Kelly W.K. The History of Russia: from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Volume 2
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A.D.
1S28]
WAR
WITH TURKEY.
333
on
which Russia
declared,
"
that
in
the
manner
of
executing
the
treaty
of
London she
will
consult
her
own
interests
and
convenience
;"
but
this
haughty
menace she was
for a while
compelled
to retract.
CHAPTEE
LXVI.
WAR
WITH
TURKEY,
1828-29.
The war
with Persia
was
scarcely
ended
when that
with
Turkey
broke
out.
On the 14th
(26th)
of
August,
1828,
a
manifesto of
the
emperor
was
published,
followed
by
an
explanatory
declaration,
to which
the Porte
replied
on
the
4th
of June.
The two
parties
accused
each other
of not
having
observed
the
treaty
of
Bukharest.
Turkey
reproached
Russia
with
having
countenanced
the insurrection
of the
Greeks,
with
having supported
and
received
Tpsilanti,
and
fomented
troubles
in Moldavia and Vallachia.
Russia,
on
her
part,
accused the divan
of
having
stimulated
the
Cir-
cassians
to
revolt,
of
having
fettered
the
commerce
of the
Black
Sea,
violated the
amnesty
which
had been
granted
to
Servia,
supported
the resistance
of
Persia,
and
retarded
the
peace
which had
just
been
concluded
with that
power.
Immediately
after the
declaration,
field-marshal
prince
"Wittgenstein placed
himself at the head of an
army
of
150,000
men,
and
on
the 7th of
May
crossed the Pruth at
three
points
;
Yassy
and Bukharest were
immediately occupied,
and
the administration
of the two
principalities
was
given
to
count Pahlen.
In
Asia,
general
Paskievitch
opened
the
campaign
on the
7th
of
July,
and
on the
15th he took Kars. The fortress
of
Poti,
the
only
one
possessed
by
the Turks on the east
coast
of
the
Black
Sea,
surrendered on the 20th to a detachment
of the
troops
of
Georgia.
On
the 4th of
September,
Paskie-
vitch
gained
a
complete victory
under
the walls of
Akhal/.ik,
which
surrendered
on the
8th,
after a
vigorous
resistance,
in
which
the Russians suffered
considerable loss.
At the
opening
of the
campaign
of 1828
Turkey
stood
absolutely
on the brink of ruin.
Exhausted
by
a conflict
of
334
HISTORY
OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXVI.
six
years
with
the
Greeks
—
her
fleet
destroyed
—
an
army
half
organised
according
to
the new
fashion
introduced
after
the
destruction of
the
Janissaries
—
without
an
ally
—
she
stood
alone,
apparently
but to
receive the
coup
de
grace.
The force
put
in
movement
by
her
antagonist
was about
one
hundred thousand
strong,
after
making
due
allowance
for
the
difference between
paper
strength
and
effective
strength.
The Russians
organised,
disciplined
;
moving
with
certain
obedience and
unmitigated
devotion to
the
will
of the
emperor
: the
Mussulmans
exhibiting
an
absolute
contrast,
and
echoing
the
words of the
sultan :
—
"
Gather
up
thy
spirit,
for Allah
knows we
are
in
great
danger." Might
it
not
have been
supposed,
with
some show
of
reason,
that
the
Russians
would have
had little
but a
summer's
march
across
the
Balkan
?
But
there
were
elements
of
strength
then in
Turkey,
which
were
formerly
overlooked
by
the
Russians,
as
by
some
of us at
the
present
time. The Russians in earlier
wars,
when
they
contended
for
Bessarabia,
seldom
met with
a check
from
the
Osmanli,
if
they
had an
opportunity
of
deploying
their
regular
infantry
on
open ground,
without
being
exposed
to the
fury
of the Turkish
cavalry charge.
Confident in
their
organisation
and
regularity,
the
advan-
tages
of which
they
had so often
proved, they
never
scrupled
to
attack
very superior
numbers.
The
traditions
of
former
wars were not
forgotten
by
them;
and
throughout
the
contests
of
the
campaigns
under
consideration,
we see them
actuated
by
the same
spirit,
and
displaying
a like
contempt
for nume-
rically stronger
forces
arrayed against
them,
—
even when the
enemy,
as was
almost
invariably
the case from the defensive
system
adopted,
enjoyed
the
advantages
of
chosen
and
in-
trenched
positions.
But
in
one
respect
the
Russians
had
misreckoned.
They
had
forgotten
that such
simple
tactics of bold
attack,
under
any
circumstances,
though
suitable to
the
certainty
of
ope-
ration in
a
plain
country,
might
involve
them
in
great
danger
in
a
more intricate
one,
there
being nothing
more
certain than that
the
more
mountainous
and difficult the
seat
of war
may
be,
the
more
formidable
does
it
become
for
defence
by
wild and
irregular
troops.
Under
such
con-
ditions the
individual
man
recovers
his
separate
value,
which
A.D.
1828]
WAB WITH TUKKEY.
335
among
disciplined
troops
is often
merged
in the
whole,
and
is lost
altogether
among
the rabble
of
untaught
levies,
which
a
general may rashly attempt
to
deploy
on
flat
ground,
in the
face
of a
more instructed
soldiery.
The
Russians were
quickly
undeceived
;
—
what
promised
so
fairly
in the
outset,
became
daily
more
arduous.
Unforeseen
impediments
presented
themselves
: detachments
to
cover or
mask
various
points
were
necessary;
difficulties arose
in
providing
the
troops
and
horses
;
in
short,
obstacles
of
every
kind rose
up
around
them. The
delays
and
sluggishness
of
the
Turkish administration
caused
but
apparent
danger
to
the
Porte,
and
time was
gained
to
garrison
fortresses,
to
raise
levies,
and
organise
a
rude but tolerable
system
of
defence.
Every
day
increased the
numbers
of
the Turkish
army,
and added
something,
however
slight,
to its
efficiency.
To
understand
the
difficulty
of the
Russians,
it
is
neces-
sary
to take a
glance
at
the
country
they
were
invading.
They
commenced
with
the
occupation
of
Vallachia,
extend-
ing
their
right
flank
to
the
neighbourhood
of
Kalafat,
as
was done afterovards
by
Gortchakof
in the autumn
of 1853.
To
this no
opposition
was made.
The Vallachian
fortresses
had been
dismantled
by
the Turks
after
their
final defeat in
Bessarabia.
They
had
determined,
and
wisely,
not
to un-
dertake the defence of
any
line
beyond
that
of
the Danube.
It
may
be
assumed,
that no
river
ever
yet
stopped
a resolute
general.
But
the
Danube
presents
great
difficulties,
and
after
it
is
crossed,
the
strong
places
on
the
right
bank,
on
the line of
operations,
must be
either invested
or
taken,
before
the
grand
obstacle
of
the
march
to
Constantinople,
the
Balkan,
can
be
attempted.
This
great
stream,
after
cutting through
the chalk
mountains
which
stretch
from
north
to south between
the
Carpathian
and
the
Balkan
ranges,
is
altered in character.
Instead of
a
narrow
channel
full of
rapids
and
encumbered
with
rocks,
we
have
a broad
flowing
river,
intersecting
thick alluvial
soil,
and
passing
through
a
valley nearly
a
hundred
miles
in breadth.
In
Little"
Vallachia,
as
far as the
Aluta,
the
country
is
traversed
by
ridges,
the
spurs
of
the
high
mountains
;
but
this
region,
as well as
the wide
extended
plains
of
Great
Vallachia,
must
be considered
in
general
as flat.
The
banks
of
the
Danube
display
a
marked
contrast. That
of
Bulgaria,
from
336 HISTORY OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
LXYI.
Widdin
downwards,
is
everywhere
high
and
steep,
and
often
completely
commands
long
reaches
of
the
river. The
Val-
laehian
bank,
on
the
contrary,
is
marked
by
a
low
shore
and
wide
swampy
meadows.
The
branchings
of the
streams
form
many marshy
islets,
and at
seasons of
high
water
the
adjacent
country
is
continually
flooded.
As
the
traveller
proceeds
downwards,
he finds the
islands
larger
and
more
numerous,
the
meadow flats wider and
more
swampy.
After
Rustchuk no firm
ground
is
found on
the
left
bank,
till
the
spot
in
front
of
Turtukai
is
reached.
Opposite
to
SiKstria a
good
road
from Kalarash to
the
Danube
is
always
open.
At
Braila,
for the first
time the left bank
becomes
important.
Below
Isaktchi the river
breaks
through
the
delta
in
three
arms,
of
which the
Sulina,
the
only
one
navigable
by
vessels
of
much
draft,
is
from
one hundred and
fifty
to two
hundred
paces
broad.
In
the
vale
country,
the force
of the
stream
averages
about two miles
and
a
half in the
hour.
To
any
one
considering
the character of the Danube
carefully,
the
difficulty
it
affords to an
invader,
and the
advantages
it
presents
on the
right
bank
for
defence,
must
be
apparent.
There it is
high,
precipitous,
and firm. On
the left
there are but a few
points
in
the
line
of
operations
of an
invading
army
on
which
troops
can be
assembled.
These
points
are for
the most
part guarded
by
fortresses or
temporary
intrenchments,
as is
the case at Turtukai. It
is,
as
lately
shown
at the
last-named
place,
difficult to
force
them in front without a
combined movement from the
left
flank,
by
the inarch of a force
up
the
right
bank thrown
across
the river
lower
down. We
in
consequence
observe,
that the invader has been
always obliged
to
carry
his first
passage
of
the river towards
its
mouth,
which is too
far
removed
from the Turkish
centre
of a
system
of
defence,
formed
on
Silistria, Varna,
and
Shumla,
to be
held
strongly.
This
was
done in
1828,
and
again lately
by
general
Liiders,
the
operation
on
both
occasions
requiring
much
forethought
and
previous
arrangement,
and
entailing
a certain
amount
of
bloodshed
;
but on
neither
occasion could
a doubt
be
enter-
tained
as to
the
success
of
the
Russians,
Isaktcki
and
Matschin
being
usually
held as
outposts.
Other causes
for
selection of the
first
passage
of
the
river
at
this
point,
are
the
facilities
afforded for
bridging,
and
the
advantages
con-
A.D.
1828]
WAR
WITH
TURKEY.
337
ferred
by
the
neighbourhood
of
the
Pruth,
the Black
Sea.
and Galatz.
Let us
suppose
the
Danube
forced,
and
the
Turks
obliged
by
circumstances still
to remain on
the
defensive,
debarred
from action in
the
open
field. The
invading
general
must
now
narrowly
examine his
maps.
He
has
a
range
of
moun-
tains before
him,
not
very high,
but
affording
only
a
few
passes,
of
which
the most
practicable
are
hardly
suited
for
military purposes.
The celebrated
hills,
separating
Ru-
melia from
Bulgaria,
after
running
due east
dip
sud-
denly
on the Black
Sea.
"Westward
at the
sources of
the
Jantra and
Tundsha the
summits
are
clothed with
snow in
June.
Thence
towards the
east
the
elevation
does not
exceed 5000 feet
as far
as the
source
of the
Kamtschic,
and
as the
eastern
extremity
is
approached,
the
height
of
3500
feet
is
rarely
found.
The descent
on the
southern side
i3
rugged
and
precipitous,
whilst
the
northern
face
is
con-
cealed
by
a
system
of
lower
hills which
stretch
unequally
towards
the
valley
of
the
Danube. The
latter
are
often
crowned
with
plateaux.
These
in
many
instances
form
the
most
admirable
military positions
for
intrenched
camps,
being
rarely
accessible
except
by
narrow
paths,
the
emi-
nences
being
revetted,
as it
were,
by
natural
walls
of
rock,
varying
in
height
from
ten
to
a
hundred
feet.
They
are
in
general
well
wooded,
although
they
do
not
possess
the
magnificent
forest
trees of
the
higher
Balkan
range.
On
the
plateaux
and
slopes
Ave
find a
thickly-set
jungle
of
dwarf
oak
and
other
shrubs, and,
stretching
far
into the
plain,
an
endless extent
of
intractable
briars.
Apart
from
the
inequality
of
the
ground,
the
march
and
deployment
of
troops
woidd
find
very
serious
obstacles
in
the
super-
abundant
forest
and
jungle
growth.
Such
is
the
great
natural
obstruction to
the
advance
of
an
enemy,
arising
not
so much on
account
of
the
height
of the
range
as
of
the
diffi-
culty
of
access,
the
paucity
of
mountain
passes,
the
admi-
rable
positions
for
defence
ranged
one
behind
another,
tho
absence of
made
roads,
as
well
of
those
appliances
of
life and
civilisation to
be met with
in
tho
Alpine
districts
of
Ger-
many
and
Switzerland.
Without
giving
the
names or
tracing
the
exact course
of
the
main
passes,
we
may simply
state
that
they
are six in
number,
between
the source
of the
VOL.
II.
z
338
niSTOET
OF
eussia.
[ch.
lxyi.
Jantra and
the Black
Sea,
and
three towards
the
east,
hetween
Shumla
and
Burgas,
being
those
naturally
chosen
by
an
army
advancing
from
Bessarabia.
In the
mountains
there are no cross
paths
between
the
passes.
.
In some
of the
valleys military
communications
may
be
maintained.
During
the
war of 1828 the
fortresses
on
the
river
and
Black
Sea
played
an
important
part.
Though imperfect
m
design
and of
insignificant profile,
none of
them
dignified
with
the denomination
of
regular
fortresses,
they
sustained
lengthened
sieges
or
investments,
and
reduced
the Russian
army
almost
to ruin. It
has been
said,
and
with
truth,
that
when
the Turks
are in
good
heart,
their
defence
often becomes
most obstinate
at the moment
when more
regular
combatants
will
surrender
a
place.
That which
with us
is considered
an
element
of
weakness,
is with
them
one
of
strength.
The
larger
the
number of
the
population
of a
town,
exclusive
of
the
garrison,
the
longer
and more tenacious
will be the
de-
fence.
In the smaller
fortresses,
where the
soldiery
has
not
been
aided
by
the
people,
it has been
rarely
respectable.
In
those
of more considerable
area,
in
which
the crowd
has
taken
arms,
the
garrison
have found themselves
reinforced,
by
men
as
capable
and
as
willing
as
themselves,
in
defending
the
tottering
walls.
On the
8th
of
June,
1828,
the Russians crossed
the
Danube,
near
its
mouth,
at
Satunovo,
and within six weeks
of that
time
had taken Braila
on
the
left
bank,
never afterwards re-
stored,
and
had
penetrated
so
far,
as to be in the centre
of
the
triangle
formed
by
Silistria,
Varna,
and Shumla.
On the
20th
of
July
a
resultless
action was
fought,
after
which
an
attempt
was
made
to
invest
Shumla
;
we
say
an
attempt,
as
the means
at
the
disposal
of the
Russians
were
never
suffi-
cient to command
the
roads in
the
rear,
and at
no
time was
the Turkish
communication
with
Adrianople
interrupted.
Shumla is the
ordinary point
of
assembly
of
the Turkish
army
in a
war
against
the
Russians.
It is
backed
by
a
chain
of
mountains which encircle it
to
the
north,
west,
and south
in
the
form of
a vast
crescent,
and it has on
the
eastern front
a
marshy
ravine which
empties
its
waters
into
the Kamtschic.
It is
only
accessible
from the east.
The
extensive
slope
of
the hills
on
that side
is
somewhat
gradual
and
glaeis-like.
The
upper
plateau,
round
which
run
the
works
—
a
position
A.D.
1828]
WAR
WITH
TTJBKET.
339
intended
as
it were
by
nature
for
an
intrenched
camp,
—
the
group
of
hills,
of
which
it
forms a
part,
being separated
from
the
Balkan
range
by
the
valley
of
the
Kamtschic
—
is elevated
above
the
Bulgarian plain
from 600
to
800
feet.
The town
is
built
in a confined
and
low
valley
terminating
in
steep
ravines,
and
is
quite open.
The lines
of
the intrenched
camp
run
along
the
crest
of the
hill
glacis
to
the
left from
the
height
of
Strandscha,
to
the
right leaning
on
that
of
Tchengell.
These
lines
overtop
Shumla
to
the north
and
south,
and
they
have
been carried
in some
parts
along
the
verge
of
the
steepest
precipices,
where
they
are of
no
use,
and
present
the
appear-
ance of an
aqueduct.
They
are of
earthwork,
and
have a
narrow
but
deep
ditch.
Their extent
from
Strandscha
to the
heights
of
Tchengell
is about
8000
paces,
and
there
is
ample
space
to
cover
completely
an
immense
army.
The
few
roads
by
which
an
enemy
can
approach
are defiles
many
miles
long,
terminating
in a
few
difficult
paths up
the
wall-iike
rocks,
where
there
can
be
neither
combination
of
the
different
arms,
nor
deployment
of
masses.
But
the
height
of
Strandscha
is vulnerable.
It
possesses
revetted
forts,
but
is
by
no means
secure
against
assault.
If
the summit
of that
height
be
won,
Shumla can
no
longer
be held.
It
is
only
accessible^
on that
part,
and from
the nature
of the
ground,_
consisting
of
marshes and
ravines,
approach
is not
easy
even
in that direc-
tion.
It
is said
in some
quarters
that
Shumla
has
gained
a
greater
reputation
than
it deserves.
The
Turks
have
already
experienced
that it
coxdd
be
turned
by
a
determined
adver-
sary,
after Varna
had been taken.
But its
position,
not
only
on the direct route
from
Rustchuk
and
Silistria,
but
also
at
the
head
of the
valley
which
debouches
on the Gulf
of
Varna,
must,
until
the fall of the
latter,
give
it a first-rate
military
importance
;
and in
any
case,
as will
be shown
hereafter
in
allusion
to the
campaign
of
1829,
utterly
disconcert
a
Russian,
commander,
however
successfully
he
may
have turned
it,
and
have
actually
reached
Adrianople by
communicating
with
the
Black Sea.
The
Russians,
in their extreme
confidence,
tried
their
hands
on
Shumla,
thinking
thus
to
take the
shortest
cut
across
the
Balkan,
and secure
their
rear,
the
fortresses
of
Varna and
Silistria
being yet
surmounted
by
the
crescent.
The
attempt
failed,
though
in
the
first
instance
directed
by
340
HISTOBY
OP
EUSSIA.
[CH.
LXYI.
the czar
in
person.
Prom
various
causes of
sickness,
neces-
sity
of
detachment,
the
masking
of
Silistria,
and
the invest-
ment of
Varna,
the
Russians
discovered
that
they
had at-
tempted
an
impossibility.
The
besieging
and
blockading
force
quickly
dwindled
to
a less
number
than the
enemy
it
sought
to shut
up.
They
soon
began
to
intrench
themselves,
and to
depend
on lines
of redoubts.
At the end
of
July
it
was
already
evident
that
no
favourable
result
could
ensue.
Frequent
combats
and
surprises
took
place
during
the fol-
lowing
month.
The assailants
were
decimated
by
exposure
to the
heat,
and
the
fatigue
of
procuring
forage
from
a dis-
tance,
till at
length,
on
the 10th
of
September,
they
acknow-
ledged
their
defeat,
by
the
determination
of
general
count
Wittgenstein
to convert
the
so-called
investment
into
a
mere
process
of
observation,
and
to
concentrate
his
troops
in Seni-
Bazar.
Had
the
Turkish commanders
displayed
at that time
but moderate
activity,
there
would
have been
an end of the
Eussian
corps
cVarmee.
The
grand
vizier
advanced
from
Adrianople
with
14,000
picked
men,
but
he did no
more.
The
Russian
division,
which,
during
the months of
August
and
September
had been
in a
most
critical
situation,
was in
consequence
saved
from
destruction
by
his
apathy
and
supine-
ness.
The
siege
of
Yarna
had been commenced
in form
by prince
Mentchikof
on
the
6th
of
August.
The
Russians,
masters
of
the
sea,
were
promptly
assisted
by
their
fleet
in
the
con-
veyance
of
troops
and
stores of
all
kinds for
the
siege.
In
the actual
prosecution
of
the
operations,
the shallowness
of
the
harbour
of Varna
prevented
much
advantage
being
gained
from
its
presence,
beyond
the strict
blockade,
and
interruption
of
communication
with
Constantinople.
The
town
had
an
old
Byzantine
castle,
which
was used as
a
powder
magazine.
The
principal
enceinte,
having
a circum-
ference
of about
two
miles and a
quarter,
is an
earthen
rampart,
without
much
command,
connected
w
T
ith
the
rocky
precipice
jutting
on
the sea
to the
north,
and
running
round
Varna
to the
Dewna river.
It was flanked
by
ten
small
bastions,
the
faces
of which
were
pierced
for
two
guns,
and
the
flanks
for
one.
The
curtains,
owing
to
their
narrowness,,
did not
admit
of
guns
;
the
ditch was
small,
wet
at
the eastern
extremity,
otherwise
dry;
the
scarp
and
counterscarp
revetted
A.D.
1828]
WAB WITH TURKEY.
341
with
brickwork
;
in the front of
the
rampart
there
were
scarcely
any permanent
works,
not
even a
covered
way.
Three lunettes
had
been
hastily
thrown
up
500
paces
in
advance of
the west
front,
and an
intrenchinent
1500
paces
from
the
north
side
of the
place.
It is not
easy
to conceive
a
more
imperfect
place
a"amies.
Yet in
this
the Turks
managed
to
maintain
themselves
till
the 10th of
October,
and
it
would
not have
fallen
then,
but
for the same cause
which
saved
the force under
Wittgenstein
after the failure
before
Shumla,
—
the incredible
apathy
which
distinguished
every
Turkish commander
during
that
war,
excepting
two or
three
in
command
of fortresses.
The
czar,
believing
that the
relief
of
Varna
would be
strongly
attempted
by
Omer
Vrione,
who had been detached
by
the
grand
vizier
from Shumla
for that
purpose
on
the 24th
of
September,
caused
him to be
attacked on the
heights
of
Kurtepe.
In
vain the
Russian commander
alleged
want
of
means
to assail
a
numerous
enemy
in a
strong
position
:
the
order was
peremptory.
The
previous
skirmishes
had been
bloody
and
damaging
;
success
could
hardly
be looked
for.
A furious
attack-
was
made
;
the liussian
soldiery displayed
an ardour
and
discipline
under
extreme
difficulty
which have
never
been
surpassed,
and suffered a loss of
1400 men
;
but
the
object
was not obtained
;
.
Omer Vrione
maintained
the
heights;
the
prince
of
Wurtemberg
Avas
compelled
to re-
treat.
The former had it in his
power
at
once
to relieve
Varna;
he
would make
no
effort. For
a
fortnight
he was
within
Bight
of
the
place, allowing
the Russians
quietly
to
continue
their
assaults and
contemplating
the
defence
of the
garrison.
At
length,
the
example
of
Jussuf
Pasha shook
the firmness
of
the
garrison. They
surrendered on
the
11th
of October
;
Omer
Vrione,
as he
richly
deserved,
was
then
beaten back
by
the
besieging
force,
which
lie had abstained
from
molesting,
when he
could
have
done
it with so much
case and
advantage.
During
this
campaign,
the
investment
of
Silistria,
owing
to bad
management
and want
of
troops, consequent
on
such
varied
operations,
was a
failure
from
beginning
to
end. With
the
fall
of
Varna
the
campaign
came to a close.
The
eastern
part
of
Bulgaria
had thus fallen
into the hands of
the
Russians,
who
occupied
the
position
between Shumla and
the
sea. This
342
HISTORY OF
RUSSIA.
[CH.
irVT.
was the
sole
result
of
the
long
and
uninterrupted
campaign
of three
months,
posterior
to the
passage
of the
Danube,
and,
as it
has
been
observed,
was
the
consequence
of an
apathy
so
suspicious,
that
we must refer it
to
treacherous
intention. But
for this cause
the
Russians must
ha,ve
re-
treated from
Varna,
as
they
did
from
Shumla. The whole
object
of their
undertaking
would have
been
missed. As
it
was,
they
were
brought
to the
verge
of
calamity, by
the mere
force
of
inaction on
the
part
of
the
Turks. For that can
hardly
be
called
a
systematic
scheme of
defence,
of
which
the
only apparent
feature in
the conduct
of the
commanders,
not
in
command
of
besieged
fortresses,
was the most
apa-
thetic
sluggishness,
which
abandoned
places
to
their
fate
when
almost
the
raising
of a hand
would have saved them
;
which
refused
to seize the
advantage
when
it
had been
won,
through
the
overweening
confidence and
rashness of
the
Rus-
sian
autocrat. But
the truth
is,
if
there was not
treachery,
the
traditions
of
former wars were
against
the Turkish
leaders,
and
they
knew that
science failed them.
They
be-
lieved
more
in the
skill of their
enemy
than in
their own
capacity
for
resistance. Their
energy
died
within them.
There
was a
marasmus of their
vital
power.
This
fatal
disease was
ultimately spread
among
their
followers.
When
they
were
not under
its
influence,
at the first
sieges
of the
war,
at
Braila,
on the left bank of the
Danube,
at
Varna,
at
Silistria,
and
in
many
of the skirmishes and
battles,
their
bearing
was
good,
and often
heroic.
During
the
early part
of the second
campaign they
still merited
praise.
In
recapitulating
the
chief
events
of
the
campaign
of
1829,
we are
simply
dealing
with
the
story
of one
siege,
one
battle,
and of a march of 500 miles. The
siege
was that
of
Silistria;
the
battle,
the battle
of
Kuleftcha
;
the
march,
the march
across
the Balkan
upon
Adrianople.
As is
well
known,
the
war
terminated
by negotiations
opened
and
concluded at
that town
between marshal
Diebitsch
and
negotiators
ap-
pointed
by
the
sultan. The
treaty
which
resulted from
these
must
always
remain
one of the
strangest
passages
in
diplomatic
history.
The
Russian
commander,
who affected
to
dictate
terms
to
the
sultan,
found himself
with
a
force
nominally
of
20,000
men in
a
hostile
town
which
counted