Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1805]
THE
THIRD
COALITION. 205
From
this time all direct
communication ceased
between the
courts.
Bayneval,
whom Hedouville
had
left
as
his
charge-
d'affaires,
was
also
recalled,
and d'Oubril
left
Paris in
August.
Alexander
had not waited
for this
opportunity
to
concert
nieans
for
setting
bounds to
Bonaparte's
ambition.
By
the
declarations
interchanged
between
the
courts of St.
Peters-
burg
and Berlin
(May
3rd
and
24th),
it was
agreed
that
they
should
not allow the French
troops
in
Germany
to
go
beyond
the frontier
of Hanover
;
and that should this
happen,
each
of the two
powers
should
employ
40,000
men to
repel
such
an
attempt.
A convention
was also
signed
between
Bussia
and Austria before
the end
of the
year,
and
they
agreed
to
set
on
foot an
army
of
350,000
men.
England,
under the
administration of
Mr.
Pitt,
added
her
strength
to these
com-
binations,
and
united the several
powers
in
a
third
coalition
for the
purpose
of
wresting
from
Prance
the
countries
sub-
dued
by
it
since
1792,
reducing
that
kingdom
within
its
ancient
limits,
and
finally
introducing
into
Europe
a
gene-
ral
system
of
public
right.
The
plan
was the same
as
that
which
ten
years
afterwards was executed
by
the
Grand
Alliance
;
it failed in
1805,
because the
participation
of
Prussia,
on which the allies
had
reckoned,
was
withheld
from
the most
ignoble
motives.
The
negotiation
of the
several
treaties connected with
the
coalition,
occupied
the
greater part
of
the
year
1805.
By
the
treaty
of
St.
Petersburg
(August
11th)
between Great
Britain and
Russia,
it
was
agreed
that Alexander
should
make
another
attempt
for
arranging
matters with
Bonaparte,
to
prevent
the
Avar. The
Bussian minister
Novosiltzof
was
sent
to
Paris
by way
of
Berlin,
where
he
received the
passports
procured
for him from
the
French cabinet
by
that
of Prussia
;
but at the same
time,
orders
reached
him
from
St.
Petersburg,
countermanding
his
journey.
The
annexa-
tion of
the
Liguriun
republic
to
Prance,
at
the
moment
when
the allies were
making
conciliatory
overtures
to
Napo-
leon,
appeared
to the
emperor
too serious an
outrage
to
allow
of his
prosecuting
further
negotiations.
War
was
conse-
quently
resolved
on.
gouvernement, que
cclui
dc
France
ne
sc
fait
pas
scrupule
de calouinier
sans
cesse,
parce
qu'il
se trouve en
guerre
avec lui."
206
HISTOKY
OF 1UJSSIA.
[CH.
LIV.
Napoleon
seemed
to be
wholly
intent on
his
design
of
invading
England.
Part
of his
troops
had
already
embarked
(August
27th),
when
on
a sudden
the
camp
of
Boulogne
was
broken
up,
and
the
army
put
in
march towards
the
Ehine,
which
river
it
passed
wiikm
a month
after.
Austria
had
set
on
foot
three
armies.
The archduke
Charles commanded
that of
Italy
;
his
brother
John
was
stationed
with
the second
army
on
the
Tyrol
;
and
the
third
was commanded
nominally
by
the
archduke
Frederick,
the
emperor's
cousin,
but in
reality by
general
Mack.
The first
Eussian
army
under
Kutusof
had
arrived
in
Gallicia,
and
was
continuing
its
march
in all
haste.
It
was followed
by
another
under
Michelson.
The
Eussian
troops
in Dalmatia
were
to
attempt
a
landing
in
Italy.
Mack
having
crossed
the
Ian
(Sept.
8th),
and
entered
Suabia,
Napoleon's
plan
was
to cut
him off
from
the
army
of
Kutusof,
which
was
marching
through
Austria.
In
this
he
succeeded
by
a violation
of
the
Prussian
territory.
Marmont,
who
had
marched
by way
of
Mayence,
and
Bernadotte,
who
had conducted
an
army
into
Franconia,
where
they
were
joined
by
the
Bavarians,
traversed
the
country
of
Anspach,
and
thus came on
the rear
of the
Austrian
army
(Oct.
6th).
Prom
that
date,
scarcely
a
day
passed
without
a
battle
favourable
to the
French.
Several
Austrian
divisions
were
forced
to
lay
down
their
arms.
Mack,
who
had
thrown
him-
self
into
Ulm,
lost
all
resolution,
and
capitulated
with
25,000
men
(Oct.
19th).
Mack's
army
was
thus
totally
dissipated,
except
6000
cavalry,
with
which the
archduke
Perdinand
had
opened
himself
a
passage
through
Pranconia,
and
20,000
men,
with
whom
Kienmayer
had
retired
to
Braunau,
where
he
was met
by
the
vanguard
of
Kutusof.
The
two
generals
continued their
retreat.
The
Eussians
repassed
the Danube
near Grein
(Nov.
9th),
and directed
their
march
towards
Moravia. A
few
days
after
(Nov.
L3th),
Vienna
fell
into
the
hands of the
French.
The
Austrians
had
renounced
the
design
of
defending
their
capital,
but
decided
that
the
passage
of
the river
should
be
disputed.
Vienna
is
situated
at
some
distance
from
the
Danube,
which
flows
to
the
right
of
the
city
between
wooded
islands.
The
Austrians
had
placed
explo-
sive
materials
under
the
flooring
of
the
wooden
bridge
which
crosses
the
several
arms of the
river,
and
were
ready
to blow
A.D.
1805]
CAMPAIGN OF
AUSTEELITZ. 207
it
up
the moment the French should
show themselves.
They
kept
themselves in readiness on
the
left
bank,
-with
their
artillery
pointed,
and a
corps
of
7000
or 8000
men,
com-
manded
by
count
Auersberg.
The
French,
nevertheless,
got
possession
of
the
bridge
by
stratagem.
Murat, Lannes,
Belliard,
and their
staff,
leaving
their
troops
behind
them,
crossed the
bridge,
told
the Austrians
that
an armistice was
agreed
on,
and asked to
see
their
general.
He was sent for.
Meanwhile,
the
French officers
kept
the Austrian
gunners
in
conversation,
and
gave
time for
a
column
of French
grena-
diers to
come
up
unseen,
under cover of
the
woods,
seize the
cannon,
and disarm the
artillerymen.
The
stupid
Austrian
commander
who
had
come to the
spot
just
at
the
critical
moment,
fell
completely
into the
trap.
He
himself led the
French column over
the
bridge,
and
ordered
the Austrian
troops
to
be drawn
up
on
parade
to receive
them as friends.
The
possession
of
the
bridge
afforded the
French
troops
the
means of
reaching
Znaym
sooner than
Kutusof,
and
thus
preventing
his
junction
with
Buxhovden.
Meanwhile,
Alexander had
gone
to
Berlin,
to
exert his
personal
influence
over the
timorous
king,
and
prevail
on him
to
abandon
his
wretched neutral
policy,
in which
there was
neither
honour,
honesty,
nor
safety.
Alexander was
warmly
seconded
by
the
beautiful
queen
of
Prussia,
and
by
the
arch-
duke
Anthony,
who
arrived
at the same time
on
a
special
mission from
Vienna. French
influence
rapidly
declined
in
Berlin
;
Duroc left
it
on the 2nd of
November,
without
having
been able
to obtain an
audience,
for
some
days
pre-
viously,
either
from the
king
or
the
emperor
;
and on
the
fol-
lowing
day
a
secret
convention
was
signed
between
the two
monarche
lor the
regulation
of
the
affairs of
Europe,
and the
erection
of a
barrier
against
the ambition of the French
emperor.
The
Prussian
minister
Haugwitz,
who had
signed
this
convention
only
to
gain
time,
and with
a secret
deter-
mination
to
elude its
provisions,
was
to
be entrusted
w
it h
the
notification
of it
to
Napoleon,
with
authority,
in
case
of
its
acceptance,
to
oiler
a
renewal
of
the former
friendship
and
alliance of
the
Prussian
nation
;
but in case of refusal.
i<>
declare
war,
with an
intimation,
that
hostilities would
begin
on
the 15th
of December
—
when
they
woidd be
too
late.
208
HISTORY
OF RUSSIA.
[CH.
LV.
Before
that
day
came,
Prussia
relapsed
into her old
tempo-
rising
habits
;
her
armies made
no
forward
movement
towards the
Danube,
and
Napoleon
was
permitted
to con-
tinue without
interruption
his advance to
Vienna,
while
80,000
disciplined
veterans
remained inactive in Silesia
;
a
force
amply
sufficient
to
have thrown
him
back with
disgrace
and
disaster to
the Rhine.
A characteristic scene
took
place
at
Potsdam
during
Alexander's
visit. The
king,
the
queen,
and the
emperor,
went one
night
by
torchlight
into the vault where
lay
the
coffin
of Frederick the Great.
They
knelt before it. Alex-
ander's
face was bathed
in
tears
;
he
pressed
his friend's
hands,
he
clasped
him in his
arms,
and
together
they
swore
eternal
amity
:
never would
they
separate
their cause
or
their fortunes.
Tilsit soon showed
what
was
the value
of
this
oath,
which
probably
was sincere for
the moment
when
it
was
taken.
CHAPTEE LV.
MORTIER
DEFEATED KUTUSOF's
FINESSE BAGRATION's
HEROIC EXPLOIT
BATTLE
OF
AUSTERLITZ
—
SEPARATE
PEACE
BETWEEN FRANCE AND
AUSTRIA
—
ATTEMPT OF
RUSSIA
TO OBTAIN
THE RIGHT OF PROTECTORATE OVER
THE
GREEK SUBJECTS OF TURKEY.
During the retreat of the
Austrians
and Russians under
Kienmayer
and Kutusof from Passau
to
Krems,
the
impru-
dence of
Mortier,
who
had
crossed
to the left bank of
the
Danube
at
Linz,
gave
occasion
to
engagements
at Stein and
Dirnstein,
in
which the French
lost more
men than
they
ever
acknowledged.
Mortier's
army
of
30,000
men consisted
of
three
divisions,
under
generals
Gazan,
Dupont,
and Dumon-
ceau.
This
army
had
positive
orders
to
keep
always
near
to
the
main
body,
which
was
pursuing
its march
along
the
right
bank,
and never to
advance
beyond
it.
Kutusof
had
long
retreated
on the
right
bank
;
but
on
the
9th
of November
he crossed
to
the
left
at
Grein,
as
before
mentioned,
and
lay
in the
neighbourhood
of
Krems,
when
Mortier's
troops
ad-
vanced.
The French
divisions maintained
the
distance
of
a
A.D.
18051
CAMPAIGN
OF
AUSTEBLITZ.
209
r
j
whole
clay's
march
one
from
another,
because
they thought
they
were
following
a
fleeing army
;
but
between
Dirnstein
and
Stein
they
fell in
with the
whole
Eussian
army,
20,000
strong,
at a
place
where
the
French
were
obliged
to
pass
through
a
frightful
ravine.
On
the
11th of
November,
Mortier
ventured to
make
an attack with
Gazan's
division
alone
;
but
between
Dirnstein
and Loiben
(twenty
hours
from
Vienna),
he
got
into
a narrow
way,
enclosed on both
sides
by
a line
of
lofty
walls,
and
there suffered a dreadful
loss. "When
the
French,
about
noon,
at
Jength
supposed
themselves
to have
gained
some
advantage,
the
Russians
re-
ceived
reinforcements,
outflanked
the
French,
cut
them
off,
and would
have
annihilated
the whole
division,
had
not
Dupont's
come
up
at the decisive
moment. The
latter
division
had also suffered
severely
on the same
day.
"Whilst
Kutusof was
sharply
engaged
with
Mortier,
whose num-
bers
were
being rapidly
diminished,
and his cannon
taken,
the
Austrian
general,
Schmidt,
attacked
Dupont
at
Stein,
where
the
contest
was as
murderous as
at
Dirnstein,
till
Schmidt
fell,
and
the French
forced
their
way.
Kutusof,
on
his
march
to
Zuaym,
was overtaken
by
the van
of
the
French,
under
Belliard,
near Hollabrunn
;
and
every-
thing depended
on
detaining
the
latter so
long
as
might
euable Kutusof
to
gain
time for
getting
in
advance. For
this
purpose,
Bagration,
with about
6000
men,
took
up
a
position
in the
l'ear of
the
main
body.
Nostitz served
under
Bagration,
and had some
thousand Austrians and
a number
of
Russians
under
his immediate command. He
occupied
the
village
of
Schongraben,
in the
rear of the
Russians,
and
in the
very
centre
of
their
line
of
march.
Belliard
ought
to
have
attacked
him iirst
;
but as his
corps
was not
superior
in
number
to
that
of
Bagration,
he
had
again
recourse
to the
expedient
which
lie had
already
tried,
with
such
signal
suc-
cess,
at
the
bridge
of
Vienna. He entered into a
parley
;
declared
that
peace
with Austria was
already
concluded,
or
as
<jood
as
concluded
;
assured them that
hostilities
hence-
forth
affected
the
Russians
alone;
and
by
such
means
in-
duced Nostitz
to
be
guilty
of a
piece
of
treachery unparal-
leled in war.
Nostitz,
with
his
Austrians,
forsook the
Rus-
sians,
even
those
whom he had
under his own
command
;
and
they being
unable
to
maintain
the
village
of
Schongraben,
it
VOL. II.
P
210
HISTORY
OF RUSSIA.
[CH.
LV.
was taken
possession
of
without a
snot
;
and
Bagration
and
Kutusof
seemed
lost,
for Murat's whole
army
was
advancing
upon
them.
In the
mean time the Russians at Hollabrunn
extricated
themselves from their
difficulty
;
for
they
were not so
stupidly
credulous as
the
Austrians,
but knew how
to
deceive
the
Gascons,
by
whom
they
were
pursued,
as Belliard had
deceived
the Austrians. For this
purpose,
they
availed
themselves of
the
presence
in
Kutusofs
camp
of count von
Winzingerode,
the
adjutant-general
of
the
emperor
of
Russia,
who had been
employed
in all the last
diplomatic
military
negotiations
in Berlin.
Murat
having
sent his
adjutant
to
call
upon
Kutusof,
whose line of march had come into the
power
of the
enemy,
in
consequence
of Nostitz's
treachery
in
capitulating,
the
Russian
general
assumed the
appearance
of
being
desirous to
negotiate,
and
Winzingerode
betook
him-
self
to the Trench
camp.
Belliard and
Murat,
without
taking
the trouble to
inquire
what
powers
the count and Kutusof
had to conclude
a
treaty
which
should
be
generally
bind-
ing,
came to
an
agreement
with
Winzingerode,
by
virtue
of
which
all the
Russians,
within a certain
number of
days,
were
to
evacuate
every
part
of the Austrian
territory.
This
capitulation
was
to be sent
to the
emperor Napoleon,
at
Sell
onbrunn,
for
confirmation;
and
to this
condition there
was
necessarily
attached
another,
for
the sake of
which
Kutusof
had commenced
the
whole affair. There
was to
be a
suspension
of
hostilities till the arrival
of
Napoleon's
answer
;
and
it
was
agreed,
that
in the
mean
time
both
par-
ties should
remain
in their then
positions.
Bagration,
with
7000
or S000
Russians,
complied
with
this
condition,
and re-
mained
in
his
position
at
Hollabrunn,
because
he
could
be observed
by
the French
;
but
Kutusof,
with
all
the rest
of
the
army,
which
lay
at
a
greater
distance,
quietly
con-
tinued his route to
Znaym
;
and
this,
with a full
knowledge
of
the
danger
of
Bagration
being
afterwards overwhelmed
by
a
superior
force.
On
being
made
acquainted
with
the
capitulation,
Napoleon
was
enraged,
for
he
immediately
perceived
how
grievously
his brother-in-law
had
suffered
himself
to be deceived
;
and
he ordered
an
immediate
attack.
This
was
indeed made
;
but
eighteen
hours
had
been
irreparably
lost,
and Kutusof
gained
two
marches
A.D.
1805]
CAMPAIGN OF
AUSTEELITZ.
211
on
Murat
;
the
whole
French
army,
above
30,000
strong,
therefore fell
upon Bagration.
Bagration,
who had still
with him
the
Austrian
regiment
of hussars of the
crown-prince
of
Homburg,
commanded
by
baron
von
Mohr,
offered
a
vigorous
resistance to
the
whole
French
army
Avith
his
7000 or 8000
men. The
Bussian
bombs
set fire to the
village
in which
was
stationed
the
corps
which
was
to
fall
upon
Bagration's
flank
;
the
consequence
was,
that
this
corps
Avas thrown
into
confusion,
and
the
Russians
opened
up
a
way
for
themselves at
the
point
of
the
bayonet.
The
Bussian
general,
it is
true,
was
obliged
to
leave
his
cannon in the hands of his
enemy,
and lost
the
half
of
his force
;
it
must, however,
always
be
regarded
as
one of
the
most
glorious
deeds of
the
whole
campaign,
that,
after
three
days'
continued
fighting,
he
succeeded in
joining
the
main
body
under
Kutusof,
at
his
head-quarters
at
"Wisehau,
between
Brlinn
and
Olmiitz, and,
to
the
astonishment of
all,
with
one-half
of his little
army.
Even the
French
admit
that
the
Bussians
behaved
nobly,
that
they
themselves
lost
a
great
number
of
men,
and
that,
among
others,
Oudinot
was
severely
Avounded.
On
the
same
day
on
which
Bagration
arrived in
Wisehau,
a
junction
had
been formed
by
Buxhovden's
army,
Avith
which
the
emperor
Alexander
was
present,
with the
troops
under
Kutusof,
avIio
thenceforAvard
assumed the chief
com-
mand
of
the
Avholc.
Napoleon
himself came
to
Briinn,
and
collected
Ins Avhole
army
around
him,
well
knowing
that
nothing
but
a
decisive
engagement
could
bring
him
safely
out of
the
situation in
which
he
then
was,
and
which
was
the
more
dangerous
the
more
splendid
and
victorious
it
out-
lly
appeased
to be.
It is
beyond
a
doubt,
that
the
pre-
cipitation
and
haughtiness
of the
Bussians,
Avho were
eager
for a
decisive
engagement,
combined
with
the
miserable
policy
of the Prussian
cabinet and
the
cowardice
of
the
king,
as
Avell as the
fears
and
irresolution
of
the
poor
emperor
Francis,
and the
Avant
of
spirit
among
his
advisers,
con-
tributed
more
to the
success
of
Napoleon's
plans
respecting
Prussia,
Germany,
and
Italy,
than
his
victories in
the field.
A
glance
at
the
situation
of
affairs
at
the
time
of the battle
of
Austerlit/,
will shoAV at
once
how
easily
he
might
have
been
stopped
in his
career.
There
Avas
nothing
Napoleon
feared
p 2
212
HISTORY
OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LV.
more
tlian
that the
Russians
should
march
either
to Hun-
gary
or to
Upper
Silesia,
and
avoid
a
decisive
engagement
;
lie
therefore
took
means
to ascertain
the characters
and views
of
the
personal
attendants
and
advisers
of
the
emperor
Alexander;
and
when
he
had learned
that
young
men
of
foolhardy
dispositions
had
the
preponderance
in his
councils,
he
formed
his
plans
accordingly.
He
first
advanced
from
Briinn to
"Wischau,
and
afterwards
retired
again
into
the
neighbourhood
of
Briinn,
as
if afraid
to venture
upon
an
attack.
The
emperor
of
Germany,
as
well as
Napoleon,
appeared
seriously
desirous
of
a
peace
;
but
the former
was
obliged
to
propose
conditions
which
the
latter
could
not
possibly
accept
;
and
Napoleon
wished
first
completely
to
set
the
emperor
Francis
free
from
the
Russians,
his
allies,
and
from
Prussia,
before
he came
to an
agreement
with
him.
As
count
Stadion,
who
came
to
the
head-quarters
of
the
French
on
the
27th
of
November,
with
Giulay,
as ambas-
sadors
to
treat for
peace,
was
a sworn
enemy
of
Napoleon,
and remained
so
till
1813,
and
had,
moreover,
been
very
in-
strumental
in
founding
the whole
coalition,
and
in
maturing
their
plans,
his
appearance
on
this occasion
wasof
itself
no
good
omen
for
the favourable
issue
of
the
mission.
The
proposals
made
as the
basis
of
a
peace
were
the
same as
had
been
contemplated
in
the
event
of
a
victory
on
the
part
of
the
allies
—
the
French
were
to evacuate
Germany
and
Italy.
When
Napoleon
sent
Savary
(afterwards
duke
of
Eovigo),
the
head
of
his
gendarmerie
police,
under
pretence
of
com-
plimenting
the
emperor
Alexander,
it
was
indisputably
a
great part
of
this
envoy's object,
as
appears
from
the
30th
bulletin,
to
make
himself
thoroughly
acquainted
with
the
prevailing
opinions
and
the
leading
characters
during
the
three
days
of
his
sojourn
in the
emperor's
camp.
Savary
was
very
well
received,
and
sent
away
with
every
courtly
attention
by
Alexander;
but
it was
intimated
that
it was
intended
to
make
common
cause
with
Prussia,
and
that it
was
expected
that
Novosiltzof,
whom
the
emperor
Alexander
wished
to send
to
Napoleon,
would
meet
Haugwitz
in Briinn.
The
hint
was sufficient
to
induce
Savary
to
decline
the com-
pany
of
Novosiltzof.
When
Savary
informed the
emperor
of
the
illusion of
the
A.D.
1805]
BATTLE OF ATJSTEKLITZ.
213
Russian
generals,
and of their belief
that
fears were enter-
tained
of
the
Russians,
and
that on this account embassies
were
sent
to
seek
for
peace
—
Napoleon very cunningly
took
care
to
strengthen
the
fools
in their
folly. Savary
was
sent
again
to
the
enemy's camp
to
propose
an interview between
Napoleon
and
the
emperor
of Russia.
The interview was
declined
;
but
prince
Dolgoruki
was sent to
propose
condi-
tions to
Napoleon.
The
latter did not allow
him
to
come
into
his
camp,
but received
him
at
the
outposts.
If it be
true
that
the
prince
behaved
most
rudely,
and that
he made the
demands
of
which
Napoleon
complains
so
bitterly
in the 30th
and 31st
bulletins,
the Russians
were
certainly
seized
Avith
a
delusion
which
could
not but draw them on to
their destruc-
tion
;
but
we
must
add,
that we
do
not
place
unhesitating
confidence
in
anything
which
proceeded
immediately
from
Napoleon,
or in
words which are
put
into
his
mouth.
In
the
same
bulletin
in which abuse is
heaped
upon
the
Russians,
the
English
again
play
a
part
along
with them
—
the
English,
who
were
always
a
thorn
in
Napoleon's
side.
If
it
be
asked
why
the
Russians,
with whom
there were
only
some
20,000
Austrians,
did not
wait for
their third
army,
under
Benningsen,
or reduce
Bonaparte
to the
greatest per-
plexity,
by
taking
up
a
strong position
in
Hungary
or
Upper
Silesia,
or
remaining quietly upon
the
heights
of
Pratzen,
the
reply
is,
that
the
whole
system
of
supplies
was
bad,
and that
want had reached
so
great
a
pitch,
that
it would have been
impossible
for
them to remain. Certain
it
is,
that
they
suffered
themselves to be
drawn down from
the
heights,
and
away
from
Austerlitz,
nearer
Briinn,
where the
talents
of
their
generals
were
unable
to
devise
any plan
of
battle
which
Napoleon
could not
immediately
oversee;
it
would
have
been
otherwise in the mountains.
The
French
allege,
that
Napoleon
had
long
before
fixed
upon
the
very
place
in
which
the
Russians offered
him battle
at
Austerlitz,
on
the
2nd
of
December,
as his
battle-field,
and laid all his
plans
accordingly.
The
possession
of
the
heights
of
Pratzen
was
regarded by
those
skilled in
strategy
as the
key
of this battle-
field.
The
Russians
were in full
possession
of these
heights,
with
all their
force,
on
the 1st
of
December;
on
1
he 2nd
they
descended
from
them,
when
Bonaparte
drew
back
one
214
HISTORY OF
ItUSSIA.
[CH.
LV.
of
the
wings
of his
army.
He had
long
calculated on
gaining
the
victory by
the
possession
of
these
heights,
and thus
rendering
the
retreat of
the
Eussians
impossible.
He
did
not,
therefore, fail,
in the
very
opening
of the
battle,
to
seize
upon
them. A
column of the
third
Bussian
army,
under
Benningsen,
commanded
by
Michelson,
just
arrived at
the
decisive moment
when
Napoleon
had
also called
to his aid
Bernadotte's
corps,
and when
the
Bavarians
were on their
march from
Budweis
to Moravia
;
but
none of
their leaders
could
lay
any
claim
to the
reputation
of
a
commander of
genius.
Napoleon's
proclamation
to his
army
shows his
full
confidence in
his
own
superiority,
as
well as in
that
of his
ge-
nerals
and
soldiers
;
and
this confidence was
fully
realised
on
the
bloody
field
of
Austerlitz
on the 2nd of December. But
though
the
Russians
were
defeated,
it is
certain,
that had it
not
been
for the
cowardice of
the
emperor
of
Germany,
and
for
the
counsels
of
Lichtenstein
and
his
associates,
who
sought
the
advantage
of
their
emperor
at
the
expense
of
his
honour
and
the
Austrian
name,
the
victory,
which
the French
so
admirably
understood
how
to
magnify,
would
not have
pro-
duced
the
effects it
actually
did
produce.
It was
not the
victory
itself,
but its
consequences,
which
made
the
German
princes
the
humble
vassals of
France,
gave
Italy
into
the
hands
of
Napoleon,
raised his
brothers
and
his
brother-in-
law to
the
rank
of
kings,
and
his
generals
and
diplomatists
to that
of
princes.
As
regards
the
immediate results ofthe
battle,
the Eussians
lost
the
greater
part
of
their
artillery
and their
army
;
but
this loss
has
been so
grossly exaggerated
by
the
French,
that
we
do
not
venture either
to
give
the
number of the
fallen,
or of
those who
escaped.
Many,
in other
respects
trustworthy
French
writers,
give
54,000
as
the number of
the
slain;
and Matthieu
Dumas,
who does not
belong
to the
boasters,
states,
that
of
80,000 Eussians, 40,000
fell in
the
battle.
It
is
obvious,
however,
that these
mere
military
official
vaunts are
not entitled
to.
much
credit,
for the
Eus-
sian
accounts as
absurdly
diminish the
amount of
the
loss,
as
those of
the French
extravagantly
exaggerate
it.
Kutusof,
in
his
account,
says
that he
lost
12,000,
and
the
French
18,000
men.
The
French
reports partly
refute
one
another,