
372
HISTORY OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXTII.
Lithuania,
crushing
on
its
way
the
small
corps
of
Eosen
and
Grolowin.
These
two latter
plans
were
evidently
only
admissible
after
the
first
had
been
tried.
Tor,
after
they
had
given
battle
there
would be
ample
time
for
them,
in the
event
of
defeat,
to
entrench
themselves in
the
city,
to vic-
tual
it
from the
right
bank,
to arm
the
people,
to barri-
cade
the
streets,
and
to renew
the immortal defence
of
Saragossa.
As to
the
proposition
of
Dembinski,
it was
only
worthy
of
consideration as a forlorn
hope,
as a last
resource,
after
the failure
of
everything
else. The
plan adopted
was
that of
Uminski
;
a
most fatal
selection,
for it
sent
away
one
entire half of
an
army,
already
far
too
weak,
on
the
prepos-
terous mission
of
procuring,
a full
fortnight
before
they
were
wanted,
additional
provisions
for
a
city,
whose
greatest clanger
at
that
moment
was,
not
famine,
but
assault.
Accordingly,
Ramorino was
despatched
with
20,000
men
and
forty-two
pieces
of
cannon
into
Podlachia,
and
Lubienski,
with
a
detachment of
4000 men
into the
palatinate
of
Plock,
so
that
there
remained for the defence of the
capital only
35,000
men.
On
learning
that
the Polish
army
was
thus
broken
up,
Paskievitch
decided
upon
attempting
an
assault,
and
fixed the 6th
of
September
for that
purpose.
His
forces
had
just
been
increased
by
a new
army
of
30,000 men,
which
general
Kreutz had
brought.
Thus the
capital
of Poland
was
menaced
at
different
points
by
a
total mass
of
120,000
men
and
386 cannon ! The
effective of the Polish
army
was about
80,000
men and 144
cannon,
but
there were at the
present
mo-
ment
in
Warsaw
only
35,000
men and 136
pieces
of
artillery.
The
city
was defended
on the left bank
by
three semicircular
lines of
vallations,
the most extended of which did not em-
brace
less
than
five
leagues.
The
principal
sallies
were
Wola,
Pariz,
and
Marymont,
connected
together
by
lunettes.
This
immense
development,
to be
adequately
maintained,
required
an
army
three times as
large
as that of the Poles.
Certain
points,
of
necessity insufficiently
manned, must,
as
a matter
of
course,
fall into
the
hands of
Paskievitch,
so that
they
had
built forts
for
the
enemy,
and
the
very
works
which were
in-
tended
to
stop
the
besieger,
became
an additional
element
of
success
at
his
disposition.
To
complete
this
misfortune,
the
points
the best
fortified
were
precisely
those
which
the Rus-
sians could
not attack.
Ivrukowiecki had conceived
the idea of