
22 
Chapter 1 
that long-term rates tend to be higher than those predicted by expected 
future short-term rates. This phenomenon is referred to as liquidity 
preference theory. It leads to long-term rates being higher than short-term 
rates most of the time. Even when the market expects a small decline in 
short-term rates, liquidity preference theory is likely to cause long-term 
rates to be higher than short-term rates. 
Many banks now have sophisticated systems for monitoring the deci-
sions being made by customers so that, when they detect small differences 
between the maturities of the assets and liabilities being chosen, they can 
fine-tune the rates they offer. Sometimes derivatives such as interest rate 
swaps are also used to manage their exposure. The result is that net interest 
income is very stable and does not lead to significant risks. However, as 
indicated in Business Snapshot 1.2, this has not always been the case. 
SUMMARY 
An important general principle in finance is that there is a trade-off 
between risk and return. Higher expected returns can usually be achieved 
only by taking higher risks. Investors should not, in theory, be concerned 
with risks they can diversify away. The extra return they demand should 
be for the amount of nondiversifiable systematic risk they are bearing. 
For companies, investment decisions are more complicated. Compan-
ies are not in general as well diversified as investors and survival is an 
Business Snapshot 1.2 Expensive Failures of Financial Institutions in the US 
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Savings and Loans (S&Ls) in the 
United States failed to manage interest rate risk well. They tended to take 
short-term deposits and make long-term fixed-rate mortgages. As a result they 
were seriously hurt by interest rate increases in 1966, 1969 70, 1974. and the 
killer in 1979-82. S&Ls were protected by government guarantees. Over 1,700 
failed in the 1980s. A major reason for the failures was their inadequate 
interest rate risk management. The total cost to the US taxpayer of the failures 
has been estimated to be between $100 and $500 billion. 
The largest bank failure in the US, Contintental Illinois, can also be 
attributed to a failure to manage interest rale risks well. During the period 
1980 to 1983 its assets (i.e., loans) with maturities over a year totaled between 
$7 billion and $8 billion, whereas its liabilities (i.e., deposits) with maturities 
over a year were between $1.4 billion and $2.5 billion. Continental failed in 
1984 and was the subject of an expensive government bailout.