
A.D.
1770]
WAB WITH TURKEY.
53
that of
Bonaparte
after his
first
campaign
in
Italy,
neaped
inexpressible
calamities on
the miserable inhabitants
of the
whole
region
from the Vistula
to
the
Danube,
and
thence
to the
Crimea,
and
completely
desolated
the
country.
Ro-
mantzof
took
up
his winter
quarters
in
Tassy,
and Olitch
in
Bucharest,
whilst
AVeissruann
commanded
on
the
Danube,
and
sent
single
divisions of
his
army
to
Kilia,
Akerman,
Braila,
and Ismail. The attack
in the
following
year
wis
chiefly
directed
against
the
Crimea,
and
the
favourites of the
empress
received
a commission at
the same
time for the re-
establishment of a Grecian
kingdom
in the islands and
in
Greece
Proper.
Three Russians
—
Romantzof,
Dolgoruki,
and one
of
the
terrible brothers
Orlof
—
received
the
respective
names
of
Zadunofsky,
Krimsky,
and
Tchesmensky,
from
the scenes of
their
exploits,
and
from
this time forward
the
empress
was
denominated the Great
;
every
one was
astonished
at the
splendour
of the
deeds,
but
no one
dared to call
to mind
the
millions
which were
spent
on the
useless
expedition
to
the
Grecian
Archipelago,
or the calamities
which were
brought
upon
unfortunate
Greece. We
shall
notice
the victors
and
their
conquests
one after
another,
beginning
with
Dolgoruki.
In 1770 Panin had
already pushed
forward
as far as Pere-
kop,
but afterwards
retired,
and took
up
his
winter
quarters
in
the
Ukraine.
Dolgoruki
had
no sooner
replaced
Panin
in
the
command of this
army,
than he advanced his whole
force
against
the
Crimea. In the same
manner as
China
was
protected
against
the incursions of
the Tatars
by
a
wall,
the
Crimea
was
secured
against
the
inroads
of the Russians
by
fortified
lines,
which
received
their name from
the
city
of
Perekop,
to
which
they
also served
as a defence. These
lines
consisted
of
a ditch
seventy
feet broad and
forty-two
feet
deep,
bordered
and
backed
by
a broad
embankment
of
earth,
which
extended
across the
whole isthmus from
sea
to
sea. The
Tut;!!.
s
had
already
learned
from
experience
how
little
such
fortilications
avail
against
the
military
arts
of
modern
Europe,
and the
undeniable valour of a Russian
army
well
commanded;
Munich
forced these
lines
in
the
year 1736,
and
Dolgoruki
now confirmed
that
lesson,
by
per-
forming
the
same
exploit
at the
head of an
army
of
40,000
men,
on
the
2Gth ef
July.
In
less than
a
month
from
that