Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1829]
WAB
WITH TUEKET.
343
S0,000
inhabitants.
Moltke
gives
the number
of
effective
combatants
at
Adrianople
as
30,000.
As
many
more
Alba-
nians
were
at
Sophia.
Of
the
fortresses
on
the
Danube,
Widdin,
Nicopolis,
Sistowa,
and
Eustchuk
still
held out
;
Skumla,
with a
very
considerable
force,
remained
in the
hands
of
the
Turks.
The
communication
between
Adria-
nople
and
the
ports
on
the
Black
Sea
might
at
any
moment
have been
cut off.
Diebitsch
and
his
army
were
completely
isolated,
and
removed
from
all
possibility
of succour.
Bad
as
all
this
was,
and
hopeless
as the condition
of
the
Russians
as thus
described,
the debilitated
and
sickly
state of
their
forces
in
Adrianople
was
worse
than all.
Diebitsch'
s
troops
were
melting away
in
his hands
under the
influence
of
a com-
bination
of
diseases,
and
yet,
being
in
this
situation,
he
wrested
from
the
ignorance
and
timidity
of
his
opponents
the
solid
fruits
of
victory,
and
all the results
of
the
most
success-
ful
campaign.
The czar
had
withdrawn
from the scene
of
action,
and re-
tired
to St.
Petersburg,
taking
with
him
the whole
diplomatic
body
—
a
matter
of no
slight importance
to
the
general
who
was
charged
with the
responsibility
of the
operations.
He
was
now
at
liberty
to
act
upon
purely
strategic
grounds,
without reference
to counsels
which
he could
not
disregard,
whatever
doubts
he
might
entertain
as to
their
soundness.
Immediately
his
hands
were
at
liberty,
general
Diebitscli
set
about the
reorganisation
of
the
army,
which
had been
sadly
shattered
by
the events
of the
last
campaign.
He
found
himself,
when
every
exertion had been
made,
at
the
head
of
GS,000
combatant*,
many
of whom bore
upon
their
faces
marks
of
the severe
suffering
which
they
had
undergone
during
the
preceding
year.
"
According
to the
testimony
of
an
eye-witness,"
writes the baron
von
Moltke,
"the
men's
faces
wore
an
expression
of sadness
and of
pain.
After
all
that
they
had suffered in the
former
campaign,
they
looked
upon
themselves
as
martyrs
to their
religion
and
their em-
peror.
Nowhere
in
the
Russian
quarters
were
to be
seen
or
heard
the
jokes
that never fail
among
German soldiers
when
in
tolerable
plight.
Singing
was the
only expression
of
joy
which
was
heard,
but
the
songs
had the
melancholy
character
peculiar
to
the
Slavonian
race.
The
soldiers
were
much
344
HISTORY
OP ETTSSIA.
[CH.
LXYI.
given
to
religious
ceremonies,
and
crossed
themselves at
every
meal
;
in
every
camp
a tent
was
fitted
up
as a
church,
and
mass
celebrated
daily."
The
great
difficulty,
however,
was the commissariat.
Thou-
sands of
waggons
drawn
by
oxen were
provided
for the ser-
vice of
the
army
on the
northern
side of the
Balkan
;
for his
provision
train
on the
southern side
of this
mountain
chain,
general
Diebitsch
relied
upon
camels
which
had
been
brought
from
Asia
for
the
purpose.
Upon
the
side of
the
Turks
there
was far
greater
confidence than at the
beginning
of
the
preceding
campaign.
The
troops
of
the sultan
—
that
is^
the
raw
levies
which
had
displaced
the Janissaries
—
had
actually
stood
the
shock of
the
Muscovites
in
the
field,
and
had
even,
upon
occasion,
returned
as
victors. Shumla
still stood
firm
—
the
Balkan
had
been
unassailed. The
state
of
feeling
through-
out the
Turkish
dominions
had,
on the
whole,
improved,
and
the
sultan
Mahmoud
reckoned
that,
after so
effective
a resist-
ance as he
had
displayed
in
1828,
the
diplomacy
of
Europe
would
not
suffer
him
to
be crushed
in
1829.
Bedschid
Pasha
was
named to
the
command-in-chief,
and on
the 21st
of
April
set
out
for
Shumla,
where
he found a
force
of
10,000
men.
The
spring
passed
away
in inaction
on either side
;
preparations
were in
active
progress
on
that
of
the Bussians
for
the
passage
of
the Balkan
—
an
operation
to
which all
others
were made
subservient. To effect this with
safety,
it
was
necessary
to
secure a
depot
at the other side of the
mountains,
where the
troops
who had
effected the
passage
might
find
temporary security
and
refreshment at
the termi-
nation of
this
portion
of
the
enterprise.
In
pursuance
of
this
design,
the
port
of Sizeboli
was
seized
by
a naval
coup
de main. It is said
to be
the
best and safest
harbour
on the
western
coast
of
the Black
Sea,
and the
possession
of
it
was
of
great
importance
to
the
Bussians
in their
subsequent
operations.
We
pass
over
the
subsequent
fruitless
attempts
of the
Turks to
recover
possession
of Sizeboli.
Mention
of the
capture
of
a Bussian
ship
of 45
guns,
the
Baphael, by
the
Turkish
squadron, cannot,
however,
be
altogether
omitted
from
the narrative of
the
campaign.
The
Capudan
Pasha,
Achmet
Papudji
(the
shoemaker),
entered
the Black
Sea
at
the
head of
a
Turkish
fleet,
and,
while he
was
lying
at anchor
A.D.
1S29]
WAE
WITH
TTJEKEY.
345
one
nighty
the
Eaphael
and
her
consort
(the
brig
Mercury),
then
cruising
in
the
waters of
Anatolia,
sailed down
to the
Turkish
fleet,
and
let
go
their
anchors in
the midst
of the
enemy's
ships.
It
is
said
by
our
author
that the
Turks
were
so
inexpert
in
their
new
trade
of
marine
warfare,
that
if the
Eussians
had
hoisted
the
red
flag,
they
would have
quietly
assumed that
the
new
comers
were a
reinforcement
which had
joined
them
in the
night.
The
brig
set all
sail,
and
escaped
;
the
Eaphael
struck
her
flag
;
and
so
pleased
was
Achmet
the
Shoemaker
with
the
fine
Eussian
ship
which
his
Prophet
had
delivered
into
his
hands,
while he was fast
asleep
in
his
cabin,
that
he
returned
to
Constantinople
with
his fleet
and his
prize
without
attempting
any
other feat
of
war.
_
The
siege
of
Silistria,
however,
is the
first
great
fea-
ture in
the
campaign
which
claims
our
attention.
General
Diebitsch
arrived
before
Silistria on
the
17th
of
May.
It
is a
striking
example
of
the
national
character
of
the
Turks
that,
during
the
interval
which had
elapsed
between
the
raising
of
the
siege
of 1828
and
the
renewal
of
that
siege
in
1829,
they
had
absolutely
done
nothing
—
beyond
digging
out
a few
temporary
works
—
to
strengthen
the fortifications
of this
important
place.
The value
of it
to the
Turks
can
scarcely
be
exaggerated
as a
security against
a march
upon
the
Balkan.
Baron
von
Moltke
tells us that it lies at a dis-
tance
of
only
two
days'
march
right
on
the
flank
of
any pos-
sible
operations
from
the
northward
against
that chain
of
mountains.
As
long
as it
was
held
by
a numerous
garrison,
it
would
have
been
necessary
either
to mask it
by
the
pre-
sence
of a
superior force,
or
to
run a
risk
which few Eussian
generals
would
have
cared
to
encounter,
even when matched
against
no
acuter
strategists
than
the
Turkish
commanders
as
they
were in ]
S2S-29. The
place
was
finally
won
by mining
and
countermining
far
more
than
by
bombardment or
open
assault. In
the
previous
campaign
the
Eussians had learnt
to
respect
the
valour
of
the
Turkish
soldier
when
fighting
from
behind
stone
walls,
and
rightly
judged
that
the shovel
and
pickaxe
were
far
safer,
as
well
as
more
certain,
weapons
in
their
own
hands
than
either
bayonet
or sabre.
The
greatest
want
of skill
was
shown
by'
the Turkish counter-
miners
;
they
suffered
themselves
to
be forestalled
at
every
point,
frequently
only
by
a
few
minutes. The countermines
346
HISTORY OF
KTTSSIA.
[CH.
LXVI.
which
they
did
fire
exploded
at
wrong
times and
places,
and
produced
scarcely any
effect.
In
other
respects
the
conduct
of
the
besieged
was admirable. It
was
certainly
a
great
feat
of
arms to defend the
place
for six
weeks
;
for the
ramparts
were
insignificant,
the
flanking
defences so
indifferent that
it was
possible
to look
into
the
fortress,
and
to
enfilade the
greater
part
of the curtains
;
while
permanent
outworks,
with
the
exception
of those
connecting
the
city
with
the
Danube,
were
altogether
wanting.
The
ditch did
not
exceed
from
eight
to ten feet in
depth,
and could not be
flooded,
the
bottom of
it
being
above the
level
of the
Danube.
Even
despite
of all their
failures
and
unskilfulness,
it
is
generally
thought
that disunion
among
the
commanders and
want
of
provisions
had
more
to
do
with
the surrender than
any
other
cause.
Probably,
had there been a Butler
or
a
Nasmyth
at
that
day present
with the
garrison
of
Silistria,
the result
might
have been different
;
but,
as
it
was,
at
the
end
of
June,
general
Diebitsch found himself free to
carry
out
his
plan against
the
Balkan,
as
far as the
garrison
of
Silistria was concerned. The
place
was
his,
and his
flank
re-
lieved from all
danger
from that
quarter
;
but before
proceed-
ing
on his
way,
he
had
to
deal with the
army
of
the
grand
vizier,
which could
bring against
him
at
any point
he
might
choose
for action a force which would
probably
exceed
his
own.
On
the
day
that Silistria was
invested,
an
attempt
was
made
at
Eski
Arnautlar,
by
Bedschid
Pasha,
to turn a Bussian
posi-
tion,
and
the
advantage apparently
remained
with
the
Turks.
He
retreated,
after an
engagement
which
had lasted for fifteen
hours,
but
halted on
a
spot
from
which,
his left
flank
being
in connexion with
Shumla,
he
threatened the
Bussian
s with
renewed
attack.
It
was but a threat.
The
fight
had
been
a
very
bitter
one,
and had been so
energetically
conducted
by
the
Moslem,
that
it
reminded
those
present
at
it of
the
impetuosity
of the old Turkish
onslaught.
At the
great
battle
of
Kosleffccha,
in
which field-marshal
Diebitsch
com-
manded
against
the
grand
vizier in
person,
on
the
1
1th
of
June,
the
attempt
being
made to
cut
off
the
latter from
his
camp
at
Shumla,
the
same
impetuosity
was
visible
for a time.
But
quickly
came the
reverse,
and the
Turks,
who at the
commencement
of the
assault
had shown
the boldest
courage,
A.D.
1829]
WAR
WITH
TURKEY.
347
displayed,
when
pressed
back
and
reduced
to
defend them-
selves,
a most
craven
spirit.
The
army
was broken
up
and
lost
in the woods. The Russians could not make
prisoners
amidst
the
pathless
forests
;
aud in the course of a
fortnight
the remains of
the Ottoman host were
again
assembled at
Shumla,
not
much
reduced in
numbers,
but thenceforth use-
less
as an
army.
Their
patience
and fortitude had now
ut-
terly
vanished. There
was a
race of
pusillanimity
and
folly
between leaders
and
soldiery.
Even
now,
had the measures
contemplated by
the
Turks
been
completed
but a
fortnight
earlier,
the Balkan would have
been secure
during
this
campaign
;
and it
was not
probable
that
the
resources
of the
Eussian
empire
would have
supported
a
third
attempt
of the kind.
Hussein
Pasha was
at
Rustchuk,
Eedschid Pasha
himself
at
Shumla.
Their
plan
was to collect
a force
of
G0,000
men,
and
to
operate
between
Silistria and
Shumla on the flank of the
Russians as
they
advanced.
They
looked to
the
Upper
Danube
for their
provisions,
and,
from
all
narratives of the
campaign
which we have
met
with,
ex-
clusive of
Moltke's,
it
would
appear
that
such a
force
might
have been
collected,
if
not
precisely
of the amount
named,
at
least numerous
enough
to
compel
the Russians to
win
their
way
to the Balkan
by
a
succession of victories
over
a
foe
against
whom
they
would
be called
upon
to
operate
under
every
circumstance
of
strategical
disadvantage.
The
timely
precautions
were, however,
neglected.
The needful
force
was
not collected
;
the
communications
were not
established
;
the fortilications
of Silistria
were
not
repaired
;
the
place
was
allowed
to
fall
into the hands of
the
enemy
;
and
now the
Russian
general
was free
to
carry
out his
plan
of
crossing
the
Balkan
with
no
greater
impediment
than
the
grand
vizier,
by
his
own
unassisted
efforts,
might
be
able
to throw in his
way.
This
officer,
who had
been
apathetic
when he should
have
displayed energy,
now
chose
the
wrong
moment for ex-
hibiting
the latter
quality,
when
the
characteristic non-
chalance of
the
Turk
would
have
much better
served
his turn.
Shumla
might
now be
disregarded.
Silistria
was
closely
invested,
and about
to fall.
Varna
was the
trophy
and
the
gain
of
the
preceding
year's
campaign.
The Dobrudsha
was
under
the
control
of the
Russians
—
the sea
absolutely
their
own. Sizeboli
had been
taken,
and
was
ready
to
afford sue-
348
history;
of
Russia.
[ch.
lxvi.
cour
and
refreshment
to
the
troops
when
the
passage
had
been
effected.
There had
been
constant
showers to
refresh
the
grass
and the
air.
Forage
for the
cavalry
was
to be
found
in
the
mountains,
and
the
weather
was not
yet
over-
poweringly
hot. All
these
considerations
were
suggestive
of
immediate
action,
but,
on
the
other
hand,
Diebitsch found
himself
but at
the head
of
25,000
men—
10,000
of
whom
he
must
leave
before
Shumla
to watch the
operations
of
the
vizier,
and
consequently
he had
but
15,000
at
his
disposal
for
an
advance into the
heart
of the
enemy's
country.
The
Russian
general
went
to
Shumla in
person,
and
was at first
inclined to
risk
a
sudden
attack
upon
the
town;
but
pru-
dence
prevailed,
as
the
town contained
18,000
fighting
in-
habitants,
and the
possession
of
Shumla would
have ex-
ercised
no
very
decisive
influence
on
the
great
operation
which
Diebitsch
had
resolved to
accomplish.
The
opposing
forces
remained
in
a
state of
half
truce,
half
skirmish,
during
a
whole
month
—
that is to
say,
from
the
middle
of
June until
the
middle
of
July.
In
this
interval of
comparative
inaction,
the
news of
the fall
of
Silistria was
received in the Eussian
camp,
and the
corps
cTarmee
which had
been
investing
that
fortress
thus
became
disengaged.
The Eussian forces
then
before
Shumla
were
divided
into four
bodies,
—
the
first,
under
general
Krassewski,
was left
to watch
Shumla
;
the
second,
under
general
Roth,
was
to
pass
along
the road from
Varna
to
Burgas
;
the
third,
under
general
Biidiger,
was to
cross the
mountain
from
Pravadi to
Aidos
;
the
fourth,
under
general
Pahlen,
was
to
act as a
reserve to
the
two
preceding
columns.
About
the 17th or
18th
of
July
the
great
operation began.
The
men
marched in
caps,
in
linen
trousers,
and in
uniform.
Each
carried his
great-coat
and
knapsack,
and the
knapsack
contained
one
shirt
and one
pair
of
trousers.
Each
man
carried,
besides,
provision
for ten
da}
r
s.
Baggage
of
every
other
kind
was left
behind.
The
obstacles which
the
Eussians met with
during
their
passage
of
the
great
range
of
mountains
which
had
been re-
garded
for
four
centuries
as the
bulwark of
the Turkish em-
pire
on that
side
arose
entirely
from
the
natural difficulties
of
the
country.
A
perfect
bewilderment
seemed
to have
taken
possession
of the
Turkish
leaders. The
troops,
too,
which
during
the
previous
campaign,
and even
until the
battle of
A.D.
1829]
WAB
WITH
TUEKET.
349
Kuleftcha,
had
fairly
grappled
with
the Muscovite
legions
and
made them
pay
a
heavy
price
even
for
victory,
had now
forgotten
their former
spirit
and enthusiasm.
The
Balkan,
in
1829,
might
have been defended inch
by
inch
as
the
Tyrol
was
against
the
French
and Bavarian forces
at
an earlier
period
of the
century
;
but
the Turks abandoned
all
their ad-
vantages,
left the
passes
open,
and,
even
when
present
in
overwhelming
numbers,
were
too much
dismayed
to receive
the
arms which
the
Russian division
was on
the
point
of
laying
down. For
example,
towards
the
end of
July,
the
Russians,
under
general
Biidiger,
were
advancing
on Aidos.
The
grand
vizier,
to
meet this
attack,
detached
a
corps
of
10,000
or
12,000
men
to
Aidos.
As soon as their
skirmishers
were
beaten in
the
Turks fled witli
precipitation,
passing
through
the
town,
which
they
left
to the
enemy
without
firing
a shot. An
immense
booty
of
tents,
powder,
military
cloaks,
arms,
and
ammunition fell into the
hands of
the Rus-
sians,
but the
triumph
was
a
fatal one to
the victors.
The
dead
bodies of
men, horses,
camels,
lay
about
polluting
the
air
in
every
direction,
and Moltke
conjectures
"
that the
seeds
of the disease which
henceforth
raged
among
the
Rus-
sian
troops
were
probably
sown
during
their
stay
in Aidos."
On
another
occasion,
a Russian force but 800
strong
was
sur-
rounded
by
a Turkish
corps
numbering
no
less
than
15,000
men.
This occurred at
Jamboli.
There had been
a
desultory
engagement
on the
31st
of
July,
and on the 1st
of
August
the Russians
expected
to
be cut
to
pieces.
"No
such
thing
;
in the
night
the Turks
evacuated the town
which
they
held in
such
force,
and
retired
—
the
infantry
to
Adrianople,
the
cavalry
to
Shumla. The
enormous stores in the
Turkish
camp
fell
into
the
hands of the astonished
victors,
among
which
wore
39,000
pud
of
biscuit,
and
100,000
cartridges.
Is it
astonishing,
in
the face of
an
organised panic
such
as
this,
that the
Russians were at
last able
to
stagger
on
to
Adrianople,
although
suffering
themselves
from sick-
ness of
various
kinds
in
most
appalling
forms,
and
having
been
guilty
of
the
greatest
mistakes
?
On the
19th of
Au-
gust,
four
weeks after
having
crossed
the
Balkan,
the
Rus-
sian
forces came
in
sight
of
tho
four
minarets
of
the
sultan
Selim's
mosque.
The
whole
story
reads
like
fiction.
Had
there
been a
man to
direct
and
a few
thousand
men
to
obey,
350
HISTORY OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXVI.
the advance
of the Russians under Dlebitsch across the
Balkan,
and from the Balkan to
Adrianople,
was
as
utterly-
impossible
as would
have
been
the march of
a
hostile
cor-
poral's
guard
from Harwich to
Edinburgh.
It
was
scarcely
necessary
to strike
a
determined
blow;
a
harassing,
vexa-
tious
guerilla
warfare of
light
cavalry
was all that was
requisite
to render
the
advance
impracticable.
It
might
have
been de
lonne
guerre
to
have
permitted
the
advance,
but then measures should have been taken
to
profit by
the
false
position
of Diebitsch's
army.
Adrianople
was
capable
of defence.
The old
part
of the
town
is surrounded
by
a
wall,
but it
is
completely
hidden
by
new
buildings,
and
the town is over-
looked
on
every
side,
although
only
from a distance. "With-
out
the
town,
hollow
roads,
ditches,
and
garden
walls afford
great
facilities
for the
defence,
and
the
approaches
may
be
covered
by
troops
so drawn
up
as
to
rest
upon
the
rivers,
but
only
in
corps
of
not
less
than
40,000
or
50,000
men. The
new Turkish
fortifications consisted
merely
of a
ditch between
the Tundscha and
the
Upper
and Lower
Max*itza,
flanked
by
a
few
unfinished
batteries.
There
were in
Adrianople
at least
20,000
combatants,
the
armed
inhabitants,
independently
of the
troops,
who num-
bered
as
many
more,
and who
might
very readily
have
been
increased
to twice or thrice that number. Detachments
from
various
parts
of
the Turkish
empire
were
on
their
way
to
Adrianople
under the command
of the
pashas,
who had
learnt
too late that
the existence
of the
empire
was
at stake.
But
these succours were as
though
they
had
not
been,
for
in
war the
golden
opportunity
for action soon
passes
away
unless
advantage
be taken of
the
propitious
moment.
Even when
Diebitsch
found himself at
Adrianople,
he
was
convinced that
nothing
but a
speedy
and unmolested
retreat
could save the remnant
of his victorious
army.
Bust-
chuk and
Shumla
were still held in his
rear.
An
army
of
irregulars
threatened
his
right.
His
forces,
so feeble
in
numbers
when
he
adventured on his
undertaking
of
the
pas-
sage
of
the Balkans
(under
20,000
men),
were
losing
hundreds
dally
from sickness.
By
skilful
demonstrations,
by carefully
masking
his real
condition,
by acting
on
the fears of
the
Turks and
their
surprising ignorance,
and
perhaps
in
some
A.D.
1829]
'
WAB
WITH
TTTEKEY.
351
instances
with
the
connivance
of a
section of
the
negotiators
at
Constantinople,
headed as
they
were
by
baron
Muffling,
he succeeded
in
securing
the
terms of a
conqueror
instead
of
incurring
durance as a
prisoner
of
war.
But
this was
owing
to
the
genius
of the
man,
aided
by
the infatuation
or
the
treachery
of
his
opponents
and
their advisers.
The
time and
the circumstances
were
favourable to
him
;
but if a
lesson on
the
obstacles
in the
country
in which
he had
operated
may
be learned
by
any
means,
it must be
in
the
consideration
of
the
fact,
that the Eussian
army
of
70,000
actual
combatants
which
began
a
campaign
in
May,
its
flank secured
by
the
Black
Sea,
the
operations
of which were conducted
on
the
most
strictly
scientific
principles,
their base
running parallel
to,
and
having
been
secured
by,
the fleet before
the
field was
taken
—
an
army
which,
from first to
last,
never
met
with
a
reverse,
the morale of its
enemy being
for
the
time
utterly
lost,
was,
in
September,
in a
position
of
difficulty,
whence
it
could
alone
be
rescued
by
a subtle
diplomacy.
No
term but
that of
rescue
can
adequately
convey
the
idea of
its
happy
extrication from
a
situation of
almost
overwhelming
peril.
As is said
by
von
Moltke,
"
If the
difficulty
of
crossing
the Balkan was
formerly
much
over-estimated,
the result
of
the
campaign
of 1828-29 has caused
many
persons
to
imagine
that it is no
impediment.
"We
must
not,
however,
forget
that
in
that
year
the mountains
were not
defended
at all."
Yet it is
calculated
the
loss of men
by
death
was,
in the
Russian
army,
about
00,000
in number
;
that one-seventh
of
the
original
force returned
to tell of the
glorious
campaign,
of
which the
grand
feature was
the
passage
of
the
Balkan
by
a detachment
of
the former. As an
instance of
the
dreadful
mortality
in
the
Eussian
ranks,
we
give
two
items,
officially
authenticated
—
viz.,
in
the
general
hospitals
: From
March
to
July,
in
1829, 28,710
deaths
occurred
among
81,214
pa-
tients
;
and of the G000
men
left sick
at
Adrianople,
on
the
retreat
of
Diebitsch,
5200 died.
In
one
word,
the
army
had
been
annihilated,
though
it
had
never
met with
a
check.
In
Asia,
the
opening
of
the
campaign
was
retarded
by
a
crime committed
against
the
ambassador at Teheran.
On
the
12th of
February,
the
Eussian
legation
attempted
to
detain an
Armenian
woman,
who
was a Russian
subject
;
this
circumstance excited
the
indignation
of the
populace,
who
352
history of
Russia.
[ch.
lxvi.
proceeded
in
arms to
the
hotel of
the
legation.
Some of
their
party
having
been
killed
by
the
Cossacks,
the
crowd
massacred all
the
persons
attached to
the
legation,
with the
exception
of
the
secretary,
who
was absent at
the
time.
The
shah,
to
prevent
any
disagreeable discussion,
punished
the
guilty,
and
sent
his
grandson
to
St.
Petersburg,
to
express
to
the
emperor
his
regret
at the
occurrence.
Being
released
from
all
apprehensions
on
that
side,
Paskievitch
resumed
hostilities
in
Asia,
where
Akhalzik
was
besieged
by
the
Turks.
On
the 13th of
May,
general
Bourzof defeated
Achmet
Khan. On the
1st of
July,
Paskievitch,
antici-
pating
the
junction
of the
seraskier
of
Erzerum with
Hagki
Pasha
in
the
valley
of
Zevine,
marched
against
the
former,
whom
he
put
to
flight,
and
on the next
day
defeated the
latter,
whom he
took
prisoner
;
thirty-one
pieces
of
cannon,
nineteen
standards,
and
fifteen
hundred
prisoners
were the
trophies
of
this
twofold
victory.
On the 5th of
July
he
took
Hassan-Khale,
the
key
of
Erzerum,
the
capital
of Turco-
mania,
which
surrendered
on the
9th.
This
war,
the most
disastrous
in
its
consequences
in which
Turkey
had
yet
been
engaged,
was terminated
by
the
treaty
of
Adrianople.
The
emperor
Nicholas,
in deference
to
the
jealousy
of
Europe,
had
publicly
disclaimed
all intention to
aggrandise
his
dominions
;
and
yet by
this
treaty
he
acquired
Anapa
and
Poti,
with
a
considerable extent
of coast on the
Black Sea
;
a
portion
of the
pashalik
of
Akhilska,
with the
two
fortresses
of
Akhilska
and
Akhilkillae,
and the virtual
possession
of the
islands
formed
by
the mouths
of
the
Danube
;
stipulated
for
the
destruction
of the
Turkish for-
tress of
Giurgievo,
and the
abandonment
by Turkey
of
the
right
bank
of the
St.
George's
branch
of
the Danube
to
the
distance of
several
miles from
the
river
;
attempted
a
virtual
separation
of
Moldavia and
Vallachia
from
Turkey
by
sani-
tary
regulations
intended to
connect
them
with
Russia
;
stipu-
lated
that
the
Porte
should
confirm
the internal
regulations
for the
government
of
those
provinces
which
Russia had es-
tablished
while
she
occupied
them
; removed,
partly
by
force
and
partly by
the
influence of the
priesthood,
many
thousand
families
of
Armenians
from the
Turkish
provinces
in Asia to
his own
territories,
as
he
had
already
moved
nearly
an
equal
number
from
Persia,
leaving
whole districts
depopulated,
and