including Riina himself, were arrested but not before they had managed to organize the
murder of the family members of many pentiti as well as the policemen and magistrates
responsible for investigative success (see Falcone).
Political and public responses
The mafia’s entanglement with Italy’s political, economic and judicial institutions has
long undermined attempts to extirpate it. Before 1945, the most direct effort at combat
was made by Mussolini whose prefect Cesare Mori, despatched to Palermo in 1925,
arrested many mafiosi but could not eliminate the social and economic circumstances
which continued to produce them. Thereafter, apart from the institution of a
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry prompted by the murder of seven policemen in
1963, little consideration was given to a serious anti-mafia strategy Only when the
systematic murder of politicians (Mattarella, La Torre), policemen (Dalla Chiesa,
Cassarà) and judges (Costa, Terranova, Chinnici, Livatino, Falcone, Borsellino) began
after 1980—and political terrorism ceased to monopolize public concern with
violence—did mafia come to be generally seen as a national, rather than a merely
Sicilian, problem.
The resulting state initiatives were inspired by the determination to identify and isolate
mafiosi ever more rigorously. Laws passed in 1982 and 1992 gave greater precision and
wider application to the definition of specifically mafia crime, and efforts to create new
and more effective institutions of prevention and repression were made. In 1982 a High
Commissioner of Anti-Mafia Affairs was appointed, but the position was ineffective and
soon replaced by a Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (National Antimafia Bureau). A
permanent Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was also established to co-ordinate
public action, and vastly more incisive judicial investigations were achieved by the
creation of specialist teams of local magistrates for all mafia cases. Serious attempts were
then made to sever the links between mafia and politics. In 1991 the Minister of the
Interior was empowered to dissolve local councils suspected of infiltration by mafia
interests—a power invoked in ninety-one cases between 1991 and 1996—and extortion
of votes was made a specific mafia offence in 1992. Measures to prevent mafiosi
competing for public works contracts, using banks to launder money and accumulating
wealth from suspect activities were passed: between 1982 and 1996, property worth more
than 6 billion lire was impounded (Violante, 1997:161). Defection was also encouraged:
reductions in sentences for mafiosi who turned state’s evidence and witness protection
programmes for their families became available in 1991, and covered about 6,000 people
in the mid-1990s.
As state commitment to repression became more visible, so popular anti-mafia protest
increased. In 1984, in revulsion against the growing number and importance of mafia
victims, a coordinating group for grassroots initiatives was formed in Palermo, where an
outspoken anti-mafia mayor, Leoluca Orlando, was elected by landslide in four
successive elections between 1985 and 1997. The party La Rete (The Network), which he
had created in 1993, became a significant force in Sicilian politics. Women, including the
widows of victims and the mothers of children destroyed by involvement in the mafioso-
run drug trade, were a novel and powerful presence in anti-mafia mobilization. Even the
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