
Transport 309
restrict output, both of which are likely to limit the economic benefits
of a transport system to a small group of operators. On the other hand,
public goods risk being underprovided for the opposite reason: the bene-
fits are too widely dispersed (that is, social utility exceeds private utility),
so that the private costs exceed the benefits to the transport company. In
practice, as we shall see, transport is not a pure form of natural monopoly
or public good, but rather a complex hybrid of both features. Finally, is-
sues of co-ordination and standardisation, critical for a complex network
industry, are often not easily handled without some form of intervention.
Therefore, governments must decide how the costs and benefits of
improved transport systems are to be distributed among different in-
terest groups. Three direct interests are the providers of infrastructure,
transport service operators (carriers) and service users (passengers, mer-
chandise owners). Vertical integration, for example the ownership by oil
companies of tanker fleets, helps to reconcile these groups but also ex-
tends marketpower.Indirect benefits from transport investment (known
to economists as positive externalities) flow more widely through society,
and thus reinforce official interest in the industry.
Road maintenance before the turnpike trusts illustrates an undersup-
plied public good, since the costs were borne locally and collectively
within the parish but the beneficiaries were largely private, including
through-travellers from beyond the locality. The introduction of turn-
pike trusts privatised road use and transferred much of its cost to the
user. By mitigating the risks of underinvestment associated with public
goods, this change provided a firm basis for higher optimal standards of
road maintenance and held out the prospect of the construction of new
highways through the support of an income stream from toll charges.
The trusts themselves were non-profit bodies in contrast to the for-profit
joint-stock companies adopted by canal builders and, later, railway com-
panies. They were initially viewed as supplementing local labour services
in road maintenance and thus a more limited role was envisaged than
themajor new capital expenditures of canal and railway construction.
While providing a solution to underinvestment in roads, the new pol-
icy adversely affected local groups who were accustomed to traditional
free right of access. They perceived the change, sometimes negatively, as
thereplacement of a communal institution based on custom and tradi-
tion with a cash payment based on a private market transaction (Albert
1983: 36). Popular unrest occurred among colliers and industrial workers
in the West Country, Wales and the West Riding of Yorks, sometimes end-
ing in the destruction or avoidance of tollgates and assaults on collectors
(Albert 1983: 35; O’Brien 1994: 219). Opposition gradually subsided when
thebeneficial impact was more clearly understood and concessions were
obtained for local users.
Asystemoftollsexisted on many inland waterways before 1750,
charged by empowered local trustees or commissioners, sometimes as
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