburg, Yaitsk, and Ufa were broken, Pugachev

barely escaping. Shielded by spring roadlessness,

the rebels replenished ranks while fleeing north-

ward through the Urals. This second phase culmi-

nated in the plunder of Kazan on July 23 before

the horde was defeated and scattered. With rebel

whereabouts unknown, panic seized Moscow, but

news of peace with the Turks soon allayed fears.

Pugachev fled southward down the Volga, ex-

terminating the nobility and government offi-

cials—the third and final phase. This rampage

sparked many local outbreaks sometimes called

“Pugachevshchina without Pugachev.” The main

rebel force was decisively defeated south of Tsarit-

syn on September 5. To save themselves, some cos-

sacks turned Pugachev over to tsarist authorities

at Yaitsk on September 26, 1774. After lengthy in-

terrogation he was beheaded and then quartered in

Moscow on January 21, 1775. To erase reminders

of the revolt, Yaitsk, the river, the cossacks, and

Pugachev’s birthplace were all renamed, his wife

and children exiled. Late in life Alexander Pushkin

(1799–1837) popularized Pugachev in history and

fiction. “The Captain’s Daughter” became an in-

stant classic, famously declaiming “God save us

from seeing a Russian revolt, senseless and merci-

less.” But agrarian anarchist dissidents found in-

spiration in Pugachev for grassroots rebellion. After

1917 the Soviet regime endorsed Pugachev’s fame,

recasting the revolt as a peasant war against feu-

dal society and autocratic government.

See also: CATHERINE II; PEASANTRY; PETER III; PUSHKIN,

ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, John T. (1969). Autocratic Politics in a Na-

tional Crisis: The Imperial Russian Government and Pu-

gachev’s Revolt, 1773–1775. Bloomington: Indiana

University Press.

Alexander, John T. (1973). Emperor of the Cossacks: Pu-

gachev and the Frontier Jacquerie of 1773–1775.

Lawrence, KS: Coronado Press.

Pushkin, Alexander. (1983). “The Captain’s Daughter”

and “A History of Pugachev.” In Alexander Pushkin:

Complete Prose Fiction, ed. Paul Debreczeny. Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press.

Raeff, Marc. (1970). “Pugachev’s Rebellion.” In Precondi-

tions for Revolution in Early Modern Europe, eds. Robert

Forster and Jack P. Greene. Baltimore: Johns Hop-

kins University Press.

OHN

T. A

LEXANDER

PUGO, BORIS KARLOVICH

(1937–1991), Party official involved in the 1991

coup attempt against Boris Yeltsin.

Born in Latvia, Boris Karlovich Pugo was a

Communist Party and state functionary whose ca-

reer was shaped by Leonid Brezhnev’s “mature so-

cialism.” This was a time of ossification in the

leadership and mounting economic crisis that gave

way to attempts to reform the system from within

under the direction of Yuri Andropov, former head

of the KGB, and then, after a brief interval, to more

systemic reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev. Like

many leaders of the Brezhnev era, Pugo began his

career as an official in the Komsomol. His career

was closely connected with Soviet power in his na-

tive Latvia, where he served as head of the local

KGB and later as first secretary of the Latvian Com-

munist Party.

Pugo came to prominence with the advent of

glasnost and perestroika. In 1988 he was appointed

chairman of the powerful CPSU Control Commis-

PUGO, BORIS KARLOVICH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

sion in Moscow, a post he held for two years. This

was a time of struggle within the Communist

Party, for Gorbachev’s effort to use it as a vehicle

for reform had failed and only managed to split the

Party along pro- and anti-reform lines. In the Baltic

republics even the local Communist parties were

joining in the call for independence by the summer

of 1990. In December, Gorbachev appointed Pugo

minister of internal affairs.

The appointment came at a time of crisis for

perestroika. There were increasing calls for inde-

pendence in the Baltic republics. Opponents of reform

in Moscow, such as the “Black Colonel” Viktor Alk-

snis, were calling for a crackdown against anti-

Soviet elements, especially in the Baltic republics.

Hardliners argued that the impending war between

the United States and Iraq would distract interna-

tional opinion from a Soviet crackdown. As one of

his first acts as minister of internal affairs, Pugo

took a leading role in the attempt to reassert So-

viet power in the Baltic republics. The crackdown

in Vilnius, poorly organized and indecisive, collapsed

in the face of popular resistance in the republics

and Gorbachev’s failure to support it publicly.

In August 1991 Pugo joined in the desperate

attempt by the State Committee for the State of

Emergency to remove Gorbachev and prevent the

approval of a new union treaty that would bring

about a radical shift in power from all-union in-

stitutions to the constituent republics, especially

the Russian Federation under its popularly elected

president, Boris Yeltsin. The so-called putsch in

which the committee attempted to seize power was

poorly organized and badly prepared. Within a

matter of days it collapsed. Boris Pugo committed

suicide on August 22, together with his wife,

Valentina. His suicide note contained a brief expla-

nation of his actions: “I put too much trust in peo-

ple. I have lived my life honestly.”

See also: AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; SOYUZ FACTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albats, Yevgeniia. (1994). The State Within a State: The

KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and Fu-

ture. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

Aron, Leon. (2000). Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life. New

York: St. Martin’s Press.

Lieven, Anatol. (1993). The Baltic Revolution: Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, and the Path to Independence. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Medevev, Roy. (2002). “Yesteryear: Three Suicides.”

Moscow News No. 023 (August 21).

ACOB

W. K

IPP

PURGES, THE GREAT

The term Great Purges does not accurately designate

the chaotic chain of events to which it is applied

and was never used by the Soviet authorities. The

regime tried to cover up the large-scale violence it

had deployed between the summer of 1936 and the

end of 1938. Although scholars apply the term

purges to this period, many of them agree that the

appellation is misleading. It implies that the Bol-

shevik attempts to eliminate the system’s presumed

enemies were a carefully planned, faithfully exe-

cuted series of punitive operations, and this was far

from being the case. The terror of 1936 to 1938

emerged without clear design—it targeted ill-de-

fined categories of people and it proceeded haphaz-

ardly. Although purges victimized around 1.5

million individuals, they did not succeed in ridding

the country of the problems they were supposed

to stamp out.

PURGES, THE GREAT

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Interior Minister Boris Pugo bows his head during the press

conference held by the leaders of the August 1991 coup. He

committed suicide days later. © S

HEPARD

HERBELL

/CORBIS SABA

FEAR OF OPPOSITION

The Bolsheviks were convinced that the USSR was

threatened by internal adversaries. They never hes-

itated to attribute discontent among the people to

instigation by irreconcilably hostile elements, and

they frequently did not even trust fellow militants.

In the course of the 1930s, failure was increasingly

imputed to deliberate sabotage.

There was barely a sector of life where the

regime’s initiatives succeeded. Collectivized agricul-

ture did not feed the country properly, industry did

not work according to plans, the Communist Party

and the state administration did not carry out im-

portant directives. Peasants on collective farms did

their best to avoid work, officeholders in the coun-

tryside vacillated between compromising with

rural ways and taking brutal measures, workers

were hard to discipline, managers invented ways

to seem to be doing their jobs, officials in all insti-

tutions eagerly covered up for incompetent col-

leagues and the true state of affairs. The Bolsheviks

were unwilling to acknowledge that the masses

were only reacting to the outcome of the regime’s

policies, and top decision-makers were unable to

grasp that subordinates were following their own

example of not speaking out about inextricable

issues, leaving problems unsolved, blaming whip-

ping boys for their own miscalculations, and lav-

ishing praise on achievements that were more than

dubious. The elite never came close to recognizing

that the monopoly of the Party-state in nearly

every domain left no room for checks and balances,

and that attempts to improve the situation could

not bring results as long as they were entrusted to

the very establishment whose practices had to be

corrected. The leaders could not see that the regime’s

difficulties were part-and-parcel of the system and

could not be overcome without changing it com-

pletely.

Unwilling to accept responsibility for the sys-

tem’s failures, the Bolsheviks intensified the search

for hidden enemies. Even top leaders were convinced

that intractable problems were due to subversion.

They projected the secretive character of their own

dealings onto controlled aspects of the Party and

state apparatus, and imagined conspiratorial in-

trigues behind the USSR’s accumulating troubles.

For Bolsheviks, there was no question but that the

remnants of the prerevolutionary elite, adherents

of defunct parties, and former kulaks represented

a threat. They also suspected erstwhile opposition-

ists of disloyalty. Many of the Trotskyites and

other deviationists of the 1920s had the same rev-

olutionary credentials as their persecutors and thus

were seen as dangerous rivals for legitimate au-

thority. Josef V. Stalin feared that they might try

to claim power if the situation worsened.

Although thousands of deviationists remained

in the Communist Party until 1937, many others

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Workers in a Leningrad turbine shop listen to a report on the trial and execution of Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and fourteen

others convicted of plotting against Stalin. © H

ULTON

-D

EUTSCH

OLLECTION

/CORBIS

were expelled during membership screenings in

1935 and 1936. Starting in 1935, secret directives

instructed the NKVD to detect their terrorist inten-

tions, even if they were in exile and detention. A

show trial highlighted the terrorist designs of the

deviationist leaders Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory E.

Zinoviev in August 1936, and this date is seen as

the starting point of the Great Purges.

THE PURGES BEGIN

The trial of Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory Y. Zi-

noviev and subsequent directives from the Central

Committee triggered a vigilance campaign within

the Party. The campaign targeted not only the op-

position, but also Party members who had criti-

cized the Party or whose work and lifestyle brought

discredit to the Bolsheviks. The failures of agricul-

ture, construction, industry, and other branches of

the economy provided a legion of opportunities to

denounce workers and managers. Poor results, er-

rors, and accidents were reclassified as intentional

sabotage. There were plenty of motives to level

accusations of poor discipline, since the campaign

came during a severe crop failure and in the wake

of a Stakhanovist drive that had disorganized pro-

duction and undermined workplace safety. Leading

cadres were reluctant to dig too deeply into condi-

tions in their workplaces, and it was safer to sin-

gle out alleged Trotskyites as scapegoats, for the

Party already had a tendency to blame them for

nearly every shortcoming.

Sabotage is more accurately described as the

regime’s daily routine. Inefficiency, abuses, and

heavy-handed handling of subordinates and the pop-

ulation disrupted the proper functioning of the Party,

the state, and the national economy. The charge of

oppositionist schemes was more problematic. It

was used to justify the elimination of imprisoned

Party members who had been dissidents in the

1920s. It was also used to stigmatize anyone who

could be blamed for the regime’s shortcomings

without having to indicate any fault other than al-

leged sympathy, association, or even simple ac-

quaintance with Trotskyites. Insinuations of this

sort obscured Party efforts to correct official mis-

conduct, facilitated scapegoating, and deflected

blame onto the most vulnerable cadres. But there

was hardly any other feasible way to dissociate the

regime from its misdeeds and to suggest that the

culprits were foreign or hostile to the Soviet ideal.

The scapegoats singled out in this way were

made to answer for the defects of the Soviet sys-

tem. Since many officeholders were at least partly

responsible for the difficult living and working con-

ditions imposed on them, the masses were not im-

pervious to the argument that their superiors were

enemies of the people. Quite a few citizens were

ready to take up this argument against unpopular

bosses as a way of venting their discontent and

avenging past mistreatment and humiliations.

The leaders of the purges often emphasized that

the alleged enemies were Party members in order

to exploit tensions within the Party, in government

agencies, and in other administrations. A show trial

in January 1937 abundantly featured charges of

wrecking and treason against Yuri L. Piatakov,

deputy commissar of heavy industry and former

member of the Central Committee, and other

prominent figures in economic management and

foreign affairs. Those who engineered this attack

on leading Communists also tried to mobilize sup-

port in the lower ranks of the Party. The plenum

of the Central Committee in February and March

1939 decided to reelect officeholders by secret bal-

lot. It also decided to use the secret ballot at forth-

coming elections for the Supreme Soviet, where, for

the first time since the Revolution, all citizens were

supposed to vote and have the right to be run for

office. High officials at the plenum warned that

subversive elements were likely to take advantage

of the election campaign. They were aware of the

discontent among the masses that had surfaced in

public discussions about the recently adopted con-

stitution, and especially that some people were

attempting to invoke their constitutionally guar-

anteed rights to reclaim confiscated property and

to freely practice religion.

The Party elections were expected to eliminate

disruptive practices and boost the regime’s reputa-

tion by replacing unruly and unpopular cadres. The

targeted members did everything possible to ensure

their reelection, because fallen communists risked

jail—or worse. Networks of mutual aid were set in

motion to rescue colleagues whose defeat would

have endangered the position of everyone connected

to them. While many targeted communists were

saved, others were irreparably damaged when the

police stepped in. By the summer of 1937, the win-

ners of the intra-Party elections increasingly faced

charges of having deceived the Party faithful. By

that time, Party members alarmed by the increas-

ing popular unrest had convinced the top leader-

ship that it was necessary to launch an extensive

purge. The crackdown came suddenly. No arrange-

ments had been made to prepare concentration

PURGES, THE GREAT

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

camps for the arrival of several hundred thousands

of prisoners.

Seen as a preventive strike before the elections

to the Supreme Soviet, the massive operation tar-

geted a wide spectrum of so-called class enemies:

kulaks, members of dissolved parties, ecclesiastics,

sectarians, recidivist criminals. Moscow ordered the

regional administrations to shoot, imprison, or de-

port specific quotas of enemies. Three-member

boards (troikas) handed down summary sentences.

This operation had hardly begun when another ter-

ror campaign was initiated. The new campaign was

ostensibly aimed at ethnic Poles accused of being

agents of the Polish government, but it was soon

extended to other minorities, most of whom were

not even mentioned in the central directives. No

limits were set on the number of victims of this

cleansing. Both operations were expected to end in

December 1937, on the eve of the elections.

At first glance, it was easy to identify people on

the basis of their past activities or political affilia-

tions, especially former oppositionists. Nonetheless,

it was impossible to know what constituted devia-

tion because the term applied to attitudes as well as

behaviors. In the same way, there was no guaran-

tee that only declassed people and believers were dis-

satisfied with the regime. Moreover, there was no

guarantee that potential subversion by foreign gov-

ernments could be countered by massacring their

ethnic kin.

OUTCOME

The Great Purges resulted in chaos. About 100,000

Party members were arrested, often tortured to con-

fess to concocted charges, and sent before the firing

squad or to camps. But it soon became evident that

many of them were victims of overzealous officials,

some of whom were themselves later purged. The

mass terror took almost a year more than projected.

This was partly because zealous cadres sought to

demonstrate their vigilance by requesting new quo-

tas from Moscow for additional arrests and shoot-

ings. The names of purported accomplices were

frequently obtained by cruelly mistreating the de-

tainees. People were sometimes punished because of

a foreign-sounding name or simply because anyone

could be accused of being a German, Japanese, Lat-

vian, or Greek spy. The campaign took on a life of

its own. Even when it was halted in November 1938,

scheduled executions continued in some regions.

More than 680,000 people were killed in 1937

and 1938, and about 630,000 were deported to

Siberia. Nevertheless, two years after the purge the

number of persons listed as politically suspect by

the secret police exceeded 1,200,000. But official

misconduct, incompetence, and networks of soli-

darity did not change, despite the massive change

in the leading personnel. The national economy and

the administration suffered from the loss of valu-

able specialists, and the hunt for enemies in the

army decapitated the high command and decimated

the officer corps. Many of the victims were sin-

cerely devoted to the principles of Bolshevism.

The Great Purges are usually associated with

Joseph V. Stalin and his police chiefs, Nikolai I.

Yezhov and Lavrenty P. Beria. But their true ori-

gin lay in the Soviet regime’s inability to utilize

modern techniques for managing institutions, po-

litical processes, and social relations. The purges

showed that indiscriminate campaigns, police op-

erations, and violence would play an important role

as policy instruments and take priority over eco-

nomic and administrative incentives to enlist pop-

ular support. They also showed the disastrous

consequences of the system’s lack of independent

watchdog agencies that could, if necessary, restrain

the Party-state’s actions. The intent behind the

purges bore some resemblance to social engineer-

ing, but the sociopolitical framework led to an out-

come that had little in common with the original

aims.

See also: BERIA, LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH; GULAG; KOMANEV,

LEV BORISOVICH; SHOW TRIALS; STALIN, JOSEF VIS-

SARIONOVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YEZHOV,

NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; ZINOVIEV, GRIGORY YEVSEYEVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chase, William J. (2001). Enemies Within the Gates? The

Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Conquest, Robert. (1990). The Great Terror: A Reassess-

ment. New York: Oxford University Press.

Getty, J. Arch. (1985). Origins of the Great Purges: The So-

viet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938. Cam-

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Getty, J. Arch. (1999). The Road to Terror: Stalin and the

Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Getty, J. Arch. (2002). “’Excesses Are Not Permitted’:

Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late

1930s.” Russian Review 2:113–138.

Getty, J. Arch, and Manning, Roberta T., eds. (1993).

Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press.

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Siegelbaum, Lewis, and Sokolov, Andrei. (2000). Stalin-

ism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

ABOR

T. R

ITTERSPORN

PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

(1799–1837), considered Russia’s greatest poet, au-

thor of lyrics, plays, prose, and the novel in verse

Eugene Onegin.

Of the Russian poets, none is mentioned by

Russians with more reverence than Alexander

Sergeyevich Pushkin. His work has been set to

opera by Mikhail Glinka, Modest Mussorgsky,

Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, and Peter Tchaikovsky;

his lyrics have been memorized by young school-

children throughout the former Soviet Union; and

leading poets of the twentieth century, such as

Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, and Alexan-

der Blok, emphasized his impact on their work and

lives. Pushkin may indeed have opened the door for

the later part of the so-called Golden Age of Russ-

ian literature. At the 1880 ceremony following the

unveiling of the Pushkin statue in Moscow, Ivan

Turgenev credited Pushkin with giving birth to the

Russian literary language; Fyodor Dostoyevsky, in

an impassioned, near-hysterical speech, declared

Pushkin superior to Shakespeare.

Such reverence is certainly merited, but rever-

ence has its dangers. The author of the novel in

verse Eugene Onegin, the historical play in verse Boris

Godunov, the cryptic yet fluid “Belkin Tales,” the

brilliant “Little Tragedies” (four plays in blank

verse, three of which deal with crimes of passion)

the stylized folktale “Ruslan and Lyudmila,” the

tense, fatalistic story “Queen of Spades,” and hun-

dreds of lyrics, a master of style who absorbed and

transformed European literary traditions and gave

Russian folklore an unprecedented poetic expres-

sion, Pushkin attained quasi-mythological status

in the twentieth century, becoming a hero figure

for the Soviet establishment and dissidents alike.

Yet Pushkin was a complex figure: profoundly soli-

tary yet immersed in the social life of the aristoc-

racy; devoted to his friends but easily incited to

violence. His female characters, such as Tatiana in

Eugene Onegin, have remarkable depth and soul, but

he himself was primarily attracted to physical

beauty in women, and brought about his own early

death partly on account of this. These contradic-

tions in his character, while perhaps limiting his

literary offering, account in part for its richness;

his work is both immediate and layered, both sin-

cere and wry.

Pushkin was born in Moscow in 1799. His fa-

ther Sergei descended from boyars, one of whom,

mentioned in Pushkin’s Boris Godunov, had been

a supporter of the False Dmitry during the Time

of Troubles. Pushkin’s mother Nadezhda was

the granddaughter of Abram Gannibal, an African

slave. Abram had been brought from Africa as a

gift for Peter I, who favored him and sent him to

Paris for military education. With the accession of

Elizabeth to the throne, Abram rose through the

ranks to the status of general, but was retired fol-

lowing Elizabeth’s death. Pushkin took pride in

his African heritage, referring to it often in his

lyrics. Abram’s daughter Mariya, Pushkin’s grand-

mother, not only played the role of surrogate par-

ent to Pushkin, whose own parents gave him little

attention or affection, but also recounted family

history, to be reflected later in Pushkin’s unfinished

novel The Blackamoor of Peter the Great.

Pushkin’s parents embraced the lifestyle of the

aristocracy, though they could not afford it. Sergei,

an adept conversationalist with a vast knowledge

of French literature, invited some of Russia’s lead-

ing literary figures to the household, including the

historian Nikolai Karamzin and poets Konstantin

Batyushkov and Vasily Zhukovsky. Pushkin and

his sister and brother grew up surrounded by

literati. However, Pushkin’s childhood was unhappy.

Pushkin was the least favored child, perhaps in part

because of his African features and awkward man-

ner. Only his grandmother and his nanny Arina

Rodionova nurtured him emotionally; the latter

told him folk tales and entertained him with gos-

sip, and served later as the model for Tatiana’s

nanny in Eugene Onegin.

In 1811 Pushkin’s parents sent him to board-

ing school, the Lyceum, newly established by

Alexander I in a wing of his palace in Tsarskoye

Selo. There Pushkin received a first-rate education

(though he was not a stellar student) in a relaxed

and nurturing environment, and formed friend-

ships that would prove lifelong, with classmates

Ivan Pushchin, Anton Delvig, Wilhelm Kyukhel-

becker, and others. While at the Lyceum, Pushkin

enjoyed a social life filled with pranks and light ro-

mantic encounters, and he amazed his teachers and

classmates with his verse. The aged poet Gavryl

Derzhavin, upon hearing Pushkin recite his “Rec-

ollections in Tsarskoye Selo” during an examina-

PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tion in 1815, recognized sixteen-year-old Pushkin

as his poetic successor.

Pushkin graduated from the Lyceum in 1817.

From there he moved to Petersburg, where he spent

his days sleeping late, taking walks, and attending

parties in the evenings. Erratic and excitable, he

made public scenes at the theater on several occa-

sions. He frequented houses of prostitutes and had

a number of romantic affairs. He was a member

of the literary circle “The Green Lamp,” whose

members, including Pushchin and Delvig, were also

involved in secret political activities aimed at re-

form. Pushkin was not invited to join in the secret

meetings, but he did write lyrics challenging the

tsarist autocracy, including his ode “Freedom”

(1817), “Noelles” (1818), and “The Village” (1819).

The lyrics caused a stir; Pushkin was ordered to ap-

pear before Count Miloradovich, governor-general

of St. Petersburg. Following that meeting in 1820,

the tsar sent Pushkin into exile in the form of mil-

itary service in South Russia under Lieutenant Gen-

eral Inzov.

Pushkin’s exile was in many ways pleasant. He

befriended General Rayevsky and his family and

traveled with them around Caucasus and Crimea.

He then spent nearly three years in Kishinev, where

he wrote the verse tales “The Prisoner of the

Caucasus” (1820–1821), “The Bandit Brothers”

(1821–1822), and “The Fountain of Bakchisaray”

(1821–1823). In addition, he wrote the scathing,

mock-religious “Gavriiliada” (1821) and began his

novel in verse Eugene Onegin (1823–1831). During

this time Pushkin was captivated by Lord George

Gordon Byron, particularly his Childe Harolde.

In July 1823 he was transferred to Odessa,

where he had a lively social life, attended theater,

and had affairs with two married women. He fin-

ished “The Fountain of Bakchisaray” and chapter

one of Eugene Onegin, and began “The Gypsies.”

From 1824 to 1826 he was exiled to his mother’s

estate of Mikhailovskoye in North Russia. There he

finished “The Gypsies” and wrote the historical play

in verse Boris Godunov, “Graf Nulin,” and chapter

two of Eugene Onegin.

In November 1825, while Pushkin was still in

Mikhailovskoye, Alexander I died. The confusion

over the successor provided the opportunity for se-

cret political societies (called the Decembrists after

the event) to rise up in armed rebellion against the

aristocracy before Nicholas was proclaimed em-

peror. The uprising took place in Petersburg in De-

cember 1825 and involved poet Kondraty Ryleev,

Colonel Pavel Pestel, Pushchin, Kyukhelbecker, and

others. Pushkin, while not present or involved, was

implicated, as some Decembrists quoted his poetry

in support of their movement. Ryleev and Pestel

were sentenced to death, Pushchin and Kyukhel-

becker to hard labor.

In the spring of 1826 Pushkin petitioned Tsar

Nicholas I for a release from exile. He met with the

tsar and was granted release, but restrictions con-

tinued as before. He was under constant scrutiny,

and his most minute activities were reported to the

tsar.

In 1829 Pushkin met and proposed to Natalia

Goncharova, a society beauty. They were formally

engaged on May 18, 1830. Pushkin was given per-

mission to publish Boris Godunov. In September

1830 Pushkin went to Boldino in east-central Rus-

sia to make wedding arrangements. Because of the

outbreak of asiatic cholera, he was forced to stay

three months there. This time was the most pro-

ductive of his life. As part of an overall transition

from poetry to prose, he wrote the magnificent

Tales of Belkin, a collection of stories in taut, swift-

moving prose, revolving around mistaken identity

PUSHKIN, ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Portrait of Alexander Pushkin. T

ETTMAN

RCHIVE